Jagadeesh Sivadasan, Natarajan Balasubramanian, Ravi Dharwadkar, Charlotte Ren
Research SummaryFirm growth and its underlying modes are rarely examined on their own, which impedes our understanding of their relative importance, correlations among them and their associations with competition and future performance. We address these using a comprehensive seven‐mode decomposition of employment growth in all US firms (2004–2013). We find that organic modes such as opening or closing plants contribute more than transactional modes such as acquisitions and selloffs, and that growth modes exhibit age‐size differences and are generally positively correlated within firms. Trade competition in manufacturing increased closures and decreased acquisitions but had no effect on new units. Transactional growth positively correlates with future survival, unlike organic growth. Together, our findings expand our understanding of firm growth as a composite of multiple growth modes.Managerial SummaryManagers have many ways to grow a firm, but studies typically emphasize transactional modes such as acquisitions and selloffs. Using data on all US firms over 2004–2013, we study seven growth modes in an integrated and comprehensive model. We find that organic modes contribute more to growth than transactional modes, that young, large firms grow less relative to old, large firms, that when firms grow (shrink), they tend to grow (shrink) using multiple modes simultaneously and that growth modes vary in their association with competition. Importantly, transactional growth positively correlates with future survival, unlike organic growth. Together, these findings not only suggest that growth modes vary in their contribution to firm growth but also that they may differently influence subsequent performance.
{"title":"How do US firms grow? New evidence from a growth decomposition","authors":"Jagadeesh Sivadasan, Natarajan Balasubramanian, Ravi Dharwadkar, Charlotte Ren","doi":"10.1002/smj.3641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3641","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryFirm growth and its underlying modes are rarely examined on their own, which impedes our understanding of their relative importance, correlations among them and their associations with competition and future performance. We address these using a comprehensive seven‐mode decomposition of employment growth in all US firms (2004–2013). We find that organic modes such as opening or closing plants contribute more than transactional modes such as acquisitions and selloffs, and that growth modes exhibit age‐size differences and are generally positively correlated within firms. Trade competition in manufacturing increased closures and decreased acquisitions but had no effect on new units. Transactional growth positively correlates with future survival, unlike organic growth. Together, our findings expand our understanding of firm growth as a composite of multiple growth modes.Managerial SummaryManagers have many ways to grow a firm, but studies typically emphasize transactional modes such as acquisitions and selloffs. Using data on all US firms over 2004–2013, we study seven growth modes in an integrated and comprehensive model. We find that organic modes contribute more to growth than transactional modes, that young, large firms grow less relative to old, large firms, that when firms grow (shrink), they tend to grow (shrink) using multiple modes simultaneously and that growth modes vary in their association with competition. Importantly, transactional growth positively correlates with future survival, unlike organic growth. Together, these findings not only suggest that growth modes vary in their contribution to firm growth but also that they may differently influence subsequent performance.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141781378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Martin Ganco, Jingnan Liu, Haifeng Wang, Shotaro Yamaguchi
Research SummaryExtant work in strategic management has focused on the role of noncompete agreements (NCAs)—a form of restrictive legal lever used by firms when managing human capital—and conceptualized them as being advantageous to firms. Challenging this notion, we highlight a novel downside of using NCAs and show how their use by some firms creates differentiation opportunities for rival firms. We analyze a unique survey dataset to examine the heterogeneity in the firms' actual use of NCAs conditional on industry and state. We find that the nonuse of NCAs is more common among firms that rely more heavily on talent and are also not the industry leaders, and such firms are more likely not to use NCAs with the goal of attracting skilled employees.Managerial SummaryNoncompete agreements (NCAs) have long been regarded as effective tools for firms managing human capital. Our research challenges this conventional wisdom. We show that NCAs are not uniformly beneficial to all firms even when looking at competitors within the same industry. By analyzing a unique survey dataset, we find that firms relying heavily on talent and not leading their industries are more inclined to forgo NCAs. Their strategic intent? Attracting skilled employees. This study sheds light on the delicate balance between legal constraints and talent attraction and is particularly salient in the context of the policy efforts to ban NCAs.
{"title":"Strategic restraint: When do human‐capital‐intensive companies choose (not) to use noncompete agreements?","authors":"Martin Ganco, Jingnan Liu, Haifeng Wang, Shotaro Yamaguchi","doi":"10.1002/smj.3648","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3648","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryExtant work in strategic management has focused on the role of noncompete agreements (NCAs)—a form of restrictive legal lever used by firms when managing human capital—and conceptualized them as being advantageous to firms. Challenging this notion, we highlight a novel downside of using NCAs and show how their use by some firms creates differentiation opportunities for rival firms. We analyze a unique survey dataset to examine the heterogeneity in the firms' actual use of NCAs conditional on industry and state. We find that the nonuse of NCAs is more common among firms that rely more heavily on talent and are also not the industry leaders, and such firms are more likely not to use NCAs with the goal of attracting skilled employees.Managerial SummaryNoncompete agreements (NCAs) have long been regarded as effective tools for firms managing human capital. Our research challenges this conventional wisdom. We show that NCAs are not uniformly beneficial to all firms even when looking at competitors within the same industry. By analyzing a unique survey dataset, we find that firms relying heavily on talent and not leading their industries are more inclined to forgo NCAs. Their strategic intent? Attracting skilled employees. This study sheds light on the delicate balance between legal constraints and talent attraction and is particularly salient in the context of the policy efforts to ban NCAs.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141781382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research SummaryThere is considerable debate about how firms should adapt to environmental dynamism. Theoretically, some scholars suggest that with increasing dynamism, firms should explore more, whereas others argue that firms should explore less. Empirical evidence remains mixed. We attempt to reconcile these mixed findings by (a) distinguishing between two facets of exploration—exploration propensity versus exploration breadth, and (b) recognizing that firms may make these two decisions using different decision‐making processes. Using a computational model we show that with increasing environmental dynamism, for high performance, (a) firms' exploration propensity may increase, decrease, or stay the same depending on their decision‐making process, but (b) firms' exploration breadth always increases. Our results help explain the mixed findings in this domain and have implications for future empirical work.Managerial SummaryResponding to dynamic environments is challenging for managers. There is limited support for the intuition that firms should explore more in more dynamic environments. We recognize that exploration decisions in firms are temporally and hierarchically separated—senior managers first decide how much to explore and middle managers then decide which projects to fund. In this research, we use a computational model to unpack how these two facets of exploration may change in dynamic environments for firms to maintain high performance. We find that as dynamism increases, how much firms explore depends on how sensitive their decision‐making process is to the perceived attractiveness of the different options, but when they explore, they should always choose options further away from their status‐quo.
{"title":"Organizational adaptation in dynamic environments: Disentangling the effects of how much to explore versus where to explore","authors":"Kannan Srikanth, Tiberiu Ungureanu","doi":"10.1002/smj.3646","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3646","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryThere is considerable debate about how firms should adapt to environmental dynamism. Theoretically, some scholars suggest that with increasing dynamism, firms should explore more, whereas others argue that firms should explore less. Empirical evidence remains mixed. We attempt to reconcile these mixed findings by (a) distinguishing between two facets of exploration—exploration propensity versus exploration breadth, and (b) recognizing that firms may make these two decisions using different decision‐making processes. Using a computational model we show that with increasing environmental dynamism, for high performance, (a) firms' exploration propensity may increase, decrease, or stay the same depending on their decision‐making process, but (b) firms' exploration breadth always increases. Our results help explain the mixed findings in this domain and have implications for future empirical work.Managerial SummaryResponding to dynamic environments is challenging for managers. There is limited support for the intuition that firms should explore more in more dynamic environments. We recognize that exploration decisions in firms are temporally and hierarchically separated—senior managers first decide how much to explore and middle managers then decide which projects to fund. In this research, we use a computational model to unpack how these two facets of exploration may change in dynamic environments for firms to maintain high performance. We find that as dynamism increases, how much firms explore depends on how sensitive their decision‐making process is to the perceived attractiveness of the different options, but when they explore, they should always choose options further away from their status‐quo.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141744296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Donald D. Bergh, Laura D'Oria, T. Russell Crook, Ashley Roccapriore
Research SummaryThe knowledge‐based view (KBV) claims that knowledge is the most important strategic resource because it is the strongest determinant of firm competitive advantage and the glue that pulls resources together. We examine this assertion through a meta‐analysis of the accumulated evidence on the relationships among strategic resources and firm performance (stock market, financial performance, and growth). Findings from 348 samples reporting 248,136 firm‐level observations show that knowledge resources have the highest positive association with all three performance dimensions, with the highest positive relationship with growth, followed by market and then financial performance. Further, knowledge may serve as a foundational resource by augmenting other strategic resources and helping make firms different. These findings support the KBV's core prediction that knowledge resources offer superior strategic value.Managerial SummaryManagers need to understand what resources yield the strongest and most consistent returns. We examined the often‐invoked claim that knowledge is the most important resource associated with firm success. Our study combines evidence from over 300 samples and finds that knowledge‐based resources are consistently associated with the strongest profit, stock market, and growth returns relative to other types of resource investments. For managers, the message is clear—acquire, integrate, retain, and motivate knowledge‐related resources because doing so pays off.
{"title":"Is knowledge really the most important strategic resource? A meta‐analytic review","authors":"Donald D. Bergh, Laura D'Oria, T. Russell Crook, Ashley Roccapriore","doi":"10.1002/smj.3645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3645","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryThe knowledge‐based view (KBV) claims that knowledge is the most important strategic resource because it is the strongest determinant of firm competitive advantage and the glue that pulls resources together. We examine this assertion through a meta‐analysis of the accumulated evidence on the relationships among strategic resources and firm performance (stock market, financial performance, and growth). Findings from 348 samples reporting 248,136 firm‐level observations show that knowledge resources have the highest positive association with all three performance dimensions, with the highest positive relationship with growth, followed by market and then financial performance. Further, knowledge may serve as a foundational resource by augmenting other strategic resources and helping make firms different. These findings support the KBV's core prediction that knowledge resources offer superior strategic value.Managerial SummaryManagers need to understand what resources yield the strongest and most consistent returns. We examined the often‐invoked claim that knowledge is the most important resource associated with firm success. Our study combines evidence from over 300 samples and finds that knowledge‐based resources are consistently associated with the strongest profit, stock market, and growth returns relative to other types of resource investments. For managers, the message is clear—acquire, integrate, retain, and motivate knowledge‐related resources because doing so pays off.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141744297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research SummaryWe examine the joint adoption of four employment restrictions that limit firm resource outflows—nondisclosure (NDA), non‐solicitation, non‐recruitment, and noncompete agreements—and their associations with value appropriation from employees. Using novel individual‐ and firm‐level survey data, we find that when firms adopt restrictions, they tend to adopt either all four restrictions or only an NDA. Adoption of all four restrictions is more likely when workers have access to valuable resources, noncompetes are more enforceable, and states adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Employees with all four restrictions earn 5.4% less than employees with only NDAs, and this effect is driven by workers with low bargaining power. Analyses of earnings and a single restriction (e.g., only noncompetes) yield opposite results from those considering joint adoption, likely because of selection.Managerial SummaryValuable firm resources are often embedded in employees. We study whether and when firms adopt four employment restrictions that could protect such resources—agreements not to disclose information, not to solicit clients or coworkers, and not to join or start a competitor—and examine the extent to which they are associated with value capture from employees. Using novel firm and worker‐level surveys, we find that firms mostly adopt either all four restrictions together, only an NDA, or use no restrictions. Workers are more likely to have all four restrictions when they have access to valuable resources, when noncompetes are more enforceable, and when states adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Finally, all four restrictions are associated with 5.4% lower earnings on average relative to workers with only an NDA, driven by workers with low‐bargaining power.
{"title":"Employment restrictions on resource transferability and value appropriation from employees","authors":"Natarajan Balasubramanian, Evan Starr, Shotaro Yamaguchi","doi":"10.1002/smj.3634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3634","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryWe examine the joint adoption of four employment restrictions that limit firm resource outflows—nondisclosure (NDA), non‐solicitation, non‐recruitment, and noncompete agreements—and their associations with value appropriation from employees. Using novel individual‐ and firm‐level survey data, we find that when firms adopt restrictions, they tend to adopt either all four restrictions or only an NDA. Adoption of all four restrictions is more likely when workers have access to valuable resources, noncompetes are more enforceable, and states adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Employees with all four restrictions earn 5.4% less than employees with only NDAs, and this effect is driven by workers with low bargaining power. Analyses of earnings and a single restriction (e.g., only noncompetes) yield opposite results from those considering joint adoption, likely because of selection.Managerial SummaryValuable firm resources are often embedded in employees. We study whether and when firms adopt four employment restrictions that could protect such resources—agreements not to disclose information, not to solicit clients or coworkers, and not to join or start a competitor—and examine the extent to which they are associated with value capture from employees. Using novel firm and worker‐level surveys, we find that firms mostly adopt either all four restrictions together, only an NDA, or use no restrictions. Workers are more likely to have all four restrictions when they have access to valuable resources, when noncompetes are more enforceable, and when states adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Finally, all four restrictions are associated with 5.4% lower earnings on average relative to workers with only an NDA, driven by workers with low‐bargaining power.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141744298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research SummaryGaining categorical status via a ranking places firms in a new comparison group and makes their behaviors more visible, potentially exposing them to greater scrutiny. How do marginally included firms respond? In this article, we propose that firms will take action in the area of CSR in order to secure their standing, deflect potential criticism, and reduce the anxiety that arises, paradoxically, from being included in a ranking. Using a regression discontinuity design involving law firms’ pro bono policies, we find support for our arguments. Consistent with the mechanism of status anxiety, the effects of marginal inclusion are amplified for firms with greater rank volatility. However, we find no difference in pro bono hours. We discuss implications for theories involving status, CSR, and decoupling.Managerial SummaryToday, firms are evaluated by rankings and ratings more frequently than ever. This continuous external surveillance heightens organizational anxieties, especially among firms that are marginally included. This study explores the strategic responses of such firms, proposing that they enhance their corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts in order to secure their standing, conform with expectations, and preemptively counter criticism. Analyzing pro bono policies of the largest U.S. law firms, the results support this idea and suggest that the tendency is particularly salient when firms' rank positions have fluctuated significantly. The findings offer insights into how rankings affect firms' CSR strategies and their efforts to balance status and performance.
{"title":"Corporate social responsibility at the margins: Firms' responses to marginal inclusion on the Vault Law 100 ranking","authors":"Wooseok Jung, Amanda Sharkey","doi":"10.1002/smj.3642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3642","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryGaining categorical status via a ranking places firms in a new comparison group and makes their behaviors more visible, potentially exposing them to greater scrutiny. How do marginally included firms respond? In this article, we propose that firms will take action in the area of CSR in order to secure their standing, deflect potential criticism, and reduce the anxiety that arises, paradoxically, from being included in a ranking. Using a regression discontinuity design involving law firms’ pro bono policies, we find support for our arguments. Consistent with the mechanism of status anxiety, the effects of marginal inclusion are amplified for firms with greater rank volatility. However, we find no difference in pro bono hours. We discuss implications for theories involving status, CSR, and decoupling.Managerial SummaryToday, firms are evaluated by rankings and ratings more frequently than ever. This continuous external surveillance heightens organizational anxieties, especially among firms that are marginally included. This study explores the strategic responses of such firms, proposing that they enhance their corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts in order to secure their standing, conform with expectations, and preemptively counter criticism. Analyzing pro bono policies of the largest U.S. law firms, the results support this idea and suggest that the tendency is particularly salient when firms' rank positions have fluctuated significantly. The findings offer insights into how rankings affect firms' CSR strategies and their efforts to balance status and performance.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141615065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research SummaryThis study abductively investigates how a firm's degree of business model development—the extent to which strategic choices are crystallized—moderates the impact of a scientific approach to decision‐making on performance. We present findings from a field experiment involving 261 entrepreneurs, where treated entrepreneurs learn to apply a scientific approach, while control counterparts receive comparable content without this approach. Results show that the effect of scientific decision making varies with business model development. Treated entrepreneurs with higher degrees of business model development elaborated their theories of value focusing on lower‐level choices, achieving superior economic performance compared to controls. Conversely, treated entrepreneurs with lower levels of business model development reevaluated fundamental aspects, resulting in increased epistemic uncertainty and less favorable short‐term economic outcomes compared to controls.Managerial Using a field experiment with 261 entrepreneurs, we explored how the degree of business strategy definition influences the benefits of adopting a scientific approach to decision‐making. In the experiment, half of the entrepreneurs were taught to use a scientific approach for making decisions (the treated group), while the others received similar training without the scientific approach (the control group). Results show that treated entrepreneurs with already defined strategies benefited more, experiencing improved performance even in the short term. Conversely, treated entrepreneurs with strategies still under definition experienced more uncertainty and lower short‐term economic performance, as the scientific approach prompted them to reassess and adjust their core strategic decisions.
{"title":"Making business model decisions like scientists: Strategic commitment, uncertainty, and economic performance","authors":"Elena Novelli, Chiara Spina","doi":"10.1002/smj.3636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3636","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryThis study abductively investigates how a firm's degree of business model development—the extent to which strategic choices are crystallized—moderates the impact of a scientific approach to decision‐making on performance. We present findings from a field experiment involving 261 entrepreneurs, where treated entrepreneurs learn to apply a scientific approach, while control counterparts receive comparable content without this approach. Results show that the effect of scientific decision making varies with business model development. Treated entrepreneurs with higher degrees of business model development elaborated their theories of value focusing on lower‐level choices, achieving superior economic performance compared to controls. Conversely, treated entrepreneurs with lower levels of business model development reevaluated fundamental aspects, resulting in increased epistemic uncertainty and less favorable short‐term economic outcomes compared to controls.Managerial Using a field experiment with 261 entrepreneurs, we explored how the degree of business strategy definition influences the benefits of adopting a scientific approach to decision‐making. In the experiment, half of the entrepreneurs were taught to use a scientific approach for making decisions (the treated group), while the others received similar training without the scientific approach (the control group). Results show that treated entrepreneurs with already defined strategies benefited more, experiencing improved performance even in the short term. Conversely, treated entrepreneurs with strategies still under definition experienced more uncertainty and lower short‐term economic performance, as the scientific approach prompted them to reassess and adjust their core strategic decisions.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"55 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141588498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research summaryThis study utilizes the administrative data of an innovation grant program in a major emerging economy to study which firms are best positioned to capture the state and access resources beyond what their rule‐complying merits command. We trace the grant allocation process and directly observe occurrences of rule‐violating funding. We show that firms vary in capability to secure irregular awards, depending on factors such as geographic proximity and the social and bureaucratic setting within which entrepreneurs and officials interact. Furthermore, by comparing the actual allocation of irregular awards with the counterfactual scenario in which recipients were evaluated solely based on grant rules, we conclude that crony capitalism, rather than bureaucratic heroism, is the primary driver of irregular awards.Managerial summaryGovernments often use innovation grant programs to promote firm innovation, but these programs sometimes fail to achieve their objectives due to grant officials violating policy rules to provide resources to undeserving firms. We study a public funding program in a major emerging economy to analyze the bureaucratic structure and the social dynamics within which entrepreneurs and bureaucrats interact to identify the sources of state‐resource misallocation. We find that geographic distance, intragovernmental checks and balances, and the lack of direct social intermediary connecting entrepreneurs with bureaucrats help reduce the likelihood of collusion for state‐resource misallocation. Our results generate insights to help guide the (re)design of public funding programs, particularly in countries with low levels of transparency and public accountability.
{"title":"Who captures the state? Evidence from irregular awards in a public innovation grant program","authors":"Yanbo Wang, Jordan Siegel, Jizhen Li","doi":"10.1002/smj.3635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3635","url":null,"abstract":"Research summaryThis study utilizes the administrative data of an innovation grant program in a major emerging economy to study which firms are best positioned to capture the state and access resources beyond what their rule‐complying merits command. We trace the grant allocation process and directly observe occurrences of rule‐violating funding. We show that firms vary in capability to secure irregular awards, depending on factors such as geographic proximity and the social and bureaucratic setting within which entrepreneurs and officials interact. Furthermore, by comparing the actual allocation of irregular awards with the counterfactual scenario in which recipients were evaluated solely based on grant rules, we conclude that crony capitalism, rather than bureaucratic heroism, is the primary driver of irregular awards.Managerial summaryGovernments often use innovation grant programs to promote firm innovation, but these programs sometimes fail to achieve their objectives due to grant officials violating policy rules to provide resources to undeserving firms. We study a public funding program in a major emerging economy to analyze the bureaucratic structure and the social dynamics within which entrepreneurs and bureaucrats interact to identify the sources of state‐resource misallocation. We find that geographic distance, intragovernmental checks and balances, and the lack of direct social intermediary connecting entrepreneurs with bureaucrats help reduce the likelihood of collusion for state‐resource misallocation. Our results generate insights to help guide the (re)design of public funding programs, particularly in countries with low levels of transparency and public accountability.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141585202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jung‐Hoon Han, Timothy G. Pollock, Srikanth Paruchuri
Research SummaryWe explore misconduct scandalization's antecedents by focusing on the rational and emotional bases underlying reputation and celebrity, and considering how they can enhance or reduce the likelihood misconduct is scandalized as a function of the misconduct's objective and perceived severity. Specifically, we argue the quantifiable nature of objective misconduct severity enhances reputation's rational influence, but attenuates celebrity's emotion‐based appeal. Conversely, perceived misconduct severity reduces reputation's influence, while enhancing the media‐driven interest in celebrity firms' behaviors. Our findings based on corporate data breaches confirm that objective severity amplifies reputation's effect and attenuates celebrity's effect, while perceived severity amplifies celebrity's effect and attenuates reputation's effect. Our findings highlight the importance of social evaluations' sociocognitive content in understanding why only some misconduct becomes scandalized.Managerial SummaryCommitting misconduct is costly; having it scandalized is devastating. Yet little is known about how social evaluations influence why only some firms' misconduct is scandalized, beyond the vague notion that prominent firms' misconduct attracts media attention. We find that the rational and emotional bases of firms' evaluations matter. High reputation, based on the rational assessment of firms' capabilities, increases the likelihood of scandalization for objectively severe misconduct, and the influence of celebrity—originating from audiences' emotional resonance with firms' unconventional traits and behaviors—weakens as objective severity increases. Conversely, reputation's influence weakens, and celebrity's influence strengthens, as media “availability cascades” grow and increase perceived severity. In addition to providing a more realistic portrayal of media behavior, we offer insights into post‐misconduct communications and remedial actions.
{"title":"Public enemies? The differential effects of reputation and celebrity on corporate misconduct scandalization","authors":"Jung‐Hoon Han, Timothy G. Pollock, Srikanth Paruchuri","doi":"10.1002/smj.3638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3638","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryWe explore misconduct scandalization's antecedents by focusing on the rational and emotional bases underlying reputation and celebrity, and considering how they can enhance or reduce the likelihood misconduct is scandalized as a function of the misconduct's objective and perceived severity. Specifically, we argue the quantifiable nature of objective misconduct severity enhances reputation's rational influence, but attenuates celebrity's emotion‐based appeal. Conversely, perceived misconduct severity reduces reputation's influence, while enhancing the media‐driven interest in celebrity firms' behaviors. Our findings based on corporate data breaches confirm that objective severity amplifies reputation's effect and attenuates celebrity's effect, while perceived severity amplifies celebrity's effect and attenuates reputation's effect. Our findings highlight the importance of social evaluations' sociocognitive content in understanding why only some misconduct becomes scandalized.Managerial SummaryCommitting misconduct is costly; having it scandalized is devastating. Yet little is known about how social evaluations influence why only some firms' misconduct is scandalized, beyond the vague notion that prominent firms' misconduct attracts media attention. We find that the rational and emotional bases of firms' evaluations matter. High reputation, based on the rational assessment of firms' capabilities, increases the likelihood of scandalization for objectively severe misconduct, and the influence of celebrity—originating from audiences' emotional resonance with firms' unconventional traits and behaviors—weakens as objective severity increases. Conversely, reputation's influence weakens, and celebrity's influence strengthens, as media “availability cascades” grow and increase perceived severity. In addition to providing a more realistic portrayal of media behavior, we offer insights into post‐misconduct communications and remedial actions.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141573467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yongzhi Wang, Nandini Rajagopalan, Lori Qingyuan Yue, Brian Wu
Research SummaryWe develop the following typology of four types of acquisition synergies by integrating the multisidedness feature of digital platforms with the mainstream strategy research: complementary‐technology‐side economies of scope, complementary‐technology‐side economies of scale, user‐side economies of scope, and user‐side economies of scale. We show that (1) acquisition synergies are entry‐deterring, (2) synergies derived from economies of scope have stronger effects than those derived from economies of scale, and (3) synergies derived from the technology side have stronger effects than those derived from the user side. We highlight the significant competitive and regulatory implications of our findings. For example, one standard‐deviation increase in technology‐side economies of scope is associated with 55 deterred entries in 1 month or a $2.80 million potential loss in annual revenue.Managerial SummaryAcquisitions can shift the market structure of a digital platform in ways that affect subsequent entries and hence the platform's base of complementors. Synergies that complementor acquirers accrue can be entry‐deterring. We develop a two‐by‐two typology of acquisition synergies in a multisided platform based on the two sides of a platform market (user side or complementary‐technology side) and two sources of synergies (economies of scale or economies of scope). We then leverage over 279,000 app developers' entry decisions into product categories in Apple's iOS App Store, over 71 million customer reviews, and over 12,000 unique software development kits to construct measures of synergies. Our paper contributes to the platform literature by demonstrating the entry‐deterring effects of synergies that complementor acquirers can exploit.
{"title":"The entry‐deterring effects of synergies in complementor acquisitions: Evidence from Apple's digital platform market, the iOS app store","authors":"Yongzhi Wang, Nandini Rajagopalan, Lori Qingyuan Yue, Brian Wu","doi":"10.1002/smj.3639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3639","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryWe develop the following typology of four types of acquisition synergies by integrating the multisidedness feature of digital platforms with the mainstream strategy research: complementary‐technology‐side economies of scope, complementary‐technology‐side economies of scale, user‐side economies of scope, and user‐side economies of scale. We show that (1) acquisition synergies are entry‐deterring, (2) synergies derived from economies of scope have stronger effects than those derived from economies of scale, and (3) synergies derived from the technology side have stronger effects than those derived from the user side. We highlight the significant competitive and regulatory implications of our findings. For example, one standard‐deviation increase in technology‐side economies of scope is associated with 55 deterred entries in 1 month or a $2.80 million potential loss in annual revenue.Managerial SummaryAcquisitions can shift the market structure of a digital platform in ways that affect subsequent entries and hence the platform's base of complementors. Synergies that complementor acquirers accrue can be entry‐deterring. We develop a two‐by‐two typology of acquisition synergies in a multisided platform based on the two sides of a platform market (user side or complementary‐technology side) and two sources of synergies (economies of scale or economies of scope). We then leverage over 279,000 app developers' entry decisions into product categories in Apple's iOS App Store, over 71 million customer reviews, and over 12,000 unique software development kits to construct measures of synergies. Our paper contributes to the platform literature by demonstrating the entry‐deterring effects of synergies that complementor acquirers can exploit.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：