An emerging consensus in certain legal, business, and scholarly communities maintains that corporate managers are pressured unduly into chasing short-term gains at the expense of superior long-term prospects. The forces inducing manage- rial myopia are easy to spot, typically embodied by activist hedge funds and Wall Street gadflies with outsized appetites for current quarterly earnings. Warnings about the dangers of “short termism” have become so well established, in fact, that they are now driving changes to mainstream practice as courts, regulators and practitioners fashion legal and transactional constraints designed to insulate firms and managers from the influence of investor short-termism. This Article draws on ac- ademic research and a series of case studies to advance the the- sis that the emergent folk wisdom about short-termism is in- complete. A growing literature in behavioral finance and psychology now provides sound reasons to conclude that corpo- rate managers often fall prey to long-term bias—excessive op- timism about their own long-term projects. We illustrate sev- eral plausible instantiations of such biases using case studies from three prominent companies where managers have argua- bly succumbed to a form of “long-termism” in their own corpo- rate stewardship. Unchecked, long-termism can impose sub- stantial costs on investors that are every bit as damaging as short-termism. Moreover, we argue that long-term managerial bias sheds considerable light on the paradox of why short- termism evidently persists among supposedly sophisticated fi- nancial market participants: shareholder activism—even if unambiguously myopic—can provide a symbiotic counter-bal- last against managerial long-termism. Without a more defini- tive understanding of the interaction between short- and long- term biases, then, policymakers should be cautious about em- bracing reforms that focus solely on half of the problem.
{"title":"Long-Term Bias","authors":"Michal Barzuza, E. Talley","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3338631","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3338631","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000An emerging consensus in certain legal, business, and scholarly communities maintains that corporate managers are pressured unduly into chasing short-term gains at the expense of superior long-term prospects. The forces inducing manage- rial myopia are easy to spot, typically embodied by activist hedge funds and Wall Street gadflies with outsized appetites for current quarterly earnings. Warnings about the dangers of “short termism” have become so well established, in fact, that they are now driving changes to mainstream practice as courts, regulators and practitioners fashion legal and transactional constraints designed to insulate firms and managers from the influence of investor short-termism. This Article draws on ac- ademic research and a series of case studies to advance the the- sis that the emergent folk wisdom about short-termism is in- complete. A growing literature in behavioral finance and \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000psychology now provides sound reasons to conclude that corpo- rate managers often fall prey to long-term bias—excessive op- timism about their own long-term projects. We illustrate sev- eral plausible instantiations of such biases using case studies from three prominent companies where managers have argua- bly succumbed to a form of “long-termism” in their own corpo- rate stewardship. Unchecked, long-termism can impose sub- stantial costs on investors that are every bit as damaging as short-termism. Moreover, we argue that long-term managerial bias sheds considerable light on the paradox of why short- termism evidently persists among supposedly sophisticated fi- nancial market participants: shareholder activism—even if unambiguously myopic—can provide a symbiotic counter-bal- last against managerial long-termism. Without a more defini- tive understanding of the interaction between short- and long- term biases, then, policymakers should be cautious about em- bracing reforms that focus solely on half of the problem. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129729481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents three models describing the Theory of Regulatory Compliance's evolution over the past 40 years.
本文提出了三个模型来描述监管合规理论在过去40年的演变。
{"title":"Theory of Regulatory Compliance Models","authors":"Richard Fiene","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3239596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3239596","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents three models describing the Theory of Regulatory Compliance's evolution over the past 40 years.","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127742812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this study is to analyze the performance and liquidity risks of African mining in the last five years. The analysis is suitable for the companies operating in Africa between 2013 and 2017, select the four companies. By descriptive analysis on this study, the analysis and comparison the mining company involved in the performance and liquidity risk. The findings suggest that the company's performance is affected by liquidity risk and economic environment.
{"title":"Performance and Riskafrican Rainbow Mining Company in the Mining Industry in Africa","authors":"Wenhao He","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3181706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3181706","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study is to analyze the performance and liquidity risks of African mining in the last five years. The analysis is suitable for the companies operating in Africa between 2013 and 2017, select the four companies. By descriptive analysis on this study, the analysis and comparison the mining company involved in the performance and liquidity risk. The findings suggest that the company's performance is affected by liquidity risk and economic environment.","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132214874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The loss distribution approach (LDA) has evolved as the industry standard for operational risk models despite a number of known weaknesses. In particular, LDA’s traditional focus on historical loss data often neglects expert knowledge that is available for operational risk types of a more predictable nature. In this paper, we present an alternative quantification technique, so-called exposure-based operational risk (EBOR) models, which aim to replace historical severity curves by measures of current exposures and use event frequencies based on actual exposures instead of historical loss counts. We introduce a general mathematical framework for exposure-based modeling that is applicable to a large number of operational risk types. As an example, an EBOR model for litigation risk is presented. Further, we discuss the integration of EBOR and LDA models into hybrid frameworks facilitating the migration of operational risk subtypes from a classical to an exposure-based treatment. The implementation of EBOR models is a challenging task since new types of data and a higher degree of expert involvement are required. In return, EBOR models provide a transparent quantitative framework for combining forward-looking expert assessments, point-in-time data (eg, current portfolios) and historical loss experience. Individual loss events can be modeled in a granular way, which facilitates the reflection of loss-generating mechanisms and provides more reliable signals to risk management.
{"title":"Operational Risk Measurement Beyond the Loss Distribution Approach: An Exposure-Based Methodology","authors":"Michael Einemann, Joerg Fritscher, M. Kalkbrener","doi":"10.21314/jop.2018.208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21314/jop.2018.208","url":null,"abstract":"The loss distribution approach (LDA) has evolved as the industry standard for operational risk models despite a number of known weaknesses. In particular, LDA’s traditional focus on historical loss data often neglects expert knowledge that is available for operational risk types of a more predictable nature. In this paper, we present an alternative quantification technique, so-called exposure-based operational risk (EBOR) models, which aim to replace historical severity curves by measures of current exposures and use event frequencies based on actual exposures instead of historical loss counts. We introduce a general mathematical framework for exposure-based modeling that is applicable to a large number of operational risk types. As an example, an EBOR model for litigation risk is presented. Further, we discuss the integration of EBOR and LDA models into hybrid frameworks facilitating the migration of operational risk subtypes from a classical to an exposure-based treatment. The implementation of EBOR models is a challenging task since new types of data and a higher degree of expert involvement are required. In return, EBOR models provide a transparent quantitative framework for combining forward-looking expert assessments, point-in-time data (eg, current portfolios) and historical loss experience. Individual loss events can be modeled in a granular way, which facilitates the reflection of loss-generating mechanisms and provides more reliable signals to risk management.","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124818111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, the corporate sector has been rocked by managerial fraud and scandals. In this paper, we analyse, employing a behavioural and sychoanalytical game theoretic approach, two particular phenomena that may lead to managerial fraud in the corporate sector: a) the tendency for fraud to start on a small scale, perceived by perpetrators as insignificant and inconsequential, but which may 'mount up' over time to large cumulative fraud. b) Formerly ethical managers becoming 'infected' by the behaviour of unethical managers within an organisation. We consider a simple model in which a manager commits a series of small frauds over time (initially perceived as insignificant). At some critical point the frauds accumulate to a magnitude where they 'activate' the manager's super-ego. At that point, guilt looms large, which may be sufficient to motivate the manager to cease his fraudulent behaviour, and to admit to previous indiscretions. However, if regret dominates, the manager may be 'entrapped' into continuing to further hide fraud. In a second version of the model, we consider an organisation consisting of two managers: one ethical/non-fraudulent and one unethical/fraudulent. We consider how the unethical manager's behaviour may 'infect' the ethical manager, so that the latter is induced to commit fraud, due to the unethical culture of the organisation. We employ our theoretical analysis to help to understand a real-world fraud case (Enron) in which fraud began at small individualistic levels, but quickly escalated and became institutionalized throughout the organization, destroying the company. We conclude with policy and ethical implications, and suggestions for future research.
{"title":"Fraud-Perception, Superegos, and Cultural Spread of Unethical Behaviour: Theory and Evidence from Enron","authors":"Richard J. Fairchild, Oliver Marnet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3283883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3283883","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, the corporate sector has been rocked by managerial fraud and scandals. In this paper, we analyse, employing a behavioural and sychoanalytical game theoretic approach, two particular phenomena that may lead to managerial fraud in the corporate sector: a) the tendency for fraud to start on a small scale, perceived by perpetrators as insignificant and inconsequential, but which may 'mount up' over time to large cumulative fraud. b) Formerly ethical managers becoming 'infected' by the behaviour of unethical managers within an organisation. We consider a simple model in which a manager commits a series of small frauds over time (initially perceived as insignificant). At some critical point the frauds accumulate to a magnitude where they 'activate' the manager's super-ego. At that point, guilt looms large, which may be sufficient to motivate the manager to cease his fraudulent behaviour, and to admit to previous indiscretions. However, if regret dominates, the manager may be 'entrapped' into continuing to further hide fraud. In a second version of the model, we consider an organisation consisting of two managers: one ethical/non-fraudulent and one unethical/fraudulent. We consider how the unethical manager's behaviour may 'infect' the ethical manager, so that the latter is induced to commit fraud, due to the unethical culture of the organisation. We employ our theoretical analysis to help to understand a real-world fraud case (Enron) in which fraud began at small individualistic levels, but quickly escalated and became institutionalized throughout the organization, destroying the company. We conclude with policy and ethical implications, and suggestions for future research.","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126032011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Strangely enough, after controversially abandoning a long-awaited revolutionary review of culture in banking, the FCA has started to invoke the mantra of culture yet again. However, Transforming culture in financial services DP18/2 is a poor discussion paper which misses the "culture" point entirely. Being prescriptive about the panacea of culture is quite an odd thing for the FCA to indulge in yet again. Worse still, the idea that a wider culture is to blame makes a mockery of individual culpability and provokes irresponsibility. Culture, we are misinformed, is a difficult concept to measure. Overall, “it is manageable” but the FCA discourages a “one size fits all” approach and it elects to be non-prescriptive about what any firm’s culture should be. In my view, the calculus of culture is not only measurable but has already been clearly recorded as conduct costs, £264 billion between 2012-2016, by the CCP Research Foundation. The systematic arrangement and coding of these costs shows that bad culture and culpability can be readily measured. No issue is taken here on the good work many of the banks are doing in this space. The conduct costs research was never intended to be a means by which to bluntly expose a bank’s conduct costs. Rather, it was to identify a proxy indicator of culture. CCP Research Foundation readily accepts the limitations of this metric. It would further accept that there are many initiatives, controls and/or mitigants that, if properly implemented, would act to promote good behaviour and outcomes for customers; as opposed to shining a light on misconduct post facto. However, the FCA has elected to ignore this useful research and this failure is a major flaw in the DP18/2 discussion paper.
奇怪的是，在备受争议地放弃了期待已久的对银行业文化的革命性审查后，FCA又开始援引文化的咒语。然而，《金融服务中的文化转型》(DP18/2)是一份糟糕的讨论文件，完全忽略了“文化”这一点。对于FCA来说，对文化的灵丹妙药做出规定是一件相当奇怪的事情，因为它再次沉迷于此。更糟糕的是，将责任归咎于更广泛的文化的观点嘲弄了个人的罪责，并引发了不负责任的行为。我们被误导了，文化是一个难以衡量的概念。总的来说，“这是可控的”，但FCA不鼓励“一刀切”的做法，它选择不规定任何公司的文化应该是什么。在我看来，文化的计算不仅是可测量的，而且已经被中共研究基金会清楚地记录为行为成本，2012年至2016年间为2640亿英镑。这些成本的系统安排和编码表明，不良文化和罪责可以很容易地衡量。这里没有对许多银行在这一领域所做的良好工作提出异议。行为成本研究从来就不是为了直接暴露银行的行为成本。相反，它是为了确定文化的代理指标。CCP Research Foundation欣然接受这一指标的局限性。它还将接受，有许多举措、控制和/或缓解措施，如果实施得当，将有助于促进客户的良好行为和成果;而不是事后曝光不当行为。然而，FCA选择忽略这一有用的研究，这一失败是DP18/2讨论文件中的一个主要缺陷。
{"title":"Banking and Misconduct: A Critique of the Cure of Culture","authors":"A. Khan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3153913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3153913","url":null,"abstract":"Strangely enough, after controversially abandoning a long-awaited revolutionary review of culture in banking, the FCA has started to invoke the mantra of culture yet again. However, Transforming culture in financial services DP18/2 is a poor discussion paper which misses the \"culture\" point entirely. Being prescriptive about the panacea of culture is quite an odd thing for the FCA to indulge in yet again. Worse still, the idea that a wider culture is to blame makes a mockery of individual culpability and provokes irresponsibility. Culture, we are misinformed, is a difficult concept to measure. Overall, “it is manageable” but the FCA discourages a “one size fits all” approach and it elects to be non-prescriptive about what any firm’s culture should be. In my view, the calculus of culture is not only measurable but has already been clearly recorded as conduct costs, £264 billion between 2012-2016, by the CCP Research Foundation. The systematic arrangement and coding of these costs shows that bad culture and culpability can be readily measured. No issue is taken here on the good work many of the banks are doing in this space. The conduct costs research was never intended to be a means by which to bluntly expose a bank’s conduct costs. Rather, it was to identify a proxy indicator of culture. CCP Research Foundation readily accepts the limitations of this metric. It would further accept that there are many initiatives, controls and/or mitigants that, if properly implemented, would act to promote good behaviour and outcomes for customers; as opposed to shining a light on misconduct post facto. However, the FCA has elected to ignore this useful research and this failure is a major flaw in the DP18/2 discussion paper.","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115823686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As negotiated settlements for corruption offences spread across jurisdictions, the appropriateness and value of such settlements for the sanctioning of the serious offence of foreign bribery is the subject of increasing contention. Questions are posed about the compatibility of negotiated settlements with the rule of law. Questions are also posed about the actual deterrent effect of negotiated settlements. This paper explores the ‘value’ of negotiated settlements and argues that we must use the right metric for this assessment. The paper argues that while metrics may indeed be developed to measure how ‘effective’, ‘proportionate,’ or ‘dissuasive’ negotiated settlements are as a sanction against corruption, the better metric of ‘value’ is probably found in Art. 1(c) of UNCAC, i.e. to ‘promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property’. Accountability and enforcement is, and has always been, the albatross of the fight against corruption. Negotiated settlements provide an alternative mechanism of enforcement that is arguably more suited to the environment in which foreign bribery occurs. In addition, the paper argues that that the ‘value’ of negotiated settlements depends on the particular context from which it is viewed. Conclusions reached in one context about negotiated settlements may not be relevant with regard to another context. However, whether viewed from a corporate criminal punishment context, or, from a rule of law context, or, from a good governance context, encouraging self-policing, self-reporting and the self-regulation, may, very simply, be the only way to bridge the impunity gap of institutionalized corruption. Bridging that gap is the true value of negotiated settlements.
{"title":"The Value of Negotiated Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases","authors":"Abiola O. Makinwa","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3088555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3088555","url":null,"abstract":"As negotiated settlements for corruption offences spread across jurisdictions, the appropriateness and value of such settlements for the sanctioning of the serious offence of foreign bribery is the subject of increasing contention. Questions are posed about the compatibility of negotiated settlements with the rule of law. Questions are also posed about the actual deterrent effect of negotiated settlements. This paper explores the ‘value’ of negotiated settlements and argues that we must use the right metric for this assessment. The paper argues that while metrics may indeed be developed to measure how ‘effective’, ‘proportionate,’ or ‘dissuasive’ negotiated settlements are as a sanction against corruption, the better metric of ‘value’ is probably found in Art. 1(c) of UNCAC, i.e. to ‘promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property’. Accountability and enforcement is, and has always been, the albatross of the fight against corruption. Negotiated settlements provide an alternative mechanism of enforcement that is arguably more suited to the environment in which foreign bribery occurs. In addition, the paper argues that that the ‘value’ of negotiated settlements depends on the particular context from which it is viewed. Conclusions reached in one context about negotiated settlements may not be relevant with regard to another context. However, whether viewed from a corporate criminal punishment context, or, from a rule of law context, or, from a good governance context, encouraging self-policing, self-reporting and the self-regulation, may, very simply, be the only way to bridge the impunity gap of institutionalized corruption. Bridging that gap is the true value of negotiated settlements.","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132980416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In July 2017 I published on SSRN an update from mid-2014 to mid-2017 of my Asian Data Privacy Laws – Trade and Human Rights Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2014), to accompany the publication of the paperback edition in July 2017. This further update aims to cover developments to 31 October 2018. The content of this update first covers International Agreements affecting privacy which are of relevance to Asia. Summaries follow of developments in the fifteen months prior to November 2018 from any of the 26 jurisdictions in Asia, considered region-by-region (North-East Asia; South-East Asia; and South Asia). This period has been a very significant one for Asian data privacy laws, with the most important developments being: * The anti-privacy provisions in the 'new TPP', the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) free trade agreement; * The initial impact of the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on Asian jurisdictions; * The draft adequacy decision concerning japan, by the European Commission; * Amendments to Korea's 'Network Act', and their significance for Korea's adequacy applicaition to the EU; * Strongly GDPR-influenced draft Bills in both Thailand and Indonesia; * Vietnam's Cybersecurity Law and its strong data localisation provisions; * The Indian Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Puttaswamy v Union of India that India has a fundamental constitutional right of privacy, and its decision by majority a year later that India's biometric ID system, the Aadhaar, while constitutionally capable of validity, was implemented by legislation which is in part invalid; * The Report by the India's Srikrishna Committee, and its GDPR and Chinese influenced draft data protection Bill.
2017年7月，我在SSRN上发表了2014年年中至2017年年中我的《亚洲数据隐私法-贸易与人权视角》(牛津大学出版社，2014年)的更新，并于2017年7月出版了平装版。此进一步更新旨在涵盖截至2018年10月31日的发展情况。本更新的内容首先涵盖与亚洲有关的影响隐私的国际协定。以下是亚洲26个司法管辖区中任何一个在2018年11月之前15个月的发展摘要，按地区考虑(东北亚;东南亚;和南亚)。这一时期是亚洲数据隐私法律的重要时期，最重要的发展是:*“新TPP”，即全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系(CPTPP)自由贸易协定中的反隐私条款;*欧盟《一般资料保护规例》(GDPR)对亚洲司法管辖区的初步影响;*欧洲委员会关于日本的适当决定草案;*韩国“网络法案”的修正案及其对韩国充分申请欧盟的意义;*泰国和印度尼西亚受gdp影响较大的法案草案;*越南《网络安全法》及其强有力的数据本地化规定;*印度最高法院在Puttaswamy诉印度联邦(Union of India)一案中一致裁定印度拥有宪法规定的基本隐私权，并在一年后以多数票裁定印度的生物识别身份系统Aadhaar虽然在宪法上具有有效性，但通过部分无效的立法实施;*印度斯里克里希纳委员会报告及其GDPR和受中国影响的数据保护法案草案。
{"title":"2014-2017 Update to Graham Greenleaf's Asian Data Privacy Laws - Trade and Human Rights Perspectives","authors":"G. Greenleaf","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3000766","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3000766","url":null,"abstract":"In July 2017 I published on SSRN an update from mid-2014 to mid-2017 of my Asian Data Privacy Laws – Trade and Human Rights Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2014), to accompany the publication of the paperback edition in July 2017. This further update aims to cover developments to 31 October 2018. \u0000 \u0000The content of this update first covers International Agreements affecting privacy which are of relevance to Asia. Summaries follow of developments in the fifteen months prior to November 2018 from any of the 26 jurisdictions in Asia, considered region-by-region (North-East Asia; South-East Asia; and South Asia). \u0000 \u0000This period has been a very significant one for Asian data privacy laws, with the most important developments being: \u0000 \u0000* The anti-privacy provisions in the 'new TPP', the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) free trade agreement; \u0000 \u0000* The initial impact of the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on Asian jurisdictions; \u0000 \u0000* The draft adequacy decision concerning japan, by the European Commission; \u0000 \u0000* Amendments to Korea's 'Network Act', and their significance for Korea's adequacy applicaition to the EU; \u0000 \u0000* Strongly GDPR-influenced draft Bills in both Thailand and Indonesia; \u0000 \u0000* Vietnam's Cybersecurity Law and its strong data localisation provisions; \u0000 \u0000* The Indian Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Puttaswamy v Union of India that India has a fundamental constitutional right of privacy, and its decision by majority a year later that India's biometric ID system, the Aadhaar, while constitutionally capable of validity, was implemented by legislation which is in part invalid; \u0000 \u0000* The Report by the India's Srikrishna Committee, and its GDPR and Chinese influenced draft data protection Bill.","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133340373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As technology transforms financial services, so too must it transform the regulation of financial markets and intermediaries. The imperative of real-time, prophylactic regulation increasingly compels reallocation of regulatory and compliance budgets to surveillance and enforcement technology. At the same time, in light of the well-known weaknesses of automated systems, securities firms (and their regulators) must temper investment in automation with efforts to augment the agency of compliance professionals. This symposium contribution considers how investment in the professional development of compliance personnel can better integrate automated tools within established compliance and supervisory structures and thereby advance regulatory and operational objectives.
{"title":"Preserving Human Agency in Automated Compliance","authors":"Onnig H. Dombalagian","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2831611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2831611","url":null,"abstract":"As technology transforms financial services, so too must it transform the regulation of financial markets and intermediaries. The imperative of real-time, prophylactic regulation increasingly compels reallocation of regulatory and compliance budgets to surveillance and enforcement technology. At the same time, in light of the well-known weaknesses of automated systems, securities firms (and their regulators) must temper investment in automation with efforts to augment the agency of compliance professionals. This symposium contribution considers how investment in the professional development of compliance personnel can better integrate automated tools within established compliance and supervisory structures and thereby advance regulatory and operational objectives.","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"192 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133789029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores an important but little studied dimension of the ongoing transformation of banking markets: the growth of risk management and compliance as key governance functions and the focus on risk as a foundation stone for regulatory strategy. The developments in risk and compliance are in part mandated by government regulation, but also reflect practices and norms developed in the private sector. Parallel developments reflecting convergence of norms and practice are observed in banking markets around the world.
{"title":"The Role of Risk Management and Compliance in Banking Integration","authors":"G. Miller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2527222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2527222","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores an important but little studied dimension of the ongoing transformation of banking markets: the growth of risk management and compliance as key governance functions and the focus on risk as a foundation stone for regulatory strategy. The developments in risk and compliance are in part mandated by government regulation, but also reflect practices and norms developed in the private sector. Parallel developments reflecting convergence of norms and practice are observed in banking markets around the world.","PeriodicalId":198853,"journal":{"name":"Compliance & Risk Management eJournal","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128320083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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