Psychological Science最新文献

Humans differ vastly in the confidence they assign to decisions. Although such under- and overconfidence relate to fundamental life outcomes, a computational account specifying the underlying mechanisms is currently lacking. We propose that prior beliefs in the ability to perform a task explain confidence differences across participants and tasks, despite similar performance. In two perceptual decision-making experiments, we show that manipulating prior beliefs about performance during training causally influences confidence in healthy adults (N = 50 each; Experiment 1: 8 men, one nonbinary; Experiment 2: 5 men) during a test phase, despite unaffected objective performance. This is true when prior beliefs are induced via manipulated comparative feedback and via manipulated training-phase difficulty. Our results were accounted for within an accumulation-to-bound model, explicitly modeling prior beliefs on the basis of earlier task exposure. Decision confidence is quantified as the probability of being correct conditional on prior beliefs, causing under- or overconfidence. We provide a fundamental mechanistic insight into the computations underlying under- and overconfidence.

With the rapid spread of information via social media, individuals are prone to misinformation exposure that they may utilize when forming beliefs. Over five experiments (total N = 815 adults, recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk in the United States), we investigated whether people could ignore quantitative information when they judged for themselves that it was misreported. Participants recruited online viewed sets of values sampled from Gaussian distributions to estimate the underlying means. They attempted to ignore invalid information, which were outlier values inserted into the value sequences. Results indicated participants were able to detect outliers. Nevertheless, participants' estimates were still biased in the direction of the outlier, even when they were most certain that they detected invalid information. The addition of visual warning cues and different task scenarios did not fully eliminate systematic over- and underestimation. These findings suggest that individuals may incorporate invalid information they meant to ignore when forming beliefs.

A major challenge in assessing psychological constructs such as impulsivity is the weak correlation between self-report and behavioral task measures that are supposed to assess the same construct. To address this issue, we developed a real-time driving task called the "highway task," in which participants often exhibit impulsive behaviors mirroring real-life impulsive traits captured by self-report questionnaires. Here, we show that a self-report measure of impulsivity is highly correlated with performance in the highway task but not with traditional behavioral task measures of impulsivity (47 adults aged 18-33 years). By integrating deep neural networks with an inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) algorithm, we inferred dynamic changes of subjective rewards during the highway task. The results indicated that impulsive participants attribute high subjective rewards to irrational or risky situations. Overall, our results suggest that using real-time tasks combined with IRL can help reconcile the discrepancy between self-report and behavioral task measures of psychological constructs.

Ethnic out-group members are disproportionately more often the victim of misidentifications. The so-called other-race effect (ORE), the tendency to better remember faces of individuals belonging to one's own ethnic in-group than faces belonging to an ethnic out-group, has been identified as one causal ingredient in such tragic incidents. Investigating an important aspect for the ORE-that is, emotional expression-the seminal study by Ackerman and colleagues (2006) found that White participants remembered neutral White faces better than neutral Black faces, but crucially, Black angry faces were better remembered than White angry faces (i.e., a reversed ORE). In the current study, we sought to replicate this study and directly tackle the potential causes for different results with later work. Three hundred ninety-six adult White U.S. citizens completed our study in which we manipulated the kind of employed stimuli (as in the original study vs. more standardized ones) whether participants knew of the recognition task already at the encoding phase. Additionally, participants were asked about the unusualness of the presented faces. We were able to replicate results from the Ackerman et al. (2006) study with the original stimuli but not with more standardized stimuli.

Four preregistered experiments (N = 4,307) explored whether anti-Christian bias claims can discreetly signal White allyship among Christian American adults. In Experiments 1 and 2, reading about anti-Christian bias led White, but not Black, Christians to perceive more anti-White bias. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate the connection between Christian and White can be leveraged by politicians in the form of a racial dog whistle. In Experiment 3, White Christians perceived a politician concerned about anti-Christian bias as caring more about anti-White bias and more willing to fight for White people (relative to a control). This politician was also perceived as less offensive than a politician concerned about anti-White bias. In Experiment 4, Black Christians perceived a politician concerned about anti-Christian bias as less offensive than one concerned about anti-White bias yet still unlikely to fight for Black people. Results suggest "anti-Christian bias" can provide a relatively palatable way to signal allegiance to White people.

The spread of misinformation is a pressing societal challenge. Prior work shows that shifting attention to accuracy increases the quality of people's news-sharing decisions. However, researchers disagree on whether accuracy-prompt interventions work for U.S. Republicans/conservatives and whether partisanship moderates the effect. In this preregistered adversarial collaboration, we tested this question using a multiverse meta-analysis (k = 21; N = 27,828). In all 70 models, accuracy prompts improved sharing discernment among Republicans/conservatives. We observed significant partisan moderation for single-headline "evaluation" treatments (a critical test for one research team) such that the effect was stronger among Democrats than Republicans. However, this moderation was not consistently robust across different operationalizations of ideology/partisanship, exclusion criteria, or treatment type. Overall, we observed significant partisan moderation in 50% of specifications (all of which were considered critical for the other team). We discuss the conditions under which moderation is observed and offer interpretations.

People sick with infectious illnesses face negative social outcomes, like exclusion, and may take steps to conceal their illnesses from others. In 10 studies of past, current, and projected illness, we examined the prevalence and predictors of infection concealment in adult samples of U.S. university students, health-care employees, and online crowdsourced workers (total N = 4,110). About 75% reported concealing illness in interpersonal interactions, possibly placing others in harm's way. Concealment motives were largely social (e.g., wanting to attend events like parties) and achievement oriented (e.g., completing work objectives). Disease characteristics, including potential harm and illness immediacy, also influenced concealment decisions. People imagining harmful (vs. mild) infections concealed illness less frequently, whereas participants who were actually sick concealed frequently regardless of illness harm, suggesting state-specific biases underlying concealment decisions. Disease concealment appears to be a widely prevalent behavior by which concealers trade off risks to others in favor of their own goals, creating potentially important public-health consequences.

In the present research, we explored social-identity threat caused by subtle acts of omission, specifically situations in which social-identity information is requested but one's identity is not among the options provided. We predicted that being unable to identify with one's group-that is, in the demographics section of a survey-may signal social-identity devaluation, eliciting negative affect (e.g., anger) and increasing the importance of the omitted identity to group members' sense of self. Six preregistered experiments (N = 2,964 adults) sampling members of two minority-identity groups (i.e., gender minorities and members of a minority political party) support these predictions. Our findings document the existence of a subtle but likely pervasive form of social-identity threat.

There is a long-standing debate in cognitive science surrounding the source of commonalities among languages of the world. Indeed, there are many potential explanations for such commonalities-accidents of history, common processes of language change, memory limitations, constraints on linguistic representations, and so on. Recent research has used psycholinguistic experiments to provide empirical evidence linking common linguistic patterns to specific features of human cognition, but these experiments tend to use English speakers, who in many cases have direct experience with the common patterns of interest. Here we highlight the importance of testing populations whose languages go against cross-linguistic trends. We investigate whether adult monolingual speakers of Kîîtharaka, which has an unusual way of ordering words, mirror the word-order preferences of English speakers. We find that they do, supporting the hypothesis that universal cognitive representations play a role in shaping word order.