As of this writing, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are in their eighth and tenth years, having accrued nearly a trillion dollars in direct military costs. I review the history of cost forecasts for these ongoing engagements, highlighting the differences across them in scope and accuracy, assessing the methods and practice of cost forecasting, and exploring the implications of the war costs themselves. Besides the unanticipated length and breadth of the military conflicts themselves, a related and equally important component of costs is the life cycle of costs associated with caring for veterans. The forecasts we have of such costs imply high levels of public spending per veteran and very high levels of costs associated with pain and suffering per veteran, as high as 10 to 25 percent of lifetime wealth. I also discuss the methods and motivations associated with war cost forecasts by comparing them with other types of aggregate forecasts, which are prone to similar types of errors. The history of war cost forecasts suggests that increasing their frequency and transparency may improve their usefulness in guiding policy.
{"title":"A Review of War Costs in Iraq and Afghanistan","authors":"Ryan D. Edwards","doi":"10.3386/W16163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W16163","url":null,"abstract":"As of this writing, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are in their eighth and tenth years, having accrued nearly a trillion dollars in direct military costs. I review the history of cost forecasts for these ongoing engagements, highlighting the differences across them in scope and accuracy, assessing the methods and practice of cost forecasting, and exploring the implications of the war costs themselves. Besides the unanticipated length and breadth of the military conflicts themselves, a related and equally important component of costs is the life cycle of costs associated with caring for veterans. The forecasts we have of such costs imply high levels of public spending per veteran and very high levels of costs associated with pain and suffering per veteran, as high as 10 to 25 percent of lifetime wealth. I also discuss the methods and motivations associated with war cost forecasts by comparing them with other types of aggregate forecasts, which are prone to similar types of errors. The history of war cost forecasts suggests that increasing their frequency and transparency may improve their usefulness in guiding policy.","PeriodicalId":224499,"journal":{"name":"ERN: National Security & War (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130474428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This piece looks at the recurring problem of inflated threat claims offered by executive branch actors to persuade the Nation to consent to the use of force. It sets out the experience of the Bush Administration’s use of incorrect threat claims to persuade the country to consent to the use of force in Iraq as a backdrop to evaluating the President Obama’s use of threat claims to support the continuing use of force in Afghanistan. Although comparison of threat advocacy by the Bush and Obama administrations must be imperfect, it allows for some observations about the extent to which the structures and incentives that have in the past allowed executive branch officials to assert unverified threats as certain and sufficient to justify the use of force have changed or remain the same. Because the structures and incentives that allow for the possibility of unverified threat claims have not changed significantly, and because significant legal changes to address the systematic problems are unlikely, this piece proposes that citizens can impose some minimal level of contemporaneous accountability on executive department threat claims offered to persuade them to consent to the use of force by keeping a several basic recognitions about executive department advocacy, intelligence information, and the incentives that impact oversight of executive branch activities in mind.
{"title":"Bush, Obama and Beyond - Observations on the Prospect for Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims Before the Use of Force","authors":"L. Jacobs","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1626971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1626971","url":null,"abstract":"This piece looks at the recurring problem of inflated threat claims offered by executive branch actors to persuade the Nation to consent to the use of force. It sets out the experience of the Bush Administration’s use of incorrect threat claims to persuade the country to consent to the use of force in Iraq as a backdrop to evaluating the President Obama’s use of threat claims to support the continuing use of force in Afghanistan. Although comparison of threat advocacy by the Bush and Obama administrations must be imperfect, it allows for some observations about the extent to which the structures and incentives that have in the past allowed executive branch officials to assert unverified threats as certain and sufficient to justify the use of force have changed or remain the same. Because the structures and incentives that allow for the possibility of unverified threat claims have not changed significantly, and because significant legal changes to address the systematic problems are unlikely, this piece proposes that citizens can impose some minimal level of contemporaneous accountability on executive department threat claims offered to persuade them to consent to the use of force by keeping a several basic recognitions about executive department advocacy, intelligence information, and the incentives that impact oversight of executive branch activities in mind.","PeriodicalId":224499,"journal":{"name":"ERN: National Security & War (Topic)","volume":"48 11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125720985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A recent decision by U.S. District Judge Vaughn R. Walker in the Northern District of California, al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, has revived a question of national security law and policy long thought to be settled - is control over access to classified information entrusted to the sole discretion of the Executive Branch, and if so can the Judiciary review that determination? Although this case began as an attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the recently discovered Terrorist Surveillance Program (“TSP”), it may present the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit with an opportunity to rule on the ability of the Executive Branch to protect sensitive military and national security information.This article will evaluate the District Court’s recent discovery orders in al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, focusing on the debate that has ensued over which branch of the United States Government is entrusted with control over access to sensitive national security information. Part I of this article will detail the background and procedural history of the al Haramain litigation, highlighting the facts and circumstances that make the plaintiff unique in the multitude of challenges to the Bush Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program. Part II examines the debate over access to classified documents generally as well as the specific issues highlighted by the al Haramain litigation, ultimately concluding that the District court ignored long standing precedent for judicial restraint in cases involving Executive Branch determinations over access to classified material. Finally, Part III proposes a variety of possible solutions that each of the coordinate branches could undertake to resolve the underlying dispute in the al Haramain litigation.
{"title":"Judicial Micro-Management of National Security Information","authors":"Stephen I. Landman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1516589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1516589","url":null,"abstract":"A recent decision by U.S. District Judge Vaughn R. Walker in the Northern District of California, al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, has revived a question of national security law and policy long thought to be settled - is control over access to classified information entrusted to the sole discretion of the Executive Branch, and if so can the Judiciary review that determination? Although this case began as an attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the recently discovered Terrorist Surveillance Program (“TSP”), it may present the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit with an opportunity to rule on the ability of the Executive Branch to protect sensitive military and national security information.This article will evaluate the District Court’s recent discovery orders in al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, focusing on the debate that has ensued over which branch of the United States Government is entrusted with control over access to sensitive national security information. Part I of this article will detail the background and procedural history of the al Haramain litigation, highlighting the facts and circumstances that make the plaintiff unique in the multitude of challenges to the Bush Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program. Part II examines the debate over access to classified documents generally as well as the specific issues highlighted by the al Haramain litigation, ultimately concluding that the District court ignored long standing precedent for judicial restraint in cases involving Executive Branch determinations over access to classified material. Finally, Part III proposes a variety of possible solutions that each of the coordinate branches could undertake to resolve the underlying dispute in the al Haramain litigation.","PeriodicalId":224499,"journal":{"name":"ERN: National Security & War (Topic)","volume":"6 7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127139361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we study the evolution of private military corporations (PMCs), which are for-profit organizations that subcontract military field services to sovereign authorities as well as to others. Between Eisenhower’s famous “military-industrial complex” speech in 1961 and the post-9/11 war in Iraq, PMCs were transformed from relatively minor subcontractors to major companies with unique capabilities that made them strategically central to the sovereign military organizations from which they had grown. Throughout this period, PMCs exhibited a “hybrid organizational form” as delineated within organizational economics. Our purpose is grounded theorizing in which we derive insights about the evolution of PMCs as hybrid organizational forms. Our analysis suggests that hybrid forms of organization enable transactions and capability development that are not possible within either markets or hierarchies. Hybrid forms may thus represent a conduit for institutional entrepreneurship and the emergence of new industry structures. Their intertemporal characteristics warrant further theoretical study.
{"title":"Outsourcing War: The Evolution of the Private Military Industry after the Cold War","authors":"Joel A. C. Baum, A. McGahan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1496498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1496498","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study the evolution of private military corporations (PMCs), which are for-profit organizations that subcontract military field services to sovereign authorities as well as to others. Between Eisenhower’s famous “military-industrial complex” speech in 1961 and the post-9/11 war in Iraq, PMCs were transformed from relatively minor subcontractors to major companies with unique capabilities that made them strategically central to the sovereign military organizations from which they had grown. Throughout this period, PMCs exhibited a “hybrid organizational form” as delineated within organizational economics. Our purpose is grounded theorizing in which we derive insights about the evolution of PMCs as hybrid organizational forms. Our analysis suggests that hybrid forms of organization enable transactions and capability development that are not possible within either markets or hierarchies. Hybrid forms may thus represent a conduit for institutional entrepreneurship and the emergence of new industry structures. Their intertemporal characteristics warrant further theoretical study.","PeriodicalId":224499,"journal":{"name":"ERN: National Security & War (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123971546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the UK government's Draft Detailed War Powers Resolution, recently put forward in its White Paper on the Constitutional Renewal Bill. Responding to calls for reform of the Crown's war prerogative, the Government has rejected primary legislation that would require parliamentary approval for its war-making decisions. Instead, the proposed resolution would preserve the prerogative, while purporting to give Parliament a greater consultative role. In critically assessing that proposal, this commentary takes a comparative look at how the US Constitution divides war powers between the President and Congress. Different interpretative schools in that country suggest that the structural distribution of war powers ultimately reflects competing preferences between values of operational efficiency and democratic accountability. Judged by these values, the British government's proposed resolution is seriously flawed. It heavily favours the executive branch by giving the Prime Minister the initial decision to seek authorization, allowing him or her excessive discretion in making exceptions, and offering little possibility for Parliament to make and enforce limitations on the government. Accordingly, the proposed resolution might actually undermine democratic accountability, by allowing the government to shield its prerogative decisions in future with a shallow and meaningless veneer of parliamentary approval. Any serious attempt to enhance the democratic accountability of executive war-making decisions must therefore address a more fundamental constitutional problem - the strict party system that allows ministers to control a parliamentary majority and prevent meaningful, independent legislative scrutiny of government war policy.
{"title":"Efficiency and Accountability in War Powers Reform","authors":"David Jenkins","doi":"10.1093/JCSL/KRP012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JCSL/KRP012","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the UK government's Draft Detailed War Powers Resolution, recently put forward in its White Paper on the Constitutional Renewal Bill. Responding to calls for reform of the Crown's war prerogative, the Government has rejected primary legislation that would require parliamentary approval for its war-making decisions. Instead, the proposed resolution would preserve the prerogative, while purporting to give Parliament a greater consultative role. In critically assessing that proposal, this commentary takes a comparative look at how the US Constitution divides war powers between the President and Congress. Different interpretative schools in that country suggest that the structural distribution of war powers ultimately reflects competing preferences between values of operational efficiency and democratic accountability. Judged by these values, the British government's proposed resolution is seriously flawed. It heavily favours the executive branch by giving the Prime Minister the initial decision to seek authorization, allowing him or her excessive discretion in making exceptions, and offering little possibility for Parliament to make and enforce limitations on the government. Accordingly, the proposed resolution might actually undermine democratic accountability, by allowing the government to shield its prerogative decisions in future with a shallow and meaningless veneer of parliamentary approval. Any serious attempt to enhance the democratic accountability of executive war-making decisions must therefore address a more fundamental constitutional problem - the strict party system that allows ministers to control a parliamentary majority and prevent meaningful, independent legislative scrutiny of government war policy.","PeriodicalId":224499,"journal":{"name":"ERN: National Security & War (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114737720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although almost eight years have passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, researchers continue to investigate the consequences of this far-reaching event in a variety of scientific disciplines and subject areas. In economic research, a number of more recent publications have added to existing body of literature by elucidating the medium- and long-term impact of the attacks using new methods and/or data. This paper is more modest in scope in that it reviews the impact of the attacks on the Manhattan's office inventory, employment and rents. Overall, there is scant evidence that the attack have had a long-lasting impact on the Manhattan office market. Of the companies that decided not to return to Lower Manhattan after 9/11, the majority relocated to Midtown Manhattan. Taken together, the core markets of Midtown and Downtown Manhattan captured about 80 percent of the stream of displaced tenants after 9/11, while areas outside of these two core clusters captured only 20 percent, which bodes well for Manhattan's ability to remain a prime office location even in the face of a severe crisis. Moreover, the set of so-called "trophy" buildings proved to be less affected by the recession than the general market, a finding that runs counter to initial assumptions about the future of office high-rises. In addition to a drastic reduction in leased space, accommodation of displaced tenants within the existing office space portfolio of large companies contributed further to lower occupancy rates than had been expected after the destruction of 10 percent of the inventory. This phenomenon, also known as backfill, caused overall absorption to be negative in the quarters following 9/11, since the positive demand created by displaced tenants was more than offset by losses incurred in the accelerated recession.
{"title":"The Aftermath of the 9/11 Attack in the New York City Office Market: A Review of Key Figures and Developments","authors":"F. Fuerst","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1340049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1340049","url":null,"abstract":"Although almost eight years have passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, researchers continue to investigate the consequences of this far-reaching event in a variety of scientific disciplines and subject areas. In economic research, a number of more recent publications have added to existing body of literature by elucidating the medium- and long-term impact of the attacks using new methods and/or data. This paper is more modest in scope in that it reviews the impact of the attacks on the Manhattan's office inventory, employment and rents. Overall, there is scant evidence that the attack have had a long-lasting impact on the Manhattan office market. Of the companies that decided not to return to Lower Manhattan after 9/11, the majority relocated to Midtown Manhattan. Taken together, the core markets of Midtown and Downtown Manhattan captured about 80 percent of the stream of displaced tenants after 9/11, while areas outside of these two core clusters captured only 20 percent, which bodes well for Manhattan's ability to remain a prime office location even in the face of a severe crisis. Moreover, the set of so-called \"trophy\" buildings proved to be less affected by the recession than the general market, a finding that runs counter to initial assumptions about the future of office high-rises. In addition to a drastic reduction in leased space, accommodation of displaced tenants within the existing office space portfolio of large companies contributed further to lower occupancy rates than had been expected after the destruction of 10 percent of the inventory. This phenomenon, also known as backfill, caused overall absorption to be negative in the quarters following 9/11, since the positive demand created by displaced tenants was more than offset by losses incurred in the accelerated recession.","PeriodicalId":224499,"journal":{"name":"ERN: National Security & War (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116734338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses the current situation under international law relating to Child Soldiers in three principal areas: 1) How international law prohibits and/or restricts the recruitment of the Child Soldier; 2) How international law criminalizes the recruitment of the Child Soldier; and 3) How international law deals with and/or criminalizes the actions of the Child Soldier.
{"title":"Mere Children or Weapons of War - Child Soldiers and International Law","authors":"S. Freeland","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1306169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1306169","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the current situation under international law relating to Child Soldiers in three principal areas: 1) How international law prohibits and/or restricts the recruitment of the Child Soldier; 2) How international law criminalizes the recruitment of the Child Soldier; and 3) How international law deals with and/or criminalizes the actions of the Child Soldier.","PeriodicalId":224499,"journal":{"name":"ERN: National Security & War (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131208368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Group pressure is a powerful tool at terrorist groups' disposal to uphold its network. The paper presents a behavioral model that explains how the radical leadership sustains group unity by pressuring likely dissidents into conformity. It explains that dissenters face three options. The first is exit, where a dissident leaves the organization to avoid group pressure. The second option is sincere voice or openly challenging the group's preferences. The first two options have prohibitive costs, making the third option, namely self-subversion the dominant response. Self-subversion is the suppression of a dissident's private opinions to conform to the demands of the leadership. One of the repercussions of self-subversion is distortion of collective decisions, leading to the radicalization of the group's members. The paper concludes with some policy prescriptions in the global struggle against international terrorism.
{"title":"Microfoundations of Terrorism: Exit, Sincere Voice, and Self-Subversion in Terrorist Networks","authors":"Tolga Koker, Carlos Yordan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1286944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1286944","url":null,"abstract":"Group pressure is a powerful tool at terrorist groups' disposal to uphold its network. The paper presents a behavioral model that explains how the radical leadership sustains group unity by pressuring likely dissidents into conformity. It explains that dissenters face three options. The first is exit, where a dissident leaves the organization to avoid group pressure. The second option is sincere voice or openly challenging the group's preferences. The first two options have prohibitive costs, making the third option, namely self-subversion the dominant response. Self-subversion is the suppression of a dissident's private opinions to conform to the demands of the leadership. One of the repercussions of self-subversion is distortion of collective decisions, leading to the radicalization of the group's members. The paper concludes with some policy prescriptions in the global struggle against international terrorism.","PeriodicalId":224499,"journal":{"name":"ERN: National Security & War (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128568649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is the second in a series of papers from a new project entitled “Who is a normative foreign policy actor? The European Union and its Global Partners”. The first paper – entitled Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners, by Nathalie Tocci, CEPS Working Document No. 279, December 2007 – set out the conceptual framework for exploring this question. The present paper constitutes one of several case studies applying this framework to the behaviour of the European Union, whereas the others to follow concern China, India, Russia and the United States. A normative foreign policy is rigorously defined as one that is normative according to the goals set, the means employed and the results obtained. Each of these studies explores eight actual case examples of foreign policy behaviour, selected in order to illustrate four alternative paradigms of foreign policy behaviour – the normative, the realpolitik, the imperialistic and the status quo. For each of these four paradigms, there are two examples of EU foreign policy, one demonstrating intended consequences and the other, unintended effects. The fact that examples can be found that fit all of these different types shows the importance of ‘conditioning factors’, which relate to the internal interests and capabilities of the EU as a foreign policy actor as well as the external context in which other major actors may be at work.
{"title":"The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor","authors":"Nathalie. Tocci","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1337970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1337970","url":null,"abstract":"This is the second in a series of papers from a new project entitled “Who is a normative foreign policy actor? The European Union and its Global Partners”. The first paper – entitled Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners, by Nathalie Tocci, CEPS Working Document No. 279, December 2007 – set out the conceptual framework for exploring this question. The present paper constitutes one of several case studies applying this framework to the behaviour of the European Union, whereas the others to follow concern China, India, Russia and the United States. A normative foreign policy is rigorously defined as one that is normative according to the goals set, the means employed and the results obtained. Each of these studies explores eight actual case examples of foreign policy behaviour, selected in order to illustrate four alternative paradigms of foreign policy behaviour – the normative, the realpolitik, the imperialistic and the status quo. For each of these four paradigms, there are two examples of EU foreign policy, one demonstrating intended consequences and the other, unintended effects. The fact that examples can be found that fit all of these different types shows the importance of ‘conditioning factors’, which relate to the internal interests and capabilities of the EU as a foreign policy actor as well as the external context in which other major actors may be at work.","PeriodicalId":224499,"journal":{"name":"ERN: National Security & War (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124768853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper examines the impact of the global economic crisis on the development of Russia’s security policy in Asia. In the final years of Vladimir Putin's presidency (2007-08), the Russian leadership made a dramatic reassessment of major global trends, sources of power, security threats, and the roles of key actors in the changing international environment. On the doctrinal level, the contours of the Kremlin’s new eastern policy has been consistent during the tenure of Dmitri Medvedev, Putin’s successor in the Kremlin. Three major developments predetermined the strengthening of the “Asian component” of Russian foreign and security strategy. Firstly, Russia’s “new globalist” approach to world politics which links national interest to the restoration of Russia’s global competitiveness and a great power status. Secondly, the imperative of modernization which requires Russia’s imminent integration into the global economic space filled with multiple geoeconomic risks and security threats. Thirdly, domestic political issues in the spheres of political control, administrative efficiency and development, critical for the interpretation of national security priorities by ruling political and business elites, especially prior to the new electoral cycle in 2011-12. The paper overviews these three groups of factors, demonstrating their impact on the Kremlin leadership and its policies aimed at Russia’s adjustment to the dynamic Asian security environment. The paper maintains that the recent global economic downturn has sharpened Moscow’s strife toward a decisive role in global affairs, aggravated its concerns of slow modernization and domestic socio-political situation. As a result, the Russian leadership is trying to reshape its foreign and security policy in Asia originally guided by the “East-West” dilemma toward a more comprehensive, proactive strategy oriented to maximizing gains from a deeper integration into the world system, and getting an access to financial and material resources including those of Asia, to eventually restore Russia’s relative influence, regionally and globally. The Asian vector of Russian foreign and security policy activism is considered to be even more important for effective management of complex domestic problems in times of economic turbulence. Moscow’s China policy remains the key component of the new Russian strategy. Driven by financial needs and the imperative of modernization, Moscow has made unprecedented steps toward a closer cooperation with Beijing which may potentially result in Russia’s irreversible gravitation to the China’s orbit and thus weaken Russia’s chances to craft the multipolar order in Eurasia. The paper concludes that, under the current circumstances, Moscow will hardly reconcile its accommodation to the emerging Sino-centered international order in the Greater East Asia with its own integrative efforts to create its exclusive zone of influence in the region. Russia will have to subsume its great power
{"title":"Russia's Security Policy in Asia in Times of Economic Uncertainty","authors":"V. Kozyrev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1643170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1643170","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines the impact of the global economic crisis on the development of Russia’s security policy in Asia. In the final years of Vladimir Putin's presidency (2007-08), the Russian leadership made a dramatic reassessment of major global trends, sources of power, security threats, and the roles of key actors in the changing international environment. On the doctrinal level, the contours of the Kremlin’s new eastern policy has been consistent during the tenure of Dmitri Medvedev, Putin’s successor in the Kremlin. Three major developments predetermined the strengthening of the “Asian component” of Russian foreign and security strategy. Firstly, Russia’s “new globalist” approach to world politics which links national interest to the restoration of Russia’s global competitiveness and a great power status. Secondly, the imperative of modernization which requires Russia’s imminent integration into the global economic space filled with multiple geoeconomic risks and security threats. Thirdly, domestic political issues in the spheres of political control, administrative efficiency and development, critical for the interpretation of national security priorities by ruling political and business elites, especially prior to the new electoral cycle in 2011-12. The paper overviews these three groups of factors, demonstrating their impact on the Kremlin leadership and its policies aimed at Russia’s adjustment to the dynamic Asian security environment. The paper maintains that the recent global economic downturn has sharpened Moscow’s strife toward a decisive role in global affairs, aggravated its concerns of slow modernization and domestic socio-political situation. As a result, the Russian leadership is trying to reshape its foreign and security policy in Asia originally guided by the “East-West” dilemma toward a more comprehensive, proactive strategy oriented to maximizing gains from a deeper integration into the world system, and getting an access to financial and material resources including those of Asia, to eventually restore Russia’s relative influence, regionally and globally. The Asian vector of Russian foreign and security policy activism is considered to be even more important for effective management of complex domestic problems in times of economic turbulence. Moscow’s China policy remains the key component of the new Russian strategy. Driven by financial needs and the imperative of modernization, Moscow has made unprecedented steps toward a closer cooperation with Beijing which may potentially result in Russia’s irreversible gravitation to the China’s orbit and thus weaken Russia’s chances to craft the multipolar order in Eurasia. The paper concludes that, under the current circumstances, Moscow will hardly reconcile its accommodation to the emerging Sino-centered international order in the Greater East Asia with its own integrative efforts to create its exclusive zone of influence in the region. Russia will have to subsume its great power ","PeriodicalId":224499,"journal":{"name":"ERN: National Security & War (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127498125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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