Humans differ in their strategic reasoning abilities and in beliefs about others' strategic reasoning abilities. Studying such cognitive hierarchies has produced new insights regarding equilibrium analysis in economics. This paper investigates the effect of cognitive hierarchies on long run behavior. Despite short run behavior being highly sensitive to variation in strategic reasoning abilities, this variation is not replicated in the long run. In particular, when generalized risk dominant strategy profiles exist, they emerge in the long run independently of the strategic reasoning abilities of players. These abilities may be arbitrarily low or high, heterogeneous across players, and evolving over time.
{"title":"Deep and Shallow Thinking in the Long Run","authors":"H. H. Nax, Jonathan Newton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3662340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3662340","url":null,"abstract":"Humans differ in their strategic reasoning abilities and in beliefs about others' strategic reasoning abilities. Studying such cognitive hierarchies has produced new insights regarding equilibrium analysis in economics. This paper investigates the effect of cognitive hierarchies on long run behavior. Despite short run behavior being highly sensitive to variation in strategic reasoning abilities, this variation is not replicated in the long run. In particular, when generalized risk dominant strategy profiles exist, they emerge in the long run independently of the strategic reasoning abilities of players. These abilities may be arbitrarily low or high, heterogeneous across players, and evolving over time.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126477023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-01DOI: 10.18601/16577558.n32.05
N. Wright
Los Estados soberanos más pequeños del mundo, que de hecho comprenden la mayoría de los Estados soberanos en todo el mundo, tienen mucho que enseñarnos sobre las diferentes interpretaciones del poder. La gran parte de los estudios de relaciones internacionales (ir) se han centrado tradicionalmente en el poder como control o coerción; sin embargo, el poder también puede significar capacidad, que se logra a través de lo que este artículo identifica como agencia creativa. Aquí, la agencia creativa se define como la capacidad de acuerdo con la forma en que uno interpreta el poder y los beneficios asociados con ese poder. Por lo tanto, ciertos componentes del poder, como la hegemonía regional o global, pueden no ser relevantes para la agencia creativa; por el contrario, una identidad cultural fuerte o una economía de nicho puede ser esencial. Este artículo divide los Estados pequeños en tres categorías: (1) 2 microestados, definidos aquí como Estados con poblaciones de menos de medio millón y/o un área no marítima de menos de 1,000 kilómetros cuadrados; (2) Estados con poblaciones de entre medio millón y un millón; y (3) Estados considerados pequeños principalmente en relación con sus vecinos más grandes. Utiliza ejemplos de todas estas categorías para ilustrar el fenómeno de la agencia creativa con respecto a la formación del Estado y el tipo de gobierno y gobernanza. Debido a que el enfoque del artículo es la pedagogía, el texto incluye referencias a temas clave que los instructores pueden presentar con Estados pequeños, así como a trabajos representativos sobre Estados pequeños de ciencias políticas, derecho, historia y antropología
{"title":"Small States and International Relations Pedagogy: Exploring the Creative Agency Frontier","authors":"N. Wright","doi":"10.18601/16577558.n32.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18601/16577558.n32.05","url":null,"abstract":"Los Estados soberanos más pequeños del mundo, que de hecho comprenden la mayoría de los Estados soberanos en todo el mundo, tienen mucho que enseñarnos sobre las diferentes interpretaciones del poder. La gran parte de los estudios de relaciones internacionales (ir) se han centrado tradicionalmente en el poder como control o coerción; sin embargo, el poder también puede significar capacidad, que se logra a través de lo que este artículo identifica como agencia creativa. Aquí, la agencia creativa se define como la capacidad de acuerdo con la forma en que uno interpreta el poder y los beneficios asociados con ese poder. Por lo tanto, ciertos componentes del poder, como la hegemonía regional o global, pueden no ser relevantes para la agencia creativa; por el contrario, una identidad cultural fuerte o una economía de nicho puede ser esencial. Este artículo divide los Estados pequeños en tres categorías: (1) 2 microestados, definidos aquí como Estados con poblaciones de menos de medio millón y/o un área no marítima de menos de 1,000 kilómetros cuadrados; (2) Estados con poblaciones de entre medio millón y un millón; y (3) Estados considerados pequeños principalmente en relación con sus vecinos más grandes. Utiliza ejemplos de todas estas categorías para ilustrar el fenómeno de la agencia creativa con respecto a la formación del Estado y el tipo de gobierno y gobernanza. Debido a que el enfoque del artículo es la pedagogía, el texto incluye referencias a temas clave que los instructores pueden presentar con Estados pequeños, así como a trabajos representativos sobre Estados pequeños de ciencias políticas, derecho, historia y antropología","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114093179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies how shocks to the social network can have aggregate effects. First, using daily consumption data across counties over the COVID-19 pandemic and Facebook's Social Connectedness Index (SCI), we find that a 10% rise in SCI-weighted cases and deaths is associated with a 0.18% and 0.23% decline in consumption expenditures. These consumption effects are concentrated among consumer goods and services that rely more on social-contact, suggesting that individuals incorporate the experiences from their social network to inform their own consumption choices. Second, we calibrate a heterogenous-agent model with market incompleteness where agents form their perceptions about the local infection conditions subject to social influences. Our model shows how the aggregate consumption has further dropped due to the presence of social network amplification given the pandemic outbreaks first took place in well-connected regions. We also show how the size of aggregate responses depends on the location of the initial shocks and structure of the network.
{"title":"Learning from Friends in a Pandemic: Social Networks and the Macroeconomic Response of Consumption","authors":"C. Makridis, Tao Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3601500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3601500","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how shocks to the social network can have aggregate effects. First, using daily consumption data across counties over the COVID-19 pandemic and Facebook's Social Connectedness Index (SCI), we find that a 10% rise in SCI-weighted cases and deaths is associated with a 0.18% and 0.23% decline in consumption expenditures. These consumption effects are concentrated among consumer goods and services that rely more on social-contact, suggesting that individuals incorporate the experiences from their social network to inform their own consumption choices. Second, we calibrate a heterogenous-agent model with market incompleteness where agents form their perceptions about the local infection conditions subject to social influences. Our model shows how the aggregate consumption has further dropped due to the presence of social network amplification given the pandemic outbreaks first took place in well-connected regions. We also show how the size of aggregate responses depends on the location of the initial shocks and structure of the network.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130103874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does timely access to national news shape political outcomes? Using newly digitized data on the growth of the telegraph network, the paper studies the impact of the electric telegraph on political participation in the mid-19th century America. I use proximity to daily newspapers with telegraphic connection to Washington to generate plausibly exogenous variation in access to telegraphed news from Washington. I find that access to Washington news with less delay increased presidential election turnout. Effects were concentrated in regions least connected to Washington prior to the telegraph. For mechanisms, I provide evidence that newspapers facilitated the dissemination of national news to local areas. Text analysis on historic newspapers shows that the improved access to news from Washington led newspapers to cover more national political news, including coverage of Congress, the presidency, and sectional divisions involving slavery. The results suggest that the telegraph made newspapers less parochial, facilitated a national conversation and increased political participation.
{"title":"The Electric Telegraph, News Coverage and Political Participation","authors":"Tianyi Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3583123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3583123","url":null,"abstract":"How does timely access to national news shape political outcomes? Using newly digitized data on the growth of the telegraph network, the paper studies the impact of the electric telegraph on political participation in the mid-19th century America. I use proximity to daily newspapers with telegraphic connection to Washington to generate plausibly exogenous variation in access to telegraphed news from Washington. I find that access to Washington news with less delay increased presidential election turnout. Effects were concentrated in regions least connected to Washington prior to the telegraph. For mechanisms, I provide evidence that newspapers facilitated the dissemination of national news to local areas. Text analysis on historic newspapers shows that the improved access to news from Washington led newspapers to cover more national political news, including coverage of Congress, the presidency, and sectional divisions involving slavery. The results suggest that the telegraph made newspapers less parochial, facilitated a national conversation and increased political participation.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134507834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We estimate the role of news shocks to total factor productivity, foreign interest rates and commodity terms of trade in explaining the variance of output and other macro aggregates in a large sample of countries. To correct for the small-sample bias of the variance decomposition estimates we develop a Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap method. We find that the mean difference of variance share of output explained by news shocks between developing and developed countries is: I) Negligible for news shocks to total factor productivity. II) Positive for news shocks to foreign interest rates (6 p.p.) and to commodity terms of trade (8.3 p.p.). Using cross-sectional data, we find that countries with less financial development have a larger share of output variance explained by news shocks to foreign interest rates, and countries with higher total trade of commodities to output ratio and less developed financial markets exhibit a larger share of output variance explained by news shocks to commodity terms of trade. These results suggest that to study the role of news shocks in the economy, one-sector models with only shocks to total factor productivity are not adequate, and that there must be a structural distinction regarding financial markets' development when modeling developing countries as opposed to developed in a general equilibrium framework.
{"title":"News Shocks across Countries: An Empirical Investigation","authors":"Miguel Acosta-Henao, Marius M. Mihai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3588030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3588030","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate the role of news shocks to total factor productivity, foreign interest rates and commodity terms of trade in explaining the variance of output and other macro aggregates in a large sample of countries. To correct for the small-sample bias of the variance decomposition estimates we develop a Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap method. We find that the mean difference of variance share of output explained by news shocks between developing and developed countries is: I) Negligible for news shocks to total factor productivity. II) Positive for news shocks to foreign interest rates (6 p.p.) and to commodity terms of trade (8.3 p.p.). Using cross-sectional data, we find that countries with less financial development have a larger share of output variance explained by news shocks to foreign interest rates, and countries with higher total trade of commodities to output ratio and less developed financial markets exhibit a larger share of output variance explained by news shocks to commodity terms of trade. These results suggest that to study the role of news shocks in the economy, one-sector models with only shocks to total factor productivity are not adequate, and that there must be a structural distinction regarding financial markets' development when modeling developing countries as opposed to developed in a general equilibrium framework.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134132478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leonardo Bursztyn, Aakaash Rao, Christopher Roth, David Yanagizawa-Drott
We study the effects of news coverage of the novel coronavirus by the two most widely-viewed cable news shows in the United States – Hannity and Tucker Carlson Tonight, both on Fox News – on viewers' behavior and downstream health outcomes. Carlson warned viewers about the threat posed by the coronavirus from early February, while Hannity originally dismissed the risks associated with the virus before gradually adjusting his position starting late February. We first validate these differences in content with independent coding of show transcripts. In line with the differences in content, we present novel survey evidence that Hannity's viewers changed behavior in response to the virus later than other Fox News viewers, while Carlson's viewers changed behavior earlier. We then turn to the effects on the pandemic itself, examining health outcomes across counties. First, we document that greater viewership of Hannity relative to Tucker Carlson Tonight is strongly associated with a greater number of COVID-19 cases and deaths in the early stages of the pandemic. The relationship is stable across an expansive set of robustness tests. To better identify the effect of differential viewership of the two shows, we employ a novel instrumental variable strategy exploiting variation in when shows are broadcast in relation to local sunset times. These estimates also show that greater exposure to Hannity relative to Tucker Carlson Tonight is associated with a greater number of county-level cases and deaths. Furthermore, the results suggest that in mid-March, after Hannity's shift in tone, the diverging trajectories on COVID-19 cases begin to revert. We provide additional evidence consistent with misinformation being an important mechanism driving the effects in the data. While our findings cannot yet speak to long-term effects, they indicate that provision of misinformation in the early stages of a pandemic can have important consequences for how a disease ultimately affects the population.
{"title":"Misinformation During a Pandemic","authors":"Leonardo Bursztyn, Aakaash Rao, Christopher Roth, David Yanagizawa-Drott","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3580487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580487","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effects of news coverage of the novel coronavirus by the two most widely-viewed cable news shows in the United States – Hannity and Tucker Carlson Tonight, both on Fox News – on viewers' behavior and downstream health outcomes. Carlson warned viewers about the threat posed by the coronavirus from early February, while Hannity originally dismissed the risks associated with the virus before gradually adjusting his position starting late February. We first validate these differences in content with independent coding of show transcripts. In line with the differences in content, we present novel survey evidence that Hannity's viewers changed behavior in response to the virus later than other Fox News viewers, while Carlson's viewers changed behavior earlier. We then turn to the effects on the pandemic itself, examining health outcomes across counties. First, we document that greater viewership of Hannity relative to Tucker Carlson Tonight is strongly associated with a greater number of COVID-19 cases and deaths in the early stages of the pandemic. The relationship is stable across an expansive set of robustness tests. To better identify the effect of differential viewership of the two shows, we employ a novel instrumental variable strategy exploiting variation in when shows are broadcast in relation to local sunset times. These estimates also show that greater exposure to Hannity relative to Tucker Carlson Tonight is associated with a greater number of county-level cases and deaths. Furthermore, the results suggest that in mid-March, after Hannity's shift in tone, the diverging trajectories on COVID-19 cases begin to revert. We provide additional evidence consistent with misinformation being an important mechanism driving the effects in the data. While our findings cannot yet speak to long-term effects, they indicate that provision of misinformation in the early stages of a pandemic can have important consequences for how a disease ultimately affects the population.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125257724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose a possible link between the political polarization among citizens and the level of shamelessness of lies issued by politicians on social media websites. To this purpose, we study the problem of a candidate who has (exogenously) decided to issue a lie on social media and that must decide how blatantly the lie should be. We assume the candidate's payoff function increases with the dissemination of the lie up to the election date. The dissemination of the lie up to the election date is shown to be a decreasing function of the shamelessness level. Nonetheless, the electorate's political polarization is an incentive for the candidate to lie brazenly. The dissemination process is carried by social media users who decide between inspecting (or not) and sharing (or not) the candidate's message. Furthermore, we include programmed bots as sources of dissemination. In this regard, we show how the influence of bots over the dissemination process relates to the electorate's political polarization level, with the lie's shamelessness and with the time interval between the posting and election dates.
{"title":"Political Polarization and Blatant Lies on Social Media","authors":"Samuel Santos, M. Griebeler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3579542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3579542","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a possible link between the political polarization among citizens and the level of shamelessness of lies issued by politicians on social media websites. To this purpose, we study the problem of a candidate who has (exogenously) decided to issue a lie on social media and that must decide how blatantly the lie should be. We assume the candidate's payoff function increases with the dissemination of the lie up to the election date. The dissemination of the lie up to the election date is shown to be a decreasing function of the shamelessness level. Nonetheless, the electorate's political polarization is an incentive for the candidate to lie brazenly. The dissemination process is carried by social media users who decide between inspecting (or not) and sharing (or not) the candidate's message. Furthermore, we include programmed bots as sources of dissemination. In this regard, we show how the influence of bots over the dissemination process relates to the electorate's political polarization level, with the lie's shamelessness and with the time interval between the posting and election dates.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127361731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fabrice Etilé, D. Johnston, P. Frijters, M. Shields
Understanding who in the population is psychologically resilient in the face of major life events, and who is not, is important for policies that target reductions in disadvantage. In this paper we construct a measure of adult resilience, document its distribution, and test its predictability by childhood socioeconomic circumstances. We use a dynamic finite mixture model applied to 17 years of panel data, and focus on the psychological reaction to ten major adverse life events. These include serious illness, major financial events, redundancy and crime victimisation. Our model accounts for non-random selection into events, anticipation of events, and differences between individuals in the immediate response and the speed of adaptation. We find considerable heterogeneity in the response to adverse events, and that resilience is strongly correlated with clinical measures of mental health. Resilience in adulthood is predictable by childhood socioeconomic circumstances; the strongest predictor is good childhood health.
{"title":"Psychological Resilience to Major Socioeconomic Life Events","authors":"Fabrice Etilé, D. Johnston, P. Frijters, M. Shields","doi":"10.31234/osf.io/vp48c","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/vp48c","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding who in the population is psychologically resilient in the face of major life events, and who is not, is important for policies that target reductions in disadvantage. In this paper we construct a measure of adult resilience, document its distribution, and test its predictability by childhood socioeconomic circumstances. We use a dynamic finite mixture model applied to 17 years of panel data, and focus on the psychological reaction to ten major adverse life events. These include serious illness, major financial events, redundancy and crime victimisation. Our model accounts for non-random selection into events, anticipation of events, and differences between individuals in the immediate response and the speed of adaptation. We find considerable heterogeneity in the response to adverse events, and that resilience is strongly correlated with clinical measures of mental health. Resilience in adulthood is predictable by childhood socioeconomic circumstances; the strongest predictor is good childhood health.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116052122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the impact of the staggered introduction of digital television in Kenya between 2013 and 2017 on electoral behavior in times of political uncertainty. I construct a geocoded dataset of Kenyan polling stations and TV reception. After studying the determinants of signal availability at a fine-grained level, I estimate a first difference model to measure the impact of exposure to TV on remobilization after the nullification of the 2017 presidential election. The effect of TV is heterogeneous: turnout is lowered by 2% in pro-opposition regions while it amplifies mobilization in pro-incumbent bastions (+4%). The effect is exacerbated when voters have previously been exposed to political violence. Applying text analysis methods, I show that TV channels widely covered the crisis: these editorial choices could have amplified voters’ risk perception. I also find evidence of collective exposure to TV as another channel of TV influence on social groups.
{"title":"TV in Times of Political Uncertainty: Evidence from the 2017 Presidential Election in Kenya","authors":"E. Mougin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3561429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561429","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of the staggered introduction of digital television in Kenya between 2013 and 2017 on electoral behavior in times of political uncertainty. I construct a geocoded dataset of Kenyan polling stations and TV reception. After studying the determinants of signal availability at a fine-grained level, I estimate a first difference model to measure the impact of exposure to TV on remobilization after the nullification of the 2017 presidential election. The effect of TV is heterogeneous: turnout is lowered by 2% in pro-opposition regions while it amplifies mobilization in pro-incumbent bastions (+4%). The effect is exacerbated when voters have previously been exposed to political violence. Applying text analysis methods, I show that TV channels widely covered the crisis: these editorial choices could have amplified voters’ risk perception. I also find evidence of collective exposure to TV as another channel of TV influence on social groups.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122650157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This report presents the most detailed and comprehensive analysis to date of news use during the 2019 UK General Election. It is based on a unique tracking study of the online news consumption of 1,711 people aged 18-65 across mobile and desktop devices throughout the campaign (spanning six weeks), combined with surveys with a subset of 752 panellists fielded before and after the vote, asking them about the relative importance of offline and online news and their attitudes to the media and politics more widely. Overall, much elite and public debate around the role of the media in politics before, during, and after the election has focused on the risks of political polarisation (especially around the issue of Brexit, and with two divisive party leaders). Our analysis here suggests that the bigger issue may be that many people do not engage much with news at all, spending just 3% of their time online with news.
{"title":"A Mile Wide, an Inch Deep: Online News and Media Use in the 2019 UK General Election","authors":"R. Fletcher, N. Newman, A. Schulz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3582441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3582441","url":null,"abstract":"This report presents the most detailed and comprehensive analysis to date of news use during the 2019 UK General Election. It is based on a unique tracking study of the online news consumption of 1,711 people aged 18-65 across mobile and desktop devices throughout the campaign (spanning six weeks), combined with surveys with a subset of 752 panellists fielded before and after the vote, asking them about the relative importance of offline and online news and their attitudes to the media and politics more widely. Overall, much elite and public debate around the role of the media in politics before, during, and after the election has focused on the risks of political polarisation (especially around the issue of Brexit, and with two divisive party leaders). Our analysis here suggests that the bigger issue may be that many people do not engage much with news at all, spending just 3% of their time online with news.","PeriodicalId":223724,"journal":{"name":"Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122828126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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