We present a review of mathematical and engineering science foundation of the risk matrix (RM). The objective was to locate and evaluate information surrounding its use. RM is governed by number theory, set theory, metrology, and functional analysis, which explains the strengths and weakness of its use. Although incorrectly reported, ordinal multiplication rigidly sets the cell numeric allocation. No scientific support was found for changing the ordinal ranks, although one reduction is introduced. Existing evidence suggests that the RM is unreliable. An example is given. Suggestions for beneficial use of the RM are provided.
{"title":"Retrospective on the risk matrix, part II: Mathematics","authors":"James A. Moseman","doi":"10.1002/prs.12614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12614","url":null,"abstract":"We present a review of mathematical and engineering science foundation of the risk matrix (RM). The objective was to locate and evaluate information surrounding its use. RM is governed by number theory, set theory, metrology, and functional analysis, which explains the strengths and weakness of its use. Although incorrectly reported, ordinal multiplication rigidly sets the cell numeric allocation. No scientific support was found for changing the ordinal ranks, although one reduction is introduced. Existing evidence suggests that the RM is unreliable. An example is given. Suggestions for beneficial use of the RM are provided.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"144 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140940477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Because open‐path gas detectors offer superior technical performance, leakage monitoring systems tend to use a hybrid layout of point and open‐path gas detectors. However, most research on the optimized layout of leakage monitoring has focused only on point gas detectors. In this paper, an optimization model for a hybrid layout of point and open‐path gas detectors was proposed considering the cost–benefit ratio and detection time. As the measured value of an open‐path gas detector is an integral concentration, a monitor line in the simulation was calculated via the approximate rectangle method. The results showed that the use of a multiobjective gas detector layout considering the cost–benefit ratio and an improved non‐dominated sorting genetic algorithm (NSGA‐II) could optimize the layout of hybrid detectors. The hybrid layout was analyzed in a case study of process facilities at a natural gas station. As the number of detectors increased (safety investment), the proportion of open‐path gas detectors increased, improving both leakage monitoring performance and the cost–benefit ratio. Additionally, the layout of the point gas detectors was analyzed. A comparison of objective function values for detection time showed the superiority of the hybrid layout in our research.
{"title":"Optimal hybrid layout of point and open‐path gas detectors in process facilities of natural gas stations","authors":"Fei Xiao, Hao Qian, Lisheng Liu, Lingling Shao","doi":"10.1002/prs.12607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12607","url":null,"abstract":"Because open‐path gas detectors offer superior technical performance, leakage monitoring systems tend to use a hybrid layout of point and open‐path gas detectors. However, most research on the optimized layout of leakage monitoring has focused only on point gas detectors. In this paper, an optimization model for a hybrid layout of point and open‐path gas detectors was proposed considering the cost–benefit ratio and detection time. As the measured value of an open‐path gas detector is an integral concentration, a monitor line in the simulation was calculated via the approximate rectangle method. The results showed that the use of a multiobjective gas detector layout considering the cost–benefit ratio and an improved non‐dominated sorting genetic algorithm (NSGA‐II) could optimize the layout of hybrid detectors. The hybrid layout was analyzed in a case study of process facilities at a natural gas station. As the number of detectors increased (safety investment), the proportion of open‐path gas detectors increased, improving both leakage monitoring performance and the cost–benefit ratio. Additionally, the layout of the point gas detectors was analyzed. A comparison of objective function values for detection time showed the superiority of the hybrid layout in our research.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140940596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Special Issue: The 4th International Symposium on Urban and Industrial Safety","authors":"Xin Zhang, Yong Pan","doi":"10.1002/prs.12616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12616","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140940604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since its public debut in late 2022, ChatGPT has sparked growing interest in AI (Artificial Intelligence) within the Process Safety Management (PSM) community, serving as a tool for data capture and industry‐wide knowledge utilization. While machine learning (ML) had previously been explored in process safety, the emergence of large language models with chat‐style interfaces has made AI more accessible to non‐experts. Over the past year, I have managed the “AI‐PSM” LinkedIn group, facilitating discussions among PSM practitioners on the AI applications in PSM. These discussions have been analyzed using Prof. Thomas Malone's “4 Roles of AI” framework. This paper explores prevailing sentiments among AI‐PSM group members using Malone's model, addressing challenges such as mathematical problem‐solving, errors, and benchmarking.
{"title":"AI‐PSM: Where are we now?","authors":"Rainer Hoff","doi":"10.1002/prs.12610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12610","url":null,"abstract":"Since its public debut in late 2022, ChatGPT has sparked growing interest in AI (Artificial Intelligence) within the Process Safety Management (PSM) community, serving as a tool for data capture and industry‐wide knowledge utilization. While machine learning (ML) had previously been explored in process safety, the emergence of large language models with chat‐style interfaces has made AI more accessible to non‐experts. Over the past year, I have managed the “AI‐PSM” LinkedIn group, facilitating discussions among PSM practitioners on the AI applications in PSM. These discussions have been analyzed using Prof. Thomas Malone's “4 Roles of AI” framework. This paper explores prevailing sentiments among AI‐PSM group members using Malone's model, addressing challenges such as mathematical problem‐solving, errors, and benchmarking.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"148 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140940680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introductions from the new editors of Process Safety Progress","authors":"Albert Ness","doi":"10.1002/prs.12612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12612","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140834555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A multi‐year review of process safety event learning data revealed that procedure usability and human factors were leading the trends of performance deviations by front‐line personnel. These insights prompted an enterprise‐wide Agile project to build capability focused on effective written guidance using science‐based tools and advanced error reduction techniques. Application of the Agile methodology was critical to gaining stakeholder commitment and establishing a comprehensive procedure integrity lifecycle to drive continuous improvement. Chemours partnered with an external consultant to create a holistic framework applicable to vital process safety roles with an orientation toward operational excellence. We share preliminary learnings and best practices leveraged from the nuclear industry, including systemic drivers to procedural deviations, the “top five error drivers” in written guidance, human performance modes (mental models), and key principles to enable human reliability.
{"title":"Procedure excellence: Changing paradigms to enable human reliability","authors":"Elliot Wolf‐Stokes, Rob Fisher","doi":"10.1002/prs.12603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12603","url":null,"abstract":"A multi‐year review of process safety event learning data revealed that procedure usability and human factors were leading the trends of performance deviations by front‐line personnel. These insights prompted an enterprise‐wide Agile project to build capability focused on effective written guidance using science‐based tools and advanced error reduction techniques. Application of the Agile methodology was critical to gaining stakeholder commitment and establishing a comprehensive procedure integrity lifecycle to drive continuous improvement. Chemours partnered with an external consultant to create a holistic framework applicable to vital process safety roles with an orientation toward operational excellence. We share preliminary learnings and best practices leveraged from the nuclear industry, including systemic drivers to procedural deviations, the “top five error drivers” in written guidance, human performance modes (mental models), and key principles to enable human reliability.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140635844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study aims to provide experimental data necessary for the validation of the test conditions given in the current standard for high‐pressure gas facility KGS FU111. A series of experiments were conducted in a shock tube on 15 specimens (walls and doors) constructed according to the design recommendations in KGS FP112. The design elements of 12 walls are the materials, the thickness, and the holder positions, while the 3 doors were made of steel plates with different types and structures. The shock tube tester used in dividual specimens were exposed to blast overpressure of 0.11 or 0.17 MPa. From the acquired data and visual inspection, we conclude that the current designs of blast mitigation for high‐pressure gas‐storage facilities in KGS FP112 are acceptable for an accidental overpressure of up to 0.17 MPa, provided that both sides of the wall are supported by auxiliary structures such as adjacent barriers. Furthermore, the walls and doors as in KGS FP112 show comparable protection performances. Nevertheless, recommendations for doors are as follows: it may require additional latches and remain closed, and when designing the facility, the doorway may be located in a place with less possibility of direct exposure to the overpressure.
{"title":"Experimental study on the explosion‐resistant performance of blast walls and doors of gas facilities","authors":"Young Jo Ryu, Yong Gil Lee, Dal Jae Park","doi":"10.1002/prs.12606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12606","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims to provide experimental data necessary for the validation of the test conditions given in the current standard for high‐pressure gas facility KGS FU111. A series of experiments were conducted in a shock tube on 15 specimens (walls and doors) constructed according to the design recommendations in KGS FP112. The design elements of 12 walls are the materials, the thickness, and the holder positions, while the 3 doors were made of steel plates with different types and structures. The shock tube tester used in dividual specimens were exposed to blast overpressure of 0.11 or 0.17 MPa. From the acquired data and visual inspection, we conclude that the current designs of blast mitigation for high‐pressure gas‐storage facilities in KGS FP112 are acceptable for an accidental overpressure of up to 0.17 MPa, provided that both sides of the wall are supported by auxiliary structures such as adjacent barriers. Furthermore, the walls and doors as in KGS FP112 show comparable protection performances. Nevertheless, recommendations for doors are as follows: it may require additional latches and remain closed, and when designing the facility, the doorway may be located in a place with less possibility of direct exposure to the overpressure.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140628368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The deep integration of information technology and process industry production systems makes system failure increasingly multi‐source and multi‐scale. In contrast to conventional hazard methods, system theoretic process analysis (STPA) can analyze the hazards in system control processes from the perspective of interactions among the system components. Theoretically, this method offers advantages that are better suited for modern production systems. However, as of now, the integration between STPA and process industrial production systems is still lacking. To address this issue, this study improved the original STPA method. First, we propose the “5 flows” concept for the process industrial cyber‐physical systems. The systems are described using multilevel flow modeling (MFM). This leads to the development of the MSTPA method, which is specifically designed to analyze the cyber‐physical hazards in process industrial production systems. Subsequently, the cyber‐physical hazards of a fluidized‐bed catalytic cracking unit are analyzed in detail using the MSTPA method as an example. The results show that MSTPA can identify cyber‐physical hazards in multiple dimensions. It is proved that, compared with the original STPA and traditional hazard methods, the MSTPA method can better identify cyber‐physical hazards in process industrial production systems.
{"title":"An integrated system theoretic process analysis with multilevel flow modeling for the identification of cyber‐physical hazards in a process industry","authors":"Feilong Zhang, Liangchao Chen, Bo Zhang, Jianwen Zhang, Qianlin Wang, Pengchao Wang, Jianfeng Yang, Zhan Dou","doi":"10.1002/prs.12604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12604","url":null,"abstract":"The deep integration of information technology and process industry production systems makes system failure increasingly multi‐source and multi‐scale. In contrast to conventional hazard methods, system theoretic process analysis (STPA) can analyze the hazards in system control processes from the perspective of interactions among the system components. Theoretically, this method offers advantages that are better suited for modern production systems. However, as of now, the integration between STPA and process industrial production systems is still lacking. To address this issue, this study improved the original STPA method. First, we propose the “5 flows” concept for the process industrial cyber‐physical systems. The systems are described using multilevel flow modeling (MFM). This leads to the development of the MSTPA method, which is specifically designed to analyze the cyber‐physical hazards in process industrial production systems. Subsequently, the cyber‐physical hazards of a fluidized‐bed catalytic cracking unit are analyzed in detail using the MSTPA method as an example. The results show that MSTPA can identify cyber‐physical hazards in multiple dimensions. It is proved that, compared with the original STPA and traditional hazard methods, the MSTPA method can better identify cyber‐physical hazards in process industrial production systems.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140564701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mohd Syazwan Mohd Shukor, Rozita Omar, Mohamad Rezi Abdul Hamid, Mohd Razif Harun, Mohamad Syazarudin Md Said
A risk analysis simulation was completed for a cryogenic distillation (Cryo‐D) pilot operation processing a natural gas feed stream containing H2S. This study placed significant H2S concentration inside the Cryo‐D and evaluated its dispersion after a simulated leak within the pilot plant. Sensitivity analysis using an in‐house process simulation identified the operating conditions that caused the highest surroundings H2S concentration. A computational fluid dynamic (CFD) dispersion simulation assessed H2S leakage at the bottom column section and its effects on operators. A case with 60 bar column pressure, −30°C inlet temperature and 10% H2S input gas had the highest mass flow rate of 4.74 kg/h H2S through a leak. Leaked H2S covers 50% of the building within 60 s. Within 120 s, H2S accumulates toward the column bottom. At 120 s, most operators are exposed to above 1000 ppm H2S, which may cause fatalities instantly. Recommendations include enhancing the ventilation of the building by installing ventilation near the base of the cryogenic column in order to lessen the exposure concentration. In conclusion, H2S leakage from an indoor Cryo‐D pilot plant can cause catastrophic consequences due to its rapid dispersion and accumulation throughout the building.
{"title":"Dispersion evaluation of hydrogen sulfide inclusion in a cryogenic distillation pilot plant","authors":"Mohd Syazwan Mohd Shukor, Rozita Omar, Mohamad Rezi Abdul Hamid, Mohd Razif Harun, Mohamad Syazarudin Md Said","doi":"10.1002/prs.12597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12597","url":null,"abstract":"A risk analysis simulation was completed for a cryogenic distillation (Cryo‐D) pilot operation processing a natural gas feed stream containing H<jats:sub>2</jats:sub>S. This study placed significant H<jats:sub>2</jats:sub>S concentration inside the Cryo‐D and evaluated its dispersion after a simulated leak within the pilot plant. Sensitivity analysis using an in‐house process simulation identified the operating conditions that caused the highest surroundings H<jats:sub>2</jats:sub>S concentration. A computational fluid dynamic (CFD) dispersion simulation assessed H<jats:sub>2</jats:sub>S leakage at the bottom column section and its effects on operators. A case with 60 bar column pressure, −30°C inlet temperature and 10% H<jats:sub>2</jats:sub>S input gas had the highest mass flow rate of 4.74 kg/h H<jats:sub>2</jats:sub>S through a leak. Leaked H<jats:sub>2</jats:sub>S covers 50% of the building within 60 s. Within 120 s, H<jats:sub>2</jats:sub>S accumulates toward the column bottom. At 120 s, most operators are exposed to above 1000 ppm H<jats:sub>2</jats:sub>S, which may cause fatalities instantly. Recommendations include enhancing the ventilation of the building by installing ventilation near the base of the cryogenic column in order to lessen the exposure concentration. In conclusion, H<jats:sub>2</jats:sub>S leakage from an indoor Cryo‐D pilot plant can cause catastrophic consequences due to its rapid dispersion and accumulation throughout the building.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140564581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A pre-startup safety review (PSSR) is a formal review of a chemical manufacturing process to verify that critical areas of the affected process have been assessed and addressed before using the process. It can be a new process or after modification to an existing process or operating conditions. There is concern about full implementation compliance, including designing the PSSR program, preparing the process to perform PSSR, following PSSR action items, and approving the PSSR report. This study aims to develop a PSSR Implementation Tool (PSSR-IT) via the Microsoft Excel platform. At the end of the self-assessment process, the end users were provided with the value of the percentage of compliance with PSSR requirements and a thorough review process prior to the start-up activities. A safety experts’ content validation index (CVI) was performed to ensure the tool's content was valid and sufficient for the PSSR process, followed by a case study. Feedback from process safety engineers and PSSR leaders as end users has been collected through the System Usability Scale (SUS). A total of 227 questions have been listed under 10 disciplines, including general info, operation, engineering, operational, process safety, health safety and environment (HSE), action log, final walk down, and approval that cover all essential aspects of review process prior to the start-up activities with CVI value of 0.98, k = 0.67. SUS findings demonstrated that all industrial experts and end users believe the tool is suitable and reliable, with a score >85%. Utilizing the PSSR tool will help the industries promote and improve the process safety program at the workplace.
{"title":"Development of pre-startup safety review implementation tool for safe operation in process plant","authors":"Amiruddin Abu Bakar, Hanida Abdul Aziz","doi":"10.1002/prs.12602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/prs.12602","url":null,"abstract":"A pre-startup safety review (PSSR) is a formal review of a chemical manufacturing process to verify that critical areas of the affected process have been assessed and addressed before using the process. It can be a new process or after modification to an existing process or operating conditions. There is concern about full implementation compliance, including designing the PSSR program, preparing the process to perform PSSR, following PSSR action items, and approving the PSSR report. This study aims to develop a PSSR Implementation Tool (PSSR-IT) via the Microsoft Excel platform. At the end of the self-assessment process, the end users were provided with the value of the percentage of compliance with PSSR requirements and a thorough review process prior to the start-up activities. A safety experts’ content validation index (CVI) was performed to ensure the tool's content was valid and sufficient for the PSSR process, followed by a case study. Feedback from process safety engineers and PSSR leaders as end users has been collected through the System Usability Scale (SUS). A total of 227 questions have been listed under 10 disciplines, including general info, operation, engineering, operational, process safety, health safety and environment (HSE), action log, final walk down, and approval that cover all essential aspects of review process prior to the start-up activities with CVI value of 0.98, k = 0.67. SUS findings demonstrated that all industrial experts and end users believe the tool is suitable and reliable, with a score >85%. Utilizing the PSSR tool will help the industries promote and improve the process safety program at the workplace.","PeriodicalId":20680,"journal":{"name":"Process Safety Progress","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140322916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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