Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0006
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter discusses Afghanistan’s recent complex history, which is characterized by fragile state structures and continuous internal and external power struggles. It shows that in presuming decisive victory, the Bush administration underestimated the post-Taliban regime challenges as internal and external rivalries unfolded in predictable ways.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0014
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter addresses the slow change in mindsets, especially in McChrystal, that reintegration of and reconciliation with the Taliban, along with a negotiated outcome, might be the most promising way to a lasting outcome.
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Why did this toxic combination arise of an insurgency with tangible support and a host nation government unable to win the battle of legitimacy in contested and insurgent-controlled areas? Existing explanations focus on the lack of Phase IV planning, inadequate troop presence to maintain security, and poor politico-military integration....
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Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0041
Christopher D. Kolenda
Based on the analysis of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, this chapter suggests avenues and questions for further research.
本章通过对阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争的分析，提出了进一步研究的途径和问题。
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Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0021
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter discusses U.S. efforts of reconciliation with the Taliban. Starting in late 2010, U.S. government officials regularly met with Taliban representatives to facilitate confidence-building measures such as detainee exchanges and the opening of a Taliban office in Doha office. Meanwhile, tensions grew between the U.S. government and Karzai, who rejected and felt blind-sided by these talks.
{"title":"Exploratory Talks","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0021","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses U.S. efforts of reconciliation with the Taliban. Starting in late 2010, U.S. government officials regularly met with Taliban representatives to facilitate confidence-building measures such as detainee exchanges and the opening of a Taliban office in Doha office. Meanwhile, tensions grew between the U.S. government and Karzai, who rejected and felt blind-sided by these talks.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127748635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0025
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter discusses war planning that preceded Operation Iraqi Freedom. It lays bare the implicit aim of decisive victory as well as the overly optimistic assumptions about turning military victory into a durable political outcome. While the military operation was repeatedly war-gamed and rehearsed, little attention was paid to post-combat operations, and even worse, there was yet again no inter-agency coordination.
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Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0018
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter overviews different reasons why there never was a serious attempt at reconciliation in Afghanistan. These reasons can be found both within the Obama. administration and the complexity of the conflict itself.
本章概述了阿富汗从未认真尝试和解的不同原因。这些原因可以在奥巴马内部找到。管理和冲突本身的复杂性。
{"title":"Reconciliation versus Transition","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0018","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter overviews different reasons why there never was a serious attempt at reconciliation in Afghanistan. These reasons can be found both within the Obama. administration and the complexity of the conflict itself.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114778137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0032
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter introduces the concept of loss aversion to explain why it took the U.S. government so long to change their strategy. Loss aversion created the desire to preserve perceived gains and resist changes in strategy that could place them at risk – even as the cost of the current policy was high, and its prospects of success were low. Only when the Bush administration accepted that the current plan would guarantee a loss and a new approach could result in a win at acceptable cost was it able to revise its strategy.
{"title":"To Surge or Not to Surge","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0032","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the concept of loss aversion to explain why it took the U.S. government so long to change their strategy. Loss aversion created the desire to preserve perceived gains and resist changes in strategy that could place them at risk – even as the cost of the current policy was high, and its prospects of success were low. Only when the Bush administration accepted that the current plan would guarantee a loss and a new approach could result in a win at acceptable cost was it able to revise its strategy.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123435169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0016
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter sheds light on how the success of the surge was assessed. As the surge was underway, each agency and department continued to assess the conflict within its silo, using different metrics and drawing different conclusions. With no interagency authority below the President, and the latter being focused on other events, the strategy for Afghanistan did not seem to take into account the developments on the ground.
{"title":"Assessments and Risks","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0016","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter sheds light on how the success of the surge was assessed. As the surge was underway, each agency and department continued to assess the conflict within its silo, using different metrics and drawing different conclusions. With no interagency authority below the President, and the latter being focused on other events, the strategy for Afghanistan did not seem to take into account the developments on the ground.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133653853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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