Muhammad Atif, Mohammed Hossain, M. Alam, M. Goergen
Abstract This paper examines the effect of board gender diversity on renewable energy consumption. Using a panel of 11,677 firm-year observations from the USA for 2008–2016, we find a positive relationship between board gender diversity and renewable energy consumption. Moreover, boards require two or more women for women to have a significant impact on renewable energy consumption, consistent with the critical mass theory. Further, we document that the positive impact of female directors on renewable energy consumption stems from female independent rather than female executive directors. Finally, we find a positive effect of the interaction between renewable energy consumption and board gender diversity on firm financial performance. Our findings are robust to different identification strategies and estimation techniques.
{"title":"Does Board Gender Diversity Affect Renewable Energy Consumption?","authors":"Muhammad Atif, Mohammed Hossain, M. Alam, M. Goergen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3428921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3428921","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the effect of board gender diversity on renewable energy consumption. Using a panel of 11,677 firm-year observations from the USA for 2008–2016, we find a positive relationship between board gender diversity and renewable energy consumption. Moreover, boards require two or more women for women to have a significant impact on renewable energy consumption, consistent with the critical mass theory. Further, we document that the positive impact of female directors on renewable energy consumption stems from female independent rather than female executive directors. Finally, we find a positive effect of the interaction between renewable energy consumption and board gender diversity on firm financial performance. Our findings are robust to different identification strategies and estimation techniques.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115028987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. French, Thibaut G. Morillon, Adam S. Yore, Andrew E. Kern
Direct listing offers a new, but unproven method of going public for industrial firms. We use prior direct listings by public non-listed REITs (PNLRs) as laboratory to explore the impact of exchange membership on the corporate governance resulting from these transactions. To that end, we examine companies with publicly owned, but non-listed shares in a unique setting where the impacts of listing are distinct from the confounding effect of capital raising inherent in a traditional IPO. Our evidence suggests that younger, more profitable PNLRs with better governance and professional management are more likely to directly list. Moreover, we find that internal corporate governance improves beyond the exchange’s requirements upon listing. The data indicates institutional ownership increases following the listing and we confirm these changes are not due capital raising.
{"title":"The Impact of Exchange Listing on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Direct Listings","authors":"D. French, Thibaut G. Morillon, Adam S. Yore, Andrew E. Kern","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3185065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3185065","url":null,"abstract":"Direct listing offers a new, but unproven method of going public for industrial firms. We use prior direct listings by public non-listed REITs (PNLRs) as laboratory to explore the impact of exchange membership on the corporate governance resulting from these transactions. To that end, we examine companies with publicly owned, but non-listed shares in a unique setting where the impacts of listing are distinct from the confounding effect of capital raising inherent in a traditional IPO. Our evidence suggests that younger, more profitable PNLRs with better governance and professional management are more likely to directly list. Moreover, we find that internal corporate governance improves beyond the exchange’s requirements upon \u0000listing. The data indicates institutional ownership increases following the listing and we confirm these changes are not due capital raising.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123317110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Skilled workers often have strong bargaining positions in compensation negotiations. This paper studies the implications for firm financing, workers' compensation structure, and turnover. There are three main insights. First, workers in strong bargaining positions demand equity-based compensation. While individually optimal, such compensation increases workers' incentives to leave when other key workers are leaving. Second, firms can reduce contagious departures by securing credit lines and offering fixed wages. Third, the paper shows an efficient way for workers to play firms making different types of compensation offers against each other. The evidence supports the predicted relation between bargaining power and compensation structure.
{"title":"Financing Skilled Labor","authors":"V. Vladimirov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3227946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3227946","url":null,"abstract":"Skilled workers often have strong bargaining positions in compensation negotiations. This paper studies the implications for firm financing, workers' compensation structure, and turnover. There are three main insights. First, workers in strong bargaining positions demand equity-based compensation. While individually optimal, such compensation increases workers' incentives to leave when other key workers are leaving. Second, firms can reduce contagious departures by securing credit lines and offering fixed wages. Third, the paper shows an efficient way for workers to play firms making different types of compensation offers against each other. The evidence supports the predicted relation between bargaining power and compensation structure.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127828793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we find that the incentive of acquiring data assets is an important driver behind mergers and acquisitions (MA and firms have a higher likelihood of becoming targets after the law enforcement of their states. Furthermore, we find a deal following the law enforcement is more likely to occur in industries where data assets are rich and strategically important. The results confirm that acquiring data assets is indeed an underlying channel for M&As.
{"title":"Mergers and Acquisitions for Data Assets: Evidence from Data Breach Noti�?cation Laws","authors":"Lai Wei, Yuan Sun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3522032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3522032","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we find that the incentive of acquiring data assets is an important driver behind mergers and acquisitions (MA and firms have a higher likelihood of becoming targets after the law enforcement of their states. Furthermore, we find a deal following the law enforcement is more likely to occur in industries where data assets are rich and strategically important. The results confirm that acquiring data assets is indeed an underlying channel for M&As.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131288324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate whether corporate board members with media expertise influence firms’ media coverage and media slant. We find that firms with a media professional on the board of directors receive more media coverage, and articles written about them include fewer negative words compared with articles on control firms. These findings highlight the importance of the composition of the board of directors as a determinant of information disclosure mechanism.
{"title":"Benefits of Publicity","authors":"Umit G. Gurun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2706969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2706969","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether corporate board members with media expertise influence firms’ media coverage and media slant. We find that firms with a media professional on the board of directors receive more media coverage, and articles written about them include fewer negative words compared with articles on control firms. These findings highlight the importance of the composition of the board of directors as a determinant of information disclosure mechanism.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116908016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates debt market benefit of socially responsible firms. We find that better CSR performance increases the share of public debt to total debt. Such effect is stronger for firms facing high agency and information costs, confirming that CSR drives debt structure by mitigating these frictions. The effect of CSR is weaker for firms in sinful industries or in low-trust regions where CSR is likely to be viewed as window dressing. Furthermore, utilizing BP oil spill event, we document that the effect of CSR becomes stronger after this event but only for non-sinful firms. This finding indicates that investors seem to value CSR more after a severe environmental disaster only for non-sinful firms, and they still perceive CSR as window dressing for sinful firms. Our evidence survives endogeneity checks and suggests that CSR facilitates firms’ access to public debt market especially when CSR is perceived as a genuine commitment.
{"title":"Does Corporate Social Responsibility Facilitate Public Debt Financing?","authors":"X. Chang, Bin Xu, Yung Chiang Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3442970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3442970","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates debt market benefit of socially responsible firms. We find that better CSR performance increases the share of public debt to total debt. Such effect is stronger for firms facing high agency and information costs, confirming that CSR drives debt structure by mitigating these frictions. The effect of CSR is weaker for firms in sinful industries or in low-trust regions where CSR is likely to be viewed as window dressing. Furthermore, utilizing BP oil spill event, we document that the effect of CSR becomes stronger after this event but only for non-sinful firms. This finding indicates that investors seem to value CSR more after a severe environmental disaster only for non-sinful firms, and they still perceive CSR as window dressing for sinful firms. Our evidence survives endogeneity checks and suggests that CSR facilitates firms’ access to public debt market especially when CSR is perceived as a genuine commitment.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127497697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A common prediction in research on practice diffusion is a “strength in numbers” effect (i.e., that a growing number of past adopters will increase the number of future adopters). We advance and te...
{"title":"Strength and Weakness in Numbers? Unpacking the Role of Prevalence in the Diffusion of Reverse Mergers","authors":"I. Naumovska, E. Zajac, Peggy M. Lee","doi":"10.5465/amj.2018.0716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2018.0716","url":null,"abstract":"A common prediction in research on practice diffusion is a “strength in numbers” effect (i.e., that a growing number of past adopters will increase the number of future adopters). We advance and te...","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132577806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Stock exchange mergers can lead to increased efficiency; however, increasing levels of concentration can potentially lead to the exercise of market power. We investigate the market power repercussions of stock exchange mergers and find that the industry’s concentration levels have not significantly increased and the concentration levels do not influence exchanges’ profitability in the post-merger period. The profitability of the merging exchanges in the post-merger period is largely influenced by efficiencies in revenue generation and cost management. The absence of evidence that stock exchange mergers lead to the exercise of market power suggests that there does not appear to be an immediate need for regulatory agencies to be overly concerned about mergers among stock exchanges leading to the exploitation of market power to the detriment of consumer welfare.
{"title":"Are Super Stock Exchange Mergers Motivated by Efficiency or Market Power Gains?","authors":"Isaac Otchere, Kobana Abukari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3665841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3665841","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Stock exchange mergers can lead to increased efficiency; however, increasing levels of concentration can potentially lead to the exercise of market power. We investigate the market power repercussions of stock exchange mergers and find that the industry’s concentration levels have not significantly increased and the concentration levels do not influence exchanges’ profitability in the post-merger period. The profitability of the merging exchanges in the post-merger period is largely influenced by efficiencies in revenue generation and cost management. The absence of evidence that stock exchange mergers lead to the exercise of market power suggests that there does not appear to be an immediate need for regulatory agencies to be overly concerned about mergers among stock exchanges leading to the exploitation of market power to the detriment of consumer welfare.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"708 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132396097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Is the relationship between environmental munificence, dynamism, and corporate social responsibility contingent on board monitoring power? This is the research question examined in this study of an international sample of 956 listed firms from 2006 to 2014. After applying several regression models for panel data based on Tobit and generalized method of moments' (GMM) estimation, this paper supports the assertion that in munificent and dynamic environments, managers show a lower commitment to social and environmental issues. Proactive promotion of social and environmental concerns only occurs in firms with efficient internal corporate governance mechanisms, resulting in a moderating effect of board monitoring power—board independence and non‐duality of CEO—on the association between environmental conditions and corporate social responsibility. Theoretically, this moderating effect triggers managers to increase their socially responsible performance in munificent and dynamic environments because: (a) these boards reinforce the orientation of a firm towards the meeting of stakeholders' expectations; and (b) managers aim to protect themselves from the greater supervision and control exerted by the board in order to maintain their decision‐making freedom in environments of superior growth, resources, market uncertainty, and instability.
{"title":"The Moderating Role of Board Monitoring Power in the Relationship between Environmental Conditions and Corporate Social Responsibility","authors":"Isabel‐María García‐Sánchez","doi":"10.1111/beer.12242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/beer.12242","url":null,"abstract":"Is the relationship between environmental munificence, dynamism, and corporate social responsibility contingent on board monitoring power? This is the research question examined in this study of an international sample of 956 listed firms from 2006 to 2014. After applying several regression models for panel data based on Tobit and generalized method of moments' (GMM) estimation, this paper supports the assertion that in munificent and dynamic environments, managers show a lower commitment to social and environmental issues. Proactive promotion of social and environmental concerns only occurs in firms with efficient internal corporate governance mechanisms, resulting in a moderating effect of board monitoring power—board independence and non‐duality of CEO—on the association between environmental conditions and corporate social responsibility. Theoretically, this moderating effect triggers managers to increase their socially responsible performance in munificent and dynamic environments because: (a) these boards reinforce the orientation of a firm towards the meeting of stakeholders' expectations; and (b) managers aim to protect themselves from the greater supervision and control exerted by the board in order to maintain their decision‐making freedom in environments of superior growth, resources, market uncertainty, and instability.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130589927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Non-performing loans (NPLs) plays a significant role as they reflect the credit quality of the loan portfolio of banks, and in aggregate terms, reflect the credit quality of the loan portfolio of the banking sector in a country. The study aims to examine the influence of corporate governance on non-performing loans of listed banks in Sri Lanka for the period from 2013 to 2017. In this study, listed banks are selected as sample for the purpose of data analysis with help of Pearson’s correlation and multiple regressions. Secondary data from the annual reports of banks and journals was used for the analysis purpose. The findings show that board activities have a significant influence on non-performing loans of listed banks in Sri Lanka whereas other corporate governance variables such as board size, board independence and CEO duality have no significant influence on non-performing loans. This study would hopefully benefit to the academicians, researchers, policy-makers and practitioners of Sri Lanka and other similar countries.
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Non–Performing Loans: Evidence From Listed Banks in Sri Lanka","authors":"S. Balagobei","doi":"10.4038/ijabf.v5i1.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4038/ijabf.v5i1.40","url":null,"abstract":"Non-performing loans (NPLs) plays a significant role as they reflect the credit quality of the loan portfolio of banks, and in aggregate terms, reflect the credit quality of the loan portfolio of the banking sector in a country. The study aims to examine the influence of corporate governance on non-performing loans of listed banks in Sri Lanka for the period from 2013 to 2017. In this study, listed banks are selected as sample for the purpose of data analysis with help of Pearson’s correlation and multiple regressions. Secondary data from the annual reports of banks and journals was used for the analysis purpose. The findings show that board activities have a significant influence on non-performing loans of listed banks in Sri Lanka whereas other corporate governance variables such as board size, board independence and CEO duality have no significant influence on non-performing loans. This study would hopefully benefit to the academicians, researchers, policy-makers and practitioners of Sri Lanka and other similar countries.","PeriodicalId":204440,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Finance eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114897102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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