Recently the world was awoken to a show of force by Muhammad bin Salman (MbS), the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In a relatively short period of time, the prince has managed to remove any real or imagined rivals from the centers of political and economic power and authority in Saudi Arabia, by charging them with corruption. It is presented to a foreign, especially western, audience1 as an anti-corruption drive by an energetic young reformer against old vested interests. It is cleverly couched in the liberal language of technocratic reform in the style of Emmanuel Macron, and liberal pundits emphasize its “revolutionary” potential. Hence, MbS’ allegedly necessary and urgent actions appeal to both domestic and international audiences.
最近，沙特阿拉伯王国王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(mohammed bin Salman)的武力展示唤醒了世界。在相对较短的时间内，王储通过指控腐败，成功地将任何真正的或想象中的对手从沙特阿拉伯的政治和经济权力和权威中心赶了出去。在外国(尤其是西方)观众面前，这部电影被描绘成一位精力充沛的年轻改革者对既得利益集团发起的反腐运动。它以埃马纽埃尔•马克龙(Emmanuel Macron)风格的技术官僚改革的自由主义语言巧妙地表达出来，自由派专家强调其“革命性”潜力。因此，MbS所谓的必要和紧急行动对国内和国际观众都有吸引力。
{"title":"Attempting to Consolidate Power: Analyzing Muhammad Bin Salman's Policies in Saudi Arabia","authors":"Feras Klenk","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3152009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3152009","url":null,"abstract":"Recently the world was awoken to a show of force by Muhammad bin Salman (MbS), the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In a relatively short period of time, the prince has managed to remove any real or imagined rivals from the centers of political and economic power and authority in Saudi Arabia, by charging them with corruption. It is presented to a foreign, especially western, audience1 as an anti-corruption drive by an energetic young reformer against old vested interests. It is cleverly couched in the liberal language of technocratic reform in the style of Emmanuel Macron, and liberal pundits emphasize its “revolutionary” potential. Hence, MbS’ allegedly necessary and urgent actions appeal to both domestic and international audiences.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115696213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is a work in progress analysis of the power structures within elite Zimbabwean politics. This project is in support of ongoing research at the Network Science Center at West Point and the original intent of this study was to compile a historical dataset of an influence network over time and to model how the network reacts to both external and internal disruptions. The conclusions and analysis will change as new data is collected and analyses are available. This analysis was conducted several months before the apparent coup in response to Emmerson Mnangagwa's removal as vice-president.
{"title":"Volatile Elite Networks and the Race for the Zimbabwean Succession","authors":"Jonathan Mellon, D. Evans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3071782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3071782","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a work in progress analysis of the power structures within elite Zimbabwean politics. This project is in support of ongoing research at the Network Science Center at West Point and the original intent of this study was to compile a historical dataset of an influence network over time and to model how the network reacts to both external and internal disruptions. The conclusions and analysis will change as new data is collected and analyses are available. This analysis was conducted several months before the apparent coup in response to Emmerson Mnangagwa's removal as vice-president.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131584355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This analysis argues that the period of easy reforms in China has ended, and the time of difficult reforms that touch core political interests has begun. The resulting challenges facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Xi Jinping when he is confirmed for another five-year-term span political, economic, and international spheres. This leadership must both maintain a domestic focus to strengthen economic growth and avoid the “middle-income trap,†while also engaging in a host of regional and global actions to cement China’s position on the world stage. Internally, Xi has consolidated significant political power, and this has created significant tension among vested interests and competing centers of influence. Externally, for the first time in several centuries, the largest economy in the world is not Western and will be under a leadership that does not share the same consensual values and political structures as those in the West. Xi has outlined several priorities, including: increased CCP control over state and society; the promotion of traditional Chinese culture; the importance of Marxism as a guiding principle; historical revisionism and censorship; the promotion of nationalism; and the pursuit of an aggressive national anti-corruption campaign. Given these goals and sets of challenges, the outcome in China is uncertain and there exist a range of possible scenarios. The most attractive for the West would be an increase in social diversity and an accommodation with society to form a new social compact. However, it is difficult to see what would cause the current elite willingly to reject the existing beneficial system. A more unpredictable outcome would be chaotic pluralization in which democracy is not entrenched and elites and their families continue to benefit from their political connections to privatize public wealth. An alternative over the short to medium term would be the continuation of the fluctuation of soft and harder authoritarianism that would make bold initiatives unlikely. Rarely does a transition occur during a period of economic growth and is more likely to occur with the system under stress. As a result, the emergence of an illiberal democracy would be quite plausible under this final scenario.
{"title":"What Does General Secretary Xi Jinping Dream About?","authors":"A. Saich","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3030375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3030375","url":null,"abstract":"This analysis argues that the period of easy reforms in China has ended, and the time of difficult reforms that touch core political interests has begun. The resulting challenges facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Xi Jinping when he is confirmed for another five-year-term span political, economic, and international spheres. This leadership must both maintain a domestic focus to strengthen economic growth and avoid the “middle-income trap,†while also engaging in a host of regional and global actions to cement China’s position on the world stage. Internally, Xi has consolidated significant political power, and this has created significant tension among vested interests and competing centers of influence. Externally, for the first time in several centuries, the largest economy in the world is not Western and will be under a leadership that does not share the same consensual values and political structures as those in the West. Xi has outlined several priorities, including: increased CCP control over state and society; the promotion of traditional Chinese culture; the importance of Marxism as a guiding principle; historical revisionism and censorship; the promotion of nationalism; and the pursuit of an aggressive national anti-corruption campaign. Given these goals and sets of challenges, the outcome in China is uncertain and there exist a range of possible scenarios. The most attractive for the West would be an increase in social diversity and an accommodation with society to form a new social compact. However, it is difficult to see what would cause the current elite willingly to reject the existing beneficial system. A more unpredictable outcome would be chaotic pluralization in which democracy is not entrenched and elites and their families continue to benefit from their political connections to privatize public wealth. An alternative over the short to medium term would be the continuation of the fluctuation of soft and harder authoritarianism that would make bold initiatives unlikely. Rarely does a transition occur during a period of economic growth and is more likely to occur with the system under stress. As a result, the emergence of an illiberal democracy would be quite plausible under this final scenario.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127414018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the activities, street-level and Legco tactics as well as the political orientation of the pro-autonomy advocates, localists and pro-independence groups in Hong Kong, contextualized within the September 2016 Legislative Council Election, ‘Fishball Revolution’ and Beijing's interpretation of the Basic Law that all took place within 2016. The ‘localists’, an amorphous group that ranges from greater Hong Kong autonomy seekers to outright independence sympathizers, were a major supporter of the street vendors at the site of the ‘Fishball Revolution’. After the ‘Fishball Revolution’ tapered off in early 2016, the second leg of post-Occupy Central resistance began in the Legislative Council when prodemocracy as well as pro-independence individuals ran for the Hong Kong Legislative Council or Legco elections. The study of political factionalism within Hong Kong serves as an important comparative case study in analysing other social movements in the Northeast Asian region.
{"title":"The Future of Hong Kong Governance: The Pro-Independence Legislators' Election Fallout and Beijing's Political Voice in Hong Kong","authors":"T. Lim","doi":"10.1002/APP5.175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/APP5.175","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the activities, street-level and Legco tactics as well as the political orientation of the pro-autonomy advocates, localists and pro-independence groups in Hong Kong, contextualized within the September 2016 Legislative Council Election, ‘Fishball Revolution’ and Beijing's interpretation of the Basic Law that all took place within 2016. The ‘localists’, an amorphous group that ranges from greater Hong Kong autonomy seekers to outright independence sympathizers, were a major supporter of the street vendors at the site of the ‘Fishball Revolution’. After the ‘Fishball Revolution’ tapered off in early 2016, the second leg of post-Occupy Central resistance began in the Legislative Council when prodemocracy as well as pro-independence individuals ran for the Hong Kong Legislative Council or Legco elections. The study of political factionalism within Hong Kong serves as an important comparative case study in analysing other social movements in the Northeast Asian region.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134071386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the most recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined. In China, Bo Xilai was arrested for corruption and stripped of his party membership. In Vietnam, Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity for promotion to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable to explain these outcomes. In particular, both candidates were competent and well connected. This cuts contrary to the expectations of both performance-based promotion and factional promotion theories. We argue that these candidates were sidelined due to a previously under-theorized factor in promotion contests — their ability to mobilize personal followings. In a literature that has focused almost exclusively on intra-elite conflict, we argue that elite-mass linkages are critical. In particular, the public profile of top leaders is important for regime legitimacy and mobilization. However, when an individual becomes exceptionally well known they become a threat to the single-party system. We test this argument on promotions in China’s 18th Party Congress in 2012 and Vietnam’s 11th Party Congress in 2011 using original data on Internet search queries and media coverage among contenders for promotion. Our approach offers new insights into the strategies authoritarian politicians use to stay afloat as well as the mistakes that sink them when competing for power under one-party rule.
在中国和越南最近举行的党代会上，两名备受期待的晋升候选人被排除在外。在中国，薄熙来因腐败被捕，并被开除党籍。在越南，阮巴清(Nguyen Ba Thanh)仍然是一个省级领导人，几乎没有机会晋升到中央政治局。现有的关于威权统治下晋升的争论无法解释这些结果。值得一提的是，两位候选人都很能干，关系也很好。这与基于绩效的晋升理论和派系晋升理论的预期背道而驰。我们认为，这些候选人之所以被排除在外，是因为在晋升竞争中有一个先前未被理论化的因素——他们动员个人追随者的能力。在一篇几乎只关注精英内部冲突的文献中，我们认为精英与大众的联系至关重要。特别是，最高领导人的公众形象对政权的合法性和动员非常重要。然而，当一个人变得异常出名时，他们就会对一党专政制度构成威胁。我们对2012年中国第十八次党代会和2011年越南第十一次党代会的晋升进行了测试，使用了互联网搜索查询和媒体报道的原始数据。我们的研究方法为我们提供了新的视角，让我们了解专制政治家在一党统治下争夺权力时所使用的维持生存的策略，以及使他们陷入困境的错误。
{"title":"Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion Under Autocracy","authors":"Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, P. Schuler","doi":"10.1017/JEA.2015.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/JEA.2015.1","url":null,"abstract":"During the most recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined. In China, Bo Xilai was arrested for corruption and stripped of his party membership. In Vietnam, Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity for promotion to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable to explain these outcomes. In particular, both candidates were competent and well connected. This cuts contrary to the expectations of both performance-based promotion and factional promotion theories. We argue that these candidates were sidelined due to a previously under-theorized factor in promotion contests — their ability to mobilize personal followings. In a literature that has focused almost exclusively on intra-elite conflict, we argue that elite-mass linkages are critical. In particular, the public profile of top leaders is important for regime legitimacy and mobilization. However, when an individual becomes exceptionally well known they become a threat to the single-party system. We test this argument on promotions in China’s 18th Party Congress in 2012 and Vietnam’s 11th Party Congress in 2011 using original data on Internet search queries and media coverage among contenders for promotion. Our approach offers new insights into the strategies authoritarian politicians use to stay afloat as well as the mistakes that sink them when competing for power under one-party rule.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130242647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-12-07DOI: 10.4324/9780203422113-21
Baogang He
Democratization, marketization, professionalism and globalization challenge the traditional pattern of the Chinese intellectual and raise the following challenging questions. Are the Chinese ideas of the intellectual incompatible with the idea of democracy? How can the Chinese traditional idea of the intellectual, especially the Confucian critical tradition, survive in an increasingly commercial and professional society? And what defines the Chinese intellectual in an increasingly globalized world?
{"title":"Chinese Intellectuals Facing the Challenges of the New Century","authors":"Baogang He","doi":"10.4324/9780203422113-21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203422113-21","url":null,"abstract":"Democratization, marketization, professionalism and globalization challenge the traditional pattern of the Chinese intellectual and raise the following challenging questions. Are the Chinese ideas of the intellectual incompatible with the idea of democracy? How can the Chinese traditional idea of the intellectual, especially the Confucian critical tradition, survive in an increasingly commercial and professional society? And what defines the Chinese intellectual in an increasingly globalized world?","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"216 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114173245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leaders—a pool of candidates for top political office—and examine how their chances of promotion depend on their performance in office and connections with top politicians. Our empirical analysis, based on the curriculum vitae of Chinese politicians, shows that connections and performance are complements in the Chinese political selection process. This complementarity is stronger the younger provincial leaders are relative to their connected top leaders. To provide one plausible interpretation of these empirical findings, we propose a simple theory in which the complementarity arises because connections foster loyalty of junior officials to senior ones, thereby allowing incumbent top politicians to select competent provincial leaders without risking being ousted. Our findings shed some light on why a political system known for patronage can still select competent leaders.
{"title":"Political Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance","authors":"Ruixue Jia, M. Kudamatsu, D. Seim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2468801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2468801","url":null,"abstract":"Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leaders—a pool of candidates for top political office—and examine how their chances of promotion depend on their performance in office and connections with top politicians. Our empirical analysis, based on the curriculum vitae of Chinese politicians, shows that connections and performance are complements in the Chinese political selection process. This complementarity is stronger the younger provincial leaders are relative to their connected top leaders. To provide one plausible interpretation of these empirical findings, we propose a simple theory in which the complementarity arises because connections foster loyalty of junior officials to senior ones, thereby allowing incumbent top politicians to select competent provincial leaders without risking being ousted. Our findings shed some light on why a political system known for patronage can still select competent leaders.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"329 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115224648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this paper is to discuss how Turkey’s president Erdogan instrumentalized Diyanet in building his own foreign policy vision. Diyanet has always maintained as the tool in the hands of the government for integration of ideology into society. During the 80s Diyanet was very active in terms of reinforcing the governmental ideology for struggle with communism, and became more radical under AKP government. Diyanet’s position was very important since it enhanced the foreign relation of Turkey with other countries. Diyanet’s propagating moderate Islam or Turkish Islam under the secular government was welcomed version of Islam abroad. After 2011, the AKP government directed by Erdogan has instrumentalized Diyanet for a new diaspora policy. The new policy has been practiced by employing three strategies. Firstly, Diyanet’s has been given extraordinary roles alongside with traditional ones. Secondly, the ideology of the AKP, the National Outlook, has been empowered in Diyanet’s organizational structure and amongst its activities abroad. Thirdly, the AKP has given new roles to Diyanet to cooperate a particular type of civil society abroad. This civil society prioritized Islamic Brotherhood rather than national unity, Turkishness or Turkey’s national interest.
{"title":"Diyanet as an Erdoganist Foreign Policy Instrument","authors":"Ihsan Yilmaz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3859814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3859814","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to discuss how Turkey’s president Erdogan instrumentalized Diyanet in building his own foreign policy vision. Diyanet has always maintained as the tool in the hands of the government for integration of ideology into society. During the 80s Diyanet was very active in terms of reinforcing the governmental ideology for struggle with communism, and became more radical under AKP government. Diyanet’s position was very important since it enhanced the foreign relation of Turkey with other countries. Diyanet’s propagating moderate Islam or Turkish Islam under the secular government was welcomed version of Islam abroad. After 2011, the AKP government directed by Erdogan has instrumentalized Diyanet for a new diaspora policy. The new policy has been practiced by employing three strategies. Firstly, Diyanet’s has been given extraordinary roles alongside with traditional ones. Secondly, the ideology of the AKP, the National Outlook, has been empowered in Diyanet’s organizational structure and amongst its activities abroad. Thirdly, the AKP has given new roles to Diyanet to cooperate a particular type of civil society abroad. This civil society prioritized Islamic Brotherhood rather than national unity, Turkishness or Turkey’s national interest.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121521023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We empirically investigate the existence of spatial autocorrelation between military dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1977 through 2007. We apply a Bayesian SAR probit regression, extended to a pooled model. We find a robust and positive spatial autocorrelation coefficient, which shows a spatial concentration of military autocracies. In particular, in the aftermath of Cold War military regimes cluster in the central region. Among covariates, interestingly, foreign aid shows a positive association with military regimes during the Cold War while it turns to exhibit a negative association after 1989. With regard to other economic covariates, we find that: a) there is a negative association between GDP per capita and the existence of a military autocracy; b) a larger manufacturing sector is associated with a smaller probability of a military rule; c) a larger mining sector is associated with a higher likelihood of military rules; d) trade openness reduces the likelihood of militarization.
{"title":"Spatial Concentration of Military Dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa (1977-2007)","authors":"Raul Caruso, Ilaria Petrarca, R. Ricciuti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2457836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2457836","url":null,"abstract":"We empirically investigate the existence of spatial autocorrelation between military dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1977 through 2007. We apply a Bayesian SAR probit regression, extended to a pooled model. We find a robust and positive spatial autocorrelation coefficient, which shows a spatial concentration of military autocracies. In particular, in the aftermath of Cold War military regimes cluster in the central region. Among covariates, interestingly, foreign aid shows a positive association with military regimes during the Cold War while it turns to exhibit a negative association after 1989. With regard to other economic covariates, we find that: a) there is a negative association between GDP per capita and the existence of a military autocracy; b) a larger manufacturing sector is associated with a smaller probability of a military rule; c) a larger mining sector is associated with a higher likelihood of military rules; d) trade openness reduces the likelihood of militarization.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121422824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Traditional point views the success of coup as the shifting of focal point from supporting dictator to supporting coup plotter, which cannot be rationalized. When we look at coup’s micro-process, we find that it is rationalizable. In this paper, I propose a model of coup with unique sub-game perfect equilibrium that focus on plotter and follower’s decision making process, and use it to study how the revelation of plotter’s ability affects the winning chance thus his decision of whether to start a coup. I show that the plotter’s income plays as a double edged-sword to the safety of the dictator. On one hand, high income decreases plotter’s motivation; on the other hand, it augments the plotter’s winning chance once coup is implemented. Meanwhile, this model also shows hidden ability is more effective than visible power in the coup process. Moreover, it is found that regime becomes more stable after some time without coup.
{"title":"Coup Process and Private Information Under Autocracy","authors":"Fangfang Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1455250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1455250","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional point views the success of coup as the shifting of focal point from supporting dictator to supporting coup plotter, which cannot be rationalized. When we look at coup’s micro-process, we find that it is rationalizable. In this paper, I propose a model of coup with unique sub-game perfect equilibrium that focus on plotter and follower’s decision making process, and use it to study how the revelation of plotter’s ability affects the winning chance thus his decision of whether to start a coup. I show that the plotter’s income plays as a double edged-sword to the safety of the dictator. On one hand, high income decreases plotter’s motivation; on the other hand, it augments the plotter’s winning chance once coup is implemented. Meanwhile, this model also shows hidden ability is more effective than visible power in the coup process. Moreover, it is found that regime becomes more stable after some time without coup.","PeriodicalId":189833,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Politics of Autocratic Regimes (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134552121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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