首页 > 最新文献

Philosophers' Imprint最新文献

英文 中文
WHO’S AFRAID OF MATHEMATICAL DIAGRAMS? 谁会害怕数学图表?
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-12-29 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1348
Silvia De Toffoli
Mathematical diagrams are frequently used in contemporary mathematics. They are, however, widely seen as not contributing to the justificatory force of proofs: they are considered to be either mere illustrations or shorthand for non-diagrammatic expressions.   Moreover, when they are used inferentially, they are seen as threatening the reliability of proofs.  In this paper, I examine certain examples of diagrams that resist this type of dismissive characterization. By presenting two diagrammatic proofs, one from topology and one from algebra, I show that diagrams form genuine notational systems, and I argue that this explains why they can play a role in the inferential structure of proofs without undermining their reliability.  I then consider whether diagrams can be essential to the proofs in which they appear.@font-face{font-family:"Cambria Math";panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:roman;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1107305727 0 0 415 0;}@font-face{font-family:Calibri;panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:swiss;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536859905 -1073697537 9 0 511 0;}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal{mso-style-unhide:no;mso-style-qformat:yes;mso-style-parent:"";margin:0in;line-height:200%;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;}.MsoChpDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-default-props:yes;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;}.MsoPapDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;line-height:200%;}div.WordSection1{page:WordSection1;}
数学图表在现代数学中经常被使用。然而,它们被广泛认为无助于证明的证明力:它们被认为仅仅是插图或非图解表达的简写。此外,当它们被推断使用时,它们被视为威胁证据的可靠性。在本文中,我考察了一些图的例子,它们抵制了这种不屑一顾的描述。通过展示两个图解证明,一个来自拓扑学,一个来自代数,我展示了图表形成真正的符号系统,我认为这解释了为什么它们可以在证明的推理结构中发挥作用,而不会破坏它们的可靠性。然后我考虑图表对于它们出现的证明是否必不可少。mso-font-charset:0;mso- general -font-family:roman;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1107305727 0 0 415 0;mso- general -font-family:swiss;MsoNormal,李。MsoNormal,div.MsoNormal {mso-style-unhide:不;mso-style-qformat:是的,mso-style-parent: ";保证金:0,行高:200%;mso-pagination: widow-orphan;字体大小:12.0 pt;字体类型:“Calibri”,无衬线;mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;} .MsoChpDefault {mso-style-type:仅供出口;mso-default-props:是的,字体类型:“Calibri”,无衬线;mso-ascii-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-hansi-font-family: Calibri; mso-bidi-font-family: Calibri;} .MsoPapDefault {mso-style-type:仅供出口;行高:200%;}div.WordSection1{页面:WordSection1;}
{"title":"WHO’S AFRAID OF MATHEMATICAL DIAGRAMS?","authors":"Silvia De Toffoli","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1348","url":null,"abstract":"Mathematical diagrams are frequently used in contemporary mathematics. They are, however, widely seen as not contributing to the justificatory force of proofs: they are considered to be either mere illustrations or shorthand for non-diagrammatic expressions.   Moreover, when they are used inferentially, they are seen as threatening the reliability of proofs.  In this paper, I examine certain examples of diagrams that resist this type of dismissive characterization. By presenting two diagrammatic proofs, one from topology and one from algebra, I show that diagrams form genuine notational systems, and I argue that this explains why they can play a role in the inferential structure of proofs without undermining their reliability.  I then consider whether diagrams can be essential to the proofs in which they appear.@font-face{font-family:\"Cambria Math\";panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:roman;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1107305727 0 0 415 0;}@font-face{font-family:Calibri;panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:swiss;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536859905 -1073697537 9 0 511 0;}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal{mso-style-unhide:no;mso-style-qformat:yes;mso-style-parent:\"\";margin:0in;line-height:200%;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;font-size:12.0pt;font-family:\"Calibri\",sans-serif;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;}.MsoChpDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-default-props:yes;font-family:\"Calibri\",sans-serif;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;}.MsoPapDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;line-height:200%;}div.WordSection1{page:WordSection1;}","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47756842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Aristotle on Intelligent Perception 亚里士多德论智能感知
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-12-10 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.660
Marc Gasser-wingate
Aristotle presents perception as a potentially intelligent form of cognition—a form of cognition that allows us to respond in discerning, knowing ways to a range of different situations, and develop certain theoretical insights relevant to some inquiry. But it’s not clear how we should understand the interaction between our rational and perceptual powers in these cases, or how widespread we should take their interaction to be. In this paper I argue against interpretations on which human perception would be an inherently rational power. I then develop an alternative view of intelligent perception that seeks to do justice to the role Aristotle assigns nonrational uses of perception in his account of our learning, and to his emphasis on the continuity between animal and human forms of cognition. On the view I develop, our rational powers allow us to develop a reflective understanding of the knowledge we acquire by purely perceptual means—a reflective understanding that can then affect what we recognize perceptually, and thereby yield forms of action and insight unavailable to other animals.
亚里士多德将感知视为一种潜在的智能认知形式,这种认知形式使我们能够对一系列不同的情况做出有洞察力的、有认知的反应,并发展出与某些探究相关的某些理论见解。但目前尚不清楚在这种情况下,我们应该如何理解我们的理性力量和感性力量之间的互动,也不清楚我们应该如何看待它们的互动。在本文中,我反对将人类感知视为内在理性力量的解释。然后,我发展了一种关于智能感知的替代观点,试图公正地对待亚里士多德在描述我们的学习时对感知的非理性使用所扮演的角色,以及他对动物和人类认知形式之间连续性的强调。根据我的观点,我们的理性力量使我们能够对我们通过纯粹的感知手段获得的知识形成反思性理解——这种反思性理解可以影响我们感知到的东西,从而产生其他动物无法获得的行动形式和洞察力。
{"title":"Aristotle on Intelligent Perception","authors":"Marc Gasser-wingate","doi":"10.3998/phimp.660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.660","url":null,"abstract":"Aristotle presents perception as a potentially intelligent form of cognition—a form of cognition that allows us to respond in discerning, knowing ways to a range of different situations, and develop certain theoretical insights relevant to some inquiry. But it’s not clear how we should understand the interaction between our rational and perceptual powers in these cases, or how widespread we should take their interaction to be. In this paper I argue against interpretations on which human perception would be an inherently rational power. I then develop an alternative view of intelligent perception that seeks to do justice to the role Aristotle assigns nonrational uses of perception in his account of our learning, and to his emphasis on the continuity between animal and human forms of cognition. On the view I develop, our rational powers allow us to develop a reflective understanding of the knowledge we acquire by purely perceptual means—a reflective understanding that can then affect what we recognize perceptually, and thereby yield forms of action and insight unavailable to other animals.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41436406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unfinished Business 未完成的任务
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1441
J. Knutzen
According to an intriguing though somewhat enigmatic line of thought first proposed by Jonathan Bennett, if humanity went extinct any time soon this would be unfortunate because important business would be left unfinished. This line of thought remains largely unexplored. I offer an interpretation of the idea that captures its intuitive appeal, is consistent with plausible constraints, and makes it non-redundant to other views in the literature. The resulting view contrasts with a welfare-promotion perspective, according to which extinction would be bad because it would come at a massive opportunity cost in terms of feasibly achievable welfare over the lifetime of our species.
根据乔纳森·班尼特(Jonathan Bennett)首先提出的一个有趣但有些神秘的思路,如果人类在不久的将来灭绝,那将是不幸的,因为重要的事情将未完成。这一思路在很大程度上仍未被探索。我对这一观点的解释抓住了其直观的吸引力,与合理的约束条件相一致,并使其与文献中的其他观点不冗余。由此产生的观点与福利促进的观点形成了对比,后者认为灭绝是坏事,因为它将以巨大的机会成本来实现我们物种一生中可实现的福利。
{"title":"Unfinished Business","authors":"J. Knutzen","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1441","url":null,"abstract":"According to an intriguing though somewhat enigmatic line of thought first proposed by Jonathan Bennett, if humanity went extinct any time soon this would be unfortunate because important business would be left unfinished. This line of thought remains largely unexplored. I offer an interpretation of the idea that captures its intuitive appeal, is consistent with plausible constraints, and makes it non-redundant to other views in the literature. The resulting view contrasts with a welfare-promotion perspective, according to which extinction would be bad because it would come at a massive opportunity cost in terms of feasibly achievable welfare over the lifetime of our species.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48131145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Remembering objects 记住对象
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-11-24 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.699
James Openshaw
Conscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, is often thought to involve ‘episodically’ recalling experienced events in one’s personal past. One might wonder whether this overlooks distinctive ways in which we sometimes recall ordinary, persisting objects. Of course, one can recall an object by remembering an event in which one encountered it. But are there acts of recall which are distinctively objectual in that they are not about objects in this mediated way (i.e., by way of being about events in which they featured)? This question has broad implications, not least for understanding the nature and role of imagery in remembering, the requirements of memory-based singular thought about objects, and the sense in which remembering involves ‘mental time travel’ through which one ‘relives’ past events. In this paper, I argue that we sometimes do recall objects from our past without remembering events in which they featured. The positive view of such cases I go on to propose draws on a wide body of empirical work in its support and accommodates a more nuanced picture of the role of imagery in remembering. Succinctly, remembering might essentially involve a kind of ‘re-experiencing’, but it need not involve ‘reliving’.
有意识的回忆,即以感官心理意象为特征的那种,通常被认为涉及到对个人过去经历的事件的“偶然”回忆。有人可能会想,这是否忽略了我们有时回忆普通、持久物体的独特方式。当然,一个人可以通过回忆他遇到的一个事件来回忆起一个物体。但是,有没有一些回忆行为是明显客观的因为它们不是以这种中介的方式(也就是说,不是以它们所处的事件的方式)与对象有关呢?这个问题具有广泛的含义,尤其是对于理解意象在记忆中的本质和作用,基于记忆的对物体的单一思考的要求,以及记忆涉及“精神时间旅行”的意义,通过这种旅行,人们可以“重温”过去的事件。在本文中,我认为我们有时确实会回忆起过去的物品,而不记得它们所发生的事件。我接下来提出的对这类案例的积极观点是基于大量的实证研究,并对意象在记忆中的作用进行了更细致的阐释。简而言之,记忆本质上可能涉及一种“重新体验”,但它不一定涉及“重新体验”。
{"title":"Remembering objects","authors":"James Openshaw","doi":"10.3998/phimp.699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.699","url":null,"abstract":"Conscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, is often thought to involve ‘episodically’ recalling experienced events in one’s personal past. One might wonder whether this overlooks distinctive ways in which we sometimes recall ordinary, persisting objects. Of course, one can recall an object by remembering an event in which one encountered it. But are there acts of recall which are distinctively objectual in that they are not about objects in this mediated way (i.e., by way of being about events in which they featured)? This question has broad implications, not least for understanding the nature and role of imagery in remembering, the requirements of memory-based singular thought about objects, and the sense in which remembering involves ‘mental time travel’ through which one ‘relives’ past events. In this paper, I argue that we sometimes do recall objects from our past without remembering events in which they featured. The positive view of such cases I go on to propose draws on a wide body of empirical work in its support and accommodates a more nuanced picture of the role of imagery in remembering. Succinctly, remembering might essentially involve a kind of ‘re-experiencing’, but it need not involve ‘reliving’.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43951425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Outrage and the Bounds of Empathy 愤怒和同理心的界限
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-11-03 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1296
Sukaina Hirji
Often, when we are angry, we are angry at someone who has hurt us. Our anger is a protest against a perceived mistreatment, and its function is to hold the person accountable for their offense. The anger involves a demand for some sort of change or response: that the hurt be acknowledged, that the relationship be repaired, that the offending party reform in some way. Call this “reform” anger. A different sort of attitude, often contrasted with reform anger, is hatred. Hatred is also a response to a perceived mistreatment, and it also demands some sort of change. Unlike reform anger, however, its goal is not to repair the relationship. Instead, its goal is destruction, to remove the offending party. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of a third sort of attitude, which I call “outrage” anger, that is distinct from both reform anger and hatred. I argue that outrage anger has an important role to play in the context of political injustice, but that it also comes with significant costs. In §1, I introduce outrage anger, and contrast it with reform anger. In §2, drawing on the work of Maria Lugones, I develop an account of outrage anger as a second-order attitude directed at the state of affairs in which a violation is not fully intelligible as the violation it is. I argue its central function is a kind of psychological boundary setting: it closes off the victim’s ability to feel empathy for their abuser. In §3, I show that the benefits of outrage come with serious costs, both epistemic and prudential. In §4, I make some suggestions about when, and for whom, the benefits of outrage outweigh the costs.
通常,当我们生气的时候,我们会对伤害我们的人感到愤怒。我们的愤怒是对被认为是虐待的抗议,它的作用是让那个人对自己的罪行负责。愤怒包括要求某种改变或回应:承认伤害,修复关系,冒犯的政党以某种方式进行改革。称之为“改革”的愤怒。另一种不同的态度是仇恨,通常与改革的愤怒形成对比。仇恨也是对被感知的虐待的回应,它也需要某种改变。然而,与改革的愤怒不同,它的目标不是修复这种关系。相反,它的目标是摧毁,清除冒犯的一方。在这篇论文中,我发展并捍卫了第三种态度,我称之为“愤怒”的愤怒,这与改革的愤怒和仇恨不同。我认为,愤怒在政治不公正的背景下发挥着重要作用,但它也会带来巨大的成本。在§1中,我介绍了愤怒愤怒,并将其与改革愤怒进行了对比。在第2节中,我借鉴了玛丽亚·卢戈内斯的作品,将愤怒描述为一种二阶态度,针对的是侵犯行为并不像侵犯行为那样完全可理解的情况。我认为它的核心功能是一种心理边界设置:它关闭了受害者对施虐者感同身受的能力。在§3中,我表明愤怒的好处伴随着严重的成本,既有认识上的,也有谨慎上的。在第4节中,我提出了一些建议,说明愤怒在何时以及对谁来说,好处大于代价。
{"title":"Outrage and the Bounds of Empathy","authors":"Sukaina Hirji","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1296","url":null,"abstract":"Often, when we are angry, we are angry at someone who has hurt us. Our anger is a protest against a perceived mistreatment, and its function is to hold the person accountable for their offense. The anger involves a demand for some sort of change or response: that the hurt be acknowledged, that the relationship be repaired, that the offending party reform in some way. Call this “reform” anger. A different sort of attitude, often contrasted with reform anger, is hatred. Hatred is also a response to a perceived mistreatment, and it also demands some sort of change. Unlike reform anger, however, its goal is not to repair the relationship. Instead, its goal is destruction, to remove the offending party. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of a third sort of attitude, which I call “outrage” anger, that is distinct from both reform anger and hatred. I argue that outrage anger has an important role to play in the context of political injustice, but that it also comes with significant costs. In §1, I introduce outrage anger, and contrast it with reform anger. In §2, drawing on the work of Maria Lugones, I develop an account of outrage anger as a second-order attitude directed at the state of affairs in which a violation is not fully intelligible as the violation it is. I argue its central function is a kind of psychological boundary setting: it closes off the victim’s ability to feel empathy for their abuser. In §3, I show that the benefits of outrage come with serious costs, both epistemic and prudential. In §4, I make some suggestions about when, and for whom, the benefits of outrage outweigh the costs.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47913410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Market Exchange and Alienation 市场交换与转让
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-09-28 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.545
B. Maguire
Efficient markets are alienating if they inhibit us from caring about one another inour productive activities. I argue that efficient market behaviour is bothexclusionary and fetishistic. As exclusionary, the efficient marketeer cannotmanifest care alongside their market behaviour. As fetishistic, the efficientmarketeer cannot manifest care in their market behaviour. The conjunction entailsthat efficient market behavior inhibits care. It doesn’t follow that efficient marketbehavior is vicious: individuals might justifiably commit to efficiency becausedoing so serves the common good. But efficient market systems nevertheless havesignificant opportunity costs. This serves as a corrective to the prevailingassumption amongst welfare state capitalists, liberal egalitarians and marketsocialists that resolving distributive objections to markets will resolve thisrelational objection. 
如果有效市场阻止我们在生产活动中相互关心,那么它就是在疏远我们。我认为,有效的市场行为既是排他性的,又是拜物教的。作为排他性的,有效的市场参与者不能在他们的市场行为中表现出关心。作为拜物教者,有效市场者不能在他们的市场行为中表现出谨慎。这种联系意味着,有效的市场行为抑制了谨慎。这并不意味着有效的市场行为是邪恶的:个人可能有理由致力于效率,因为这样做符合共同利益。然而,有效的市场体系有巨大的机会成本。这纠正了福利国家资本家、自由平等主义者和市场社会主义者的普遍假设,即解决对市场分配的反对意见将解决这种关系上的反对意见。
{"title":"Market Exchange and Alienation","authors":"B. Maguire","doi":"10.3998/phimp.545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.545","url":null,"abstract":"Efficient markets are alienating if they inhibit us from caring about one another inour productive activities. I argue that efficient market behaviour is bothexclusionary and fetishistic. As exclusionary, the efficient marketeer cannotmanifest care alongside their market behaviour. As fetishistic, the efficientmarketeer cannot manifest care in their market behaviour. The conjunction entailsthat efficient market behavior inhibits care. It doesn’t follow that efficient marketbehavior is vicious: individuals might justifiably commit to efficiency becausedoing so serves the common good. But efficient market systems nevertheless havesignificant opportunity costs. This serves as a corrective to the prevailingassumption amongst welfare state capitalists, liberal egalitarians and marketsocialists that resolving distributive objections to markets will resolve thisrelational objection. ","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45602009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taking the Straight Path. P.F. Strawson's Later Work on Freedom and Responsibility 走正道。斯特劳森后期关于自由与责任的著作
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-09-27 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.782
Benjamin De Mesel
I highlight three features of P.F. Strawson’s later, neglected work on freedom and responsibility. First, in response to a criticism by Rajendra Prasad, Strawson explicitly rejects an argument put forward in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ against the relevance of determinism to moral responsibility. Second, his remarkable acceptance of Prasad’s criticism motivates him to take the ‘straight path’, that is, to be straightforward about the relation between determinism, freedom, the ability to do otherwise and the conditions of responsibility. He claims that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition of responsibility and provides a list of additional conditions, including a knowledge condition. Third, he clarifies the relation between responsibility, quality of will and the reactive attitudes. The latter do not figure essentially in his answer to the question, ‘What are the conditions of responsibility?’, but they do play an essential role in his answer to the question, ‘Why do we have the concept of responsibility?’ We have it, Strawson suggests, because of our natural concern about the quality of will with which people act, a concern expressed in our reactive attitudes. I argue that, although Strawson’s later work definitely involves a shift of emphasis when compared to ‘Freedom and Resentment’, his overall account of freedom and responsibility is coherent. The later work helps to better understand the nature and significance of Strawson’s contribution, and to identify problems with common interpretations of and objections to ‘Freedom and Resentment’. 
我强调了斯特劳森后来被忽视的关于自由和责任的著作的三个特点。首先,在回应Rajendra Prasad的批评时,Strawson明确拒绝了《自由与怨恨》中反对决定论与道德责任相关的论点。其次,他对普拉萨德批评的显著接受促使他走“笔直的道路”,也就是说,直截了当地处理决定论、自由、不这样做的能力和责任条件之间的关系。他声称,不这样做的能力是责任的必要条件,并提供了一系列附加条件,包括知识条件。第三,他阐明了责任、意志品质和反应态度之间的关系。后者在他回答“责任的条件是什么?”,但在他回答“为什么我们有责任的概念?”这个问题时,它们确实发挥了重要作用。斯特劳森认为,我们之所以会有这种感觉,是因为我们天生就关心人们行动时的意志质量,这种关心表现在我们的反应性态度中。我认为,尽管与《自由与怨恨》相比,斯特劳森的后期作品确实涉及了重点的转移,但他对自由与责任的总体描述是连贯的。后来的工作有助于更好地理解斯特劳森贡献的性质和意义,并确定对“自由与怨恨”的共同解释和反对意见的问题。
{"title":"Taking the Straight Path. P.F. Strawson's Later Work on Freedom and Responsibility","authors":"Benjamin De Mesel","doi":"10.3998/phimp.782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.782","url":null,"abstract":"I highlight three features of P.F. Strawson’s later, neglected work on freedom and responsibility. First, in response to a criticism by Rajendra Prasad, Strawson explicitly rejects an argument put forward in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ against the relevance of determinism to moral responsibility. Second, his remarkable acceptance of Prasad’s criticism motivates him to take the ‘straight path’, that is, to be straightforward about the relation between determinism, freedom, the ability to do otherwise and the conditions of responsibility. He claims that the ability to do otherwise is a necessary condition of responsibility and provides a list of additional conditions, including a knowledge condition. Third, he clarifies the relation between responsibility, quality of will and the reactive attitudes. The latter do not figure essentially in his answer to the question, ‘What are the conditions of responsibility?’, but they do play an essential role in his answer to the question, ‘Why do we have the concept of responsibility?’ We have it, Strawson suggests, because of our natural concern about the quality of will with which people act, a concern expressed in our reactive attitudes. I argue that, although Strawson’s later work definitely involves a shift of emphasis when compared to ‘Freedom and Resentment’, his overall account of freedom and responsibility is coherent. The later work helps to better understand the nature and significance of Strawson’s contribution, and to identify problems with common interpretations of and objections to ‘Freedom and Resentment’. ","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46435870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Idealizations and ideal policing 理想化与理想警务
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-09-18 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.882
Jake Monaghan
Political philosophy often focuses on “major institutions” that make up the “basic structure” of society. These include political, economic, and social institutions. In this paper I argue first that policing plays a substantial role in generating the kinds of inequalities and problems that are concerns of social or structural justice, and therefore that police agencies qualify as a major institution. When we abandon full compliance or similar idealizations, it is clear that policing is not a concern secondary to, e.g., the electoral system or the scheme of property rights in a society. Nor, I argue, does maintaining full compliance or moral character idealizations obviate an active enforcement role. Eliminating that role from an idealized model society requires engaging in a methodologically and substantively unattractive amount of abstraction. The result is that an active enforcement role is at the core of a complete theory of justice rather than something that is significant only “downstream” from more fundamental issues.
政治哲学通常关注构成社会“基本结构”的“主要机构”。其中包括政治、经济和社会机构。在本文中,我首先认为,警务在产生社会或结构正义所关注的不平等和问题方面发挥着重要作用,因此,警察机构有资格成为一个主要机构。当我们放弃完全遵守或类似的理想化时,很明显,治安不是一个次要的问题,例如,选举制度或社会中的产权制度。我认为,保持完全遵守或道德品质理想化也不能排除积极的执行作用。从理想化的模范社会中消除这种角色需要进行方法论和实质上不具吸引力的抽象。结果是,积极的执法作用是完整司法理论的核心,而不是仅仅在更根本的问题的“下游”才具有重要意义的东西。
{"title":"Idealizations and ideal policing","authors":"Jake Monaghan","doi":"10.3998/phimp.882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.882","url":null,"abstract":"Political philosophy often focuses on “major institutions” that make up the “basic structure” of society. These include political, economic, and social institutions. In this paper I argue first that policing plays a substantial role in generating the kinds of inequalities and problems that are concerns of social or structural justice, and therefore that police agencies qualify as a major institution. When we abandon full compliance or similar idealizations, it is clear that policing is not a concern secondary to, e.g., the electoral system or the scheme of property rights in a society. Nor, I argue, does maintaining full compliance or moral character idealizations obviate an active enforcement role. Eliminating that role from an idealized model society requires engaging in a methodologically and substantively unattractive amount of abstraction. The result is that an active enforcement role is at the core of a complete theory of justice rather than something that is significant only “downstream” from more fundamental issues.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48986278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
For Better And Worse: Taking phenomenalist accounts of intuition seriously 好与坏:认真对待直觉的现象主义解释
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-09-14 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1271
Miguel Egler
The historically-influential perceptual analogy states that intuitions and perceptual experiences are alike in many important respects. Phenomenalists defend a particular reading of this analogy according to which intuitions and perceptual experiences share a common phenomenal character. The phenomenalist thesis has proven highly influential in recent years. However, insufficient attention has been given to the challenges that the phenomenalist thesis raises for theories of intuitions. In this paper, I first develop one such challenge. I argue that if we take seriously the idea that intuitions and perceptual experiences have a common phenomenal character, then an analogous version of the familiar problem of perceptual presence arises for intuitions. I call this the 'problem of intuitive presence'. In the second part of the paper I sketch a novel enactivist solution to this problem.
具有历史影响的知觉类比指出,直觉和知觉经验在许多重要方面是相似的。现象主义者为这种类比的一种特殊解读辩护,根据这种解读,直觉和知觉经验具有共同的现象特征。近年来,现象主义理论被证明具有很大的影响力。然而,人们对现象主义命题对直觉理论提出的挑战关注不够。在本文中,我首先提出了一个这样的挑战。我认为,如果我们认真对待直觉和感知经验具有共同的现象特征这一观点,那么直觉就会出现一个类似于我们所熟悉的感知存在问题的版本。我称之为“直觉存在的问题”。在论文的第二部分,我对这个问题提出了一个新的激进的解决方案。
{"title":"For Better And Worse: Taking phenomenalist accounts of intuition seriously","authors":"Miguel Egler","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1271","url":null,"abstract":"The historically-influential perceptual analogy states that intuitions and perceptual experiences are alike in many important respects. Phenomenalists defend a particular reading of this analogy according to which intuitions and perceptual experiences share a common phenomenal character. The phenomenalist thesis has proven highly influential in recent years. However, insufficient attention has been given to the challenges that the phenomenalist thesis raises for theories of intuitions. In this paper, I first develop one such challenge. I argue that if we take seriously the idea that intuitions and perceptual experiences have a common phenomenal character, then an analogous version of the familiar problem of perceptual presence arises for intuitions. I call this the 'problem of intuitive presence'. In the second part of the paper I sketch a novel enactivist solution to this problem.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46386954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Assertion is weak 断言很弱
IF 1.4 1区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Pub Date : 2021-08-31 DOI: 10.3998/phimp.1076
M. Mandelkern, Kevin Dorst
Recent work has argued that belief is weak: the level of rational credence required for belief is relatively low. That literature has  contrasted belief with assertion, arguing that the latter requires an epistemic state much stronger than (weak) belief---perhaps knowledge or even certainty.  We argue that this is wrong: assertion is just as weak as belief.  We first present a variety of new arguments for this, and then show that the standard arguments for stronger norms are not convincing.  Finally, we sketch an alternative picture on which the fundamental norm of assertion is to say what you believe, but both belief and assertion are weak. To help make sense of this, we propose that both belief and assertion involve navigating a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity, and so it can makes sense to believe/say something you only have weak evidence for, if it is informative enough.
最近的研究表明,信仰是脆弱的:信仰所需的理性信任水平相对较低。该文献将信念与断言进行了对比,认为后者需要一种比(弱)信念更强的认识状态——也许是知识,甚至是确定性。我们认为这是错误的:断言和信念一样脆弱。我们首先提出了各种新的论点,然后证明了更强规范的标准论点是不令人信服的。最后,我们描绘了一个替代的画面,在这个画面上,断言的基本准则是说出你的信仰,但信仰和断言都是脆弱的。为了帮助理解这一点,我们提出,信念和断言都涉及在准确性和非信息性之间进行权衡,因此,如果信息足够丰富,相信/说一些你只有微弱证据的事情是有意义的。
{"title":"Assertion is weak","authors":"M. Mandelkern, Kevin Dorst","doi":"10.3998/phimp.1076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1076","url":null,"abstract":"Recent work has argued that belief is weak: the level of rational credence required for belief is relatively low. That literature has  contrasted belief with assertion, arguing that the latter requires an epistemic state much stronger than (weak) belief---perhaps knowledge or even certainty.  We argue that this is wrong: assertion is just as weak as belief.  We first present a variety of new arguments for this, and then show that the standard arguments for stronger norms are not convincing.  Finally, we sketch an alternative picture on which the fundamental norm of assertion is to say what you believe, but both belief and assertion are weak. To help make sense of this, we propose that both belief and assertion involve navigating a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity, and so it can makes sense to believe/say something you only have weak evidence for, if it is informative enough.","PeriodicalId":20021,"journal":{"name":"Philosophers' Imprint","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42135079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
期刊
Philosophers' Imprint
全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1