Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.1201/9780203486061-24
Christopher D. Kolenda
Bargaining asymmetries undermined the prospects for reconciliation in Afghanistan. President Obama’s decision on December 1, 2009, to announce both a surge of forces and a timeline for withdrawal limited American leverage. The Taliban aimed to gain concessions that improved its legitimacy while coaxing the United States to complete its withdrawal, but the insurgents were not interested in negotiating an end to the conflict at that time. As the drawdown continued, American bargaining power declined further. By March 2012, the Taliban postponed talks with the United States. The persistent and increasingly specific withdrawal announcements likely doomed any hopes of a peace process before the withdrawal of American troops. The Pentagon continued to receive a level of White House scrutiny about military operations that diplomats never underwent regarding reconciliation, regional diplomacy, and the 2014 elections. The number of meetings about those matters were comparatively few and far between....
{"title":"Conclusion to Part IV","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.1201/9780203486061-24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1201/9780203486061-24","url":null,"abstract":"Bargaining asymmetries undermined the prospects for reconciliation in Afghanistan. President Obama’s decision on December 1, 2009, to announce both a surge of forces and a timeline for withdrawal limited American leverage. The Taliban aimed to gain concessions that improved its legitimacy while coaxing the United States to complete its withdrawal, but the insurgents were not interested in negotiating an end to the conflict at that time. As the drawdown continued, American bargaining power declined further. By March 2012, the Taliban postponed talks with the United States. The persistent and increasingly specific withdrawal announcements likely doomed any hopes of a peace process before the withdrawal of American troops. The Pentagon continued to receive a level of White House scrutiny about military operations that diplomats never underwent regarding reconciliation, regional diplomacy, and the 2014 elections. The number of meetings about those matters were comparatively few and far between....","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130608075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0022
Christopher D. Kolenda
Reconciliation efforts soon derailed, as this chapter shows. Conflicting interests between the U.S., the Taliban, and the Karzai government meant that the reconciliation process was lacking progress. While a Strategic Partnership Agreement seemed to realign the U.S. and Afghan governments, poor coordination of the opening of the Doha office and the transition ceremony from ISAF to Afghan forces set back the relationship. By continuing the drawdown, the U.S. was losing negotiating leverage.
{"title":"Coming Off the Rails","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0022","url":null,"abstract":"Reconciliation efforts soon derailed, as this chapter shows. Conflicting interests between the U.S., the Taliban, and the Karzai government meant that the reconciliation process was lacking progress. While a Strategic Partnership Agreement seemed to realign the U.S. and Afghan governments, poor coordination of the opening of the Doha office and the transition ceremony from ISAF to Afghan forces set back the relationship. By continuing the drawdown, the U.S. was losing negotiating leverage.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132448768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0029
Christopher D. Kolenda
As benchmarks within political, military, and economic lines of effort were achieved in Iraq, the Bush administration felt it was making progress. This chapter shows how assessing progress within bureaucratic silos allowed the Bush administration to remain overly optimistic about a favorable and durable outcome, even though violence intensified.
{"title":"Achieving Milestones While Losing the War","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0029","url":null,"abstract":"As benchmarks within political, military, and economic lines of effort were achieved in Iraq, the Bush administration felt it was making progress. This chapter shows how assessing progress within bureaucratic silos allowed the Bush administration to remain overly optimistic about a favorable and durable outcome, even though violence intensified.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129493073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0033
Christopher D. Kolenda
The surge seemed successful at first, especially because it coincided with the Anbar Awakening spreading through Sunni communities. Violence levels plummeted. However, the U.S. administration was still being manipulated by the Iraq government, which continued its sectarian agenda. More importantly, the surge was not strategically connected to a specific war termination outcome, making it unclear how it could be turned into durable success.
{"title":"A New Plan on Shaky Foundations","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0033","url":null,"abstract":"The surge seemed successful at first, especially because it coincided with the Anbar Awakening spreading through Sunni communities. Violence levels plummeted. However, the U.S. administration was still being manipulated by the Iraq government, which continued its sectarian agenda. More importantly, the surge was not strategically connected to a specific war termination outcome, making it unclear how it could be turned into durable success.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131496983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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{"title":"Coming Off the Rails","authors":"K. Hopper","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv201xj68.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv201xj68.28","url":null,"abstract":"International \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Information for International Students \u0000Why Choose St Mary's? \u0000What Our Students Say \u0000Entry Requirements \u0000How to Apply \u0000Accommodation \u0000Tuition Fees \u0000International Scholarships \u0000Asia Pacific Office \u0000History and Tradition \u0000Information for Students from the USA \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Visa Information for International Students \u0000Tier 4 Visa Information \u0000Student Visitor Visa Information \u0000Tier 4 Student Responsibilities \u0000Working Whilst Studying on a Tier 4 Visa \u0000Registering With The Police \u0000 \u0000Preparatory Courses for International Students \u0000English Language Summer School \u0000In-Sessional English Programme \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Spend a Study Abroad Semester at St Mary's \u0000American Partners \u0000Canadian Partners \u0000Latin American Partners \u0000Australian and Asian Partners \u0000Term Dates \u0000Module and Timetable Information \u0000Accommodation \u0000What Our Students Say \u0000How to Apply \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Study Abroad Programme for Current St Mary's Students \u0000Erasmus Exchange Programme (Europe) \u0000American Partners \u0000Canadian Partners \u0000Latin American Partners \u0000Australian and Asian Partners \u0000What Our Students Say \u0000 \u0000British and International Education \u0000Malaysian Trainee Teachers \u0000 \u0000Research \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Research \u0000Research of Excellence \u0000Research Strategy \u0000Research Excellence Framework 2014 \u0000Research Integrity \u0000 \u0000Research Areas \u0000Centres \u0000Showcases \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Postgraduate Research Study \u0000Prospective Students \u0000Training and Development \u0000Research Student Events \u0000 \u0000News and Events \u0000Academic Conferences \u0000Media Centre Coverage \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Research Centres \u0000Aquinas Centre \u0000Centre for Bioethics and Emerging Technologies (CBET) \u0000Centre for Initiatives in Spirituality and Reconciliation (InSpiRe) \u0000Centre for Irish Studies \u0000Centre for Joseph Conrad Studies \u0000Centre for Law and Culture \u0000Centre for the Philosophy of History \u0000Centre for Religion and History \u0000Centre for the Social-Scientific Study of the Bible \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Research Centre Conferences \u0000Aquinas Conferences \u0000CBET Conferences \u0000InSpiRe Conferences \u0000Irish Studies Conferences \u0000Joseph Conrad Studies Conferences \u0000Law and Culture Conferences \u0000Philosophy of History Conferences \u0000Religion and History Conferences \u0000Social-Scientific Study of the Bible Conferences \u0000 \u0000Student Life \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Accommodation \u0000Living in Halls \u0000Halls Available \u0000What Our Students Say \u0000Refectory and Meal Plans \u0000Your Questions Answered \u0000Off-Campus Accommodation \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Living on Campus \u0000Facilities and Local Amenities \u0000Campus Security \u0000Support on Campus \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Students' Union \u0000Messages From Your SU and AU Presidents \u0000Events and Activities \u0000Clubs and Societies \u0000SU Hub (Shop and Lounge) \u0000SU Common Room \u0000Student Radio Station \u0000Student Newspaper \u0000Staff Contacts \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Chaplaincy \u0000Meet the Chaplaincy Team \u0000Sacraments \u0000Music \u0000Spirituality and Retreats \u0000Serving Others \u0000Fairtrade Status \u0000Wider Christian Community and Interfaith \u0000History of the Chapel \u0000The Papal Visit from the Chaplaincy's Perspective \u0000 \u0000Student Support \u0000 \u0000 \u0000Careers Service \u0000What Can We Do For You? \u0000Meet the Team \u0000What Our Students Say \u0000Job Vacancies \u0000Teaching Fair \u0000Key Policies and Disclaimers.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124285883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0013
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter details the thinking that eventually led to the surge. Obama’s patience waned while bureaucratic frictions and problems with the Karzai government continued to impede progress. U.S. departments and agencies continued to write and execute individual plans within bureaucratic silos, and there was no effort to develop with Afghan partners a coordinated strategy for the war or to address the misaligned aims and incentives. Additionally, the simultaneous announcement of a surge and withdrawal timeline limited both U.S. options and leverage.
{"title":"Surging into the Good War","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter details the thinking that eventually led to the surge. Obama’s patience waned while bureaucratic frictions and problems with the Karzai government continued to impede progress. U.S. departments and agencies continued to write and execute individual plans within bureaucratic silos, and there was no effort to develop with Afghan partners a coordinated strategy for the war or to address the misaligned aims and incentives. Additionally, the simultaneous announcement of a surge and withdrawal timeline limited both U.S. options and leverage.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125380714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is common practice to forecast social, political, and economic outcomes by polling people about their intentions. This approach is direct, but it can be unreliable in settings where it is hard to identify a representative sample, or where subjects have an incentive to conceal their true intentions or beliefs. The authors propose that, as a substitute or a supplement, forecasters use historical outcomes to predict future ones. The relevance of historical events, however, is not guaranteed. The authors apply a novel technique called Partial Sample Regression to identify, in a mathematically precise way, the subset of events that are most relevant to the present. The outcomes of those events are then weighted by their relevance and averaged to give a prediction for the future. The authors illustrate their technique by showing that it correctly predicted the winner of the last six U.S. presidential elections based only on the political, geopolitical, and economic circumstances of the election year.
{"title":"The Past as Prologue:","authors":"M. Czasonis, M. Kritzman, D. Turkington","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv201xj68.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv201xj68.6","url":null,"abstract":"It is common practice to forecast social, political, and economic outcomes by polling people about their intentions. This approach is direct, but it can be unreliable in settings where it is hard to identify a representative sample, or where subjects have an incentive to conceal their true intentions or beliefs. The authors propose that, as a substitute or a supplement, forecasters use historical outcomes to predict future ones. The relevance of historical events, however, is not guaranteed. The authors apply a novel technique called Partial Sample Regression to identify, in a mathematically precise way, the subset of events that are most relevant to the present. The outcomes of those events are then weighted by their relevance and averaged to give a prediction for the future. The authors illustrate their technique by showing that it correctly predicted the winner of the last six U.S. presidential elections based only on the political, geopolitical, and economic circumstances of the election year.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130688609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0035
Christopher D. Kolenda
Why was the U.S. unsuccessful in turning successes achieved during the surge into a durable political outcome? This chapter offers three related arguments: the desire to withdraw reduced U.S. bargaining leverage; the reduction in violence led U.S. officials to overestimate Maliki’s inclusiveness; and U.S. leverage was further dissipated by civil-military tensions and strategic incoherence in theater. The surge had not been designed to alleviate either of those aspects.
{"title":"The Surge Misunderstood","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0035","url":null,"abstract":"Why was the U.S. unsuccessful in turning successes achieved during the surge into a durable political outcome? This chapter offers three related arguments: the desire to withdraw reduced U.S. bargaining leverage; the reduction in violence led U.S. officials to overestimate Maliki’s inclusiveness; and U.S. leverage was further dissipated by civil-military tensions and strategic incoherence in theater. The surge had not been designed to alleviate either of those aspects.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127097155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why did the Bush and Obama administrations fixate on ineffective strategies? Confirmation bias reinforced the Bush administration’s belief that the war was over, that a small military effort could defeat the remnants of the Taliban, and that the international community could pick up the burden of reconstruction. Officials emphasized reports of progress within political, military, and economic silos and discounted evidence of mounting problems. The Obama administration’s belief that the Taliban would be unwilling to fight other Afghans and its frustration over the Karzai government’s endemic corruption, coupled with the Pentagon’s narrative about the ANSF’s readiness, reinforced the withdrawal timeline. Evidence mounted that the Afghan government was losing legitimacy, and the ANSF was corrupt and poorly led. The Taliban remained resilient with their sanctuaries in Pakistan and local support in Afghanistan intact. Still, the Obama administration would not reexamine the drawdown timeline until the disaster became apparent at the end of 2014. Poor strategic empathy compounded the effects of confirmation bias in both administrations. Civilian and military officials, focused in their silos, never addressed the cross-cutting issues that jeopardized US aims. Defense officials had to use subtle language about risks to avoid running afoul of the White House, but no one in Congress picked up the nuances....
{"title":"Conclusion to Part III","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv201xj68.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv201xj68.23","url":null,"abstract":"Why did the Bush and Obama administrations fixate on ineffective strategies? Confirmation bias reinforced the Bush administration’s belief that the war was over, that a small military effort could defeat the remnants of the Taliban, and that the international community could pick up the burden of reconstruction. Officials emphasized reports of progress within political, military, and economic silos and discounted evidence of mounting problems. The Obama administration’s belief that the Taliban would be unwilling to fight other Afghans and its frustration over the Karzai government’s endemic corruption, coupled with the Pentagon’s narrative about the ANSF’s readiness, reinforced the withdrawal timeline. Evidence mounted that the Afghan government was losing legitimacy, and the ANSF was corrupt and poorly led. The Taliban remained resilient with their sanctuaries in Pakistan and local support in Afghanistan intact. Still, the Obama administration would not reexamine the drawdown timeline until the disaster became apparent at the end of 2014. Poor strategic empathy compounded the effects of confirmation bias in both administrations. Civilian and military officials, focused in their silos, never addressed the cross-cutting issues that jeopardized US aims. Defense officials had to use subtle language about risks to avoid running afoul of the White House, but no one in Congress picked up the nuances....","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131522192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0040
Christopher D. Kolenda
As the case study analysis has highlighted systemic factors in how the U.S. plans and wages its wars, this chapter suggests specific ways to address these problems and avoid getting caught in endless conflicts in the future.
{"title":"Implications for US Foreign Policy","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0040","url":null,"abstract":"As the case study analysis has highlighted systemic factors in how the U.S. plans and wages its wars, this chapter suggests specific ways to address these problems and avoid getting caught in endless conflicts in the future.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129674511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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