Pub Date : 2018-05-03DOI: 10.1355/9789814786843-015
A. Maw
{"title":"Stability and Expectations: Economic Reform and the NLD Government","authors":"A. Maw","doi":"10.1355/9789814786843-015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814786843-015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":21900,"journal":{"name":"Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"38 2","pages":"221 - 241"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72630323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-03DOI: 10.1355/9789814786843-018
Dennis F. Quilala
{"title":"Narratives and Counter-Narratives: Responding to Political Violence in the Philippines","authors":"Dennis F. Quilala","doi":"10.1355/9789814786843-018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814786843-018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":21900,"journal":{"name":"Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"68 1","pages":"285 - 295"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84154372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Southeast Asia on the Economic Front: Holding Steady, Bracing for Change","authors":"Hwok-Aun Lee","doi":"10.1355/aa18-1b","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1355/aa18-1b","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":21900,"journal":{"name":"Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82742278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-05-05DOI: 10.1355/9789814762878-013
D. Weatherbee
The Garuda — the man-bird — in Indian mythology is the vehicle of Vishnu. Perhaps the best known image of the Garuda in ancient Javanese art has it transporting historical eleventh-century East Javanese king Airlangga. The Garuda has been adopted as the symbol of the modern Indonesian state. The author has used the Garuda as a metaphor for Indonesian foreign policy and has likened it to the Phoenix, the fabulous bird of Greek mythology that arises from the ashes of the fire that consumed its previous incarnation, to fly again. Sukarno’s Garuda was left in ashes in 1965. Under Soeharto, it rose to fly again, towards Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN and the so-called “South”. It was immolated in the economic meltdown and political turmoil of the collapse of the regime in 1998. The ashes of the Garuda were barely stirred by the short presidencies of B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur); the former engulfed in the disastrous separation of East Timor from Indonesia and the latter by the leader’s erratic eccentricity. It was not until President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s term of office that the Garuda began to struggle out of the ashes of its predecessor. It was a wounded Garuda, bleeding from the internal war in Aceh, but able to stretch its wings at the 2003 Bali ASEAN Summit (Bali II), where it sought to reclaim ASEAN leadership. Only in the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) did the Garuda take full flight again. SBY’s high-profile global foreign policy outreach was viewed as a tool to advance Indonesia’s place in the world as an emerging middle power actively engaged in international affairs.
{"title":"Indonesia's Foreign Policy in 2016: Garuda Hovering","authors":"D. Weatherbee","doi":"10.1355/9789814762878-013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814762878-013","url":null,"abstract":"The Garuda — the man-bird — in Indian mythology is the vehicle of Vishnu. Perhaps the best known image of the Garuda in ancient Javanese art has it transporting historical eleventh-century East Javanese king Airlangga. The Garuda has been adopted as the symbol of the modern Indonesian state. The author has used the Garuda as a metaphor for Indonesian foreign policy and has likened it to the Phoenix, the fabulous bird of Greek mythology that arises from the ashes of the fire that consumed its previous incarnation, to fly again. Sukarno’s Garuda was left in ashes in 1965. Under Soeharto, it rose to fly again, towards Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN and the so-called “South”. It was immolated in the economic meltdown and political turmoil of the collapse of the regime in 1998. The ashes of the Garuda were barely stirred by the short presidencies of B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur); the former engulfed in the disastrous separation of East Timor from Indonesia and the latter by the leader’s erratic eccentricity. It was not until President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s term of office that the Garuda began to struggle out of the ashes of its predecessor. It was a wounded Garuda, bleeding from the internal war in Aceh, but able to stretch its wings at the 2003 Bali ASEAN Summit (Bali II), where it sought to reclaim ASEAN leadership. Only in the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) did the Garuda take full flight again. SBY’s high-profile global foreign policy outreach was viewed as a tool to advance Indonesia’s place in the world as an emerging middle power actively engaged in international affairs.","PeriodicalId":21900,"journal":{"name":"Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"23 1","pages":"163 - 176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82178117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-05-05DOI: 10.1355/9789814762878-017
A. Thawnghmung, Gwen Robinson
The resounding victory of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) in the national elections in November 2015 ushered in what many hailed as a new era for Myanmar, after more than a half-century of military and semi-military rule. While the NLD’s ascension has generated overwhelming optimism, a more open environment, a surge of foreign aid, and — after a fourmonth hiatus — investment, the fledgling government’s performance in addressing Myanmar’s age-old challenges has received mixed reviews. We examine how the rise of the NLD government and its de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has transformed the political landscape, and highlight key opportunities and challenges confronting the party and Myanmar’s overall transition to democracy.
{"title":"Myanmar's New Era: A Break from the Past, or Too Much of the Same?","authors":"A. Thawnghmung, Gwen Robinson","doi":"10.1355/9789814762878-017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814762878-017","url":null,"abstract":"The resounding victory of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) in the national elections in November 2015 ushered in what many hailed as a new era for Myanmar, after more than a half-century of military and semi-military rule. While the NLD’s ascension has generated overwhelming optimism, a more open environment, a surge of foreign aid, and — after a fourmonth hiatus — investment, the fledgling government’s performance in addressing Myanmar’s age-old challenges has received mixed reviews. We examine how the rise of the NLD government and its de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has transformed the political landscape, and highlight key opportunities and challenges confronting the party and Myanmar’s overall transition to democracy.","PeriodicalId":21900,"journal":{"name":"Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"36 1","pages":"237 - 257"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75475747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-05-05DOI: 10.1355/9789814762878-006
M. Majid
At the end of 2015, ASEAN did not any more become a community of nations than remain an association of states. Words matter for the expectations they raise. ASEAN slow marched in 2015 towards the “milestone” that it was to be proclaimed a “community” at the end of it, but in reality this remains an admitted work in progress. The term “community” had been adopted in communion with, although not as a replication of, what existed in Europe. It seemed like a good idea, this approximation, which got more distant as Europe further integrated into a union of twenty-eight nation-states. Of course, nowadays, ASEAN may congratulate itself on its superior wisdom of not rushing into forming a community, let alone a union, seeing the strains and stresses in the European Union (EU). But the term “community” remained. For the private sector there are clear expectations of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), perhaps even more so than from constituents of the politicalsecurity and sociocultural pillars, the two other legs of the community proclaimed in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November 2015. It is in the AEC that the ASEAN Community shows the greatest promise of development. Indeed, it may very well be the AEC that will hold ASEAN together, even if it does not necessarily drive greater integration with the other two pillars. There are however challenges ahead, both internal and external to the AEC, including from geopolitical and geoeconomic forces beyond ASEAN’s loose organizational control.
{"title":"Forging the Asean Economic Community, 2015 To 2016—and Beyond","authors":"M. Majid","doi":"10.1355/9789814762878-006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814762878-006","url":null,"abstract":"At the end of 2015, ASEAN did not any more become a community of nations than remain an association of states. Words matter for the expectations they raise. ASEAN slow marched in 2015 towards the “milestone” that it was to be proclaimed a “community” at the end of it, but in reality this remains an admitted work in progress. The term “community” had been adopted in communion with, although not as a replication of, what existed in Europe. It seemed like a good idea, this approximation, which got more distant as Europe further integrated into a union of twenty-eight nation-states. Of course, nowadays, ASEAN may congratulate itself on its superior wisdom of not rushing into forming a community, let alone a union, seeing the strains and stresses in the European Union (EU). But the term “community” remained. For the private sector there are clear expectations of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), perhaps even more so than from constituents of the politicalsecurity and sociocultural pillars, the two other legs of the community proclaimed in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November 2015. It is in the AEC that the ASEAN Community shows the greatest promise of development. Indeed, it may very well be the AEC that will hold ASEAN together, even if it does not necessarily drive greater integration with the other two pillars. There are however challenges ahead, both internal and external to the AEC, including from geopolitical and geoeconomic forces beyond ASEAN’s loose organizational control.","PeriodicalId":21900,"journal":{"name":"Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"27 1","pages":"43 - 53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83279327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-05-05DOI: 10.1355/9789814762878-005
T. S. Yean, Andrew Kam Jia Yi
The year 2016 will be remembered for its extraordinary events. It started on a promising note with the signing of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement in February 2016, after prolonged years of negotiations. This was followed by the unexpected United Kingdom vote in favour of leaving the European Union (Brexit) in June and Donald Trump’s stunning victory in the U.S. presidential election in November. The latter event has now cast doubt over whether the TPP will be ratified. In Southeast Asia the death of Thailand’s revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the world’s longest-reigning monarch, in October, also marked another historical moment. China’s launching of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in January 2016 signalled a new era in global finance, as the new international bank is perceived to rival the U.S.-led World Bank. All ten economies in Southeast Asia have signed on to be members, although the ratification of Malaysia and the Philippines had not been completed at the time of writing. Within the region there have been several changes that may affect its internal cohesiveness, as well as the region’s economic and political relations with external powers. These include changes in political leadership in Laos, the Philippines, and Vietnam, while rising tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea have strained relations between China and some countries in the region. The signing of the TPP has also been perceived by some members of ASEAN as disruptive to ASEAN integration. Amidst such changes, how did the Southeast Asian economies fare in 2016? The main objective of this chapter is to examine the growth of the ten Southeast Asian economies over the year and the main factors that have contributed to this
{"title":"Southeast Asian Economies: In Search of Sustaining Growth","authors":"T. S. Yean, Andrew Kam Jia Yi","doi":"10.1355/9789814762878-005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814762878-005","url":null,"abstract":"The year 2016 will be remembered for its extraordinary events. It started on a promising note with the signing of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement in February 2016, after prolonged years of negotiations. This was followed by the unexpected United Kingdom vote in favour of leaving the European Union (Brexit) in June and Donald Trump’s stunning victory in the U.S. presidential election in November. The latter event has now cast doubt over whether the TPP will be ratified. In Southeast Asia the death of Thailand’s revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the world’s longest-reigning monarch, in October, also marked another historical moment. China’s launching of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in January 2016 signalled a new era in global finance, as the new international bank is perceived to rival the U.S.-led World Bank. All ten economies in Southeast Asia have signed on to be members, although the ratification of Malaysia and the Philippines had not been completed at the time of writing. Within the region there have been several changes that may affect its internal cohesiveness, as well as the region’s economic and political relations with external powers. These include changes in political leadership in Laos, the Philippines, and Vietnam, while rising tensions over territorial disputes in the South China Sea have strained relations between China and some countries in the region. The signing of the TPP has also been perceived by some members of ASEAN as disruptive to ASEAN integration. Amidst such changes, how did the Southeast Asian economies fare in 2016? The main objective of this chapter is to examine the growth of the ten Southeast Asian economies over the year and the main factors that have contributed to this","PeriodicalId":21900,"journal":{"name":"Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"53 1","pages":"19 - 42"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86691361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-05-05DOI: 10.1355/9789814762878-021
K. Tan, Augustin Boey
For Singapore, 2015 was an extraordinary year. Proud of their country’s numerous accomplishments, Singaporeans celebrated their fiftieth year of independence and participated in a year-long series of events and projects that were branded SG50. They mourned the death of their founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and wondered what the future would bring in his towering absence. Would there be an SG100 for Singapore and, if so, what would it be like? Also in 2015, the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) surprised many observers by winning 69.9 per cent of votes, and 83 out of 89 seats, in a general election in which all seats were, for the first time, contested. This suggested that opposition parties, which had been making strong inroads since the general election of 2006, were not after all going to have an easy time strengthening their presence in Singapore’s government and politics. Liberal democratization was not going to be a straightforward linear process in Singapore. In the afterglow of its convincing electoral victory, a more confident PAP government concentrated on consolidating its power and protecting Singapore’s interests in a post–Lee Kuan Yew world. In his National Day message, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong focused on the theme of political, economic, and social stability in Singapore amidst an increasingly uncertain global and regional environment.
{"title":"Singapore in 2016: Life after Lee Kuan Yew","authors":"K. Tan, Augustin Boey","doi":"10.1355/9789814762878-021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814762878-021","url":null,"abstract":"For Singapore, 2015 was an extraordinary year. Proud of their country’s numerous accomplishments, Singaporeans celebrated their fiftieth year of independence and participated in a year-long series of events and projects that were branded SG50. They mourned the death of their founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and wondered what the future would bring in his towering absence. Would there be an SG100 for Singapore and, if so, what would it be like? Also in 2015, the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) surprised many observers by winning 69.9 per cent of votes, and 83 out of 89 seats, in a general election in which all seats were, for the first time, contested. This suggested that opposition parties, which had been making strong inroads since the general election of 2006, were not after all going to have an easy time strengthening their presence in Singapore’s government and politics. Liberal democratization was not going to be a straightforward linear process in Singapore. In the afterglow of its convincing electoral victory, a more confident PAP government concentrated on consolidating its power and protecting Singapore’s interests in a post–Lee Kuan Yew world. In his National Day message, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong focused on the theme of political, economic, and social stability in Singapore amidst an increasingly uncertain global and regional environment.","PeriodicalId":21900,"journal":{"name":"Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"8 1","pages":"315 - 333"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88436277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-05-05DOI: 10.1355/9789814762878-010
A. Kumpoh
Following the global drop in oil prices for three consecutive years, economic developments during 2016 demonstrated the fact that Brunei was adjusting well to the challenging economic environment. Oil and gas exports traditionally account for 65 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and for more than 90 per cent of government revenue. Due to the prolonged period of low oil prices, the country’s trade deficit was about B$2 billion in 2015, and by October 2016 total national exports stood at B$545.5 million, a decrease of 12.1 per cent from the figure in the same month in 2015. However, Brunei was fortunate that the pace of contraction was moderated as production output generated a 3.6 per cent rebound in GDP, mainly contributed by liquefied natural gas exports, which increased by 13.6 per cent in October 2016. However, as the non-oil and gas industrial sector’s contribution to GDP decreased, Brunei’s projected GDP growth for 2016 is only at 1 per cent, one of the slowest growing economies in Southeast Asia.
{"title":"Brunei Darussalam in 2016: Adjusting to Economic Challenges","authors":"A. Kumpoh","doi":"10.1355/9789814762878-010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814762878-010","url":null,"abstract":"Following the global drop in oil prices for three consecutive years, economic developments during 2016 demonstrated the fact that Brunei was adjusting well to the challenging economic environment. Oil and gas exports traditionally account for 65 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and for more than 90 per cent of government revenue. Due to the prolonged period of low oil prices, the country’s trade deficit was about B$2 billion in 2015, and by October 2016 total national exports stood at B$545.5 million, a decrease of 12.1 per cent from the figure in the same month in 2015. However, Brunei was fortunate that the pace of contraction was moderated as production output generated a 3.6 per cent rebound in GDP, mainly contributed by liquefied natural gas exports, which increased by 13.6 per cent in October 2016. However, as the non-oil and gas industrial sector’s contribution to GDP decreased, Brunei’s projected GDP growth for 2016 is only at 1 per cent, one of the slowest growing economies in Southeast Asia.","PeriodicalId":21900,"journal":{"name":"Southeast Asian Affairs","volume":"12 1","pages":"117 - 130"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86650558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：