Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.1201/9780203486061-34
Christopher D. Kolenda
Clausewitz argues that a balance of determination and ability to adapt to circumstances is essential to military genius.1 Cognitive bias, entrapment by Iraqi leaders, and loss aversion reinforced the Bush administration’s obstinacy and impeded their ability to learn and adapt. Although the Bush administration had developed metrics to assess progress, the most virulent, strategically damaging problems were intangible or difficult to measure. These included factors such as the political scrimmage for power, predatory sectarianism, and growing corruption. These frequently occurred along the seams of bureaucratic silos, so they were never accurately measured or considered in assessments of strategic risk. The absence of such considerations may have played a role in the willingness of the Bush administration to discount violence levels as strategically irrelevant....
{"title":"Conclusion to Part VI","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.1201/9780203486061-34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1201/9780203486061-34","url":null,"abstract":"Clausewitz argues that a balance of determination and ability to adapt to circumstances is essential to military genius.1 Cognitive bias, entrapment by Iraqi leaders, and loss aversion reinforced the Bush administration’s obstinacy and impeded their ability to learn and adapt. Although the Bush administration had developed metrics to assess progress, the most virulent, strategically damaging problems were intangible or difficult to measure. These included factors such as the political scrimmage for power, predatory sectarianism, and growing corruption. These frequently occurred along the seams of bureaucratic silos, so they were never accurately measured or considered in assessments of strategic risk. The absence of such considerations may have played a role in the willingness of the Bush administration to discount violence levels as strategically irrelevant....","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132298492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0003
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter discusses three successful war termination outcomes in irregular war: decisive victory, negotiated outcome, and transition, and shows how the choice of a desired war termination outcome affects the selection of an appropriate strategy.
{"title":"Further Defining War Termination","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses three successful war termination outcomes in irregular war: decisive victory, negotiated outcome, and transition, and shows how the choice of a desired war termination outcome affects the selection of an appropriate strategy.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114451823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0007
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter addresses early events in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. The United States took steps to create a new government and constitution, but was preoccupied with the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Meanwhile, an internal struggle to fill the power vacuum ensued between local warlords who each aimed to exploit U.S. efforts according to their interests. Without a governing strategy that looked beyond the ouster of the Taliban, the United States eventually found itself unable to adapt to a dynamic situation.
{"title":"The Fall of the Taliban and the Bonn Conference","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses early events in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. The United States took steps to create a new government and constitution, but was preoccupied with the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Meanwhile, an internal struggle to fill the power vacuum ensued between local warlords who each aimed to exploit U.S. efforts according to their interests. Without a governing strategy that looked beyond the ouster of the Taliban, the United States eventually found itself unable to adapt to a dynamic situation.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124016687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0002
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter gives an overview of the U.S. war in Vietnam to show that the war termination problems which the U.S. has encountered during the major post-9/11 interventions are not an aberration.
本章概述了美国在越南的战争，以表明美国在9/11后的主要干预中遇到的战争终止问题并不是一种失常。
{"title":"The Past as Prologue","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter gives an overview of the U.S. war in Vietnam to show that the war termination problems which the U.S. has encountered during the major post-9/11 interventions are not an aberration.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131988889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0036
Christopher D. Kolenda
Reconciliation seemed far away and Prime Minister Maliki continued his sectarian agenda. As the UN resolution providing legal basis for U.S. troops in Iraq was due to expire at the end of 2008, the U.S. had to negotiate a new agreement with the Iraqi government. Together with the U.S. commitment to the withdrawal timeline this gave Maliki more leverage. As discussions focused on when the U.S. forces would leave, reconciliation was further side-lined.
{"title":"The Absence of a Political Strategy Erodes US Leverage","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0036","url":null,"abstract":"Reconciliation seemed far away and Prime Minister Maliki continued his sectarian agenda. As the UN resolution providing legal basis for U.S. troops in Iraq was due to expire at the end of 2008, the U.S. had to negotiate a new agreement with the Iraqi government. Together with the U.S. commitment to the withdrawal timeline this gave Maliki more leverage. As discussions focused on when the U.S. forces would leave, reconciliation was further side-lined.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122493897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0005
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter discusses U.S. planning and assumptions before the invasion of Afghanistan. The Bush administration, with President Bush’s dislike of nation-building, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s preference for light, technological solutions, and the idea that Afghanistan was only one of many fronts of the Global War on Terrorism, opted for a limited military footprint and aimed to exit as quickly as possible. A contradiction ensued between a decisive victory outcome and the minimalist ways and means devoted to it.
{"title":"Light Footprints to a Long War","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses U.S. planning and assumptions before the invasion of Afghanistan. The Bush administration, with President Bush’s dislike of nation-building, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s preference for light, technological solutions, and the idea that Afghanistan was only one of many fronts of the Global War on Terrorism, opted for a limited military footprint and aimed to exit as quickly as possible. A contradiction ensued between a decisive victory outcome and the minimalist ways and means devoted to it.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129717911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0037
Christopher D. Kolenda
President Obama came to the office in 2009 with the promise of ending the Iraq war. Such reluctance to be committed to the war had already diminished U.S. leverage in the previous years and continued to do so. At the same time, the Iraqi government’s sectarianism and corruption undermined the prospects of a successful transition. The U.S. did not use its opportunities to push Maliki to reform the government. By mid-2014, a new Sunni Arab insurgency was flourishing.
{"title":"New Administration, Similar Challenges","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0037","url":null,"abstract":"President Obama came to the office in 2009 with the promise of ending the Iraq war. Such reluctance to be committed to the war had already diminished U.S. leverage in the previous years and continued to do so. At the same time, the Iraqi government’s sectarianism and corruption undermined the prospects of a successful transition. The U.S. did not use its opportunities to push Maliki to reform the government. By mid-2014, a new Sunni Arab insurgency was flourishing.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120913107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0026
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter discusses the initial steps the Coalition Provisional Authority took in Iraq after the defeat of Saddam Hussein. It shows how these steps – mainly the de-Ba’athifaction and disbanding the Iraqi Army – alienated Sunni, prompting resistance and solidifying the rift between Sunni and Shia. Once again, the United States became entangled in local power struggles.
{"title":"A Complicated Approach to a Complex Situation","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0026","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses the initial steps the Coalition Provisional Authority took in Iraq after the defeat of Saddam Hussein. It shows how these steps – mainly the de-Ba’athifaction and disbanding the Iraqi Army – alienated Sunni, prompting resistance and solidifying the rift between Sunni and Shia. Once again, the United States became entangled in local power struggles.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114018570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conclusion to Part VI","authors":"B. Thuraisingham","doi":"10.1201/B15433-37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1201/B15433-37","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130296427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conclusion to Part VII","authors":"B. Thuraisingham","doi":"10.1201/B15433-43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1201/B15433-43","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124761739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：