Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-99-110
V. Rozin
The author, starting from the situation of the correct presentation in the course “History and Philosophy of Science” of Aristotle's views on movement, raises the question of the general conditions for the analysis and understanding of philosophical texts and the reality presented in them. Two opposite interpretations of Stagirite’s statements are given. If from the point of view of the correspondence theory, Aristotle's understanding of movement and its causes looks erroneous, then in postmodern optics these views are seen as legitimate, conditioned by a language game. From the standpoint of a cultural-historical approach, the Aristotelian explanation of movement and its causes and the Galilean explanation are two different ways of thinking and studying, which the author analyzes. Concepts that allow to understand the situation of different interpretations of ancient and modern scientific research are characterized. According to the author, “ideal objects” allow one to think consistently, to solve problems and tasks facing a scientist (philosopher), to comprehend facts. In addition to the Kantian understanding of “the thing-in-itself”, one more thing is added – this concept allows not only to think about the cognized object, but also to understand it as a phenomenon (as a real phenomenon), including all its real manifestations. When the ways of thinking are also taken into account in the projection onto the phenomenon, the concept of “object of study” is introduced (in Kant, “phenomenon”, “object”). The effectiveness of using the distinctions of these three types of objects is demonstrated first by comprehending the teachings of movement created by Aristotle Galileo, then by the example of historical versions of the explanation of the phenomenon of heat. The considered material allows us to separate three more concepts: “objects of the first nature”, “artifacts”, they are created by a person, and “social objects” that are formed in culture. The latter in their formation go through three stages: at the first they are conceived and exist in a narrative and virtual form, at the second, the implementation of intentional constructions in social life takes place, at the third stage a new social phenomenon appears and begins to develop, which can already be studied.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-121-135
E. Knyazeva
The article discusses modern trends in the development of the idea of the multiverse (plurality of worlds) on the material of natural science. In physics, this is a multi-world interpretation of H. Everett’s quantum mechanics, in biology, the teachings about Umwelt by J. von Uexkul, in cognitive science, the notion of cognitive isolation, subjectively personal coloring, phenomenological certainty of the worlds of cognition and creativity of individuals. It is shown what some conceptual foundations can be offered for finding ways to develop an integrative vision, for building bridges from physics to biology and from biology to social sciences and humanities. Evolutionary epistemology, the conception of autopoiesis, theory of complex systems, and biosemiotics are considered as possible bearing conceptual nodes for interdisciplinary synthesis. These theoretical conceptions make it possible to tentatively explain why there are many worlds and why they are separated from each other, cognitively closed in the living nature. Leibniz’s ideas about possible worlds, a wealth of potentialities, subtle connections and eventual interweaving of worlds and their compossibility and self-reference turn out to be very relevant today. Various realizations of the world that arise as a result of measuring particles states in quantum mechanics, the worlds (umwelts) of living organisms, semantic worlds in human creative activity are just options in which nature expresses itself, reads itself, calculates itself, correlates with itself, and there are countless options.
本文从自然科学的材料出发，论述了多元宇宙论的现代发展趋势。在物理学中，这是对H. Everett量子力学的多世界解释，在生物学中，这是J. von Uexkul关于Umwelt的教导，在认知科学中，这是认知孤立的概念，主观的个人色彩，认知世界的现象学确定性和个人的创造力。它展示了一些概念基础，可以为寻找发展综合愿景的方法，为建立从物理学到生物学，从生物学到社会科学和人文科学的桥梁提供一些概念基础。进化认识论、自创生概念、复杂系统理论和生物符号学被认为可能承载跨学科综合的概念节点。这些理论概念使我们有可能初步解释为什么有许多世界，为什么它们彼此分离，在有生命的自然中认知封闭。莱布尼茨关于可能世界的观点，丰富的可能性，微妙的联系以及世界之间的最终交织以及它们的相容性和自我参照在今天被证明是非常相关的。由于测量量子力学中的粒子状态而产生的世界的各种实现，生物体的世界(umwelts)，人类创造性活动中的语义世界都只是自然表达自己，阅读自己，计算自己，与自己相关的选择，并且有无数的选择。
{"title":"The idea of the multiverse: An interdisciplinary perspective","authors":"E. Knyazeva","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-121-135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-121-135","url":null,"abstract":"The article discusses modern trends in the development of the idea of the multiverse (plurality of worlds) on the material of natural science. In physics, this is a multi-world interpretation of H. Everett’s quantum mechanics, in biology, the teachings about Umwelt by J. von Uexkul, in cognitive science, the notion of cognitive isolation, subjectively personal coloring, phenomenological certainty of the worlds of cognition and creativity of individuals. It is shown what some conceptual foundations can be offered for finding ways to develop an integrative vision, for building bridges from physics to biology and from biology to social sciences and humanities. Evolutionary epistemology, the conception of autopoiesis, theory of complex systems, and biosemiotics are considered as possible bearing conceptual nodes for interdisciplinary synthesis. These theoretical conceptions make it possible to tentatively explain why there are many worlds and why they are separated from each other, cognitively closed in the living nature. Leibniz’s ideas about possible worlds, a wealth of potentialities, subtle connections and eventual interweaving of worlds and their compossibility and self-reference turn out to be very relevant today. Various realizations of the world that arise as a result of measuring particles states in quantum mechanics, the worlds (umwelts) of living organisms, semantic worlds in human creative activity are just options in which nature expresses itself, reads itself, calculates itself, correlates with itself, and there are countless options.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133487136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-110-114
B. Falkenburg, I. E. Pris
Professor Dr. Brigitte Falkenburg is one of the leading philosophers of science, a representative of the German school of philosophy of science. She wrote or edited about twenty books, and published more than hundred articles on the most topical issues of philosophy of science, philosophy of physics and philosophy of consciousness. Her work is attractive for its clarity, precision and depth of scientific and philosophical analysis. Some of her prominent books include: “Particle metaphysics: A critical account of subatomic reality” (2007), “Kant’s cosmology: From the Pre-Critical System to the Antinomy of Pure Reason” (2020) etc. In this interview, Prof. Falkenburg talks about her career path, main directions of her research, her books and new projects. Topics such as neo-Kantian philosophy of physics, scientific realism, interpretations of quantum mechanics, reality of virtual particles, the hard problem of consciousness, inductive metaphysics, the limits of scientific knowledge and others are discussed.
{"title":"Philosophy of science: Interview with Brigitte Falkenburg","authors":"B. Falkenburg, I. E. Pris","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-110-114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-110-114","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Dr. Brigitte Falkenburg is one of the leading philosophers of science, a representative of the German school of philosophy of science. She wrote or edited about twenty books, and published more than hundred articles on the most topical issues of philosophy of science, philosophy of physics and philosophy of consciousness. Her work is attractive for its clarity, precision and depth of scientific and philosophical analysis. Some of her prominent books include: “Particle metaphysics: A critical account of subatomic reality” (2007), “Kant’s cosmology: From the Pre-Critical System to the Antinomy of Pure Reason” (2020) etc. In this interview, Prof. Falkenburg talks about her career path, main directions of her research, her books and new projects. Topics such as neo-Kantian philosophy of physics, scientific realism, interpretations of quantum mechanics, reality of virtual particles, the hard problem of consciousness, inductive metaphysics, the limits of scientific knowledge and others are discussed.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132284595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-69-71
V. Przhilenskiy
The “remarks” assess the consistency of T. Rockmore’s assertion that Kant’s philosophy creates the possibility of further development of anti-representationalist and constructivist ideas. They criticize the reduction of the turn to the statement that phenomena are only representations, not things-in-themselves. Rockmore’s interpretation of the turn is opposed to a more traditional position whereby I. Kant changed a ratio of theoretical and practical in the hierarchy of knowledge, which caused a “revolutionary” and “turnable” revision of the whole idea of mind, its structure and content.
{"title":"Comments on the Tom Rockmore’s article “Some consequences of Kant’s Copernican turn”","authors":"V. Przhilenskiy","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-69-71","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-69-71","url":null,"abstract":"The “remarks” assess the consistency of T. Rockmore’s assertion that Kant’s philosophy creates the possibility of further development of anti-representationalist and constructivist ideas. They criticize the reduction of the turn to the statement that phenomena are only representations, not things-in-themselves. Rockmore’s interpretation of the turn is opposed to a more traditional position whereby I. Kant changed a ratio of theoretical and practical in the hierarchy of knowledge, which caused a “revolutionary” and “turnable” revision of the whole idea of mind, its structure and content.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117339812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-46-60
T. Rockmore
Kant turns from an early representational view of cognition to a later anti-representational, epistemic constructivist view, often simply referred to as the Copernican revolution or the Copernican turn. Kant’s Copernican turn belongs to the modern, non-standard interest in epistemic constructivism. At least since Parmenides the standard approach to cognition requires knowledge of the real, reality or the world. In modern philosophy this approach is countered by the emergence of epistemic constructivism as a non-standard solution for the cognitive problem in Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Vico, and others, and independently in Kant. This paper briefly describes consequences of Kant’s Copernican turn concerning at least five themes: (i) cognition, (ii) German idealism, (iii) the subject, (iv) the historical character of knowledge and (v) the success or failure of the philosophical tradition.
{"title":"Some consequences of Kant’s Copernican turn","authors":"T. Rockmore","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-46-60","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-46-60","url":null,"abstract":"Kant turns from an early representational view of cognition to a later anti-representational, epistemic constructivist view, often simply referred to as the Copernican revolution or the Copernican turn. Kant’s Copernican turn belongs to the modern, non-standard interest in epistemic constructivism. At least since Parmenides the standard approach to cognition requires knowledge of the real, reality or the world. In modern philosophy this approach is countered by the emergence of epistemic constructivism as a non-standard solution for the cognitive problem in Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Vico, and others, and independently in Kant. This paper briefly describes consequences of Kant’s Copernican turn concerning at least five themes: (i) cognition, (ii) German idealism, (iii) the subject, (iv) the historical character of knowledge and (v) the success or failure of the philosophical tradition.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125452576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-130-148
P. Kusliy
The article provides an overview of the latest research in the field of the semantics of tense and specifically the ways of representing the temporal dimension of meaning in natural language. The paper also outlines the content of classical studies, the problems of which are discussed in the more recent literature. It is shown that with the development of research in the field of semantics of temporal morphemes and quantifier expressions, the relationship between language and time began to acquire more and more parallels with the relationship between language and individual objects. This statement is illustrated with a number of examples. In particular, the difference between the quantificational and the pronominal interpretation of temporal morphemes. Parallels in the semantics of temporal morphemes and referential expressions are also revealed in propositional attitude reports, where similar problems arise (both in connection with de se and de re reports). Thus, it is shown that, like the morphology of personal pronouns, the temporal morphology can be interpreted or uninterpreted in similar circumstances. It is also shown that the semantics of temporal morphemes is in some cases even more sensitive to linguistic aspects and the context of use than that of personal pronouns. This is illustrated with the existing restrictions on the temporal interpretation of attitude reports that have no analogues in the sphere of pointing to individual objects. The problems of connection of the temporal interpretation of linguistic expressions with the semantics of the verb form, modal verbs and negation are also addressed. It is shown how exactly these aspects of the semantics of tense significantly enrich the philosophical understanding of the triad “language – reality – subject”.
{"title":"Individuals and times in the problems of contemporary philosophy of language","authors":"P. Kusliy","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-130-148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-130-148","url":null,"abstract":"The article provides an overview of the latest research in the field of the semantics of tense and specifically the ways of representing the temporal dimension of meaning in natural language. The paper also outlines the content of classical studies, the problems of which are discussed in the more recent literature. It is shown that with the development of research in the field of semantics of temporal morphemes and quantifier expressions, the relationship between language and time began to acquire more and more parallels with the relationship between language and individual objects. This statement is illustrated with a number of examples. In particular, the difference between the quantificational and the pronominal interpretation of temporal morphemes. Parallels in the semantics of temporal morphemes and referential expressions are also revealed in propositional attitude reports, where similar problems arise (both in connection with de se and de re reports). Thus, it is shown that, like the morphology of personal pronouns, the temporal morphology can be interpreted or uninterpreted in similar circumstances. It is also shown that the semantics of temporal morphemes is in some cases even more sensitive to linguistic aspects and the context of use than that of personal pronouns. This is illustrated with the existing restrictions on the temporal interpretation of attitude reports that have no analogues in the sphere of pointing to individual objects. The problems of connection of the temporal interpretation of linguistic expressions with the semantics of the verb form, modal verbs and negation are also addressed. It is shown how exactly these aspects of the semantics of tense significantly enrich the philosophical understanding of the triad “language – reality – subject”.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131141554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-91-106
V. Rozin
The article proposes a reconstruction of the evolution of the concepts of philosophy of science, including the author's concept of science. The basis for such a reconstruction is the distinction between three concepts – justification, study and methodology. Is it possible to assume, the author asks, that the first stage of the formation of the philosophy of science (the concept of positivists and neopositivists) was characterized by a substantiation approach, the second (concepts of T. Kuhn and S. Toulmin) – the point of view of scientific research, the third – the methodology of science. It is the ideas of the concept of substantiation of science, coming from F. Bacon, differently understood in the works of D. Hilbert and L. Wittgenstein, that make it possible to understand the negative attitude of positivists to philosophy, and also why logic was taken to determine the rigor of scientific constructions, and theory was made the central subject of consideration. The transition to the scientific study of science in the works of T. Kuhn and S. Toulmin forced to change this subject (not theory, but the paradigm and evolution of science). The author discusses the conditions for the study of science, showing that the representatives of the second direction relied on social science and the activity approach. The methodological approach to the study of science is analyzed on the example of the ideas of the concept of research programs by I. Lakatos and the implementation of this concept in the study of ancient philosophy by P.P. Gaidenko. The a thor also positions himself as a representative of the methodological approach. He presents the main stages of his own methodological research of science. The main ideas of his concept of science include: the cultural and historical reconstruction of science, thehypothesis of two starts of the formation of science – in antiquity and in the culture of the New Age, characteristics of the “‘genome of science’ that developed in ancient philosophy and re-established in the following cultures, features of “science as social institution of modernity”. The author considers all his constructions ideal-typical and methodological.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-38-43
V. Bazhanov
The article critically evaluates the computational approach and its application to living beings and social organization. Arguments are put forward according to which the cognitive potential of more traditional approaches to these subject areas – at least at the present time – is far from a state of exhaustion, and the computational approach is unable to create an alternative to them. This leads to the idea that the naturalization of the concept of computation in relation to such systems should be treated only as a metaphor.
{"title":"Computing nature – reality or metaphor? DISCUSSION ON THE I. MIKHAILOV’S PAPER “COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE”","authors":"V. Bazhanov","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-38-43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-38-43","url":null,"abstract":"The article critically evaluates the computational approach and its application to living beings and social organization. Arguments are put forward according to which the cognitive potential of more traditional approaches to these subject areas – at least at the present time – is far from a state of exhaustion, and the computational approach is unable to create an alternative to them. This leads to the idea that the naturalization of the concept of computation in relation to such systems should be treated only as a metaphor.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125791686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-52-67
S. Pirozhkova
The article analyzes the evolution of the cultural status of science by considering its history through the prism of the opposition to the ideal of pure and useful science. The purpose of the study is not to propose a new periodization of the development of the scientific tradition, but to identify the dynamics of its relationship with the cultural whole and to correct on this basis the previously obtained scenarios of the development of science as a cultural phenomenon. It is shown that science arises as a separate social practice, opposed to another type of normalized activity. The way out from under such rationing is fixed by the idea of scientific leisure as a necessary condition for scientific and philosophical knowledge. This is a model of pure science, the practical usefulness of which is not questioned. However, the very fact of the appearance of a new type of activity entails its socialization, transformation into a profession and the gradual emergence of the principle of the social utility of science. The accumulated historical experience leads to the formation in modern times of a strategy for justifying science as both existentially and ideologically valuable (through its integration into religious discourse) and practically useful. Secularization, scientific and technological progress and economic development lead to a non-religious interpretation of human history. This interpretation is characterized by the dominance of two socio-cultural myths – technological and economic. The future of science depends on whether it will be absorbed by these myths (largely generated by itself) or will be able to offer, primarily through the efforts of socio-humanitarian disciplines, an alternative project for the development of culture.
{"title":"“Pure” or “useful”: the cultural status of science and the prospects for its change","authors":"S. Pirozhkova","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-52-67","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-52-67","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the evolution of the cultural status of science by considering its history through the prism of the opposition to the ideal of pure and useful science. The purpose of the study is not to propose a new periodization of the development of the scientific tradition, but to identify the dynamics of its relationship with the cultural whole and to correct on this basis the previously obtained scenarios of the development of science as a cultural phenomenon. It is shown that science arises as a separate social practice, opposed to another type of normalized activity. The way out from under such rationing is fixed by the idea of scientific leisure as a necessary condition for scientific and philosophical knowledge. This is a model of pure science, the practical usefulness of which is not questioned. However, the very fact of the appearance of a new type of activity entails its socialization, transformation into a profession and the gradual emergence of the principle of the social utility of science. The accumulated historical experience leads to the formation in modern times of a strategy for justifying science as both existentially and ideologically valuable (through its integration into religious discourse) and practically useful. Secularization, scientific and technological progress and economic development lead to a non-religious interpretation of human history. This interpretation is characterized by the dominance of two socio-cultural myths – technological and economic. The future of science depends on whether it will be absorbed by these myths (largely generated by itself) or will be able to offer, primarily through the efforts of socio-humanitarian disciplines, an alternative project for the development of culture.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127049181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-144-157
A. V. Kucherova
The natural sciences have changed the traditional understanding of human nature by pointing out the biological dependence of human. The relationship between the biological and the social has become a problem, and this reflects the phenomenon of psychopathy – a special type of personality that combines neurophysiological abnormalities and related behavior. The article summarizes the conclusions of the latest experimental research in this field. It is hypothesized that psychopathic properties exactly correspond to the ideological requirements of modern society, and the development of modern technologies contributes to their reproduction. The cultivation of psychopathy can completely change human beings, making society physically psychopathic, and psychopathy can be a model for the future state of society.
{"title":"Psychopathy in the context of modernity: from a biosocial problem in the definition of a person to a psychopathic model of society","authors":"A. V. Kucherova","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-144-157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-144-157","url":null,"abstract":"The natural sciences have changed the traditional understanding of human nature by pointing out the biological dependence of human. The relationship between the biological and the social has become a problem, and this reflects the phenomenon of psychopathy – a special type of personality that combines neurophysiological abnormalities and related behavior. The article summarizes the conclusions of the latest experimental research in this field. It is hypothesized that psychopathic properties exactly correspond to the ideological requirements of modern society, and the development of modern technologies contributes to their reproduction. The cultivation of psychopathy can completely change human beings, making society physically psychopathic, and psychopathy can be a model for the future state of society.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127292863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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