According to the embodied cognition framework, language is closely linked to the motor system and rehabilitation programs should stimulate language processing through the activation of motor and perceptual systems. In this study, we present an innovative training program based on the embodied cognition framework, using immersive technology to stimulate the perceptual-motor system through gesture observation from a first-person perspective. Post-stroke aphasic patients, in the post-acute phase and presenting with naming deficits, were assigned to one of two training conditions. The experimental group (EG) viewed videos of everyday gestures (i.e., pouring water, cutting carrots) from a first-person perspective, enhancing motor resonance, while the active control group (AC) viewed the same gestures from a third-person perspective. During video playback, the action was named by a female voice and the patient had to repeat it after video completion. The training was administered three times per week for four weeks. Naming abilities, along with other language and quality of life measures, were assessed pre- and post-intervention. Bayesian analysis of the primary outcome - percentage of rehabilitated items - yielded a Bayes factor BF+0 = 2.86, providing anecdotal-to-moderate evidence in favour of the first-person perspective group. The EG showed a higher mean percentage of rehabilitated items (M = 85.5%, SD = 22.5%) compared to the AC group (M = 50.5%, SD = 33.4%). No between-group differences were observed for broader language or quality-of-life measures. These preliminary, hypothesis-generating findings suggest greater efficacy of immersive, embodied gesture observation in promoting word retrieval recovery, and warrant replication in larger, adequately powered studies.
In 2015, Adam Zeman and colleagues coined the term "aphantasia" to describe the apparent inability of some individuals to conjure mental images, leading to the virtual rediscovery of this condition and sparking renewed interest in the literature on mental imagery. Ten years later, where do we stand? This article surveys current empirical research on aphantasia, focusing on five recently published comparative neurophysiological studies and how they mesh with four hypotheses proposed to account for reports of absence of mental imagery. These hypotheses explain such reports in terms of (i) a discrepancy in the use of concepts, (ii) a failure of introspection, (iii) a deficit in access to imagistic representations, and (iv) an absence of imagistic representations. The article concludes that these studies reveal neural differences between aphantasics and other individuals that allow us to reject the first two hypotheses and to consolidate the latter two as plausible explanations of aphantasia, with the final hypothesis emerging in a comparatively stronger position to provide a general account. The nature of the neural differences between these groups and how to understand them, however, remain far from clear, and the resolution of this issue presupposes the resolution of an ongoing debate between two neural models of mental imagery.

