Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-29-35
V. Porus, Z. K. Zagidullin, N. Kuznetsova, V. Lektorsky
Participants in the discussion about the empiricism of modern epistemology Vladimir N. Porus, Nataliya I. Kuznetsova, Zhan K. Zagidullin, Vladislav A. Lektorsky comment on each other’s positions, pointing out the strong and weak points in their justification, agreeing on a number of issues, designating the theses and arguments that are fundamental for their positions, groping for prospects for the further development of the discussed issues. The discussion raises topics related to the prospects for the development of modern epistemology and philosophy of science, with the role of empirical facts and empirics in researching modern scientific knowledge, the problem of the development of the tools and conceptual apparatus of the epistemologist, normative and descriptive attitudes in epistemology and how they help or hinder leading dialogue between philosophers and scientists.
参与现代认识论经验主义讨论的Vladimir N. Porus, Nataliya I. Kuznetsova, Zhan K. Zagidullin, Vladislav a . Lektorsky对彼此的立场进行了评论，指出了他们的辩护中的优缺点，对一些问题达成了一致，指出了他们立场的基本论点和论点，并为所讨论的问题的进一步发展探索了前景。讨论提出了与现代认识论和科学哲学发展前景相关的主题，包括经验事实和经验在研究现代科学知识中的作用，认识论的工具和概念装置的发展问题，认识论中的规范和描述性态度，以及它们如何帮助或阻碍哲学家和科学家之间的主要对话。
{"title":"Should epistemology and philosophy of science turn to empirical facts?","authors":"V. Porus, Z. K. Zagidullin, N. Kuznetsova, V. Lektorsky","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-29-35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-29-35","url":null,"abstract":"Participants in the discussion about the empiricism of modern epistemology Vladimir N. Porus, Nataliya I. Kuznetsova, Zhan K. Zagidullin, Vladislav A. Lektorsky comment on each other’s positions, pointing out the strong and weak points in their justification, agreeing on a number of issues, designating the theses and arguments that are fundamental for their positions, groping for prospects for the further development of the discussed issues. The discussion raises topics related to the prospects for the development of modern epistemology and philosophy of science, with the role of empirical facts and empirics in researching modern scientific knowledge, the problem of the development of the tools and conceptual apparatus of the epistemologist, normative and descriptive attitudes in epistemology and how they help or hinder leading dialogue between philosophers and scientists.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128407017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-85-99
A.A. Kazakova
Despite the role engineers initially played in the foundation of philosophy of technology, it took more than a century for engineering practice to become a legitimate special subject of philosophical inquiry. At the turn of the XX–XXI centuries philosophy of engineering has been emerging as a subfield in parallel in different regions (China, Europe, the USA), gradually demarcating itself from philosophy of science and technology, and positioning itself in relation to STS. The overview highlights the turning points of these developments: formation of the research programs and communities. It is argued that the emergence of philosophy of engineering is a result of a growing empirical orientation and ethical problematization in philosophy and the social studies of science and technology. In the engineered sociotechnical world, both descriptive and normative research of engineering practices is required for responsibilization of technological action. An empirically informed philosophical study of engineering includes the ontological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of engineering activity, overcoming the opposition of its context and content. Engineering is a specifically modern form of action in the world and at the same time can contribute to philosophical anthropology and the theory of human creativity. Institutionalization of philosophy of engineering becomes possible when (and where) a coalition of the interested actors has been formed, including the professional associations of engineering, academy, and policymakers. The overview concludes with deliberations on perspectives of the field in Russia, where a significant corpus of studies of engineering has been accumulated – yet, philosophy of engineering is not institutionalized, and remains an exotic label.
{"title":"The emergence and self-definition of philosophy of engineering","authors":"A.A. Kazakova","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-85-99","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-85-99","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the role engineers initially played in the foundation of philosophy of technology, it took more than a century for engineering practice to become a legitimate special subject of philosophical inquiry. At the turn of the XX–XXI centuries philosophy of engineering has been emerging as a subfield in parallel in different regions (China, Europe, the USA), gradually demarcating itself from philosophy of science and technology, and positioning itself in relation to STS. The overview highlights the turning points of these developments: formation of the research programs and communities. It is argued that the emergence of philosophy of engineering is a result of a growing empirical orientation and ethical problematization in philosophy and the social studies of science and technology. In the engineered sociotechnical world, both descriptive and normative research of engineering practices is required for responsibilization of technological action. An empirically informed philosophical study of engineering includes the ontological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of engineering activity, overcoming the opposition of its context and content. Engineering is a specifically modern form of action in the world and at the same time can contribute to philosophical anthropology and the theory of human creativity. Institutionalization of philosophy of engineering becomes possible when (and where) a coalition of the interested actors has been formed, including the professional associations of engineering, academy, and policymakers. The overview concludes with deliberations on perspectives of the field in Russia, where a significant corpus of studies of engineering has been accumulated – yet, philosophy of engineering is not institutionalized, and remains an exotic label.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129262009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-20-30
E. Agazzi
The article describes scientific realism and the debate around this position. It shows that initially (in the scholastic tradition) the debate between realists and antirealists was purely ontological, since it was accepted that when we know, we know the real − knowledge cannot be anything other than knowledge of the real. The question about the reality of the object of our knowledge, about whether the world beyond our representations is equal to the world we represent to ourselves, distinguishes modern philosophy from classical philosophy and arises from the claim that we know our representations and not the real. A twofold problem is formed: first, to demonstrate the existence of the world beyond our representations, and second, to demonstrate that that the knowledge we have constitutes precisely the knowledge of the world in which we live and is, in fact, actual knowledge, not chimer. Thus the problem of realism takes on an almost exclusively epistemological meaning. Nevertheless, contemporary realistic positions often confuse ontological and epistemological theses, which leads to internal contradictions. The same is true of the proponents of anti-realist views. The question of the causes of the anti-realistic tendency in the philosophy of science is raised and it is shown that the initial attitude of the modern science was realistic. It was undermined, on the one hand, by anti-realistic interpretations of the cognitive process (starting from Kant), on the other hand, by difficulties of theoretical order arisen in physics, and the main thing was that science began to deal with the unobservable, undermining the cognitive basis of radical empiricism. However, the new cognitive situation does not necessarily lead to anti-realism, another way of development relies on an understanding of the complexity and problematic relationship between theory and experience. A number of reasons in favor of scientific realism are concluded.
{"title":"The problems of scientific realism today","authors":"E. Agazzi","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-20-30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-20-30","url":null,"abstract":"The article describes scientific realism and the debate around this position. It shows that initially (in the scholastic tradition) the debate between realists and antirealists was purely ontological, since it was accepted that when we know, we know the real − knowledge cannot be anything other than knowledge of the real. The question about the reality of the object of our knowledge, about whether the world beyond our representations is equal to the world we represent to ourselves, distinguishes modern philosophy from classical philosophy and arises from the claim that we know our representations and not the real. A twofold problem is formed: first, to demonstrate the existence of the world beyond our representations, and second, to demonstrate that that the knowledge we have constitutes precisely the knowledge of the world in which we live and is, in fact, actual knowledge, not chimer. Thus the problem of realism takes on an almost exclusively epistemological meaning. Nevertheless, contemporary realistic positions often confuse ontological and epistemological theses, which leads to internal contradictions. The same is true of the proponents of anti-realist views. The question of the causes of the anti-realistic tendency in the philosophy of science is raised and it is shown that the initial attitude of the modern science was realistic. It was undermined, on the one hand, by anti-realistic interpretations of the cognitive process (starting from Kant), on the other hand, by difficulties of theoretical order arisen in physics, and the main thing was that science began to deal with the unobservable, undermining the cognitive basis of radical empiricism. However, the new cognitive situation does not necessarily lead to anti-realism, another way of development relies on an understanding of the complexity and problematic relationship between theory and experience. A number of reasons in favor of scientific realism are concluded.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127714855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-5-33
V. Lektorsky, Ekaterina A. Alekseeva, N. Emelyanova, A. V. Katunin, Inna G. Merkulova, S. Pirozhkova, E. Trufanova, I. Shchedrina, Aleksandra F. Yakovleva
The article contains the papers of the “round table” discussion that was held at the Department of Philosophy of the State Academic University for the Humanities on October 30th 2020. The “round table” was dedicated to the 70-years anniversary of the publication of Alan Turing’s famous paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950). The speakers have discussed the role of the artificial intelligence research in understanding of human consciousness and natural intelligence, the possibilities and dangers of artificial intelligence introduction in different spheres of modern life – education, political activity, social communications. The importance of the new philosophical analysis of the Turing’s paper considering new digital challenges and artificial intellectual systems development was demonstrated.
{"title":"Artificial intelligence in the research of consciousness and in social life (in honor of 70-years anniversary of A. Turing’s paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (papers of the “round table”)","authors":"V. Lektorsky, Ekaterina A. Alekseeva, N. Emelyanova, A. V. Katunin, Inna G. Merkulova, S. Pirozhkova, E. Trufanova, I. Shchedrina, Aleksandra F. Yakovleva","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-5-33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-5-33","url":null,"abstract":"The article contains the papers of the “round table” discussion that was held at the Department of Philosophy of the State Academic University for the Humanities on October 30th 2020. The “round table” was dedicated to the 70-years anniversary of the publication of Alan Turing’s famous paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950). The speakers have discussed the role of the artificial intelligence research in understanding of human consciousness and natural intelligence, the possibilities and dangers of artificial intelligence introduction in different spheres of modern life – education, political activity, social communications. The importance of the new philosophical analysis of the Turing’s paper considering new digital challenges and artificial intellectual systems development was demonstrated.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129571284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-25-2-90-102
T.O. Provolovich
The article deals with a methodological analysis of S. Dehaene’s theory of the global neural workspace. The French neuroscientist criticizes philosophical theories of consciousness because they do not use experimentally confirmed data. Also, he rejects such concepts of consciousness as wakefulness and attention, since they primarily describe the work of the unconscious, and not consciousness. Therefore, he suggests a way to study consciousness that would be solely based on empirical methods and provide univocal neural correlates that could be used to track the transition of a stimulus received in the brain from the unconscious to the conscious area. S. Dehaene’s research team offers four such correlates, or “signature” of consciousness, the last of which demonstrates the transition of activity from different, specialized parts of the brain to the entire neural network. Also, he believes that due to the development of neuroscientific methods of consciousness research and technologies for reading and decrypting neuroactivity in the near future, it will be possible to “read minds”, which means the reproduction of both individual conscious states and consciousness as a whole on artificial systems. This theory is not a fundamentally new way of studying consciousness, since it develops the ideas put forward by B. Baars at the end of the XX century. Based on the theory of the global neural workspace, the article attempts to identify the main misconceptions of neurobiological theories of consciousness, outlining the direction of research programs of consciousness and the brain as interrelated parts, and determining their prospects in solving the problem of consciousness.
{"title":"Theory of global neuronal workspace by S. Dehaene","authors":"T.O. Provolovich","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2021-25-2-90-102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-25-2-90-102","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with a methodological analysis of S. Dehaene’s theory of the global neural workspace. The French neuroscientist criticizes philosophical theories of consciousness because they do not use experimentally confirmed data. Also, he rejects such concepts of consciousness as wakefulness and attention, since they primarily describe the work of the unconscious, and not consciousness. Therefore, he suggests a way to study consciousness that would be solely based on empirical methods and provide univocal neural correlates that could be used to track the transition of a stimulus received in the brain from the unconscious to the conscious area. S. Dehaene’s research team offers four such correlates, or “signature” of consciousness, the last of which demonstrates the transition of activity from different, specialized parts of the brain to the entire neural network. Also, he believes that due to the development of neuroscientific methods of consciousness research and technologies for reading and decrypting neuroactivity in the near future, it will be possible to “read minds”, which means the reproduction of both individual conscious states and consciousness as a whole on artificial systems. This theory is not a fundamentally new way of studying consciousness, since it develops the ideas put forward by B. Baars at the end of the XX century. Based on the theory of the global neural workspace, the article attempts to identify the main misconceptions of neurobiological theories of consciousness, outlining the direction of research programs of consciousness and the brain as interrelated parts, and determining their prospects in solving the problem of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117261746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-100-116
M. Sushchin
{"title":"Visual consciousness, representations and actions","authors":"M. Sushchin","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-100-116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-100-116","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124090932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-49-58
Vladimir A. Simelin, E. Nikitina
The article deals with one of the key problems of the digital transformation of society – the problem of human adaptation to the increasingly complex information and technological environment of the digital society, the increased information load. One of the promising directions for solving this problem is the development of neurotechnologies, and, in particular, brain-computer neural interfaces. The possibilities and prospects of using the brain-computer neural interface and neurotechnologies are considered. It is shown that the development of neurotechnologies and, in particular, the brain-computer neural interface should be accompanied by the study and early warning of the risks associated with their development, as well as the identification and discussion of social, existential and ethical problems in the development of neurotechnologies, and the development of ways to solve them. It is important to form a public discourse on various aspects of the use of neurotechnologies by humans.
{"title":"Brain-computer interface as a symbol of the co-evolution of man and technology","authors":"Vladimir A. Simelin, E. Nikitina","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-49-58","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-1-49-58","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with one of the key problems of the digital transformation of society – the problem of human adaptation to the increasingly complex information and technological environment of the digital society, the increased information load. One of the promising directions for solving this problem is the development of neurotechnologies, and, in particular, brain-computer neural interfaces. The possibilities and prospects of using the brain-computer neural interface and neurotechnologies are considered. It is shown that the development of neurotechnologies and, in particular, the brain-computer neural interface should be accompanied by the study and early warning of the risks associated with their development, as well as the identification and discussion of social, existential and ethical problems in the development of neurotechnologies, and the development of ways to solve them. It is important to form a public discourse on various aspects of the use of neurotechnologies by humans.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116967184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-100-107
D. Dubrovsky
The article considers a qualitatively new stage in the development of artificial intelligence (AI), associated with the development of artificial general intelligence (abbreviated as AGI in the international nomenclature – from Artificial General Intelligence). Unlike traditional AI, AGI is significantly closer in its functions to natural intelligence (EI), it will be able to self-learn, solve a wide range of tasks in different environments, i.e. be integral and autonomous. Such a level of “independence” of AGI opens up fundamentally new prospects for the development of information technologies, but at the same time poses many acute socio-humanitarian problems associated with the risks and threats of losing control over the development of AI. The successful development of AGI requires new theoretical and methodological approaches based on the principles of post-nonclassical epistemology and the results of neuroscientific and phenomenological studies of consciousness. It is very important to consider these issues from the angle of the extreme aggravation of the global crisis of world civilization, due to its consumer dominance and efforts to preserve its monopolar structure from the part of the United States and its Western allies. In this regard, a broader, philosophical-anthropological approach is also required to understand the current state of our civilization and the possibilities for its transformation. It involves taking into account what is called the nature of man, as a stable complex of his mental and bodily properties. They were reproduced among all peoples, in all historical epochs, under all social structures, which indicates their biological conditionality. Among them, along with altruistic properties, a number of negative properties can be distinguished (such as unlimited consumerism, aggressiveness towards one’s own kind, excessive egoistic self-will). These characteristic properties of mass consciousness were actively exploited adherents of monopolarity in their interests. Overcoming the principles and practices of monopolarity and thereby changing the global social self-organization is a necessary condition for a truly humanistic stage of anthropotechnological evolution, capable of opening up new existential prospects for the transformation of man and mankind.
{"title":"The development of artificial intelligence and the global crisis of earthly civilization (to the analysis of socio-humanitarian problems)","authors":"D. Dubrovsky","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-100-107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2022-27-2-100-107","url":null,"abstract":"The article considers a qualitatively new stage in the development of artificial intelligence (AI), associated with the development of artificial general intelligence (abbreviated as AGI in the international nomenclature – from Artificial General Intelligence). Unlike traditional AI, AGI is significantly closer in its functions to natural intelligence (EI), it will be able to self-learn, solve a wide range of tasks in different environments, i.e. be integral and autonomous. Such a level of “independence” of AGI opens up fundamentally new prospects for the development of information technologies, but at the same time poses many acute socio-humanitarian problems associated with the risks and threats of losing control over the development of AI. The successful development of AGI requires new theoretical and methodological approaches based on the principles of post-nonclassical epistemology and the results of neuroscientific and phenomenological studies of consciousness. It is very important to consider these issues from the angle of the extreme aggravation of the global crisis of world civilization, due to its consumer dominance and efforts to preserve its monopolar structure from the part of the United States and its Western allies. In this regard, a broader, philosophical-anthropological approach is also required to understand the current state of our civilization and the possibilities for its transformation. It involves taking into account what is called the nature of man, as a stable complex of his mental and bodily properties. They were reproduced among all peoples, in all historical epochs, under all social structures, which indicates their biological conditionality. Among them, along with altruistic properties, a number of negative properties can be distinguished (such as unlimited consumerism, aggressiveness towards one’s own kind, excessive egoistic self-will). These characteristic properties of mass consciousness were actively exploited adherents of monopolarity in their interests. Overcoming the principles and practices of monopolarity and thereby changing the global social self-organization is a necessary condition for a truly humanistic stage of anthropotechnological evolution, capable of opening up new existential prospects for the transformation of man and mankind.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123700810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2021-25-2-75-89
D. Ivanov
The article is devoted to the analysis and comparison of theories of moral intuition, actively discussed in epistemology and cognitive science in the first two decades of this century. At the beginning of the twentieth century intuitionism was a popular position in ethics. However, already in the middle of the last century this position was rejected by philosophers. At the beginning of the new century, we can see a return of interest in the study of intuition and its role in ethical decision-making. The main disciplines in which there is an increase in the number of studies of moral intuition are primarily cognitive science and epistemology. Approaches to the phenomenon of moral intuition in these disciplines are different. Cognitive science, moral psychology, is primarily focused on understanding intuition as a psychological process characterized by a specific cognitive role. Epistemology is interested in moral intuition as an epistemic state, in what role it plays in justification of our knowledge of moral facts. However, despite the fact that moral intuition is understood differently in these disciplines, we can nevertheless highlight common points. The paper notes that the revival of interest in moral intuition is associated largely with the development of research in the field of decision theory, namely the development of a theory of ethical decision-making. Another area of research, with which the study of moral intuition is closely related, is the problem of moral uncertainty.
{"title":"Contemporary investigations of moral intuition in epistemology and cognitive science","authors":"D. Ivanov","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2021-25-2-75-89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-25-2-75-89","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the analysis and comparison of theories of moral intuition, actively discussed in epistemology and cognitive science in the first two decades of this century. At the beginning of the twentieth century intuitionism was a popular position in ethics. However, already in the middle of the last century this position was rejected by philosophers. At the beginning of the new century, we can see a return of interest in the study of intuition and its role in ethical decision-making. The main disciplines in which there is an increase in the number of studies of moral intuition are primarily cognitive science and epistemology. Approaches to the phenomenon of moral intuition in these disciplines are different. Cognitive science, moral psychology, is primarily focused on understanding intuition as a psychological process characterized by a specific cognitive role. Epistemology is interested in moral intuition as an epistemic state, in what role it plays in justification of our knowledge of moral facts. However, despite the fact that moral intuition is understood differently in these disciplines, we can nevertheless highlight common points. The paper notes that the revival of interest in moral intuition is associated largely with the development of research in the field of decision theory, namely the development of a theory of ethical decision-making. Another area of research, with which the study of moral intuition is closely related, is the problem of moral uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123438449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-72-75
T. Rockmore
The replies given by the author to Profs. Katrechko and Prof. Przhilenskiy are very different. Prof. Katrechko approaches Kant as if he was a contemporary thinker simultaneously committed to correlationism, a semanticist, a follower of Strawson, a representationalist, and so on. The response is that he is not a contemporary thinker. What remains is Prof. Katrechko’s view that he shares with some other Kantian scholars that the critical philosophy is a form of representationalism. Prof. Przhilenskiy begins by agreeing that Kant can in fact be read as supporting anti-representational and constructivist ideas, while suggesting that the Copernican turn can be read in different ways. He attributes to the author the view that phenomena are just representations, whereas, on the contrary, the author claims, though perhaps not clearly enough, that the mature Kant turns away from representationalism.
{"title":"Replies to comments by Profs. Katrechko and Przhilenskiy","authors":"T. Rockmore","doi":"10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-72-75","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-72-75","url":null,"abstract":"The replies given by the author to Profs. Katrechko and Prof. Przhilenskiy are very different. Prof. Katrechko approaches Kant as if he was a contemporary thinker simultaneously committed to correlationism, a semanticist, a follower of Strawson, a representationalist, and so on. The response is that he is not a contemporary thinker. What remains is Prof. Katrechko’s view that he shares with some other Kantian scholars that the critical philosophy is a form of representationalism. Prof. Przhilenskiy begins by agreeing that Kant can in fact be read as supporting anti-representational and constructivist ideas, while suggesting that the Copernican turn can be read in different ways. He attributes to the author the view that phenomena are just representations, whereas, on the contrary, the author claims, though perhaps not clearly enough, that the mature Kant turns away from representationalism.","PeriodicalId":227944,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science and Technology","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129166621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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