Transnational regulations, often established by private bodies, play a large and important role in the international political economy. This paper makes two contributions to the literature on transnational regulation. First, governments and international organization often legitimate the delegation of regulatory authority to transnational private bodies with efficiency gains. It is rare, however, that the alleged gains are empirically examined, which requires a comparative analysis vis-a-vis other regulatory regimes. I contrast rule-making for manufactured goods and financial reporting, where a single transnational private body is the clear focal point for rule-making at the international level, with purely domestic regulatory regimes and the prior attempts to establish international product and financial standards through negotiations between governments or public regulators. I show that the shift to transnational (private) regulation indeed brought real, substantial gains in the effectiveness and efficiency of rule-making. Second, I scrutinize the distributional consequences of transnational private regulation, which I submit are closely related to the efficiency gains. Here, the existing literature focuses on the distribution of the financial costs and benefits of specific rules among those who are the targets of such rules, given a particular regulatory regime. Institutional complementarity theory provides a powerful analytical framework for examining such distributional effects. In this paper, I push the framework further to examine the distributional consequences of the shift to transnational private regulation. I argue that this shift has persistent structural consequences for the relative power of a broad range of stakeholders (both within and across countries) and thus for their regulatory capabilities.
{"title":"Distributional Consequences of Transnational Private Regulation: Institutional Complementarity as a Structural Source of Power in Global Product and Financial Markets","authors":"","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2238100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2238100","url":null,"abstract":"Transnational regulations, often established by private bodies, play a large and important role in the international political economy. This paper makes two contributions to the literature on transnational regulation. First, governments and international organization often legitimate the delegation of regulatory authority to transnational private bodies with efficiency gains. It is rare, however, that the alleged gains are empirically examined, which requires a comparative analysis vis-a-vis other regulatory regimes. I contrast rule-making for manufactured goods and financial reporting, where a single transnational private body is the clear focal point for rule-making at the international level, with purely domestic regulatory regimes and the prior attempts to establish international product and financial standards through negotiations between governments or public regulators. I show that the shift to transnational (private) regulation indeed brought real, substantial gains in the effectiveness and efficiency of rule-making. Second, I scrutinize the distributional consequences of transnational private regulation, which I submit are closely related to the efficiency gains. Here, the existing literature focuses on the distribution of the financial costs and benefits of specific rules among those who are the targets of such rules, given a particular regulatory regime. Institutional complementarity theory provides a powerful analytical framework for examining such distributional effects. In this paper, I push the framework further to examine the distributional consequences of the shift to transnational private regulation. I argue that this shift has persistent structural consequences for the relative power of a broad range of stakeholders (both within and across countries) and thus for their regulatory capabilities.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115312435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper seeks to delineate some preliminary factors and working methods that could work in favour of establishing a workable international export control regime for dual-use goods and technologies. Drawing on the work initiated by various United Nations initiatives and the Wassenaar Agreement, but specifically looking at the European Union export regime model, this working paper asks if and how a similar model could be adopted at the international level. Far from suggesting that the EU regime should of could be adopted on a global basis or that the regime is full-proof, the authors acknowledge that EU regulations are seen as among the most stringent of frameworks on dual-use goods and technologies available. Accordingly, this paper asks what elements of the EU’s control regime could be of international benefit after the ATT negotiations and how it could be adopted on a more international basis. Indeed, any future ATT control mechanism for dual-use items will have to draw on existing arms transfers and control regimes. It does this through an analysis of the ATT and the current discourse on dual-use goods and technologies in the negotiations, an stocktaking of the strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s export control regime and by asking what elements of the EU’s regime could be utilised for international control mechanisms after a future ATT is negotiated.
{"title":"The Arms Trade Treaty and the Control of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: What Can the European Union's Export Control Regime Offer?","authors":"Daniel Fiott, Katherine Prizeman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2234976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2234976","url":null,"abstract":"This paper seeks to delineate some preliminary factors and working methods that could work in favour of establishing a workable international export control regime for dual-use goods and technologies. Drawing on the work initiated by various United Nations initiatives and the Wassenaar Agreement, but specifically looking at the European Union export regime model, this working paper asks if and how a similar model could be adopted at the international level. Far from suggesting that the EU regime should of could be adopted on a global basis or that the regime is full-proof, the authors acknowledge that EU regulations are seen as among the most stringent of frameworks on dual-use goods and technologies available. Accordingly, this paper asks what elements of the EU’s control regime could be of international benefit after the ATT negotiations and how it could be adopted on a more international basis. Indeed, any future ATT control mechanism for dual-use items will have to draw on existing arms transfers and control regimes. It does this through an analysis of the ATT and the current discourse on dual-use goods and technologies in the negotiations, an stocktaking of the strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s export control regime and by asking what elements of the EU’s regime could be utilised for international control mechanisms after a future ATT is negotiated.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116637852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-02-28DOI: 10.11130/JEI.2013.28.1.1
M. Jovanović
The principal goal of integration in Europe has always been the safeguarding of peace through economic integration. The European Union (EU) has overseen splendid economic achievements. A sign of that great success has been the EU’s continuous enlargement. The eurozone is the crown jewel in the process of European integration, but it is also its weakest component. The EU’s most glorious attribute, the eurozone is now synonymous with harsh austerity measures, protests and no prospect of any remarkable growth in many countries for years to come. Obvious rifts between the EU’s countries are shaking its foundations like never before. The EU passed through many crises (approximately one a decade), and it always exited stronger. This time may be different. The EU may weather the storm. It may, however, end up as a big and important group, but not a very happy family of nations. The first decade of the 21st century was ‘lost’ for the EU, while the second decade may prove to be the epoch of its diminished global relevance. This is a pity as Europe has taken the reins in many global issues (e.g. environment). Compared with Europe, integration in Southeast Asia started from a very different point and at a different time. Nonetheless, the region provides certain context-specific lessons for the integration path. Given the circumstances in Southeast Asia, it is suggested that the region integrate but follow a light institutional model coupled with simple rules of origin to support efficient supply chains and production networks.
{"title":"Was European Integration Nice While it Lasted?","authors":"M. Jovanović","doi":"10.11130/JEI.2013.28.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11130/JEI.2013.28.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"The principal goal of integration in Europe has always been the safeguarding of peace through economic integration. The European Union (EU) has overseen splendid economic achievements. A sign of that great success has been the EU’s continuous enlargement. The eurozone is the crown jewel in the process of European integration, but it is also its weakest component. The EU’s most glorious attribute, the eurozone is now synonymous with harsh austerity measures, protests and no prospect of any remarkable growth in many countries for years to come. Obvious rifts between the EU’s countries are shaking its foundations like never before. The EU passed through many crises (approximately one a decade), and it always exited stronger. This time may be different. The EU may weather the storm. It may, however, end up as a big and important group, but not a very happy family of nations. The first decade of the 21st century was ‘lost’ for the EU, while the second decade may prove to be the epoch of its diminished global relevance. This is a pity as Europe has taken the reins in many global issues (e.g. environment). Compared with Europe, integration in Southeast Asia started from a very different point and at a different time. Nonetheless, the region provides certain context-specific lessons for the integration path. Given the circumstances in Southeast Asia, it is suggested that the region integrate but follow a light institutional model coupled with simple rules of origin to support efficient supply chains and production networks.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129045746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-01-28DOI: 10.4337/9780857930019.00009
Y. Brauner, M. Stewart
Comprising original essays written by top legal scholars, this innovative volume is the most comprehensive collection to date of independent academic work exploring the relationship between tax, law and development. Contributors cover a range of tax issues, drawing on economic, political, social, and institutional perspectives to offer a comprehensive view of how tax laws affect and are affected by human economic development.
{"title":"Introduction: Tax, Law and Development","authors":"Y. Brauner, M. Stewart","doi":"10.4337/9780857930019.00009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9780857930019.00009","url":null,"abstract":"Comprising original essays written by top legal scholars, this innovative volume is the most comprehensive collection to date of independent academic work exploring the relationship between tax, law and development. Contributors cover a range of tax issues, drawing on economic, political, social, and institutional perspectives to offer a comprehensive view of how tax laws affect and are affected by human economic development.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134174525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article we analyses threats to international security posed by international terrorist organisations and main approaches to combating their criminal activities at the national and international levels. We offer own concept of responsibility of international terrorist organisations under international criminal law and establishment of an International Tribunal on Crimes of International Terrorist Organisations as a possible solution
{"title":"Extension of International Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed by International Terrorist Organisations","authors":"E. Ivanov","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2202143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2202143","url":null,"abstract":"In this article we analyses threats to international security posed by international terrorist organisations and main approaches to combating their criminal activities at the national and international levels. We offer own concept of responsibility of international terrorist organisations under international criminal law and establishment of an International Tribunal on Crimes of International Terrorist Organisations as a possible solution","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116979140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-01-03DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_62
S. Deva
{"title":"Corporate Human Rights Violations: A Case for Extraterritorial Regulation","authors":"S. Deva","doi":"10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_62","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_62","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115454036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article, written jointly by a law professor and political science professor, endeavors to explain why the United States is particularly resistant to various efforts at international harmonization of antitrust law. While others have wrangled with this question over the years, none has assessed the question from within the broader political framework in which all relations between nations exist. Our article endeavors to fill this intellectual gap.Existing efforts to describe or explain the lack of international harmonization have generally focused on the direct economic effects, and the narrow political difficulties, of the harmonization of competition laws through certain international mechanisms, most notably the WTO and the OECD. Largely absent in these accounts is a background theory of international politics against which the practicalities – and the ultimate desirability – of international competition law harmonization can be assessed. Our article presents such a theory. It places the conflict over international competition laws within the larger framework of international relations, and in so doing draws out some novel and important implications of the debate.An important insight of this Article is that, largely independent of the economic calculus regarding the costs and benefits of entering into a multilateral international antitrust agreement, there is an inherent “transaction benefit” in the act of engaging in political exchange between states. Traditional economic and legal analyses of international relations have focused largely on the choice of organizational form (market exchange (no explicit agreement) versus bilateral versus multilateral institutions) and the likelihood and nature of compliance with each type in the absence of a central enforcement authority. By contrast, we strive here to develop a political theory of international law which accounts on the one hand for the costs of entering into international agreements, but also accounts for the state’s political preference for a specific form of agreement. The novel implication of this understanding is that, by crafting international agreements in which the other parties are made to alter their domestic institutions as a condition of agreement, the dominant state (here, the United States) receives a credible commitment from the other state as to its willingness to adhere to the terms of the specific agreement under negotiation which, in the absence of centralized enforcement, might not otherwise be forthcoming. Additionally, the alteration of domestic institutions in a manner directed by the dominant state will in and of itself be viewed as a benefit of the agreement. By facilitating domestic normative change, the dominant state will gain a measure of transformative power from the change of domestic institutions. As a result, nations derive political benefits from international agreements in a way that transcends the substance of the agreements themselves.The process of int
{"title":"International Signals: The Political Dimension of International Competition Law Harmonization","authors":"Geoffrey A. Manne, Seth Weinberger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1448223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1448223","url":null,"abstract":"The article, written jointly by a law professor and political science professor, endeavors to explain why the United States is particularly resistant to various efforts at international harmonization of antitrust law. While others have wrangled with this question over the years, none has assessed the question from within the broader political framework in which all relations between nations exist. Our article endeavors to fill this intellectual gap.Existing efforts to describe or explain the lack of international harmonization have generally focused on the direct economic effects, and the narrow political difficulties, of the harmonization of competition laws through certain international mechanisms, most notably the WTO and the OECD. Largely absent in these accounts is a background theory of international politics against which the practicalities – and the ultimate desirability – of international competition law harmonization can be assessed. Our article presents such a theory. It places the conflict over international competition laws within the larger framework of international relations, and in so doing draws out some novel and important implications of the debate.An important insight of this Article is that, largely independent of the economic calculus regarding the costs and benefits of entering into a multilateral international antitrust agreement, there is an inherent “transaction benefit” in the act of engaging in political exchange between states. Traditional economic and legal analyses of international relations have focused largely on the choice of organizational form (market exchange (no explicit agreement) versus bilateral versus multilateral institutions) and the likelihood and nature of compliance with each type in the absence of a central enforcement authority. By contrast, we strive here to develop a political theory of international law which accounts on the one hand for the costs of entering into international agreements, but also accounts for the state’s political preference for a specific form of agreement. The novel implication of this understanding is that, by crafting international agreements in which the other parties are made to alter their domestic institutions as a condition of agreement, the dominant state (here, the United States) receives a credible commitment from the other state as to its willingness to adhere to the terms of the specific agreement under negotiation which, in the absence of centralized enforcement, might not otherwise be forthcoming. Additionally, the alteration of domestic institutions in a manner directed by the dominant state will in and of itself be viewed as a benefit of the agreement. By facilitating domestic normative change, the dominant state will gain a measure of transformative power from the change of domestic institutions. As a result, nations derive political benefits from international agreements in a way that transcends the substance of the agreements themselves.The process of int","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122782833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims to make two contributions: to review the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures in response to the financial and sovereign debt crisis against the background of the institutional framework and financial structure of the euro area; and to interpret this response from a flow-of-funds perspective. The paper highlights how the ECB’s non-standard measures are motivated differently from quantitative easing policies. As a complement to standard interest rate decisions, rather than a substitute, they aim at supporting their effective transmission to the economy rather than at delivering additional monetary stimulus directly. The flow-of-funds analysis proposes an interpretation of central banks’ crisis response as reflecting their capacity to act as the ‘ultimate sector’ that can take on leverage when other sectors are under pressure to deleverage. It also provides examples for tracing the impact of non-standard measures across different sectors and markets. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.
{"title":"The ECB’s Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures: The Role of Institutional Factors and Financial Structure","authors":"Philippine Cour-Thimann, Bernhard Winkler","doi":"10.1093/OXREP/GRS038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OXREP/GRS038","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to make two contributions: to review the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures in response to the financial and sovereign debt crisis against the background of the institutional framework and financial structure of the euro area; and to interpret this response from a flow-of-funds perspective. The paper highlights how the ECB’s non-standard measures are motivated differently from quantitative easing policies. As a complement to standard interest rate decisions, rather than a substitute, they aim at supporting their effective transmission to the economy rather than at delivering additional monetary stimulus directly. The flow-of-funds analysis proposes an interpretation of central banks’ crisis response as reflecting their capacity to act as the ‘ultimate sector’ that can take on leverage when other sectors are under pressure to deleverage. It also provides examples for tracing the impact of non-standard measures across different sectors and markets. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115365649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study aims at explaining the deviation between the budget balance ratio forecasts and the outcomes in the Portuguese official forecasts and in the European Commission (EC) vintage forecasts. Therefore, we used data from the EC for the period 1969-2011 and also the Portuguese official forecasts for 1977-2011. We explain the deviation of the budget balanceto- GDP through econometric estimations and present statistical decomposition about budget balance, revenue and spending-to-GDP deviations. The statistical significance of real GDP and inflation deviations reveals the effect of automatic stabilizers and the imperfect tax indexation system. The European panel reveals statistical significance (no significance) of investment (unemployment) deviations in the budget-to-GDP ratio. Countries with better fiscal rules seem to present favourable deviations (in the absence of fixed effects). In Portugal, there is evidence of unfavourable errors about the budget balance in nominal currency in most years, which has been offset (totally or partially) by a favourable nominal GDP effect deviation. JEL Classification: C23, E44, H68.
{"title":"The Fiscal Forecasting Track Record of the European Commission and Portugal","authors":"António Afonso, Jorge Silva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2181117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2181117","url":null,"abstract":"This study aims at explaining the deviation between the budget balance ratio forecasts and the outcomes in the Portuguese official forecasts and in the European Commission (EC) vintage forecasts. Therefore, we used data from the EC for the period 1969-2011 and also the Portuguese official forecasts for 1977-2011. We explain the deviation of the budget balanceto- GDP through econometric estimations and present statistical decomposition about budget balance, revenue and spending-to-GDP deviations. The statistical significance of real GDP and inflation deviations reveals the effect of automatic stabilizers and the imperfect tax indexation system. The European panel reveals statistical significance (no significance) of investment (unemployment) deviations in the budget-to-GDP ratio. Countries with better fiscal rules seem to present favourable deviations (in the absence of fixed effects). In Portugal, there is evidence of unfavourable errors about the budget balance in nominal currency in most years, which has been offset (totally or partially) by a favourable nominal GDP effect deviation. JEL Classification: C23, E44, H68.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124101851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The nature of the emerging investment treaty system has become central in addressing many open questions in international investment law and policy. The current debate, however, seems to revolve around taking side in the clash between granting maximum protection to foreign investors and safeguarding host States’ ability to regulate in the public interest. In order to put forward a methodology capable of properly balancing investment protection and the sovereign right to regulate, the paper suggests conceptualizing the investment treaty system through the lens of judicial review. The paper’s central argument is that the nature of the investment treaty system is (and should be) at its core, the establishment of a transnational legal framework for the control of public decision-making at the domestic level for the immediate benefit of foreign investors. The paper then proceeds with applying the ‘judicial review’ conceptualization to two specific issues dealing with the ‘scope’ and ‘standards’ of review carried out by investment tribunals on the basis of investment treaties. With regard to the scope of review, the paper addresses the issue of amenability to review under investment treaties of situations involving ‘contracts’ between the host State and the foreign investor. With regard to the standards of review, the paper focuses in particular on the issue of the intensity of the review carried out by investment tribunals. The aim here is to show the merits and implications of adopting a judicial review conceptualization to the investment treaty system.
{"title":"The Investment Treaty System as Judicial Review","authors":"F. Ortino","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2181103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2181103","url":null,"abstract":"The nature of the emerging investment treaty system has become central in addressing many open questions in international investment law and policy. The current debate, however, seems to revolve around taking side in the clash between granting maximum protection to foreign investors and safeguarding host States’ ability to regulate in the public interest. In order to put forward a methodology capable of properly balancing investment protection and the sovereign right to regulate, the paper suggests conceptualizing the investment treaty system through the lens of judicial review. The paper’s central argument is that the nature of the investment treaty system is (and should be) at its core, the establishment of a transnational legal framework for the control of public decision-making at the domestic level for the immediate benefit of foreign investors. The paper then proceeds with applying the ‘judicial review’ conceptualization to two specific issues dealing with the ‘scope’ and ‘standards’ of review carried out by investment tribunals on the basis of investment treaties. With regard to the scope of review, the paper addresses the issue of amenability to review under investment treaties of situations involving ‘contracts’ between the host State and the foreign investor. With regard to the standards of review, the paper focuses in particular on the issue of the intensity of the review carried out by investment tribunals. The aim here is to show the merits and implications of adopting a judicial review conceptualization to the investment treaty system.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"163 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122690958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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