Pub Date : 2021-04-12DOI: 10.21744/IRJMIS.V8N3.1471
Rodrigo Barra Novoa
This article offers a first approximation of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Chilean macro and microeconomic environment, using representative data from the latest formal surveys in the country. Here, the number of active firms plummeted in part due to the social crisis that began on October 18, 2019, and losses were felt in most industries due to the pandemic crisis that continues to generate job losses and low business profitability. These first results have implications for central bank policies and can predict medium and medium-term projections, especially for the country's economic and social growth.
{"title":"Macro and Microeconomic Analysis of the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Chile and the Projections of the Central Bank's","authors":"Rodrigo Barra Novoa","doi":"10.21744/IRJMIS.V8N3.1471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21744/IRJMIS.V8N3.1471","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers a first approximation of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Chilean macro and microeconomic environment, using representative data from the latest formal surveys in the country. Here, the number of active firms plummeted in part due to the social crisis that began on October 18, 2019, and losses were felt in most industries due to the pandemic crisis that continues to generate job losses and low business profitability. These first results have implications for central bank policies and can predict medium and medium-term projections, especially for the country's economic and social growth.","PeriodicalId":20373,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Health eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78973775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This document analyses monetary policy effects on transmission of credit interest rates in Colombia with particular attention to the period of global liquidity spurred by the COVID-pandemic during 2020-2022. Challenges for banks operating in Colombia are twofold: they face increasing banking competition (reinforced by FINTECH) and increasing credit risks due to deteriorating macro-financial conditions after a -6.8% real-GDP and an average of 16% in unemployment over 2020. Expected rebound for 2021 looks mild at 4% in real-GDP and staggered unemployment averaging 14%.Credit transmission has been fairly rapid in corporate credits, but slow in consumption loans, given contract prevalence at fix-rates (87% of total) and extensions averaging 6 years in the latter. Gains in credit transmission would require: i) deepening of the swaps market of interest rates, currently focused at OTC instead of the registered market;and ii) increasing the floating portion related to the IBR (bid-market over the central bank repo-window), currently covering only 12% of the portfolio. This would be the Colombian version of the worldwide move from LIBOR into SFAR. However, this deepening of capital markets in Colombia hinge crucially in preserving the “investment grade” status over 2021-2022, currently facing unanimous “negative outlook” from the rating agencies. Finally, compression of financial wedges, increasing credit risks, and higher liquidity-capital requirements (over 2021-2024, under Basle III) represent significant challenges for banks operating in Colombia. Financial Superintendence recently reported Colombia as complying with Basle III, after the transition period of 2016-2019, joining the 42% of LATAM countries in that category.
{"title":"Credit Transmission, Liquidity, and Bank Capital in Colombia","authors":"Sergio Clavijo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3821922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3821922","url":null,"abstract":"This document analyses monetary policy effects on transmission of credit interest rates in Colombia with particular attention to the period of global liquidity spurred by the COVID-pandemic during 2020-2022. Challenges for banks operating in Colombia are twofold: they face increasing banking competition (reinforced by FINTECH) and increasing credit risks due to deteriorating macro-financial conditions after a -6.8% real-GDP and an average of 16% in unemployment over 2020. Expected rebound for 2021 looks mild at 4% in real-GDP and staggered unemployment averaging 14%.Credit transmission has been fairly rapid in corporate credits, but slow in consumption loans, given contract prevalence at fix-rates (87% of total) and extensions averaging 6 years in the latter. Gains in credit transmission would require: i) deepening of the swaps market of interest rates, currently focused at OTC instead of the registered market;and ii) increasing the floating portion related to the IBR (bid-market over the central bank repo-window), currently covering only 12% of the portfolio. This would be the Colombian version of the worldwide move from LIBOR into SFAR. However, this deepening of capital markets in Colombia hinge crucially in preserving the “investment grade” status over 2021-2022, currently facing unanimous “negative outlook” from the rating agencies. Finally, compression of financial wedges, increasing credit risks, and higher liquidity-capital requirements (over 2021-2024, under Basle III) represent significant challenges for banks operating in Colombia. Financial Superintendence recently reported Colombia as complying with Basle III, after the transition period of 2016-2019, joining the 42% of LATAM countries in that category.","PeriodicalId":20373,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Health eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75579750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this report, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (the “Committee”) describes the turmoil in the U.S. Treasury market during March 2020, with a focus on the unexpected rise in Treasury yields, the illiquidity in the Treasury market and the subsequent intervention by the Federal Reserve to stabilize the market. We then describe the market structure for trading U.S. Treasuries as well as trade reporting requirements and public information regarding the owners of Treasuries. We find that policymakers and the public lack the transaction data to comprehensively determine the source of selling in March 2020 that drove the volatility in the U.S. Treasury market.Policymakers have sought to identify the source of the selling pressure in the Treasury market in March 2020 because holders of U.S. Treasuries, including large financial institutions and foreign investors, rely on the assumption that Treasuries are cash-like instruments.1 For U.S. Treasuries to continue to function as a global safe haven asset, Treasuries must retain their value and trade efficiently during market crises. Identifying the source of the selling pressure in March 2020 would enable policymakers to determine whether changes to regulation or market structure are necessary to allow the Treasury market to better accommodate such selling in the future. In-deed, understanding the potential sources of fragility in the Treasury market remains important, as periodic bouts of volatility persist—most recently in February 2021.2In Part I of our report, we summarize the volatility in the U.S. Treasury market in March 2020 and the Federal Reserve’s role in stabilizing the market. In Part II, we provide a comprehensive overview of the market structure for trading U.S. Treasuries (so-called “cash Treasury” markets), including the respective role of broker-dealers, proprietary trading firms, institutional inves-tors and trading venues. Part II then describes the trade information for U.S. Treasuries available to regulators from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (“FINRA’s TRACE database”). Finally, in Part III we evaluate public disclosures of ownership information and trade data for U.S. Treasuries, including data provided by the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department regarding institutional investors, foreign investors and foreign official investors (such as central banks and sovereign wealth funds). We also review public disclosures regarding the U.S. Treasury holdings of hedge funds and mutual funds.We conclude that policymakers and the public lack the trade and ownership information necessary to comprehensively determine the source of selling in the Treasury market in March 2020. We therefore recommend that policymakers exercise caution before reaching conclusions or enacting regulations related to the March 2020 spike in Treasury yields. An appropriate first step for policymakers would be to consider whether expanded reporting ob
{"title":"Nothing but the Facts: The U.S. Treasury Market During the COVID-19 Crisis","authors":"H. Scott, John W. Gulliver, Hillel Nadler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3823293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3823293","url":null,"abstract":"In this report, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (the “Committee”) describes the turmoil in the U.S. Treasury market during March 2020, with a focus on the unexpected rise in Treasury yields, the illiquidity in the Treasury market and the subsequent intervention by the Federal Reserve to stabilize the market. We then describe the market structure for trading U.S. Treasuries as well as trade reporting requirements and public information regarding the owners of Treasuries. We find that policymakers and the public lack the transaction data to comprehensively determine the source of selling in March 2020 that drove the volatility in the U.S. Treasury market.Policymakers have sought to identify the source of the selling pressure in the Treasury market in March 2020 because holders of U.S. Treasuries, including large financial institutions and foreign investors, rely on the assumption that Treasuries are cash-like instruments.1 For U.S. Treasuries to continue to function as a global safe haven asset, Treasuries must retain their value and trade efficiently during market crises. Identifying the source of the selling pressure in March 2020 would enable policymakers to determine whether changes to regulation or market structure are necessary to allow the Treasury market to better accommodate such selling in the future. In-deed, understanding the potential sources of fragility in the Treasury market remains important, as periodic bouts of volatility persist—most recently in February 2021.2In Part I of our report, we summarize the volatility in the U.S. Treasury market in March 2020 and the Federal Reserve’s role in stabilizing the market. In Part II, we provide a comprehensive overview of the market structure for trading U.S. Treasuries (so-called “cash Treasury” markets), including the respective role of broker-dealers, proprietary trading firms, institutional inves-tors and trading venues. Part II then describes the trade information for U.S. Treasuries available to regulators from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (“FINRA’s TRACE database”). Finally, in Part III we evaluate public disclosures of ownership information and trade data for U.S. Treasuries, including data provided by the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department regarding institutional investors, foreign investors and foreign official investors (such as central banks and sovereign wealth funds). We also review public disclosures regarding the U.S. Treasury holdings of hedge funds and mutual funds.We conclude that policymakers and the public lack the trade and ownership information necessary to comprehensively determine the source of selling in the Treasury market in March 2020. We therefore recommend that policymakers exercise caution before reaching conclusions or enacting regulations related to the March 2020 spike in Treasury yields. An appropriate first step for policymakers would be to consider whether expanded reporting ob","PeriodicalId":20373,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Health eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73074837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The federal government’s economic response to the COVID-19 epidemic has principally been one in which the Federal Reserve has set up extraordinary lending facilities in partnership with the Treasury Department. These facilities were modeled on multi-trillion-dollar lending facilities set up by the Federal Reserve in 2008 in response to the prior economic crisis. These Federal Reserve lending facilities are extraordinary in size but also extraordinary because they involve lending to firms that are not banks. Federal Reserve lending over the first hundred years of its history was almost exclusively limited to banks. Congress put in place statutory limits on this extraordinary lending authority in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 to limit the Federal Reserve’s discretion and minimize the risk that generous lending by the Federal Reserve would encourage excessive risk taking. Those limits prohibit the Fed from supporting insolvent firms, from propping up individual firms like it did with AIG in 2008, includes a number of other prescriptive measures to ensure the Federal Reserve takes reasonable risk management practices even in extraordinary times. This paper argues that those limits have not proven enforceable nor constraining on the Fed’s discretion, and this paper instead argues that a private right of action to enforce them would better fulfill Congress’ objective in the Dodd-Frank Act to limit Federal Reserve discretion in lending to non-banks.
{"title":"Sue The Fed: The Case for Privately Enforceable Statutory Constraints on Federal Reserve Emergency Lending","authors":"J. Verret","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3798534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3798534","url":null,"abstract":"The federal government’s economic response to the COVID-19 epidemic has principally been one in which the Federal Reserve has set up extraordinary lending facilities in partnership with the Treasury Department. These facilities were modeled on multi-trillion-dollar lending facilities set up by the Federal Reserve in 2008 in response to the prior economic crisis. These Federal Reserve lending facilities are extraordinary in size but also extraordinary because they involve lending to firms that are not banks. Federal Reserve lending over the first hundred years of its history was almost exclusively limited to banks. Congress put in place statutory limits on this extraordinary lending authority in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 to limit the Federal Reserve’s discretion and minimize the risk that generous lending by the Federal Reserve would encourage excessive risk taking. Those limits prohibit the Fed from supporting insolvent firms, from propping up individual firms like it did with AIG in 2008, includes a number of other prescriptive measures to ensure the Federal Reserve takes reasonable risk management practices even in extraordinary times. This paper argues that those limits have not proven enforceable nor constraining on the Fed’s discretion, and this paper instead argues that a private right of action to enforce them would better fulfill Congress’ objective in the Dodd-Frank Act to limit Federal Reserve discretion in lending to non-banks.","PeriodicalId":20373,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Health eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91500987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Exploiting the exogenous COVID-19 shock, this paper attempts to shed light on the closed-end fund (CEF) discount puzzle. CEF discounts increased substantially after COVID-19, and I identify a causal role of sentiment in this effect. I show that COVID-19 reduced individual investor sentiment. Using the difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, I find that CEFs with higher sentiment beta or higher retail ownership experienced a larger increase in discounts after the COVID-19 shock. The DiD results are unlikely to be driven by alternative channels such as the liquidity, expense, payout, and leverage channels. Overall, the results support the sentiment-based explanation of CEF discounts.
{"title":"What Drives Closed-End Fund Discounts? Evidence from COVID-19","authors":"Liangbo Ma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3793904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3793904","url":null,"abstract":"Exploiting the exogenous COVID-19 shock, this paper attempts to shed light on the closed-end fund (CEF) discount puzzle. CEF discounts increased substantially after COVID-19, and I identify a causal role of sentiment in this effect. I show that COVID-19 reduced individual investor sentiment. Using the difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, I find that CEFs with higher sentiment beta or higher retail ownership experienced a larger increase in discounts after the COVID-19 shock. The DiD results are unlikely to be driven by alternative channels such as the liquidity, expense, payout, and leverage channels. Overall, the results support the sentiment-based explanation of CEF discounts.","PeriodicalId":20373,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Health eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90390332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Understanding how the Papua New Guinea (PNG) agricultural economy and associated household consumption is affected by climate, market and other shocks requires attention to linkages and substitution effects across various products and the markets in which they are traded. In this study, we use a multi-market simulation model of the PNG food economy that explicitly includes production, consumption, external trade and prices of key agricultural commodities to quantify the likely impacts of a set of potential shocks on household welfare and food security in PNG.
In this study, we use a multi-market simulation model of the PNG food economy that explicitly includes production, consumption, external trade and prices of key agricultural commodities to quantify the likely impacts of a set of potential shocks on household welfare and food security in PNG. We have built the model to be flexible in order to explore different potential scenarios and then identify where and how households are most affected by an unexpected shock. The model is designed using region and country-level data sources that inform the structure of the PNG food economy, allowing for a data-driven evaluation of potential impacts on agricultural production, food prices, and food consumption. Thus, as PNG confronts different unexpected challenges within its agricultural economy, the model presented in this paper can be adapted to evaluate the potential impact and necessary response by geographic region of an unexpected economic shock on the food economy of the country.
We present ten simulations modeling the effects of various shocks on PNG’s economy. The first group of scenarios consider the effects of shocks to production of specific agricultural commodities including: 1) a decrease on maize and sorghum output due to Fall Armyworm; 2) reduction in pig production due to a potential outbreak of African Swine Fever; 3) decline in sweet potato production similar to the 2015/16 El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) climate shock; and 4) a decline in poultry production due to COVID-19 restrictions on domestic mobility and trade. A synopsis of this report, which focuses on the COVID-19 related shocks on the PNG economy is also available online (Diao et al., 2020).
The second group of simulations focus on COVID-19-related changes in international prices, increased marketing costs in international and domestic trade, and reductions in urban incomes. We simulate a 1) 30 percent increase in the price of imported rice, 2) a 30 percent decrease in world prices for major PNG agricultural exports, 3) higher trade transaction costs due to restrictions on the movement of people (traders) and goods given social distancing measures of COVID-19, and 4) potential economic recession causing urban household income to fall by 10 percent. Finally, the last simulation considers the combined effect of all COVID-19 related shocks combining the above scenarios into a single simulation.
了解巴布亚新几内亚农业经济和相关家庭消费如何受到气候、市场和其他冲击的影响，需要关注各种产品及其交易市场之间的联系和替代效应。在本研究中，我们使用巴布亚新几内亚粮食经济的多市场模拟模型，明确包括主要农产品的生产、消费、对外贸易和价格，以量化一系列潜在冲击对巴布亚新几内亚家庭福利和粮食安全的可能影响。在本研究中，我们使用巴布亚新几内亚粮食经济的多市场模拟模型，明确包括主要农产品的生产、消费、对外贸易和价格，以量化一系列潜在冲击对巴布亚新几内亚家庭福利和粮食安全的可能影响。我们建立了灵活的模型，以便探索不同的潜在情况，然后确定家庭在哪里以及如何受到意外冲击的最大影响。该模型利用区域和国家一级的数据源设计，这些数据源提供了巴布亚新几内亚粮食经济结构的信息，允许对农业生产、粮食价格和粮食消费的潜在影响进行数据驱动的评估。因此，由于巴布亚新几内亚在其农业经济中面临不同的意外挑战，本文提出的模型可以适用于评估意外经济冲击对该国粮食经济的潜在影响和按地理区域作出的必要反应。我们提出了十个模拟模拟各种冲击对巴布亚新几内亚经济的影响。第一组情景考虑了冲击对特定农产品生产的影响，包括:1)秋粘虫导致玉米和高粱产量下降;2)由于可能爆发非洲猪瘟导致生猪产量减少;3)甘薯产量下降与2015/16年厄尔Niño南方涛动(ENSO)气候冲击相似;4)由于COVID-19对国内流动和贸易的限制，家禽产量下降。该报告的摘要也可在网上获得(Diao et al.， 2020)，重点关注与COVID-19相关的冲击对巴布亚新几内亚经济的影响。第二组模拟侧重于与covid -19相关的国际价格变化、国际和国内贸易营销成本增加以及城市收入减少。我们模拟了以下情况:1)进口大米价格上涨30%，2)巴布亚新几内亚主要农产品出口的世界价格下跌30%，3)由于COVID-19的社会距离措施，人员(贸易商)和货物流动受到限制，贸易交易成本上升，以及4)潜在的经济衰退导致城市家庭收入下降10%。最后，最后一个模拟考虑了所有与COVID-19相关的冲击的综合影响，将上述情景合并为一个模拟。分析的一个关键结果是，城市家庭，特别是城市贫困人口，特别容易受到与COVID-19大流行相关的冲击。城市地区经济活动减少(假定会使城市非农业收入减少10%)，国内贸易中断导致营销成本增加，进口大米价格上涨30%，这些因素加在一起，使城市贫困和非贫困家庭的收入减少了近15%。然而，城市贫困家庭的卡路里消费量下降幅度最大，为19.8%，而城市非贫困家庭的卡路里消费量下降幅度为15.8%。在这些模拟中，农村家庭受COVID-19相关冲击的影响要小得多。农村家庭收入主要受到城市需求减少和市场混乱的影响，仅下降了约4%。然而，农村贫困人口和非贫困人口的卡路里消费量分别下降了5.5%和4.2%。
{"title":"Effects of COVID-19 and Other Shocks on Papua New Guinea's Food Economy: A Multi-Market Simulation Analysis","authors":"X. Diao, P. Dorosh, Peixun Fang, E. Schmidt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3789126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3789126","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding how the Papua New Guinea (PNG) agricultural economy and associated household consumption is affected by climate, market and other shocks requires attention to linkages and substitution effects across various products and the markets in which they are traded. In this study, we use a multi-market simulation model of the PNG food economy that explicitly includes production, consumption, external trade and prices of key agricultural commodities to quantify the likely impacts of a set of potential shocks on household welfare and food security in PNG. <br><br>In this study, we use a multi-market simulation model of the PNG food economy that explicitly includes production, consumption, external trade and prices of key agricultural commodities to quantify the likely impacts of a set of potential shocks on household welfare and food security in PNG. We have built the model to be flexible in order to explore different potential scenarios and then identify where and how households are most affected by an unexpected shock. The model is designed using region and country-level data sources that inform the structure of the PNG food economy, allowing for a data-driven evaluation of potential impacts on agricultural production, food prices, and food consumption. Thus, as PNG confronts different unexpected challenges within its agricultural economy, the model presented in this paper can be adapted to evaluate the potential impact and necessary response by geographic region of an unexpected economic shock on the food economy of the country. <br><br>We present ten simulations modeling the effects of various shocks on PNG’s economy. The first group of scenarios consider the effects of shocks to production of specific agricultural commodities including: 1) a decrease on maize and sorghum output due to Fall Armyworm; 2) reduction in pig production due to a potential outbreak of African Swine Fever; 3) decline in sweet potato production similar to the 2015/16 El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) climate shock; and 4) a decline in poultry production due to COVID-19 restrictions on domestic mobility and trade. A synopsis of this report, which focuses on the COVID-19 related shocks on the PNG economy is also available online (Diao et al., 2020).<br><br>The second group of simulations focus on COVID-19-related changes in international prices, increased marketing costs in international and domestic trade, and reductions in urban incomes. We simulate a 1) 30 percent increase in the price of imported rice, 2) a 30 percent decrease in world prices for major PNG agricultural exports, 3) higher trade transaction costs due to restrictions on the movement of people (traders) and goods given social distancing measures of COVID-19, and 4) potential economic recession causing urban household income to fall by 10 percent. Finally, the last simulation considers the combined effect of all COVID-19 related shocks combining the above scenarios into a single simulation. <br><br","PeriodicalId":20373,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Health eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78286840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The response of the international community to the COVID-19 pandemic has been characterized by a lack of transparency, substantial gaps in scientific understanding, inconsistent communication, lack of capacity for the manufacture of vaccines, substantial gaps in preparedness for diagnostics and personal protective equipment, absence to date of an effective treatment, and political conflict. What makes most of these problems the more glaring is that we understood the gaps well in advance, but we were not prepared to address them. Regrettably for the international community, the pandemic struck during a confluence of political trends that culminated in strong nationalist and anti-science political movements. Can International law provide a more resilient framework in which the decisions of national leaders during crisis are less likely to cause harm? A framework in which we are less susceptible to ad hoc and incoherent decision making? In a way we are asking whether international law can child-proof the working space of global public health, making it less susceptible to the transient ebb and flow of national political leaders? A fully functioning global public health system would prepare us in advance to address viral and other pathogenic outbreaks in terms of robust R&D platforms and sound manufacturing infrastructure. It would alert us to an outbreak at the earliest possible date, and it would instruct us regarding the appropriate interim protective measures to take, all without triggering perceptions of personal insecurity that lead to social unrest and conflict. While flagging some of the potential obstacles it is nevertheless worth considering the possibility for a comprehensive International arrangement to prepare for and address future pandemic outbreaks. Given the many interests implicated by pandemic outbreaks – which COVID-19 reminds us can have extensive and devastating impacts around the world – it might be well to envisage a self-standing regime, or a regime negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. This would take into account the “political equality” of the principal multilateral institutions. An international convention or other mechanism to address a pandemic must create winners. It cannot be perceived as depriving Party A to satisfy the needs of Party B.
{"title":"Child-Proofing Global Public Health in Anticipation of Emergency","authors":"Frederick M. Abbott","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3789677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3789677","url":null,"abstract":"The response of the international community to the COVID-19 pandemic has been characterized by a lack of transparency, substantial gaps in scientific understanding, inconsistent communication, lack of capacity for the manufacture of vaccines, substantial gaps in preparedness for diagnostics and personal protective equipment, absence to date of an effective treatment, and political conflict. What makes most of these problems the more glaring is that we understood the gaps well in advance, but we were not prepared to address them. \u0000 \u0000Regrettably for the international community, the pandemic struck during a confluence of political trends that culminated in strong nationalist and anti-science political movements. \u0000 \u0000Can International law provide a more resilient framework in which the decisions of national leaders during crisis are less likely to cause harm? A framework in which we are less susceptible to ad hoc and incoherent decision making? In a way we are asking whether international law can child-proof the working space of global public health, making it less susceptible to the transient ebb and flow of national political leaders? \u0000 \u0000A fully functioning global public health system would prepare us in advance to address viral and other pathogenic outbreaks in terms of robust R&D platforms and sound manufacturing infrastructure. It would alert us to an outbreak at the earliest possible date, and it would instruct us regarding the appropriate interim protective measures to take, all without triggering perceptions of personal insecurity that lead to social unrest and conflict. \u0000 \u0000While flagging some of the potential obstacles it is nevertheless worth considering the possibility for a comprehensive International arrangement to prepare for and address future pandemic outbreaks. Given the many interests implicated by pandemic outbreaks – which COVID-19 reminds us can have extensive and devastating impacts around the world – it might be well to envisage a self-standing regime, or a regime negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. This would take into account the “political equality” of the principal multilateral institutions. \u0000 \u0000An international convention or other mechanism to address a pandemic must create winners. It cannot be perceived as depriving Party A to satisfy the needs of Party B.","PeriodicalId":20373,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Health eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75112751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-10DOI: 10.18288/1994-5124-2021-1-82-103
V. Komarov, V. Akimova
The article is dedicated to the analysis of the approved strategies for sustainable mobility (sustainable transport) in the world’s leading cities. It is shown that most strategic documents contain similar principles and goals that determine the transformation vectors for cities. The fundamental principles include hierarchy of priorities (not only financial, but also in terms of equitable distribution of urban space, starting from pedestrian and bicycle mobility and public transport and ending with parking); increasing ecomobility, involving the “80:20” principle (fixing the goal of bringing the share of sustainable modes of mobility to 80% and decreasing the share of cars to 20% by 2030); “healthy streets, healthy people” and “complete streets” (reformatting car-oriented streets into bicycle and pedestrian spaces, administrative restrictions for cars, internalization of externalities); development of environmentally friendly high-speed rail public transport and the creation of preferential access rights for public transport; Vision Zero (zero tolerance for road accidents); compactness, polycentricity, and transit-oriented development; smart transport and multimodality; consideration of the transport system as one of the integral parts of the city’s stability (holistic view), etc. It is determined that the analyzed mobility strategies organically integrate into the general trajectory of sustainable long-term development and promotion of real human wellbeing. Most strategies focus on personal experience of their beneficiaries, which lies at the heart of any reform (people-centered approach). An additional benefit resulting from the implementation of sustainable mobility strategies is lower density and safer distancing within cities, which is highly relevant in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as reduced freight prices and development of a more just and secure city environment.
{"title":"Стратегии уcтойчивой мобильноcти: лучшие мировые практики (Strategies for Sustainable Urban Mobility: Analysis of Best Practices )","authors":"V. Komarov, V. Akimova","doi":"10.18288/1994-5124-2021-1-82-103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2021-1-82-103","url":null,"abstract":"The article is dedicated to the analysis of the approved strategies for sustainable mobility (sustainable transport) in the world’s leading cities. It is shown that most strategic documents contain similar principles and goals that determine the transformation vectors for cities. The fundamental principles include hierarchy of priorities (not only financial, but also in terms of equitable distribution of urban space, starting from pedestrian and bicycle mobility and public transport and ending with parking); increasing ecomobility, involving the “80:20” principle (fixing the goal of bringing the share of sustainable modes of mobility to 80% and decreasing the share of cars to 20% by 2030); “healthy streets, healthy people” and “complete streets” (reformatting car-oriented streets into bicycle and pedestrian spaces, administrative restrictions for cars, internalization of externalities); development of environmentally friendly high-speed rail public transport and the creation of preferential access rights for public transport; Vision Zero (zero tolerance for road accidents); compactness, polycentricity, and transit-oriented development; smart transport and multimodality; consideration of the transport system as one of the integral parts of the city’s stability (holistic view), etc. It is determined that the analyzed mobility strategies organically integrate into the general trajectory of sustainable long-term development and promotion of real human wellbeing. Most strategies focus on personal experience of their beneficiaries, which lies at the heart of any reform (people-centered approach). An additional benefit resulting from the implementation of sustainable mobility strategies is lower density and safer distancing within cities, which is highly relevant in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as reduced freight prices and development of a more just and secure city environment.","PeriodicalId":20373,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Health eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86312967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a flow-based methodology for real-time unemployment rate projections and shows that this approach performed considerably better at the onset of the COVID-19 recession in the spring 2020 in predicting the peak unemployment rate as well as its rapid decline over the year. It presents an alternative scenario analysis for 2021 based on this methodology and argues that the unemployment rate is likely to decline to 5.4 percent by the end of 2021. The predictive power of the methodology comes from its combined use of real-time data with the flow approach.
{"title":"Unemployment in the Time of Covid-19: A Flow-Based Approach to Real-Time Unemployment Projections","authors":"A. Sahin, Murat Tasci, Jin Yan","doi":"10.3386/W28445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28445","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a flow-based methodology for real-time unemployment rate projections and shows that this approach performed considerably better at the onset of the COVID-19 recession in the spring 2020 in predicting the peak unemployment rate as well as its rapid decline over the year. It presents an alternative scenario analysis for 2021 based on this methodology and argues that the unemployment rate is likely to decline to 5.4 percent by the end of 2021. The predictive power of the methodology comes from its combined use of real-time data with the flow approach.","PeriodicalId":20373,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Health eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76081470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ester Faia, A. Fuster, Vincenzo Pezone, basit. zafar
We conduct two survey experiments to study which information people choose to consume and how it affects their beliefs. In the first experiment, respondents choose between optimistic and pessimistic article headlines related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and are then randomly shown one of the articles. Respondents with more pessimistic prior beliefs tend to prefer pessimistic headlines, providing evidence of confirmation bias. Additionally, respondents assigned to the less preferred article discount its information. The second experiment studies the role of partisan views, uncovering strong source dependence: news source revelation further distorts information acquisition, eliminating the role of priors in article choice.
{"title":"Biases in Information Selection and Processing: Survey Evidence from the Pandemic","authors":"Ester Faia, A. Fuster, Vincenzo Pezone, basit. zafar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3783215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3783215","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We conduct two survey experiments to study which information people choose to consume and how it affects their beliefs. In the first experiment, respondents choose between optimistic and pessimistic article headlines related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and are then randomly shown one of the articles. Respondents with more pessimistic prior beliefs tend to prefer pessimistic headlines, providing evidence of confirmation bias. Additionally, respondents assigned to the less preferred article discount its information. The second experiment studies the role of partisan views, uncovering strong source dependence: news source revelation further distorts information acquisition, eliminating the role of priors in article choice.","PeriodicalId":20373,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Health eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89458913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：