Pub Date : 2022-11-17DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2022.2136689
J. Soong
Abstract Since 2020, the rising economic competition and political rivalries have become intensive and austere between the United States and China. The formation of new global economic and political orders have started to establish a new era gradually under a USA-China hegemonic contest. As a consequence, Asian states have been enforced and reluctant to face the escalating and reshaping regional orders amid the USA-China power rivalry in the new millennium. There are three important parts emphasized for this special issue. One, the research approach will be based on the integration of neoclassic realism and a strategic triangle. Two, the strategic choice of small states toward a China-USA power rivalry intends to apply balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging strategies. The last, involves conducting a research framework of small state’s responses and strategies on the basis of hedging governance.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Asian States and Their Development Strategies under USA-China Power Rivalry: Conducting Hedging Strategy on Triangular Relation and Operation","authors":"J. Soong","doi":"10.1080/10971475.2022.2136689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2136689","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since 2020, the rising economic competition and political rivalries have become intensive and austere between the United States and China. The formation of new global economic and political orders have started to establish a new era gradually under a USA-China hegemonic contest. As a consequence, Asian states have been enforced and reluctant to face the escalating and reshaping regional orders amid the USA-China power rivalry in the new millennium. There are three important parts emphasized for this special issue. One, the research approach will be based on the integration of neoclassic realism and a strategic triangle. Two, the strategic choice of small states toward a China-USA power rivalry intends to apply balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging strategies. The last, involves conducting a research framework of small state’s responses and strategies on the basis of hedging governance.","PeriodicalId":22382,"journal":{"name":"The Chinese Economy","volume":"35 1","pages":"245 - 255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76280988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-28DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2022.2136696
Muhamad Iksan, J. Soong
Abstract In the new century, a growing power rivalry and contest between China and USA has significantly impacted the Asia-Pacific region. In turn, Indonesia has tried to avoid being caught in the middle between these two great powers. Among unanswered questions are how to respond to influences affecting politics and security and how to interact concerning economic cooperation and market integration. This article will explore how Indonesia tried to protect its own national interests amid this great-power competition by making strategic and timely policy choices from 2016 to 2022. We offer a new argument and interpretation for how a middle-sized power like Indonesia can flexibly and efficiently operate a hedging strategy toward US and China to promote its own security and development. Neoclassic realism will be applied to interpret a strategic triangle. As such, we explore Indonesia’s state leadership, domestic politics, political culture, and economic entity within the context of US-China power rivalry, closely in related to facing China’s Belt-and-Road initiative (BRI) as well as US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy with Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).
{"title":"The Political Economy of Indonesia’s Development Strategy under China-USA Power Rivalry and Hegemonic Competition: A Middle Power with Its Hedging Strategy","authors":"Muhamad Iksan, J. Soong","doi":"10.1080/10971475.2022.2136696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2136696","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the new century, a growing power rivalry and contest between China and USA has significantly impacted the Asia-Pacific region. In turn, Indonesia has tried to avoid being caught in the middle between these two great powers. Among unanswered questions are how to respond to influences affecting politics and security and how to interact concerning economic cooperation and market integration. This article will explore how Indonesia tried to protect its own national interests amid this great-power competition by making strategic and timely policy choices from 2016 to 2022. We offer a new argument and interpretation for how a middle-sized power like Indonesia can flexibly and efficiently operate a hedging strategy toward US and China to promote its own security and development. Neoclassic realism will be applied to interpret a strategic triangle. As such, we explore Indonesia’s state leadership, domestic politics, political culture, and economic entity within the context of US-China power rivalry, closely in related to facing China’s Belt-and-Road initiative (BRI) as well as US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy with Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).","PeriodicalId":22382,"journal":{"name":"The Chinese Economy","volume":"67 1","pages":"304 - 320"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89390947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-28DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2022.2136694
Wen-Chih Chao
Abstract The competition between the United States and China has intensified since the Trump administration, and the two sides have clashed in the areas such as the economy, military, politics, technology, and human rights. This conflict presents countries in the Indo-Pacific region with the challenge of navigating foreign policy with these two hegemonic powers. The Philippines is one such country facing the challenge of maintaining a balanced relationship with the two countries as a major concern for a strategic triangle. The incumbent Philippine president must calculate the benefits and risks before formulating policies. Facing such a dilemma, former President Aquino chose to file a lawsuit with the International Arbitration Court and strengthen cooperation with the United States to defend the sovereignty of the Philippines in the SCS, whereas former President Duterte chose to shelve the sovereignty of the SCS and to cooperate with China under the framework of the BRI. However, President Duterte quickly changed his anti-United States stance in the climate of the ongoing conflict between the Philippines and China over islands and reefs in the SCS and then cooperated with the United States to reinstate the military cooperation agreement that he had suspended. Current President Marcos Jr. has adopted a more subtle approach. He declared that he would maintain economic cooperation with China and, at the same time, would strengthen bilateral cooperation with the United States, thereby attempting to maintain a balanced relationship with the two countries. In sum, the Philippines has adopted a dynamic balancing strategy to defend its national interests in the face of the strategic competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region.
{"title":"The Political Economy of the Philippines and Its Development Strategy under China-USA Power Rivalry and Hegemonic Competition: Hedge with Balance","authors":"Wen-Chih Chao","doi":"10.1080/10971475.2022.2136694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2136694","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The competition between the United States and China has intensified since the Trump administration, and the two sides have clashed in the areas such as the economy, military, politics, technology, and human rights. This conflict presents countries in the Indo-Pacific region with the challenge of navigating foreign policy with these two hegemonic powers. The Philippines is one such country facing the challenge of maintaining a balanced relationship with the two countries as a major concern for a strategic triangle. The incumbent Philippine president must calculate the benefits and risks before formulating policies. Facing such a dilemma, former President Aquino chose to file a lawsuit with the International Arbitration Court and strengthen cooperation with the United States to defend the sovereignty of the Philippines in the SCS, whereas former President Duterte chose to shelve the sovereignty of the SCS and to cooperate with China under the framework of the BRI. However, President Duterte quickly changed his anti-United States stance in the climate of the ongoing conflict between the Philippines and China over islands and reefs in the SCS and then cooperated with the United States to reinstate the military cooperation agreement that he had suspended. Current President Marcos Jr. has adopted a more subtle approach. He declared that he would maintain economic cooperation with China and, at the same time, would strengthen bilateral cooperation with the United States, thereby attempting to maintain a balanced relationship with the two countries. In sum, the Philippines has adopted a dynamic balancing strategy to defend its national interests in the face of the strategic competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region.","PeriodicalId":22382,"journal":{"name":"The Chinese Economy","volume":"12 1","pages":"292 - 303"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75670814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-28DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2022.2136699
Jiranuwat Swaspitchayaskun, Siwat Surakitbovorn
Abstract The relations between the United States and China is currently changing into a more aggressive competition, with the US seeing China’s rise as a force that diminishes its role as a superpower reshaping the world order. With the current US-China relationship, Thailand is sandwiched in a dilemma of how to best balance the influence of the two superpowers and to hedge to avoid embarrassment or the possible effects of drawing too close to either one. Thailand has emphasized its policy of being neutral or as a “buffer state,” hedging between China and the US economically and politically – a policy it employed during the colonization of Indochina and the Second World War. Through this strategy, Thailand has been able to maintain a political and economic balance with the two superpowers as it did in the past and benefit from its role as an important geopolitical link of China and the United States. Nevertheless, Thailand faces the challenge of balancing influences as it invokes old policies to survive being torn apart in new rivalries.
{"title":"Thailand and Its Development Strategies under USA-China Power Rivalry: The Difficulty of Balancing Influence and Hedging","authors":"Jiranuwat Swaspitchayaskun, Siwat Surakitbovorn","doi":"10.1080/10971475.2022.2136699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2136699","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The relations between the United States and China is currently changing into a more aggressive competition, with the US seeing China’s rise as a force that diminishes its role as a superpower reshaping the world order. With the current US-China relationship, Thailand is sandwiched in a dilemma of how to best balance the influence of the two superpowers and to hedge to avoid embarrassment or the possible effects of drawing too close to either one. Thailand has emphasized its policy of being neutral or as a “buffer state,” hedging between China and the US economically and politically – a policy it employed during the colonization of Indochina and the Second World War. Through this strategy, Thailand has been able to maintain a political and economic balance with the two superpowers as it did in the past and benefit from its role as an important geopolitical link of China and the United States. Nevertheless, Thailand faces the challenge of balancing influences as it invokes old policies to survive being torn apart in new rivalries.","PeriodicalId":22382,"journal":{"name":"The Chinese Economy","volume":"219 1","pages":"330 - 338"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74177317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-28DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2022.2136700
Pei-shan Kao
Abstract Since the United States and China established diplomatic relations, this relationship has been encountered many difficulties; for example, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the 1999 US-led NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the 2001 US-China aircraft collision in China’s Hainan Island, and China’s 15-year World Trade Organization accession negotiation process and its disputes later with the United States under the WTO, etc. Needless to say, the two great powers also have serious debates and arguments on the Taiwan issue. Under this long-term US-China strategic competition and conflict, Southeast Asian countries therefore have their views and considerations. They smartly have cooperated with China on trade and economic issues while are eagerly or kind of faithfully inclined toward the United States on political and militarily issues. This paper therefore wants to review first the neorealist assumptions on great powers’ relations, and then examine US-China strategic competition and rivalry in the Pacific. Also, it introduces Singapore’s domestic politics and foreign policy as well as its strategic hedging considerations and choices under US-China power rivalry and make a conclusion.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Singapore and Its Development Strategies under USA-China Power Rivalry: A Choice of Hedging Policies","authors":"Pei-shan Kao","doi":"10.1080/10971475.2022.2136700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2136700","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since the United States and China established diplomatic relations, this relationship has been encountered many difficulties; for example, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the 1999 US-led NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the 2001 US-China aircraft collision in China’s Hainan Island, and China’s 15-year World Trade Organization accession negotiation process and its disputes later with the United States under the WTO, etc. Needless to say, the two great powers also have serious debates and arguments on the Taiwan issue. Under this long-term US-China strategic competition and conflict, Southeast Asian countries therefore have their views and considerations. They smartly have cooperated with China on trade and economic issues while are eagerly or kind of faithfully inclined toward the United States on political and militarily issues. This paper therefore wants to review first the neorealist assumptions on great powers’ relations, and then examine US-China strategic competition and rivalry in the Pacific. Also, it introduces Singapore’s domestic politics and foreign policy as well as its strategic hedging considerations and choices under US-China power rivalry and make a conclusion.","PeriodicalId":22382,"journal":{"name":"The Chinese Economy","volume":"70 1","pages":"339 - 351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87356768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-28DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2022.2136690
V. Vu, J. Soong, K. Nguyen
Abstract The US–China confrontation has been undertaking a great change ever since the end of the Cold War. The two superpowers are embarking in a comprehensive confrontation in various spheres: trade, investment, technology, security, ideology, and so on. In order to avoid being a political pawn in the game of great powers, Vietnam consistently conducts the policy of non-taking side and hedging strategy between China and the US, economically and politically. This strategy is a successful integrated combination of bandwagoning and balancing policies comprehensively. It has so far helped Vietnam to take advantages of its geo-politics for better economic development and at the same time to reduce negative influences and pressures from both powers on its national autonomy and independence.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Vietnam and Its Development Strategy under China–USA Power Rivalry and Hegemonic Competition: Hedging for Survival","authors":"V. Vu, J. Soong, K. Nguyen","doi":"10.1080/10971475.2022.2136690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2136690","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The US–China confrontation has been undertaking a great change ever since the end of the Cold War. The two superpowers are embarking in a comprehensive confrontation in various spheres: trade, investment, technology, security, ideology, and so on. In order to avoid being a political pawn in the game of great powers, Vietnam consistently conducts the policy of non-taking side and hedging strategy between China and the US, economically and politically. This strategy is a successful integrated combination of bandwagoning and balancing policies comprehensively. It has so far helped Vietnam to take advantages of its geo-politics for better economic development and at the same time to reduce negative influences and pressures from both powers on its national autonomy and independence.","PeriodicalId":22382,"journal":{"name":"The Chinese Economy","volume":"29 1","pages":"256 - 270"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82578476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-28DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2022.2136691
Wayne Tan, J. Soong
Abstract This paper explores hedging in a theoretical thinking and applies it to the foreign policy of India in an era of growing USA–China power rivalry. In this regard, hedging is defined as insurance seeking strategy under situations with high uncertainty, where rational actors (both middle and small states) will try to avoid taking sides and to pursue room for autonomy in decision-making. While Washington and Beijing dislike middle and small countries’ hedging, they both overlook that it is the uncertainties stemming from their own behaviors that push middle and small states to hedge. As uncertainties deepen, most countries in Indo-Pacific region will prefer to use hedging policies to reduce their possible losses. For India, unless USA–China rivalry escalates into a direct military conflict, or unless Washington retreats its commitment to regional security in Indo-Pacific, then India will stop hedging and moving to bandwagoning with China; or if Beijing’s actions directly undermine India’s vital interests in security, then India’s hedging will be replaced by balancing against China. In short, hedging is a passive response, not an active choice; India’s hedging strategy is very likely to persist on making ambiguities in the USA–China–India strategic triangle and entanglement.
{"title":"The Political Economy of India and Its Strategic Choice under USA–China Power Rivalry and Hegemonic Competition: A Defensive Hedging Policy","authors":"Wayne Tan, J. Soong","doi":"10.1080/10971475.2022.2136691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2136691","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper explores hedging in a theoretical thinking and applies it to the foreign policy of India in an era of growing USA–China power rivalry. In this regard, hedging is defined as insurance seeking strategy under situations with high uncertainty, where rational actors (both middle and small states) will try to avoid taking sides and to pursue room for autonomy in decision-making. While Washington and Beijing dislike middle and small countries’ hedging, they both overlook that it is the uncertainties stemming from their own behaviors that push middle and small states to hedge. As uncertainties deepen, most countries in Indo-Pacific region will prefer to use hedging policies to reduce their possible losses. For India, unless USA–China rivalry escalates into a direct military conflict, or unless Washington retreats its commitment to regional security in Indo-Pacific, then India will stop hedging and moving to bandwagoning with China; or if Beijing’s actions directly undermine India’s vital interests in security, then India’s hedging will be replaced by balancing against China. In short, hedging is a passive response, not an active choice; India’s hedging strategy is very likely to persist on making ambiguities in the USA–China–India strategic triangle and entanglement.","PeriodicalId":22382,"journal":{"name":"The Chinese Economy","volume":"51 1","pages":"271 - 280"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85206280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-26DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2022.2136692
G. Lim, Chengwei Xu
Abstract Much has been written on how an increasingly assertive China has sought to challenge the incumbent players in the global and regional arenas. Japan, as East Asia’s regional hegemon, is said to be throwing its weight behind the US because it has much to lose in an era of China rising. Nevertheless, how much of this resembles reality? This article seeks to unpack some commonly held assumptions, focusing on the political/security as well as economic choices facing Japan. It argues that the Japanese have seemingly forged a rather strong alignment with the US in the sphere of politics/security, often with an eye to limit the influence of China. However, the situation is less clear cut when it comes to opportunities and challenges in the economic realm. Indeed, in some of Japan’s most prominent industries, one observes complementarity effects and close interdependence with the Chinese economy. These findings illustrate that China-Japan competition is more complex than commonly portrayed, in addition to raising questions about the complicating effects that economic interdependence can have in a nation’s “strategic” policies.
{"title":"The Political Economy of Japan’s Development Strategy under China-US Rivalry: The Crane, the Dragon, and the Bald Eagle","authors":"G. Lim, Chengwei Xu","doi":"10.1080/10971475.2022.2136692","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2136692","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Much has been written on how an increasingly assertive China has sought to challenge the incumbent players in the global and regional arenas. Japan, as East Asia’s regional hegemon, is said to be throwing its weight behind the US because it has much to lose in an era of China rising. Nevertheless, how much of this resembles reality? This article seeks to unpack some commonly held assumptions, focusing on the political/security as well as economic choices facing Japan. It argues that the Japanese have seemingly forged a rather strong alignment with the US in the sphere of politics/security, often with an eye to limit the influence of China. However, the situation is less clear cut when it comes to opportunities and challenges in the economic realm. Indeed, in some of Japan’s most prominent industries, one observes complementarity effects and close interdependence with the Chinese economy. These findings illustrate that China-Japan competition is more complex than commonly portrayed, in addition to raising questions about the complicating effects that economic interdependence can have in a nation’s “strategic” policies.","PeriodicalId":22382,"journal":{"name":"The Chinese Economy","volume":"374 1","pages":"281 - 291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77983729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-26DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2022.2136697
Kok Fay Chin
Abstract The past two years have witnessed escalating geopolitical tensions occurring not only in the political but also economic domains especially technology and global supply chains, infrastructure connectivity, trade and finance. With tensions between the US and China escalating on many fronts, Southeast Asia has become a focal point of strategic rivalry again as Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022 attempts to rebuild the US-led order in Asia to blunt China’s growing influence in the region. A series of economic initiatives following his Indo-Pacific strategy focuses on reconfiguring the semiconductor global supply chain. In this context, the paper aims to examine how Malaysia cope with the complex patterns of cooperation, competition and conflict arising from the current shifts in the global geopolitics and geoeconomics. The paper benefits from the insights from the international political economy research which explores how the Malaysian government strives to reconcile domestic and international imperatives in navigating the changing global geopolitical economy, which can be perceived as both a threat as well as an opportunity by the state and non-state actors in the country. The question of whether hedging is tenable is undoubtedly contingent upon the extent of big power rivalry. Given the greater uncertainty over the pernicious effects of rising regional polarization and retreat from economic globalization, Malaysia will continue to maintain strategic ambiguity as long as US-China rivalry has not (yet) escalated into outright military conflict. Nevertheless, the paper concludes that the space to hedge may be squeezed since small power like Malaysia may face harsher realities as it navigates the changing geopolitical economy landscape. Hence, the ASEAN solidarity and cohesion is crucial to ensure a more unified regional response to the escalating Sino-American strategic competition.
{"title":"Malaysia in Changing Geopolitical Economy: Navigating Great Power Competition between China and the United States","authors":"Kok Fay Chin","doi":"10.1080/10971475.2022.2136697","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2136697","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The past two years have witnessed escalating geopolitical tensions occurring not only in the political but also economic domains especially technology and global supply chains, infrastructure connectivity, trade and finance. With tensions between the US and China escalating on many fronts, Southeast Asia has become a focal point of strategic rivalry again as Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 2022 attempts to rebuild the US-led order in Asia to blunt China’s growing influence in the region. A series of economic initiatives following his Indo-Pacific strategy focuses on reconfiguring the semiconductor global supply chain. In this context, the paper aims to examine how Malaysia cope with the complex patterns of cooperation, competition and conflict arising from the current shifts in the global geopolitics and geoeconomics. The paper benefits from the insights from the international political economy research which explores how the Malaysian government strives to reconcile domestic and international imperatives in navigating the changing global geopolitical economy, which can be perceived as both a threat as well as an opportunity by the state and non-state actors in the country. The question of whether hedging is tenable is undoubtedly contingent upon the extent of big power rivalry. Given the greater uncertainty over the pernicious effects of rising regional polarization and retreat from economic globalization, Malaysia will continue to maintain strategic ambiguity as long as US-China rivalry has not (yet) escalated into outright military conflict. Nevertheless, the paper concludes that the space to hedge may be squeezed since small power like Malaysia may face harsher realities as it navigates the changing geopolitical economy landscape. Hence, the ASEAN solidarity and cohesion is crucial to ensure a more unified regional response to the escalating Sino-American strategic competition.","PeriodicalId":22382,"journal":{"name":"The Chinese Economy","volume":"124 1","pages":"321 - 329"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86433300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-22DOI: 10.1080/10971475.2022.2132700
Yuwen Dai
Abstract Two decades have passed since the acronym BRIC was coined in 2001. The cooperation within the BRIC was formalized in 2009, and the BRIC expanded into BRICS after South Africa joined in 2010. To deepen economic cooperation within the BRICS, the progress of regional economic integration will affect the degree of business cycle synchronization within the region, which in turn will have an impact on the direction and magnitude of macroeconomic interdependence and growth spillovers among the regional partners. In this paper, we find inconclusive evidence of cross-country business cycle synchronization and trade integration in the BRICS. To investigate their potential for further multilateral trade integration, we combine data on international trade linkages with network methods to examine the multilateral trade system in the BRICS as an interdependent complex network. We map the topology of the BRICS multilateral trade network, and assess the extent of their multilateral trade integration. The policy implication is that to promote BRICS regional economic integration, there are two possible paths forward: the formation of regional trade agreement (RTA), and the adoption of central bank digital currency (CBDC).
{"title":"Business Cycle Synchronization and Multilateral Trade Integration in the BRICS","authors":"Yuwen Dai","doi":"10.1080/10971475.2022.2132700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2132700","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Two decades have passed since the acronym BRIC was coined in 2001. The cooperation within the BRIC was formalized in 2009, and the BRIC expanded into BRICS after South Africa joined in 2010. To deepen economic cooperation within the BRICS, the progress of regional economic integration will affect the degree of business cycle synchronization within the region, which in turn will have an impact on the direction and magnitude of macroeconomic interdependence and growth spillovers among the regional partners. In this paper, we find inconclusive evidence of cross-country business cycle synchronization and trade integration in the BRICS. To investigate their potential for further multilateral trade integration, we combine data on international trade linkages with network methods to examine the multilateral trade system in the BRICS as an interdependent complex network. We map the topology of the BRICS multilateral trade network, and assess the extent of their multilateral trade integration. The policy implication is that to promote BRICS regional economic integration, there are two possible paths forward: the formation of regional trade agreement (RTA), and the adoption of central bank digital currency (CBDC).","PeriodicalId":22382,"journal":{"name":"The Chinese Economy","volume":"84 1","pages":"163 - 181"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77646106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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