Novel formulations of strategic problems are key to innovation and exploration. Conventional wisdom suggests that intuitive thinking, rather than rational-analytic thinking, facilitates novel problem formulations. This article proposes that intuitive thinking is insufficient and that novel formulations instead depend on sequencing rational-analytic and intuitive thinking across two phases of the problem formulation task. Two experiments using samples of strategists in organizations support the importance of analysis followed by intuition when developing novel problem formulations. This article advances the “both-and” approach to managerial cognition by investigating how harnessing intuition and analysis in combination may lead to a desirable outcome for a managerial task. This approach moves beyond the typical, “either-or” approach to cognition in past studies, which pit analysis against intuition in achieving desirable outcomes.
{"title":"Finding a road less traveled: Combining analysis and intuition to develop novel problem formulations","authors":"Chan Hyung Park","doi":"10.1002/smj.3637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3637","url":null,"abstract":"Novel formulations of strategic problems are key to innovation and exploration. Conventional wisdom suggests that intuitive thinking, rather than rational-analytic thinking, facilitates novel problem formulations. This article proposes that intuitive thinking is insufficient and that novel formulations instead depend on sequencing rational-analytic and intuitive thinking across two phases of the problem formulation task. Two experiments using samples of strategists in organizations support the importance of analysis followed by intuition when developing novel problem formulations. This article advances the “both-and” approach to managerial cognition by investigating how harnessing intuition and analysis in combination may lead to a desirable outcome for a managerial task. This approach moves beyond the typical, “either-or” approach to cognition in past studies, which pit analysis against intuition in achieving desirable outcomes.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141510644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jinsil Kim, Miranda J. Welbourne Eleazar, Seung‐Hyun Lee
Research SummaryLobbying allows firms to influence the government to potentially limit firms' costs during product recall crises. However, such lobbying can elicit scrutiny from the media if the lobbying gives the impression that firms wish to save costs at the expense of safety, thereby appearing hypocritical. We theorize that when faced with negative media coverage of product recalls or recall‐related lobbying, firms strategically eschew lobbying to limit further media scrutiny and its associated negative consequences. We test our hypotheses using the US auto industry's lobbying from 2008 to 2022. We provide further depth to our examination of strategic eschewal through 15 supplemental interviews of lobbyists about how the media influences firms' lobbying decisions.Managerial SummaryCompanies may resort to lobbying in efforts to reduce costs related to product recall crises, but such controversial lobbying may also tarnish their image. When confronted with negative media coverage of product recalls, or recall‐related lobbying, companies are more likely to strategically refrain from lobbying to minimize additional, unwanted media spotlight and its associated negative repercussions. Managers should be mindful that even if lobbying may help limit the costs of recalls, it could also cause potential reputational harm. Thus, it is vitally important that managers pay attention to the reputational cues from the media, which can help them determine when lobbying may be problematic and allow them to preemptively refrain from such lobbying.
{"title":"The influence of media scrutiny on firms' strategic eschewal of lobbying","authors":"Jinsil Kim, Miranda J. Welbourne Eleazar, Seung‐Hyun Lee","doi":"10.1002/smj.3633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3633","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryLobbying allows firms to influence the government to potentially limit firms' costs during product recall crises. However, such lobbying can elicit scrutiny from the media if the lobbying gives the impression that firms wish to save costs at the expense of safety, thereby appearing hypocritical. We theorize that when faced with negative media coverage of product recalls or recall‐related lobbying, firms <jats:italic>strategically eschew</jats:italic> lobbying to limit further media scrutiny and its associated negative consequences. We test our hypotheses using the US auto industry's lobbying from 2008 to 2022. We provide further depth to our examination of strategic eschewal through 15 supplemental interviews of lobbyists about how the media influences firms' lobbying decisions.Managerial SummaryCompanies may resort to lobbying in efforts to reduce costs related to product recall crises, but such controversial lobbying may also tarnish their image. When confronted with negative media coverage of product recalls, or recall‐related lobbying, companies are more likely to strategically refrain from lobbying to minimize additional, unwanted media spotlight and its associated negative repercussions. Managers should be mindful that even if lobbying may help limit the costs of recalls, it could also cause potential reputational harm. Thus, it is vitally important that managers pay attention to the reputational cues from the media, which can help them determine when lobbying may be problematic and allow them to preemptively refrain from such lobbying.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141510645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gilbert Kofi Adarkwah, S. Dorobantu, C. Sabel, Flladina Zilja
We examine how geopolitical volatility—the instability of bilateral political affinity between countries—affects foreign subsidiary investments. Building on prior work that shows that the level of political affinity between countries facilitates foreign investments, we argue that the volatility of political affinity impedes firms' ability to form expectations about stakeholder behavior and reduces subsequent investments in subsidiaries. We further argue that the effect of volatility of political affinity on foreign subsidiary investments is less pronounced when the level of political affinity between countries is high and when the firm has strong political connections at home. Our analyses examine 1054 US firms and their subsidiary investments in 106 countries from 2000 to 2015.Geopolitical risk has emerged as an important factor in foreign investment decisions in recent years. The rise of geopolitical tensions worldwide and the fragmentation of relationships between countries have introduced new dimensions to foreign investment risks. We study the propensity for sudden and unpredictable shifts in the political relationship between countries—that is, volatility of political affinity in their bilateral political relations—and its effect on firms' foreign subsidiary investments. We show that volatility of political affinity negatively affects the number of subsidiaries, employees, and local sales in the host country because when bilateral relations change suddenly, it is more difficult for multinational firms to predict how stakeholder behavior will impact the performance of their investments.
{"title":"Geopolitical volatility and subsidiary investments","authors":"Gilbert Kofi Adarkwah, S. Dorobantu, C. Sabel, Flladina Zilja","doi":"10.1002/smj.3631","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3631","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how geopolitical volatility—the instability of bilateral political affinity between countries—affects foreign subsidiary investments. Building on prior work that shows that the level of political affinity between countries facilitates foreign investments, we argue that the volatility of political affinity impedes firms' ability to form expectations about stakeholder behavior and reduces subsequent investments in subsidiaries. We further argue that the effect of volatility of political affinity on foreign subsidiary investments is less pronounced when the level of political affinity between countries is high and when the firm has strong political connections at home. Our analyses examine 1054 US firms and their subsidiary investments in 106 countries from 2000 to 2015.Geopolitical risk has emerged as an important factor in foreign investment decisions in recent years. The rise of geopolitical tensions worldwide and the fragmentation of relationships between countries have introduced new dimensions to foreign investment risks. We study the propensity for sudden and unpredictable shifts in the political relationship between countries—that is, volatility of political affinity in their bilateral political relations—and its effect on firms' foreign subsidiary investments. We show that volatility of political affinity negatively affects the number of subsidiaries, employees, and local sales in the host country because when bilateral relations change suddenly, it is more difficult for multinational firms to predict how stakeholder behavior will impact the performance of their investments.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141359530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Investment growth in family firms is constrained by family preferences to retain corporate control, which limits outside equity issuance and increases the expropriation risk perceived by external minority shareholders. Tenure-based voting rights (TVRs) weaken the link between voting rights and cash flow rights, facilitating new equity capital issuance without loss of control. We find that publicly listed family firms in Italy adopt TVRs to facilitate the continuation of investment growth while retaining family control. We also find that in family firms with fragile control, investment increases after TVR adoption. Our results indicate that control-enhancing mechanisms such as TVRs can help resolve the control–growth dilemma in family firms.
{"title":"Do tenure-based voting rights help mitigate the family firm control-growth dilemma?","authors":"Claudia Imperatore, Peter F. Pope","doi":"10.1002/smj.3630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3630","url":null,"abstract":"Investment growth in family firms is constrained by family preferences to retain corporate control, which limits outside equity issuance and increases the expropriation risk perceived by external minority shareholders. Tenure-based voting rights (TVRs) weaken the link between voting rights and cash flow rights, facilitating new equity capital issuance without loss of control. We find that publicly listed family firms in Italy adopt TVRs to facilitate the continuation of investment growth while retaining family control. We also find that in family firms with fragile control, investment increases after TVR adoption. Our results indicate that control-enhancing mechanisms such as TVRs can help resolve the control–growth dilemma in family firms.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141510646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joseph S. Harrison, Steven Boivie, Ithai Stern, Joseph Porac
This study extends recent findings that inventor CEOs increase innovative output in large established firms by examining how their involvement in the innovative process influences the nature of innovations produced. Our theory suggests that inventor CEOs who take a hands‐on approach to innovation lead their firms to engage in more exploitative rather than exploratory innovation. We further posit that this effect is particularly strong for insider inventor CEOs, and especially founders, but weaker for outsiders and when the firm's board has broader industry experience. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 1994 to 2010 and inventor CEOs' engagement in patenting as an indicator of hands‐on involvement, we find considerable support for our predictions.CEOs with hands‐on experience innovating can substantially increase innovative output in large established firms. Yet, we show that inventors who remain directly engaged in their firms' innovation activities as CEO can limit their scope to incremental innovations that exploit existing technologies as opposed to more radical innovations that result in novel product or service offerings. These tendencies are stronger for inventors who come to the CEO position from inside the firm, especially founders, but weaker when the firm's board has broader industry experience. Overall, our study reveals an important tradeoff for large firms of having an inventor as CEO, how hands‐on involvement by inventor CEOs may narrow their firms' innovative trajectories, and how or when these tendencies can be mitigated.
{"title":"Inventor CEO involvement and firm exploitative and exploratory innovation","authors":"Joseph S. Harrison, Steven Boivie, Ithai Stern, Joseph Porac","doi":"10.1002/smj.3628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3628","url":null,"abstract":"This study extends recent findings that inventor CEOs increase innovative output in large established firms by examining how their involvement in the innovative process influences the nature of innovations produced. Our theory suggests that inventor CEOs who take a hands‐on approach to innovation lead their firms to engage in more exploitative rather than exploratory innovation. We further posit that this effect is particularly strong for insider inventor CEOs, and especially founders, but weaker for outsiders and when the firm's board has broader industry experience. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 1994 to 2010 and inventor CEOs' engagement in patenting as an indicator of hands‐on involvement, we find considerable support for our predictions.CEOs with hands‐on experience innovating can substantially increase innovative output in large established firms. Yet, we show that inventors who remain directly engaged in their firms' innovation activities as CEO can limit their scope to incremental innovations that exploit existing technologies as opposed to more radical innovations that result in novel product or service offerings. These tendencies are stronger for inventors who come to the CEO position from inside the firm, especially founders, but weaker when the firm's board has broader industry experience. Overall, our study reveals an important tradeoff for large firms of having an inventor as CEO, how hands‐on involvement by inventor CEOs may narrow their firms' innovative trajectories, and how or when these tendencies can be mitigated.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141384191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jasmina Chauvin, Carlos Inoue, Christopher Poliquin
Scarcity of productive factors poses a challenge for firms entering underdeveloped regions. We theorize that incumbent firms can overcome scarcity of skilled human capital in local labor markets by redeploying workers from existing units. We predict that redeployment is more valuable when factor markets exhibit large differences in resource scarcity. Redeployment is also more valuable when output is highly sensitive to worker skill and is responsive to complementarities between labor and other inputs. Important implications are that redeployment can endow firms with superior resources and enable them to enter more markets. Data on sugar mills in Brazil, where a sudden demand boom incentivized expansion, corroborate the predictions. Our research identifies a new mechanism of value-creation from resource redeployment across factor markets.
{"title":"Resource redeployment as an entry advantage in resource-poor settings","authors":"Jasmina Chauvin, Carlos Inoue, Christopher Poliquin","doi":"10.1002/smj.3627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3627","url":null,"abstract":"Scarcity of productive factors poses a challenge for firms entering underdeveloped regions. We theorize that incumbent firms can overcome scarcity of skilled human capital in local labor markets by redeploying workers from existing units. We predict that redeployment is more valuable when factor markets exhibit large differences in resource scarcity. Redeployment is also more valuable when output is highly sensitive to worker skill and is responsive to complementarities between labor and other inputs. Important implications are that redeployment can endow firms with superior resources and enable them to enter more markets. Data on sugar mills in Brazil, where a sudden demand boom incentivized expansion, corroborate the predictions. Our research identifies a new mechanism of value-creation from resource redeployment across factor markets.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141166610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research SummaryExternal representations, particularly visuals, are important in strategic decision‐making. However, their pervasiveness and impact are not well understood in the strategy literature. Based on cognitive science research, we identify four cognitive functions crucial to strategic decision‐making that benefit from using external representations. We also propose a conceptual model and propositions that explain how the quality of strategic decision‐making depends on the interactions among task environment, external representations, and managers. We show that external representations influence in predictable ways the boundedly rational process of searching for new strategies. Key determinants include the manager's representational capability and the usability and malleability of the external representation. We discuss implications for users, designers, and teachers of external representations in strategy, as well as suggest avenues for future research.Managerial SummaryThis research points to the pivotal role of external representations, especially visuals, in strategic decision‐making. Drawing from cognitive science, this study identifies four critical cognitive functions that benefit from these external representations—working memory, long‐term memory, pattern recognition, and knowledge transfer. Further, the study highlights that external representations significantly influence the process of strategic decision‐making in predictable ways. Finally, we show that not all external representations are alike in their ease of use and a managers' ability to operate on an external representation, referred to as representational capability, greatly affects the decision‐making quality. The implications extend to users, designers, and educators of external representations, urging attention to the design and use of external representations for improved decision outcomes.
{"title":"External representations in strategic decision‐making: Understanding strategy's reliance on visuals","authors":"Felipe A. Csaszar, Nicole Hinrichs, Mana Heshmati","doi":"10.1002/smj.3613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3613","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryExternal representations, particularly visuals, are important in strategic decision‐making. However, their pervasiveness and impact are not well understood in the strategy literature. Based on cognitive science research, we identify four cognitive functions crucial to strategic decision‐making that benefit from using external representations. We also propose a conceptual model and propositions that explain how the quality of strategic decision‐making depends on the interactions among task environment, external representations, and managers. We show that external representations influence in predictable ways the boundedly rational process of searching for new strategies. Key determinants include the manager's representational capability and the usability and malleability of the external representation. We discuss implications for users, designers, and teachers of external representations in strategy, as well as suggest avenues for future research.Managerial SummaryThis research points to the pivotal role of external representations, especially visuals, in strategic decision‐making. Drawing from cognitive science, this study identifies four critical cognitive functions that benefit from these external representations—working memory, long‐term memory, pattern recognition, and knowledge transfer. Further, the study highlights that external representations significantly influence the process of strategic decision‐making in predictable ways. Finally, we show that not all external representations are alike in their ease of use and a managers' ability to operate on an external representation, referred to as representational capability, greatly affects the decision‐making quality. The implications extend to users, designers, and educators of external representations, urging attention to the design and use of external representations for improved decision outcomes.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141150290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Without compelling empirical proxies for economic profits, we may need to reconsider the decades of empirical research purporting to inform our theories of competitive advantage. The new stakeholder perspective suggests that stakeholders may capture significant shares of the firm's economic profits that should be incorporated into these proxies. In this article, we propose a novel empirical approach to measuring stakeholder rents and then apply our approach to measure workforce rents across the population of all Belgian firms employing workers from 2008 to 2016. Our results demonstrate substantial variance in workforce rents among firms, with some firms allowing most of the economic profits they generate to flow to the workforce. We discuss the implications of our findings in detail and lay out a pathway for future research.This article examines the extent to which companies pay their workforces above (below) what the labor market demands as a way of exploring how much of the company's economic profits go to stakeholders other than shareholders. We demonstrate a wide range of over (under) payments to workforces in a large sample of Belgian firms from 2008 to 2016. One of the important contributions of our paper is developing a method to determine over (under) payments for the workforce, but our method can also be applied to other stakeholders. We hope our work provides an empirical approach for others to explore how stakeholders capture portions of the economic profits that companies create.
{"title":"Empirically exploring the veracity of the new stakeholder perspective in strategy: Documenting workforce rents","authors":"Jeroen Neckebrouck, David Kryscynski","doi":"10.1002/smj.3612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3612","url":null,"abstract":"Without compelling empirical proxies for economic profits, we may need to reconsider the decades of empirical research purporting to inform our theories of competitive advantage. The new stakeholder perspective suggests that stakeholders may capture significant shares of the firm's economic profits that should be incorporated into these proxies. In this article, we propose a novel empirical approach to measuring stakeholder rents and then apply our approach to measure workforce rents across the population of all Belgian firms employing workers from 2008 to 2016. Our results demonstrate substantial variance in workforce rents among firms, with some firms allowing most of the economic profits they generate to flow to the workforce. We discuss the implications of our findings in detail and lay out a pathway for future research.This article examines the extent to which companies pay their workforces above (below) what the labor market demands as a way of exploring how much of the company's economic profits go to stakeholders other than shareholders. We demonstrate a wide range of over (under) payments to workforces in a large sample of Belgian firms from 2008 to 2016. One of the important contributions of our paper is developing a method to determine over (under) payments for the workforce, but our method can also be applied to other stakeholders. We hope our work provides an empirical approach for others to explore how stakeholders capture portions of the economic profits that companies create.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140969705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
From the perspective of the divesting firm, do divestitures to private equity (PE) acquirers perform differently from divestitures to corporate acquirers? If so, why? This question‐based, empirical study shows that on average, divestitures to PE acquirers correlate with lower divesting firms' shareholder returns than divestitures to corporate acquirers. The study explores whether these lower returns when divesting to PE acquirers are explained by the differences in PE acquirers' distinct value creation strategies when it comes to target selection, ownership, or transaction timing. The results reveal that divesting firms' lower shareholder returns when divesting to PE acquirers are more likely correlated with differences in value creation by PE acquirers due to their distinct ownership and transaction timing strategies, but not their selection strategies.Private equity (PE) firms are prominent buyers of corporate divestitures, and PE firms' strategies for creating value when acquiring divested businesses tend to differ from those of corporate buyers. Yet the performance implications, from the perspective of the divesting firm, of divesting a business to a PE acquirer versus a corporate acquirer are not clear. In this study, I explore the differences in returns to firms divesting to PE acquirers versus those divesting to corporate acquirers. First, on average, divesting firms' returns are lower when divesting to PE acquirers. Second, these lower returns are more likely to occur when the PE acquirer may be expecting to create less value, or when firms choose to divest at a suboptimal time.
从资产剥离公司的角度来看，向私募股权（PE）收购方进行的资产剥离与向公司收购方进行的资产剥离表现是否不同？如果是，为什么？这项以问题为基础的实证研究表明，平均而言，与剥离给公司收购方相比，剥离给私募股权收购方的资产与剥离公司股东回报率较低相关。本研究探讨了向私募股权收购者剥离资产时，股东回报率较低的原因是否在于私募股权收购者在目标选择、所有权或交易时机方面采取了不同的价值创造策略。研究结果表明，剥离企业在剥离给 PE 收购者时较低的股东回报率更有可能与 PE 收购者在价值创造方面的差异有关，原因在于其不同的所有权和交易时机策略，而非其选择策略。私募股权（PE）公司是企业剥离资产的主要买家，而 PE 公司在收购剥离企业时的价值创造策略往往与企业买家不同。然而，从剥离企业的角度来看，将企业剥离给私募股权收购方与企业收购方对企业绩效的影响并不明确。在本研究中，笔者探讨了企业剥离给私募股权收购方与剥离给企业收购方的收益差异。首先，平均而言，剥离给 PE 收购者的企业收益较低。其次，当私募股权收购者预期创造的价值较低时，或当企业选择在次优时机剥离时，这些较低的回报率更有可能发生。
{"title":"Do corporations benefit from divesting to private equity acquirers? An empirical investigation","authors":"P. Nary","doi":"10.1002/smj.3611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3611","url":null,"abstract":"From the perspective of the divesting firm, do divestitures to private equity (PE) acquirers perform differently from divestitures to corporate acquirers? If so, why? This question‐based, empirical study shows that on average, divestitures to PE acquirers correlate with lower divesting firms' shareholder returns than divestitures to corporate acquirers. The study explores whether these lower returns when divesting to PE acquirers are explained by the differences in PE acquirers' distinct value creation strategies when it comes to target selection, ownership, or transaction timing. The results reveal that divesting firms' lower shareholder returns when divesting to PE acquirers are more likely correlated with differences in value creation by PE acquirers due to their distinct ownership and transaction timing strategies, but not their selection strategies.Private equity (PE) firms are prominent buyers of corporate divestitures, and PE firms' strategies for creating value when acquiring divested businesses tend to differ from those of corporate buyers. Yet the performance implications, from the perspective of the divesting firm, of divesting a business to a PE acquirer versus a corporate acquirer are not clear. In this study, I explore the differences in returns to firms divesting to PE acquirers versus those divesting to corporate acquirers. First, on average, divesting firms' returns are lower when divesting to PE acquirers. Second, these lower returns are more likely to occur when the PE acquirer may be expecting to create less value, or when firms choose to divest at a suboptimal time.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140977523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We spotlight the use of machine learning in two‐stage matching models to deal with sample selection bias. Recent advances in machine learning have unlocked new empirical possibilities for inductive theorizing. In contrast, the opportunities to use machine learning in regression studies involving large‐scale data with many covariates and a causal claim are still less well understood. Our core contribution is to guide researchers in the use of machine learning approaches to choosing matching variables for enhanced causal inference in propensity score matching models. We use an analysis of real‐world technology invention data of public–private relationships to demonstrate the method and find that machine learning can provide an alternative approach to ad hoc matching. However, as with any method, it is also important to understand its limitations.This article explores the use of machine learning to enhance decision‐making, particularly in addressing sample selection bias in large‐scale datasets. The rapid development of AI and machine learning offers new, powerful tools especially for digital ecosystems where complex data and causal relationships are complex to analyze. We offer managers and stakeholders insight into the effective integration of machine learning for selecting critical variables in propensity score matching models. Through a detailed examination of real‐world data on technology inventions within public–private relationships, we demonstrate the effectiveness of machine learning as a robust alternative to traditional matching methods.
{"title":"Making the most of AI and machine learning in organizations and strategy research: Supervised machine learning, causal inference, and matching models","authors":"Jason M. Rathje, R. Katila, Philipp Reineke","doi":"10.1002/smj.3604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3604","url":null,"abstract":"We spotlight the use of machine learning in two‐stage matching models to deal with sample selection bias. Recent advances in machine learning have unlocked new empirical possibilities for inductive theorizing. In contrast, the opportunities to use machine learning in regression studies involving large‐scale data with many covariates and a causal claim are still less well understood. Our core contribution is to guide researchers in the use of machine learning approaches to choosing matching variables for enhanced causal inference in propensity score matching models. We use an analysis of real‐world technology invention data of public–private relationships to demonstrate the method and find that machine learning can provide an alternative approach to ad hoc matching. However, as with any method, it is also important to understand its limitations.This article explores the use of machine learning to enhance decision‐making, particularly in addressing sample selection bias in large‐scale datasets. The rapid development of AI and machine learning offers new, powerful tools especially for digital ecosystems where complex data and causal relationships are complex to analyze. We offer managers and stakeholders insight into the effective integration of machine learning for selecting critical variables in propensity score matching models. Through a detailed examination of real‐world data on technology inventions within public–private relationships, we demonstrate the effectiveness of machine learning as a robust alternative to traditional matching methods.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140972621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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