This paper proposes an alternative approach to the empirical study of wage gap between workers with different educational levels in the enlarged EU. The analysis is based on sectoral database, linking labor market statistics and trade data at the level of 12 manufacturing sectors in a group of 20 European countries: selected New Member States (NMS-5) and former EU-15 economies, in the period 1995-2005. The results of the empirical model suggest that wage inequality between workers with academic education and lower is associated mainly with domestic (and not foreign) labor market conditions and, to a lower extent, to trade forces. Degree of trade penetration affects skilled-unskilled wage gaps but we do not find significant wage effects of imports from less developed EU countries. The same result is confirmed when we consider trade in intermediates and outsourcing practices in Europe.
{"title":"Skilled-Unskilled Wage Gap Versus Evolving Trade and Labour Market Structures in the EU","authors":"Aleksandra Parteka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2172296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2172296","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes an alternative approach to the empirical study of wage gap between workers with different educational levels in the enlarged EU. The analysis is based on sectoral database, linking labor market statistics and trade data at the level of 12 manufacturing sectors in a group of 20 European countries: selected New Member States (NMS-5) and former EU-15 economies, in the period 1995-2005. The results of the empirical model suggest that wage inequality between workers with academic education and lower is associated mainly with domestic (and not foreign) labor market conditions and, to a lower extent, to trade forces. Degree of trade penetration affects skilled-unskilled wage gaps but we do not find significant wage effects of imports from less developed EU countries. The same result is confirmed when we consider trade in intermediates and outsourcing practices in Europe.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126415295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In January 2008 the African Union (AU) launched a Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012). The Plan acknowledged the “need for a comprehensive approach”, and aimed to “reverse the current trends of drug abuse and trafficking, organised crime, corruption, terrorism and related challenges to socio-economic development and human security”. To date most African governments have focused their drug policies and programmes on the criminalisation of drug possession and use, and on operations to arrest dealers and intercept drug shipments. UNODC has acknowledged the damaging “unintended consequences” of this approach: not least the “huge criminal black market that now thrives”, the vast amount being spent, the displacement of markets and problems to new countries, and unsustainably high numbers of individuals in prison or pre-trial detention. In October 2012, the AU Conference of Ministers of Drug Control will review the progress made, and is expected to adopt a new AU Plan of Action on Drug Control (2013 - 2017). This is a crucial time for drug policies in the region. This IDPC Advocacy Note offers a set of recommendations based on global evidence to guide policy makers in adopting the new AU Plan of Action on Drug Control.
{"title":"IDPC Advocacy Note - Recommendations for the African Union Plan of Action on Drug Control (2013-2017)","authors":"J. Bridge","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2185967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2185967","url":null,"abstract":"In January 2008 the African Union (AU) launched a Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2007-2012). The Plan acknowledged the “need for a comprehensive approach”, and aimed to “reverse the current trends of drug abuse and trafficking, organised crime, corruption, terrorism and related challenges to socio-economic development and human security”. To date most African governments have focused their drug policies and programmes on the criminalisation of drug possession and use, and on operations to arrest dealers and intercept drug shipments. UNODC has acknowledged the damaging “unintended consequences” of this approach: not least the “huge criminal black market that now thrives”, the vast amount being spent, the displacement of markets and problems to new countries, and unsustainably high numbers of individuals in prison or pre-trial detention. In October 2012, the AU Conference of Ministers of Drug Control will review the progress made, and is expected to adopt a new AU Plan of Action on Drug Control (2013 - 2017). This is a crucial time for drug policies in the region. This IDPC Advocacy Note offers a set of recommendations based on global evidence to guide policy makers in adopting the new AU Plan of Action on Drug Control.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115876705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper assembles detailed information on the market access provisions in trade in goods contained in 192 active regional trade agreements (RTAs) notified to the WTO as of November 2010. Although market access provisions in trade in goods in RTAs have been addressed in a number of studies, much of this work has been limited to subsets of RTAs, particularly plurilateral RTAs involving three or more parties. The goal of the current study is to expand beyond the more commonly studied RTAs and to include all RTAs notified to the WTO for which data are available. This task has been facilitated by the recent Transparency Mechanism for RTAs (TM), adopted in 2006, that provides the basis for the systematic provision of detailed tariff and trade data by WTO Members engaged in RTAs. This information has been supplemented by other public sources of data, where available. A number of trends are evident. While a majority of RTAs result in a reasonably high degree of liberalization overall (with developing countries often liberalizing as much or more than developed countries), liberalization is not uniform across products or RTA parties. In some RTAs the degree of liberalization appears to be a negotiated outcome, depending on the RTA partner. Agricultural goods continue to be subject to lower levels of liberalization, frequent product exclusions and systematic protection in some RTAs, regardless of the RTA partner's comparative advantage. Nonetheless, a lower level of ambition in some RTAs is tempered by a commitment to negotiate further concessions or expand upon the RTA's scope at some future point: more than half the RTAs analysed contain such a commitment. Much has been written about the potential for the multilateralization of commitments undertaken in RTAs. While there may be scope for positive externalities in terms of regulatory convergence particularly with regard to services liberalization undertaken in RTAs, there is less evidence in this study to suggest that increased market access in merchandise goods leads to a more favourable trading environment for third parties. Continuing constructive engagement by WTO Members in the Transparency Mechanism through the provision of data, timely notifications, and submission of implementation reports will increase the availability of tariff and trade liberalization data, thus facilitating further examination of the topics highlighted in the study as worthy of future research.
{"title":"Market Access Provisions on Trade in Goods in Regional Trade Agreements","authors":"J. Crawford","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2174330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2174330","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assembles detailed information on the market access provisions in trade in goods contained in 192 active regional trade agreements (RTAs) notified to the WTO as of November 2010. Although market access provisions in trade in goods in RTAs have been addressed in a number of studies, much of this work has been limited to subsets of RTAs, particularly plurilateral RTAs involving three or more parties. The goal of the current study is to expand beyond the more commonly studied RTAs and to include all RTAs notified to the WTO for which data are available. This task has been facilitated by the recent Transparency Mechanism for RTAs (TM), adopted in 2006, that provides the basis for the systematic provision of detailed tariff and trade data by WTO Members engaged in RTAs. This information has been supplemented by other public sources of data, where available. A number of trends are evident. While a majority of RTAs result in a reasonably high degree of liberalization overall (with developing countries often liberalizing as much or more than developed countries), liberalization is not uniform across products or RTA parties. In some RTAs the degree of liberalization appears to be a negotiated outcome, depending on the RTA partner. Agricultural goods continue to be subject to lower levels of liberalization, frequent product exclusions and systematic protection in some RTAs, regardless of the RTA partner's comparative advantage. Nonetheless, a lower level of ambition in some RTAs is tempered by a commitment to negotiate further concessions or expand upon the RTA's scope at some future point: more than half the RTAs analysed contain such a commitment. Much has been written about the potential for the multilateralization of commitments undertaken in RTAs. While there may be scope for positive externalities in terms of regulatory convergence particularly with regard to services liberalization undertaken in RTAs, there is less evidence in this study to suggest that increased market access in merchandise goods leads to a more favourable trading environment for third parties. Continuing constructive engagement by WTO Members in the Transparency Mechanism through the provision of data, timely notifications, and submission of implementation reports will increase the availability of tariff and trade liberalization data, thus facilitating further examination of the topics highlighted in the study as worthy of future research.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"601 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116308025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Effective interaction between climate science and policy is important for moving climate negotiations forward to reach an ambitious global climate change deal. Lack of progress in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations during recent years is a good reason for taking a closer look at the process of climate science–policy interaction to identify and eliminate existing shortcomings hindering climate policymaking. This paper examines the current state of climate science–policy interaction and suggests ways to integrate scientific input into the UNFCCC process more effectively. Suggestions relate to improvement in institutional structures, processes and procedures of the UNFCCC and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), quality of scientific input, credibility of scientific message and public awareness of climate change.
{"title":"The Arduous Process of Climate Change Negotiations: How Science Can Facilitate the Desired Outcome","authors":"Kateryna Holzer, Joelle de Sepibus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2148004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2148004","url":null,"abstract":"Effective interaction between climate science and policy is important for moving climate negotiations forward to reach an ambitious global climate change deal. Lack of progress in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations during recent years is a good reason for taking a closer look at the process of climate science–policy interaction to identify and eliminate existing shortcomings hindering climate policymaking. This paper examines the current state of climate science–policy interaction and suggests ways to integrate scientific input into the UNFCCC process more effectively. Suggestions relate to improvement in institutional structures, processes and procedures of the UNFCCC and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), quality of scientific input, credibility of scientific message and public awareness of climate change.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134509709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The report provides a democratic explanation for the crisis and the EU’s failure in successfully addressing it so far. It argues that the solution to the crisis and the future of EU governance must depart from a renewed justification of the project of European integration which must be founded on its democratic and justice enhancing potential. It criticizes two mainstream models of governance for the Euro area and explains the advantages and political viability of an alternative model based on a new EU budget, new EU policies, more EU politics and a more effective political authority. The financial solidarity necessary for any successful model of governance of the EU must be detached from transfers between states and related, instead, to the wealth generated by the process of Economic integration.
{"title":"A New Governance for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy and Justice","authors":"M. Maduro","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2180248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2180248","url":null,"abstract":"The report provides a democratic explanation for the crisis and the EU’s failure in successfully addressing it so far. It argues that the solution to the crisis and the future of EU governance must depart from a renewed justification of the project of European integration which must be founded on its democratic and justice enhancing potential. It criticizes two mainstream models of governance for the Euro area and explains the advantages and political viability of an alternative model based on a new EU budget, new EU policies, more EU politics and a more effective political authority. The financial solidarity necessary for any successful model of governance of the EU must be detached from transfers between states and related, instead, to the wealth generated by the process of Economic integration.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124708749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do powerful countries protect their investors abroad? Protecting investment across borders is problematic without an international enforcer, but like other phenomena that occur in a state of anarchy, order is still possible. For decades, scholars have developed theories to explain why governments expropriate. Seldom is it pointed out however that in the majority of cases, governments give back, often in large amounts. This paper will be the first to offer a general theory of the politics and economics of why governments pay compensation for expropriation. It argues that the role of state power in protecting international property rights is revealed if we look at the architecture surrounding compensation. The paper aims to convince scholars in political economy that a political and economic analysis of international property rights cannot be achieved by simply looking at the occurrence of contract breaches - it must also account for attempts to compensate for those breaches. Bridging insights from international law, political science and economics, the project contributes the following: attention to an understudied research vein in the political risk literature; an explanation about why states compensate; hypotheses tested with novel data from the political risk insurance industry; and a game theoretic model of international investment which includes different mechanisms for compliance, and expands the decision to expropriate to include the prospect of compensation.
{"title":"Political Risk and Realpolitik: The Politics of Compensation for Expropriation","authors":"Noel Johnston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2134577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2134577","url":null,"abstract":"How do powerful countries protect their investors abroad? Protecting investment across borders is problematic without an international enforcer, but like other phenomena that occur in a state of anarchy, order is still possible. For decades, scholars have developed theories to explain why governments expropriate. Seldom is it pointed out however that in the majority of cases, governments give back, often in large amounts. This paper will be the first to offer a general theory of the politics and economics of why governments pay compensation for expropriation. It argues that the role of state power in protecting international property rights is revealed if we look at the architecture surrounding compensation. The paper aims to convince scholars in political economy that a political and economic analysis of international property rights cannot be achieved by simply looking at the occurrence of contract breaches - it must also account for attempts to compensate for those breaches. Bridging insights from international law, political science and economics, the project contributes the following: attention to an understudied research vein in the political risk literature; an explanation about why states compensate; hypotheses tested with novel data from the political risk insurance industry; and a game theoretic model of international investment which includes different mechanisms for compliance, and expands the decision to expropriate to include the prospect of compensation.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121779928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Building on the Kantian tripod of peace in liberal peace theory, we test theories of state intergovernmental organization (IGO) membership and levels of state cooperation. We examine the measurement for IGO joint membership and find that it is inadequate to measure the level of cooperation among states. Using network analysis, we propose a new dyadic measure for the level of bilateral cooperation. We argue that states craft intergovernmental agreements, purposely nested within bilateral treaty networks, to further consolidate and bolster such agreements’ efficacy. States both express and safeguard their power interests via negotiated treaties, and while costs of violating individual treaties are small, violating treaties nested within broader treaty networks are more costly as this significantly inhibits future cooperation with all states in a region. By creating networks of treaties, states bolster compliance, enhance the prospects for cooperative foreign policy behavior, and strengthen the conditions for peace. We argue that the strength of a bilateral treaty network is a better measure than joint IGO membership for liberal peace theory. We test this measure in the post-Soviet space, where many scholars expect dyadic conflict due to Russia’s regional economic and military dominance. Using militarized interstate disputes (MID’s) as the dependent variable in our model, we find that dyads that have stronger treaty networks are significantly less likely to experience a MID than dyads without a strong treaty network. We propose that the strength of treaty networks is a better measure for tapping cooperation among states, yielding analytical results more compatible with liberal peace theory.
{"title":"The Quest for the Liberal Peace: Toward a Measure of Interstate Cooperation","authors":"Michael O. Slobodchikoff, J. Willerton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2125221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2125221","url":null,"abstract":"Building on the Kantian tripod of peace in liberal peace theory, we test theories of state intergovernmental organization (IGO) membership and levels of state cooperation. We examine the measurement for IGO joint membership and find that it is inadequate to measure the level of cooperation among states. Using network analysis, we propose a new dyadic measure for the level of bilateral cooperation. We argue that states craft intergovernmental agreements, purposely nested within bilateral treaty networks, to further consolidate and bolster such agreements’ efficacy. States both express and safeguard their power interests via negotiated treaties, and while costs of violating individual treaties are small, violating treaties nested within broader treaty networks are more costly as this significantly inhibits future cooperation with all states in a region. By creating networks of treaties, states bolster compliance, enhance the prospects for cooperative foreign policy behavior, and strengthen the conditions for peace. We argue that the strength of a bilateral treaty network is a better measure than joint IGO membership for liberal peace theory. We test this measure in the post-Soviet space, where many scholars expect dyadic conflict due to Russia’s regional economic and military dominance. Using militarized interstate disputes (MID’s) as the dependent variable in our model, we find that dyads that have stronger treaty networks are significantly less likely to experience a MID than dyads without a strong treaty network. We propose that the strength of treaty networks is a better measure for tapping cooperation among states, yielding analytical results more compatible with liberal peace theory.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121178832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rise of China in recent years has brought about more questions than answers as to whether and when China will take on the world, and number one — the United States. In line with this reasoning, many pundits as well as policy circles begin to suggest that a rinsing China, along with a declining America, would inevitably invite a change of the international order. Based upon the case of WTO, how do international institutions shape China’s behavior? After being a rule taker for 10 years and benefiting from WTO, will China become a rule taker in the near future? This paper aims to provide a preliminary answer to these questions.
{"title":"China and the Liberal International Order: Did China's Accession to WTO Shape Its Behavior?","authors":"Yeh-chung Lu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2125559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2125559","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of China in recent years has brought about more questions than answers as to whether and when China will take on the world, and number one — the United States. In line with this reasoning, many pundits as well as policy circles begin to suggest that a rinsing China, along with a declining America, would inevitably invite a change of the international order. Based upon the case of WTO, how do international institutions shape China’s behavior? After being a rule taker for 10 years and benefiting from WTO, will China become a rule taker in the near future? This paper aims to provide a preliminary answer to these questions.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"298 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128615705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Decision-making processes are among the most important methods of functioning against which the legitimacy of one institution may be rated. It is because they show how the organization treats its members and thereby fulfils the first and minimal level of accountability. Moreover, in the recent trend of international fora, especially the WTO, decision-making by consensus has become popular. This characteristic of the WTO makes it considerably and significantly different from other international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), where decisions are based on weighted voting. In the WTO, consensus based decision-making is popular, while voting is possible and/or mandatory only in some special cases. In voting process, each member state has one vote and therefore allowing equal status to all members irrespective of trade shares or general economic size. The principle of equality of voting status of member states is clearly seen in the formal structures of the WTO. The top body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which meets every two years. The day-to-day workings of the WTO are carried out by the General Council. The General Council also meets in the guise of the Trade Policy Review Body and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Below the General Council are the Councils for Goods, Services and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), along with Committees that report directly to the General Council. Representation at all three levels is open to all members of the WTO. The provisions stipulate the use of consensus and voting in the WTO covered Agreements will be examined in the first section. The advantages and disadvantages of consensus are the core discussion in section 2. On the one hand, consensus in decision-making offers developing countries with equal voice with their developed partners irrespective of trade shares and economic sizes. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of developing countries, they have to face a lot of disadvantages deriving from the consensus based decision-making. Finally, in order to help WTO become the most democratic, efficient, transparent and legitimate organization in promoting international trade, some recommendations about the reform of the WTO in the field of decision-making are raised.
{"title":"Decision-Making by Consensus in the WTO","authors":"Thanh-Tung Nguyen, Quynh-Dan Nguyen, P. Pham","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2122948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2122948","url":null,"abstract":"Decision-making processes are among the most important methods of functioning against which the legitimacy of one institution may be rated. It is because they show how the organization treats its members and thereby fulfils the first and minimal level of accountability. Moreover, in the recent trend of international fora, especially the WTO, decision-making by consensus has become popular. This characteristic of the WTO makes it considerably and significantly different from other international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), where decisions are based on weighted voting. In the WTO, consensus based decision-making is popular, while voting is possible and/or mandatory only in some special cases. In voting process, each member state has one vote and therefore allowing equal status to all members irrespective of trade shares or general economic size. The principle of equality of voting status of member states is clearly seen in the formal structures of the WTO. The top body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which meets every two years. The day-to-day workings of the WTO are carried out by the General Council. The General Council also meets in the guise of the Trade Policy Review Body and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Below the General Council are the Councils for Goods, Services and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), along with Committees that report directly to the General Council. Representation at all three levels is open to all members of the WTO. The provisions stipulate the use of consensus and voting in the WTO covered Agreements will be examined in the first section. The advantages and disadvantages of consensus are the core discussion in section 2. On the one hand, consensus in decision-making offers developing countries with equal voice with their developed partners irrespective of trade shares and economic sizes. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of developing countries, they have to face a lot of disadvantages deriving from the consensus based decision-making. Finally, in order to help WTO become the most democratic, efficient, transparent and legitimate organization in promoting international trade, some recommendations about the reform of the WTO in the field of decision-making are raised.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129767835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-07-27DOI: 10.1163/22112596-01702018
Panos Delimatsis
This note attempts to map the relevance of global law advocacy for the WTO. In this regard, it understands global law as an attempt to describe a growing decrease of the regulatory State and an ensuing increase of private rule-making. Global law intends to generate new thinking about global governance and its patterns of influence and power. Few instances of creeping global law are identified, whereas the note concludes with some thoughts on much-needed future research on a range of topics ranging from the role of NGOs to the struggle against intrinsic inequalities of the multilateral trading system.
{"title":"A Global Law Perspective of the WTO","authors":"Panos Delimatsis","doi":"10.1163/22112596-01702018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22112596-01702018","url":null,"abstract":"This note attempts to map the relevance of global law advocacy for the WTO. In this regard, it understands global law as an attempt to describe a growing decrease of the regulatory State and an ensuing increase of private rule-making. Global law intends to generate new thinking about global governance and its patterns of influence and power. Few instances of creeping global law are identified, whereas the note concludes with some thoughts on much-needed future research on a range of topics ranging from the role of NGOs to the struggle against intrinsic inequalities of the multilateral trading system.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121159833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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