Psychological Science最新文献

Many societal challenges are threshold dilemmas requiring people to cooperate to reach a threshold before group benefits can be reaped. Yet receiving feedback about others' outcomes relative to one's own (relative feedback) can undermine cooperation by focusing group members' attention on outperforming each other. We investigated the impact of relative feedback compared to individual feedback (only seeing one's own outcome) on cooperation in children from Germany and India (6- to 10-year-olds, N = 240). Using a threshold public-goods game with real water as a resource, we show that, although feedback had an effect, most groups sustained cooperation at high levels in both feedback conditions until the end of the game. Analyses of children's communication (14,374 codable utterances) revealed more references to social comparisons and more verbal efforts to coordinate in the relative-feedback condition. Thresholds can mitigate the most adverse effects of social comparisons by focusing attention on a common goal.

Laypeople believe that sharing their emotional experiences with others will improve their understanding of those experiences, but no clear empirical evidence supports this belief. To address this gap, we used data from four daily life studies (N = 659; student and community samples) to explore the association between social sharing and subsequent emotion differentiation, which involves labeling emotions with a high degree of complexity. Contrary to our expectations, we found that social sharing of emotional experiences was linked to greater subsequent emotion differentiation on occasions when people ruminated less than usual about these experiences. In contrast, on occasions when people ruminated more than usual about their experiences, social sharing of these experiences was linked to lower emotion differentiation. These effects held when we controlled for levels of negative emotion. Our findings suggest that putting feelings into words through sharing may only enable emotional precision when that sharing occurs without dwelling or perseverating.

Past work reveals a tight relationship between spatial attention and storage in visual working memory. But is spatially attending an item tantamount to working memory encoding? Here, we tracked electroencephalography (EEG) signatures of spatial attention and working memory encoding while independently manipulating the number of memory items and the spatial extent of attention in two studies of adults (N = 39; N = 33). Neural measures of spatial attention tracked the position and size of the attended area independent of the number of individuated items encoded into working memory. At the same time, multivariate decoding of the number of items stored in working memory was insensitive to variations in the breadth and position of spatial attention. Finally, representational similarity analyses provided converging evidence for a pure load signal that is insensitive to the spatial extent of the stored items. Thus, although spatial attention is a persistent partner of visual working memory, it is functionally dissociable from the selection and maintenance of individuated representations in working memory.

Children sometimes learn distracting information better than adults do, perhaps because of the development of selective attention. To understand this potential link, we ask how the learning of children (aged 7-9 years) and the learning of adults differ when information is the directed focus of attention versus when it is not. Participants viewed drawings of common objects and were told to attend to the drawings (Experiment 1: 42 children, 35 adults) or indicate when shapes (overlaid on the drawings) repeated (Experiment 2: 53 children, 60 adults). Afterward, participants identified fragments of these drawings as quickly as possible. Adults learned better than children when directed to attend to the drawings; however, when drawings were task irrelevant, children showed better learning than adults in the first half of the test. And although directing attention to the drawings improved learning in adults, children learned the drawings similarly across experiments regardless of whether the drawings were the focus of the task or entirely irrelevant.

Statistical learning is a powerful mechanism that enables the rapid extraction of regularities from sensory inputs. Although numerous studies have established that statistical learning serves a wide range of cognitive functions, it remains unknown whether statistical learning impacts conscious access. To address this question, we applied multiple paradigms in a series of experiments (N = 153 adults): Two reaction-time-based breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS) experiments showed that probable objects break through suppression faster than improbable objects. A preregistered accuracy-based b-CFS experiment showed higher localization accuracy for suppressed probable (versus improbable) objects under identical presentation durations, thereby excluding the possibility of processing differences emerging after conscious access (e.g., criterion shifts). Consistent with these findings, a supplemental visual-masking experiment reaffirmed higher localization sensitivity to probable objects over improbable objects. Together, these findings demonstrate that statistical learning alters the competition for scarce conscious resources, thereby potentially contributing to established effects of statistical learning on higher-level cognitive processes that require consciousness.

Using publicly available data from 299 preregistered replications from the social sciences, we found that the language used to describe a study can predict its replicability above and beyond a large set of controls related to the article characteristics, study design and results, author information, and replication effort. To understand why, we analyzed the textual differences between replicable and nonreplicable studies. Our findings suggest that the language in replicable studies is transparent and confident, written in a detailed and complex manner, and generally exhibits markers of truthful communication, possibly demonstrating the researchers' confidence in the study. Nonreplicable studies, however, are vaguely written and have markers of persuasion techniques, such as the use of positivity and clout. Thus, our findings allude to the possibility that authors of nonreplicable studies are more likely to make an effort, through their writing, to persuade readers of their (possibly weaker) results.

Working memory (WM) is a goal-directed memory system that actively maintains a limited amount of task-relevant information to serve the current goal. By this definition, WM maintenance should be terminated after the goal is accomplished, spontaneously removing no-longer-relevant information from WM. Past studies have failed to provide direct evidence of spontaneous removal of WM content by allowing participants to engage in a strategic reallocation of WM resources to competing information within WM. By contrast, we provide direct neural and behavioral evidence that visual WM content can be largely removed less than 1 s after it becomes obsolete, in the absence of a strategic allocation of resources (total N = 442 adults). These results demonstrate that visual WM is intrinsically a goal-directed system, and spontaneous removal provides a means for capacity-limited WM to keep up with ever-changing demands in a dynamic environment.

The capacity to leverage information from others' opinions is a hallmark of human cognition. Consequently, past research has investigated how we learn from others' testimony. Yet a distinct form of social information-aggregated opinion-increasingly guides our judgments and decisions. We investigated how people learn from such information by conducting three experiments with participants recruited online within the United States (N = 886) comparing the predictions of three computational models: a Bayesian solution to this problem that can be implemented by a simple strategy for combining proportions with prior beliefs, and two alternatives from epistemology and economics. Across all studies, we found the strongest concordance between participants' judgments and the predictions of the Bayesian model, though some participants' judgments were better captured by alternative strategies. These findings lay the groundwork for future research and show that people draw systematic inferences from aggregated opinion, often in line with a Bayesian solution.

Across four studies (N = 816 U.S. adults), we uncovered a gender stereotype about dual pathways to social hierarchy: Men were associated with power, and women were associated with status. We detected this pattern both explicitly and implicitly in perceptions of individuals drawn from Forbes magazine's powerful people lists in undergraduate and online samples. We examined social-cognitive implications, including prominent people's degree of recognition by individuals and society, and the formation of men's and women's self-concepts. We found that power (status) ratings predicted greater recognition of men (women) and lesser recognition of women (men). In terms of the self-concept, we found that women internalized the stereotype associating women with status more than power implicitly and explicitly. Although men explicitly reported having less status and more power than women, men implicitly associated the self with status as much as power. No gender differences emerged in the desires for power and status.