Without compelling empirical proxies for economic profits, we may need to reconsider the decades of empirical research purporting to inform our theories of competitive advantage. The new stakeholder perspective suggests that stakeholders may capture significant shares of the firm's economic profits that should be incorporated into these proxies. In this article, we propose a novel empirical approach to measuring stakeholder rents and then apply our approach to measure workforce rents across the population of all Belgian firms employing workers from 2008 to 2016. Our results demonstrate substantial variance in workforce rents among firms, with some firms allowing most of the economic profits they generate to flow to the workforce. We discuss the implications of our findings in detail and lay out a pathway for future research.This article examines the extent to which companies pay their workforces above (below) what the labor market demands as a way of exploring how much of the company's economic profits go to stakeholders other than shareholders. We demonstrate a wide range of over (under) payments to workforces in a large sample of Belgian firms from 2008 to 2016. One of the important contributions of our paper is developing a method to determine over (under) payments for the workforce, but our method can also be applied to other stakeholders. We hope our work provides an empirical approach for others to explore how stakeholders capture portions of the economic profits that companies create.
{"title":"Empirically exploring the veracity of the new stakeholder perspective in strategy: Documenting workforce rents","authors":"Jeroen Neckebrouck, David Kryscynski","doi":"10.1002/smj.3612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3612","url":null,"abstract":"Without compelling empirical proxies for economic profits, we may need to reconsider the decades of empirical research purporting to inform our theories of competitive advantage. The new stakeholder perspective suggests that stakeholders may capture significant shares of the firm's economic profits that should be incorporated into these proxies. In this article, we propose a novel empirical approach to measuring stakeholder rents and then apply our approach to measure workforce rents across the population of all Belgian firms employing workers from 2008 to 2016. Our results demonstrate substantial variance in workforce rents among firms, with some firms allowing most of the economic profits they generate to flow to the workforce. We discuss the implications of our findings in detail and lay out a pathway for future research.This article examines the extent to which companies pay their workforces above (below) what the labor market demands as a way of exploring how much of the company's economic profits go to stakeholders other than shareholders. We demonstrate a wide range of over (under) payments to workforces in a large sample of Belgian firms from 2008 to 2016. One of the important contributions of our paper is developing a method to determine over (under) payments for the workforce, but our method can also be applied to other stakeholders. We hope our work provides an empirical approach for others to explore how stakeholders capture portions of the economic profits that companies create.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140969705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
From the perspective of the divesting firm, do divestitures to private equity (PE) acquirers perform differently from divestitures to corporate acquirers? If so, why? This question‐based, empirical study shows that on average, divestitures to PE acquirers correlate with lower divesting firms' shareholder returns than divestitures to corporate acquirers. The study explores whether these lower returns when divesting to PE acquirers are explained by the differences in PE acquirers' distinct value creation strategies when it comes to target selection, ownership, or transaction timing. The results reveal that divesting firms' lower shareholder returns when divesting to PE acquirers are more likely correlated with differences in value creation by PE acquirers due to their distinct ownership and transaction timing strategies, but not their selection strategies.Private equity (PE) firms are prominent buyers of corporate divestitures, and PE firms' strategies for creating value when acquiring divested businesses tend to differ from those of corporate buyers. Yet the performance implications, from the perspective of the divesting firm, of divesting a business to a PE acquirer versus a corporate acquirer are not clear. In this study, I explore the differences in returns to firms divesting to PE acquirers versus those divesting to corporate acquirers. First, on average, divesting firms' returns are lower when divesting to PE acquirers. Second, these lower returns are more likely to occur when the PE acquirer may be expecting to create less value, or when firms choose to divest at a suboptimal time.
从资产剥离公司的角度来看，向私募股权（PE）收购方进行的资产剥离与向公司收购方进行的资产剥离表现是否不同？如果是，为什么？这项以问题为基础的实证研究表明，平均而言，与剥离给公司收购方相比，剥离给私募股权收购方的资产与剥离公司股东回报率较低相关。本研究探讨了向私募股权收购者剥离资产时，股东回报率较低的原因是否在于私募股权收购者在目标选择、所有权或交易时机方面采取了不同的价值创造策略。研究结果表明，剥离企业在剥离给 PE 收购者时较低的股东回报率更有可能与 PE 收购者在价值创造方面的差异有关，原因在于其不同的所有权和交易时机策略，而非其选择策略。私募股权（PE）公司是企业剥离资产的主要买家，而 PE 公司在收购剥离企业时的价值创造策略往往与企业买家不同。然而，从剥离企业的角度来看，将企业剥离给私募股权收购方与企业收购方对企业绩效的影响并不明确。在本研究中，笔者探讨了企业剥离给私募股权收购方与剥离给企业收购方的收益差异。首先，平均而言，剥离给 PE 收购者的企业收益较低。其次，当私募股权收购者预期创造的价值较低时，或当企业选择在次优时机剥离时，这些较低的回报率更有可能发生。
{"title":"Do corporations benefit from divesting to private equity acquirers? An empirical investigation","authors":"P. Nary","doi":"10.1002/smj.3611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3611","url":null,"abstract":"From the perspective of the divesting firm, do divestitures to private equity (PE) acquirers perform differently from divestitures to corporate acquirers? If so, why? This question‐based, empirical study shows that on average, divestitures to PE acquirers correlate with lower divesting firms' shareholder returns than divestitures to corporate acquirers. The study explores whether these lower returns when divesting to PE acquirers are explained by the differences in PE acquirers' distinct value creation strategies when it comes to target selection, ownership, or transaction timing. The results reveal that divesting firms' lower shareholder returns when divesting to PE acquirers are more likely correlated with differences in value creation by PE acquirers due to their distinct ownership and transaction timing strategies, but not their selection strategies.Private equity (PE) firms are prominent buyers of corporate divestitures, and PE firms' strategies for creating value when acquiring divested businesses tend to differ from those of corporate buyers. Yet the performance implications, from the perspective of the divesting firm, of divesting a business to a PE acquirer versus a corporate acquirer are not clear. In this study, I explore the differences in returns to firms divesting to PE acquirers versus those divesting to corporate acquirers. First, on average, divesting firms' returns are lower when divesting to PE acquirers. Second, these lower returns are more likely to occur when the PE acquirer may be expecting to create less value, or when firms choose to divest at a suboptimal time.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140977523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We spotlight the use of machine learning in two‐stage matching models to deal with sample selection bias. Recent advances in machine learning have unlocked new empirical possibilities for inductive theorizing. In contrast, the opportunities to use machine learning in regression studies involving large‐scale data with many covariates and a causal claim are still less well understood. Our core contribution is to guide researchers in the use of machine learning approaches to choosing matching variables for enhanced causal inference in propensity score matching models. We use an analysis of real‐world technology invention data of public–private relationships to demonstrate the method and find that machine learning can provide an alternative approach to ad hoc matching. However, as with any method, it is also important to understand its limitations.This article explores the use of machine learning to enhance decision‐making, particularly in addressing sample selection bias in large‐scale datasets. The rapid development of AI and machine learning offers new, powerful tools especially for digital ecosystems where complex data and causal relationships are complex to analyze. We offer managers and stakeholders insight into the effective integration of machine learning for selecting critical variables in propensity score matching models. Through a detailed examination of real‐world data on technology inventions within public–private relationships, we demonstrate the effectiveness of machine learning as a robust alternative to traditional matching methods.
{"title":"Making the most of AI and machine learning in organizations and strategy research: Supervised machine learning, causal inference, and matching models","authors":"Jason M. Rathje, R. Katila, Philipp Reineke","doi":"10.1002/smj.3604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3604","url":null,"abstract":"We spotlight the use of machine learning in two‐stage matching models to deal with sample selection bias. Recent advances in machine learning have unlocked new empirical possibilities for inductive theorizing. In contrast, the opportunities to use machine learning in regression studies involving large‐scale data with many covariates and a causal claim are still less well understood. Our core contribution is to guide researchers in the use of machine learning approaches to choosing matching variables for enhanced causal inference in propensity score matching models. We use an analysis of real‐world technology invention data of public–private relationships to demonstrate the method and find that machine learning can provide an alternative approach to ad hoc matching. However, as with any method, it is also important to understand its limitations.This article explores the use of machine learning to enhance decision‐making, particularly in addressing sample selection bias in large‐scale datasets. The rapid development of AI and machine learning offers new, powerful tools especially for digital ecosystems where complex data and causal relationships are complex to analyze. We offer managers and stakeholders insight into the effective integration of machine learning for selecting critical variables in propensity score matching models. Through a detailed examination of real‐world data on technology inventions within public–private relationships, we demonstrate the effectiveness of machine learning as a robust alternative to traditional matching methods.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140972621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christopher S. Tuggle, Cameron J. Borgholthaus, Peter D. Harms, Jonathan P. O'Brien
Research SummaryUpper echelons research has generated insights into the organizational consequences of CEO narcissism. However, fewer studies have empirically attended to the mechanisms through which these consequences occur. Using the attention‐based view, we introduce a process model examining how CEO narcissism is linked to corporate risk‐taking through the board of director discussion tone of risk‐taking during board meetings. We further note that narcissistic CEOs have an increased ability to do so when they are appointed to be board chair. We find strong support for each of our hypotheses by utilizing a unique data set of corporate board meeting transcripts encompassing 88 public firms and 197 CEOs over 20 years. Our results suggest that narcissistic CEOs are adept at controlling the attentional foci of boards of directors to get their way.Managerial SummaryOur study offers an explanation as to how CEO narcissism influences firm risk‐taking behavior. Specifically, we demonstrate that narcissistic CEOs are prone to drive board discussions about risk‐taking to hold a positive tone—especially when they also serve as board chair—thereby enabling them to allocate increased resources toward risk‐taking strategies. Through an extensive analysis of board meeting transcripts spanning two decades across 88 companies, we illustrate how narcissistic CEOs wield substantial influence in molding board conversations to mirror their own pro‐risk inclinations. This insight further considers the importance of understanding CEO behavior in guiding risk management strategies in the future.
{"title":"Setting the tone to get their way: An attention‐based approach to how narcissistic CEOs influence the board of directors to take more risk","authors":"Christopher S. Tuggle, Cameron J. Borgholthaus, Peter D. Harms, Jonathan P. O'Brien","doi":"10.1002/smj.3610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3610","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryUpper echelons research has generated insights into the organizational consequences of CEO narcissism. However, fewer studies have empirically attended to the mechanisms through which these consequences occur. Using the attention‐based view, we introduce a process model examining how CEO narcissism is linked to corporate risk‐taking through the board of director discussion tone of risk‐taking during board meetings. We further note that narcissistic CEOs have an increased ability to do so when they are appointed to be board chair. We find strong support for each of our hypotheses by utilizing a unique data set of corporate board meeting transcripts encompassing 88 public firms and 197 CEOs over 20 years. Our results suggest that narcissistic CEOs are adept at controlling the attentional foci of boards of directors to get their way.Managerial SummaryOur study offers an explanation as to how CEO narcissism influences firm risk‐taking behavior. Specifically, we demonstrate that narcissistic CEOs are prone to drive board discussions about risk‐taking to hold a positive tone—especially when they also serve as board chair—thereby enabling them to allocate increased resources toward risk‐taking strategies. Through an extensive analysis of board meeting transcripts spanning two decades across 88 companies, we illustrate how narcissistic CEOs wield substantial influence in molding board conversations to mirror their own pro‐risk inclinations. This insight further considers the importance of understanding CEO behavior in guiding risk management strategies in the future.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140935438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We reassess existing theories on individual failure learning and propose an inverted-U-shaped relationship between an individual's accumulated failures and learning, based on a theoretical framework that jointly considers the opportunity, motivation, and perceived ability to learn. Using data on 307 California-based cardiothoracic surgeons who performed coronary artery bypass graft surgeries in 133 hospitals between 2003 and 2018, we find compelling evidence that individuals reach a threshold at which they discontinue learning from their own failures. We also find that this threshold is higher for surgeons who had higher perceived ability to learn. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between individuals' failure experience and their learning, and advance our understanding of the microfoundations of organizational learning, an important basis of firm performance.
{"title":"Giving up learning from failures? An examination of learning from one's own failures in the context of heart surgeons","authors":"Sunkee Lee, Jisoo Park","doi":"10.1002/smj.3609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3609","url":null,"abstract":"We reassess existing theories on individual failure learning and propose an inverted-U-shaped relationship between an individual's accumulated failures and learning, based on a theoretical framework that jointly considers the opportunity, motivation, and perceived ability to learn. Using data on 307 California-based cardiothoracic surgeons who performed coronary artery bypass graft surgeries in 133 hospitals between 2003 and 2018, we find compelling evidence that individuals reach a threshold at which they discontinue learning from their own failures. We also find that this threshold is higher for surgeons who had higher perceived ability to learn. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between individuals' failure experience and their learning, and advance our understanding of the microfoundations of organizational learning, an important basis of firm performance.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140832457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research SummaryThe impact of multimarket contact (MMC) between partners on strategic alliance survival is unclear, even though recent studies have suggested that MMC increases the likelihood of alliance formation. Our study investigates this issue by integrating two mechanisms occurring between multimarket firms: mutual forbearance and technological resource imitation. We argue that MMC between partners deters opportunism in alliances via mutual forbearance, resulting in a positive effect on the likelihood of strategic alliance survival. We also suggest that the positive effect is weakened in two settings with higher risks of technological resource imitation: technological overlap between partners and the presence of R&D activities in an alliance. Evidence from strategic alliances in the global semiconductor industry supports these conclusions.Managerial SummaryRecent research has shown that firms encountering each other in multiple markets are more likely to form strategic alliances, but it is unclear whether these firms are likely to stick together. Our theory suggests that the threat of broad retaliation limits opportunism and increases the likelihood of alliance survival when partners encounter each other in multiple markets. Nonetheless, in settings where partners have similar technologies, or in alliances involving R&D activities, their ability and incentives to copy each other's technological resources offsets the positive effect of multimarket contact on alliance survival. We study strategic alliances in the global semiconductor industry and find evidence consistent with these arguments.
{"title":"Multimarket contact between partners and strategic alliance survival","authors":"Tadhg Ryan‐Charleton, Robert J. Galavan","doi":"10.1002/smj.3607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3607","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryThe impact of multimarket contact (MMC) between partners on strategic alliance survival is unclear, even though recent studies have suggested that MMC increases the likelihood of alliance formation. Our study investigates this issue by integrating two mechanisms occurring between multimarket firms: mutual forbearance and technological resource imitation. We argue that MMC between partners deters opportunism in alliances via mutual forbearance, resulting in a positive effect on the likelihood of strategic alliance survival. We also suggest that the positive effect is weakened in two settings with higher risks of technological resource imitation: technological overlap between partners and the presence of R&D activities in an alliance. Evidence from strategic alliances in the global semiconductor industry supports these conclusions.Managerial SummaryRecent research has shown that firms encountering each other in multiple markets are more likely to form strategic alliances, but it is unclear whether these firms are likely to stick together. Our theory suggests that the threat of broad retaliation limits opportunism and increases the likelihood of alliance survival when partners encounter each other in multiple markets. Nonetheless, in settings where partners have similar technologies, or in alliances involving R&D activities, their ability and incentives to copy each other's technological resources offsets the positive effect of multimarket contact on alliance survival. We study strategic alliances in the global semiconductor industry and find evidence consistent with these arguments.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140829384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
R. Brymer, J. Paraskevas, Matthew A. Josefy, Lisa Ellram
Pipeline hiring, repeatedly hiring individuals from the same external source organization, is a common recruiting practice. Yet, whether this pipeline approach improves incoming human capital quality or performance has limited empirical evidence. We argue that, in cooperative source‐hiring organization contexts, pipelines reduce the information asymmetries present in labor markets in a way that both attracts individuals with higher pre‐entry human capital and predicts postentry performance that surpasses pre‐entry expectations. In the context of particularly intense recruiting competition—American college football—we test and find support for these hypotheses. We also probe key boundary conditions, specifically discontinuity, geographic proximity, and factor market competition that highlight the limits of when the informational advantage is more or less salient.Organizations often recruit through pipelines ‐ repeatedly hiring new workers from the same sources, such as universities or supply partners. Despite how common pipeline hiring is, we have little evidence to suggest if this practice helps hire more capable workers. Using rich data from American college football, we find that players who are successfully recruited through a pipeline tend to be rated as higher potential before joining their college team and perform better, holding their potential constant, in their collegiate career than players who joined from a standalone source. We argue that these benefits come from information flows between recruiting organizations, alumni, and prospective workers. When conditions make these information flows less exclusive, more interrupted, or redundant, we find evidence that the typical pipeline recruiting benefits diminish.
{"title":"Pipeline hiring's effects on the human capital and performance of new recruits","authors":"R. Brymer, J. Paraskevas, Matthew A. Josefy, Lisa Ellram","doi":"10.1002/smj.3605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3605","url":null,"abstract":"Pipeline hiring, repeatedly hiring individuals from the same external source organization, is a common recruiting practice. Yet, whether this pipeline approach improves incoming human capital quality or performance has limited empirical evidence. We argue that, in cooperative source‐hiring organization contexts, pipelines reduce the information asymmetries present in labor markets in a way that both attracts individuals with higher pre‐entry human capital and predicts postentry performance that surpasses pre‐entry expectations. In the context of particularly intense recruiting competition—American college football—we test and find support for these hypotheses. We also probe key boundary conditions, specifically discontinuity, geographic proximity, and factor market competition that highlight the limits of when the informational advantage is more or less salient.Organizations often recruit through pipelines ‐ repeatedly hiring new workers from the same sources, such as universities or supply partners. Despite how common pipeline hiring is, we have little evidence to suggest if this practice helps hire more capable workers. Using rich data from American college football, we find that players who are successfully recruited through a pipeline tend to be rated as higher potential before joining their college team and perform better, holding their potential constant, in their collegiate career than players who joined from a standalone source. We argue that these benefits come from information flows between recruiting organizations, alumni, and prospective workers. When conditions make these information flows less exclusive, more interrupted, or redundant, we find evidence that the typical pipeline recruiting benefits diminish.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140656874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop new theory on incumbent firms' strategic decision‐making and the associated emotional dynamics at platform transitions. Based on in‐depth interviews with Nokia's senior leaders about their decision to adopt the Windows platform in 2011, we suggest that highly capable platform companies' entry into the established phone industry invalidated senior leaders' long‐held core assumptions about the industry, triggering existential anxiety and stunting self‐regulation. Distinct mechanisms then influenced senior leaders' emotions toward external platform options—myopic appraisals of firm competitiveness inside a platform (vs. platform competitiveness against other platforms), appraisals of changing firm boundaries, and emotional resonance of potential partners. These emotions contributed to emotional drift, with top managers ultimately favoring the emotionally attractive option. Our theorizing extends theory on platforms, strategy, and emotion.This research provides fresh insights into how emotions play a crucial role in incumbent firms' strategic choices, especially in the context of evolving technology platforms and major industry shifts. Our research focused on Nokia's 2011 decision to adopt the Windows platform. We discovered that when new players, like platform companies, enter a market, they can unsettle longstanding beliefs, causing anxiety and decision‐making challenges among top management. Specifically, we found that executives often focus too narrowly on their firm's ability to compete within a new platform rather than the platform's overall competitiveness. Additionally, changes in company boundaries and the emotional appeal of potential partners significantly influence these decisions. Executives' analyses emotionally drift such that they start favoring the emotionally attractive options.
我们就在位企业的战略决策以及平台过渡时期的相关情感动态提出了新的理论。基于对诺基亚高层领导在 2011 年决定采用 Windows 平台的深入访谈，我们认为，高能力平台公司进入成熟的手机行业使高层领导长期以来对该行业的核心假设失效，引发了生存焦虑并阻碍了自我调节。随后，不同的机制影响了高层领导对外部平台选择的情绪--对公司在平台内部竞争力（相对于平台对其他平台的竞争力）的近视评价、对公司边界变化的评价以及对潜在合作伙伴的情感共鸣。这些情感因素导致了情感漂移，高层管理者最终倾向于具有情感吸引力的选择。我们的理论研究扩展了有关平台、战略和情感的理论。这项研究为我们提供了新的视角，让我们了解情感是如何在现有企业的战略选择中发挥关键作用的，尤其是在不断发展的技术平台和重大行业变革的背景下。我们的研究侧重于诺基亚 2011 年采用 Windows 平台的决策。我们发现，当平台公司等新参与者进入市场时，他们可能会打破长期以来的观念，从而引起高层管理者的焦虑和决策挑战。具体来说，我们发现高管们往往过于狭隘地关注公司在新平台中的竞争能力，而不是平台的整体竞争力。此外，公司边界的变化和潜在合作伙伴的情感吸引力也会对这些决策产生重大影响。高管们的分析在情感上会发生偏移，从而开始倾向于具有情感吸引力的选择。
{"title":"Strategic decision‐making at platform transitions: The case of Nokia (2010–2011)","authors":"Timo O. Vuori, M. Tushman","doi":"10.1002/smj.3608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3608","url":null,"abstract":"We develop new theory on incumbent firms' strategic decision‐making and the associated emotional dynamics at platform transitions. Based on in‐depth interviews with Nokia's senior leaders about their decision to adopt the Windows platform in 2011, we suggest that highly capable platform companies' entry into the established phone industry invalidated senior leaders' long‐held core assumptions about the industry, triggering existential anxiety and stunting self‐regulation. Distinct mechanisms then influenced senior leaders' emotions toward external platform options—myopic appraisals of firm competitiveness inside a platform (vs. platform competitiveness against other platforms), appraisals of changing firm boundaries, and emotional resonance of potential partners. These emotions contributed to emotional drift, with top managers ultimately favoring the emotionally attractive option. Our theorizing extends theory on platforms, strategy, and emotion.This research provides fresh insights into how emotions play a crucial role in incumbent firms' strategic choices, especially in the context of evolving technology platforms and major industry shifts. Our research focused on Nokia's 2011 decision to adopt the Windows platform. We discovered that when new players, like platform companies, enter a market, they can unsettle longstanding beliefs, causing anxiety and decision‐making challenges among top management. Specifically, we found that executives often focus too narrowly on their firm's ability to compete within a new platform rather than the platform's overall competitiveness. Additionally, changes in company boundaries and the emotional appeal of potential partners significantly influence these decisions. Executives' analyses emotionally drift such that they start favoring the emotionally attractive options.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140667990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kenneth G. Huang, Mei‐Xuan Li, Carl Hsin‐Han Shen, Yanzhi Wang
Research SummaryNon‐practicing entities (NPEs) are firms that accumulate and acquire patents but do not further develop or implement the patented inventions (known as patent trolling). NPEs seek to receive royalties or profits through out‐of‐court settlements in patent infringement cases. We examine how firms targeted by NPEs in NPE‐initiated litigations (i.e., target firms) shift their innovation strategies and trajectories in response to heightened litigation risks. We theorize and show that after the initial lawsuit, target firms draw more upon their in‐house technologies to reduce the legal ground for further lawsuits. Furthermore, nontarget firms in related technology areas shift their innovation activities away from those of target firms under high NPE litigation risks. These effects are more pronounced with higher innovation costs and under more competitive product markets.Managerial SummaryNon‐practicing entities (NPEs) are known as patent trolls that accumulate and acquire patents but do not further develop or implement these patented inventions. These patent trolls aim to obtain royalties or profits through out‐of‐court settlements in patent infringement cases. We investigate how firms targeted by patent trolls in litigations (i.e., target firms) change their innovation strategies and trajectories to deal with increased NPE litigation risks. After the initial lawsuit, we find that these target firms use their in‐house technologies more to reduce the legal ground for future lawsuits. Moreover, nontarget firms in related technology areas move their innovation activities away from those of target firms under high litigation risks. These effects are stronger when innovation costs are higher and under more competitive product markets.
{"title":"Escaping the patent trolls: The impact of non‐practicing entity litigation on firm innovation strategies","authors":"Kenneth G. Huang, Mei‐Xuan Li, Carl Hsin‐Han Shen, Yanzhi Wang","doi":"10.1002/smj.3606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3606","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryNon‐practicing entities (NPEs) are firms that accumulate and acquire patents but do not further develop or implement the patented inventions (known as patent trolling). NPEs seek to receive royalties or profits through out‐of‐court settlements in patent infringement cases. We examine how firms targeted by NPEs in NPE‐initiated litigations (i.e., target firms) shift their innovation strategies and trajectories in response to heightened litigation risks. We theorize and show that after the initial lawsuit, target firms draw more upon their in‐house technologies to reduce the legal ground for further lawsuits. Furthermore, nontarget firms in related technology areas shift their innovation activities away from those of target firms under high NPE litigation risks. These effects are more pronounced with higher innovation costs and under more competitive product markets.Managerial SummaryNon‐practicing entities (NPEs) are known as patent trolls that accumulate and acquire patents but do not further develop or implement these patented inventions. These patent trolls aim to obtain royalties or profits through out‐of‐court settlements in patent infringement cases. We investigate how firms targeted by patent trolls in litigations (i.e., target firms) change their innovation strategies and trajectories to deal with increased NPE litigation risks. After the initial lawsuit, we find that these target firms use their in‐house technologies more to reduce the legal ground for future lawsuits. Moreover, nontarget firms in related technology areas move their innovation activities away from those of target firms under high litigation risks. These effects are stronger when innovation costs are higher and under more competitive product markets.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140629960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Owen N. Parker, Cole E. Short, Varkey K. Titus, Ke Gong, Peter Inho Nahm
Research SummaryWhile previous organizational impression mnagement (OIM) research focuses on highlighting firms in a favorable light, we explore CEOs' use of “strategic negativity” to manage expectations. We draw on OIM's psychological roots to predict that despite pressure to “be positive,” when CEOs perceive stakeholders are motivated to raise their expectations and have an opportunity to do so, CEOs strategically use negativity to counteract this anticipated expectation increase. We test our predictions on 7330 quarterly earnings calls from 370 publicly traded firms (2008–2019), examining how the “motive” of a positive material earnings surprise and “opportunity” of a new fiscal year jointly increase CEO negativity in prepared remarks. We elaborate the wide applicability of strategic negativity, the “other side” of the OIM phenomenon.Managerial SummaryIn contrast to the prevailing view that CEOs usually “positively spin” the firm's situation to stakeholders, we investigate how CEOs strategically use negativity to counteract stakeholder optimism, provided CEOs perceive expectations are likely to rocket upward. We argue that positive news represents a “motive” and a chance to reflect represents an “opportunity,” and that together they risk raising expectations. Analyzing 7330 quarterly earnings calls of 370 companies (2008–2019), we specifically examined how both (1) a positive earnings surprise and (2) a new fiscal year force CEOs out of their positivity comfort zone and encourage them to be strategically negative in earnings call remarks, to try to lower stakeholder expectations. Our results support this view and pave the way for future research.
{"title":"Accentuate the positive? Strategic negativity amid the hazard of high expectations","authors":"Owen N. Parker, Cole E. Short, Varkey K. Titus, Ke Gong, Peter Inho Nahm","doi":"10.1002/smj.3603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3603","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryWhile previous organizational impression mnagement (OIM) research focuses on highlighting firms in a favorable light, we explore CEOs' use of “strategic negativity” to manage expectations. We draw on OIM's psychological roots to predict that despite pressure to “be positive,” when CEOs perceive stakeholders are motivated to raise their expectations and have an opportunity to do so, CEOs strategically use negativity to counteract this anticipated expectation increase. We test our predictions on 7330 quarterly earnings calls from 370 publicly traded firms (2008–2019), examining how the “motive” of a positive material earnings surprise and “opportunity” of a new fiscal year jointly increase CEO negativity in prepared remarks. We elaborate the wide applicability of strategic negativity, the “other side” of the OIM phenomenon.Managerial SummaryIn contrast to the prevailing view that CEOs usually “positively spin” the firm's situation to stakeholders, we investigate how CEOs strategically use negativity to counteract stakeholder optimism, provided CEOs perceive expectations are likely to rocket upward. We argue that positive news represents a “motive” and a chance to reflect represents an “opportunity,” and that together they risk raising expectations. Analyzing 7330 quarterly earnings calls of 370 companies (2008–2019), we specifically examined how both (1) a positive earnings surprise and (2) a new fiscal year force CEOs out of their positivity comfort zone and encourage them to be strategically negative in earnings call remarks, to try to lower stakeholder expectations. Our results support this view and pave the way for future research.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140586894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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