Roll-call voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has long attracted the attention of scholars; first to study the formation of voting blocs in the UNGA and more recently to create indicators for the common interests of states. This chapter discusses the data and the various choices scholars have to make when using these data for both these purposes. The chapter points out various common errors, such as confusing abstentions and absentee votes, and discusses appropriate methodologies for estimating state preferences from observed vote choices. I argue that studies that use UN voting data to measure common interests pay insufficient attention to the content of UN votes and show how ignoring (changes in) the UN’s agenda and dimensions of contestation can lead to serious biases. The chapter reviews characteristics of available data and gives a bird’s eye view of the history of UN voting.
{"title":"Data and Analyses of Voting in the UN General Assembly","authors":"E. Voeten","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2111149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2111149","url":null,"abstract":"Roll-call voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has long attracted the attention of scholars; first to study the formation of voting blocs in the UNGA and more recently to create indicators for the common interests of states. This chapter discusses the data and the various choices scholars have to make when using these data for both these purposes. The chapter points out various common errors, such as confusing abstentions and absentee votes, and discusses appropriate methodologies for estimating state preferences from observed vote choices. I argue that studies that use UN voting data to measure common interests pay insufficient attention to the content of UN votes and show how ignoring (changes in) the UN’s agenda and dimensions of contestation can lead to serious biases. The chapter reviews characteristics of available data and gives a bird’s eye view of the history of UN voting.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132897656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores how European integration impacts the national identities of member states. Identity is an amorphous concept, and so this paper focuses on one dimension of it: the perception of relative status of the nation that nationalized individuals possess. Perceptions of relative national status flow from the fact that the international system is characterized with hierarchy, competition, and concerns for relative gains and losses. A key motivation for the foreign policies of lower status nations is equality with higher status ones, and for the former European integration is often perceived in equalizing terms. But this perception of Europe as equalizer often does not correspond with the objective unequal power relations in Europe. This paper focuses on why, among nationalized individuals, perceptions of power differentials change even though objectively the unequal inter-state power relations remain unchanged. The case study is Italy entering the European Monetary Union in 1999, which was perceived by many Italians in equalizing terms, even though the unequal power relations between Italy and Europe’s elite countries remained objectively unchanged.
{"title":"Vicarious Evaluation: How European Integration Changes National Identities","authors":"Philip Giurlando","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2155909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2155909","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores how European integration impacts the national identities of member states. Identity is an amorphous concept, and so this paper focuses on one dimension of it: the perception of relative status of the nation that nationalized individuals possess. Perceptions of relative national status flow from the fact that the international system is characterized with hierarchy, competition, and concerns for relative gains and losses. A key motivation for the foreign policies of lower status nations is equality with higher status ones, and for the former European integration is often perceived in equalizing terms. But this perception of Europe as equalizer often does not correspond with the objective unequal power relations in Europe. This paper focuses on why, among nationalized individuals, perceptions of power differentials change even though objectively the unequal inter-state power relations remain unchanged. The case study is Italy entering the European Monetary Union in 1999, which was perceived by many Italians in equalizing terms, even though the unequal power relations between Italy and Europe’s elite countries remained objectively unchanged.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116272818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-07-01DOI: 10.5089/9781475505207.001.A001
S. Claessens, A. Mody, Shahin Vallée.
This paper discusses proposals for common euro area sovereign securities. Such instruments can potentially serve two functions: in the short-term, stabilize financial markets and banks and, in the medium-term, help improve the euro area economic governance framework through enhanced fiscal discipline and risk-sharing. Many questions remain on whether financial instruments can ever accomplish such goals without bold institutional and political decisions, and, whether, in the absence of such decisions, they can create new distortions. The proposals discussed are also not necessarily competing substitutes; rather, they can be complements to be sequenced along alternative paths that possibly culminate in a fully-fledged Eurobond. The specific path chosen by policymakers should allow for learning and secure the necessary evolution of institutional infrastructures and political safeguards.
{"title":"Paths to Eurobonds","authors":"S. Claessens, A. Mody, Shahin Vallée.","doi":"10.5089/9781475505207.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475505207.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses proposals for common euro area sovereign securities. Such instruments can potentially serve two functions: in the short-term, stabilize financial markets and banks and, in the medium-term, help improve the euro area economic governance framework through enhanced fiscal discipline and risk-sharing. Many questions remain on whether financial instruments can ever accomplish such goals without bold institutional and political decisions, and, whether, in the absence of such decisions, they can create new distortions. The proposals discussed are also not necessarily competing substitutes; rather, they can be complements to be sequenced along alternative paths that possibly culminate in a fully-fledged Eurobond. The specific path chosen by policymakers should allow for learning and secure the necessary evolution of institutional infrastructures and political safeguards.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"188 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114194019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper investigates the relation between private transnational regulation through standards and the formation of transnational networks. More particularly, focusing on standards compliance, the analysis is intended to test whether private regulation induces the existence of networks able to: (a) enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of compliance coordination in accordance with a “whole-chain supply approach” to safety regulation; (b) contribute to monitoring along the chain, even when this function is in different ways performed by other players (public authorities, independent certifiers, etc.); (c) possibly and eventually redistribute costs of compliance along the chain. Starting from the observation of contractual practices, mainly within supply chains subject to international certification schemes (for example in the case of food supply chains), different models of networks will be compared depending on: (i) the allocation of monitoring and sanctioning powers (these being assigned to producers, traders or independent actors); (ii) the means of monitoring (peer monitoring v. more formalised monitoring duties); (iii) the types of sanctions (particularly, label/certificate suspension or revocation); (iv) the structure of the network (as based on merely linked contracts or on a mix of contractual and organizational relations).
{"title":"Private Regulation and Industrial Organisation: The Network Approach","authors":"F. Cafaggi, P. Iamiceli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2168729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2168729","url":null,"abstract":"The paper investigates the relation between private transnational regulation through standards and the formation of transnational networks. More particularly, focusing on standards compliance, the analysis is intended to test whether private regulation induces the existence of networks able to: (a) enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of compliance coordination in accordance with a “whole-chain supply approach” to safety regulation; (b) contribute to monitoring along the chain, even when this function is in different ways performed by other players (public authorities, independent certifiers, etc.); (c) possibly and eventually redistribute costs of compliance along the chain. Starting from the observation of contractual practices, mainly within supply chains subject to international certification schemes (for example in the case of food supply chains), different models of networks will be compared depending on: (i) the allocation of monitoring and sanctioning powers (these being assigned to producers, traders or independent actors); (ii) the means of monitoring (peer monitoring v. more formalised monitoring duties); (iii) the types of sanctions (particularly, label/certificate suspension or revocation); (iv) the structure of the network (as based on merely linked contracts or on a mix of contractual and organizational relations).","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122947987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, concluded seven years of international negotiations on the role of carbon capture and storage in the Clean Development Mechanism. This article considers the resulting Durban CCS rules in light of the state of CCS technologies, their place among the range of climate mitigation options, and the resulting challenges, opportunities, and uncertainties surrounding the role of CCS. Eight principles that should guide the use of CCS in the CDM are proposed, and the Durban rules are assessed against them.
{"title":"Carbon Capture and Storage in the CDM: Finding its Place Among Climate Mitigation Options?","authors":"Meinhard Doelle, Emily Lukaweski","doi":"10.3233/CL-2012-056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3233/CL-2012-056","url":null,"abstract":"The climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, concluded seven years of international negotiations on the role of carbon capture and storage in the Clean Development Mechanism. This article considers the resulting Durban CCS rules in light of the state of CCS technologies, their place among the range of climate mitigation options, and the resulting challenges, opportunities, and uncertainties surrounding the role of CCS. Eight principles that should guide the use of CCS in the CDM are proposed, and the Durban rules are assessed against them.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125873432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper was presented at the 106th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law as part of a panel considering the 2012 U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development. It critiques the "Green Economy," a theme of the Rio 20 Conference, by emphasizing the core indeterminancy of the concept. The paper points out some key definitional issues that must be resolved if the "Green Economy" is going to be more than a contentless slogan.
{"title":"Tracing the Limits of the Green Economy","authors":"Rebecca M. Bratspies","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2058212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2058212","url":null,"abstract":"This paper was presented at the 106th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law as part of a panel considering the 2012 U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development. It critiques the \"Green Economy,\" a theme of the Rio 20 Conference, by emphasizing the core indeterminancy of the concept. The paper points out some key definitional issues that must be resolved if the \"Green Economy\" is going to be more than a contentless slogan.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123646909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The adoption of anti-offshoring legislation by federal governments can potentially violate the commitments made by such governments to the World Trade Organization and other bilateral and regional trade agreements. This motivates examination of the constitutionality and legality of governmental actions in the offshoring arena. The Obama administration has taken several steps to favor performance of tasks in the United States. Over 40 state governments in the US have considered anti-offshoring legislation, and some of these bills have been enacted by the respective legislatures. According to the US Constitution, the federal government possesses exclusive rights over the areas of interstate commerce, foreign affairs, and foreign trade in the US. All these constitutional principles are arguably violated when state governments approve anti-offshoring legislation. Some of the policy directives of the European Union (EU) and other countries also hamper the practice of offshoring. In particular, those relating to protection of privacy of personal data are discriminatory in nature and place foreign suppliers of services at a disadvantage compared to their domestic counterparts. The US and EU are major proponents of free trade; this is a two-way street, and comes with benefits and constraints. These issues are analyzed with respect to the current situation.
{"title":"The Legal Validity of Anti-Offshoring Laws, Bills, and Policies in the United States and Other Countries","authors":"Amar Gupta, Deth Sao","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2041762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2041762","url":null,"abstract":"The adoption of anti-offshoring legislation by federal governments can potentially violate the commitments made by such governments to the World Trade Organization and other bilateral and regional trade agreements. This motivates examination of the constitutionality and legality of governmental actions in the offshoring arena. The Obama administration has taken several steps to favor performance of tasks in the United States. Over 40 state governments in the US have considered anti-offshoring legislation, and some of these bills have been enacted by the respective legislatures. According to the US Constitution, the federal government possesses exclusive rights over the areas of interstate commerce, foreign affairs, and foreign trade in the US. All these constitutional principles are arguably violated when state governments approve anti-offshoring legislation. Some of the policy directives of the European Union (EU) and other countries also hamper the practice of offshoring. In particular, those relating to protection of privacy of personal data are discriminatory in nature and place foreign suppliers of services at a disadvantage compared to their domestic counterparts. The US and EU are major proponents of free trade; this is a two-way street, and comes with benefits and constraints. These issues are analyzed with respect to the current situation.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124663914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We demonstrate the advantages of a climate treaty based solely on rules for international permit markets when there is uncertainty about abatement costs and environmental damages. Such a ‘Rules Treaty’ comprises a scaling factor and a refunding rule. Each signatory can freely choose the number of permits it allocates to domestic firms. For every permit so issued, an international agency is allowed to issue additional permits in accordance with the scaling factor. The agency auctions all additional permits and refunds all the revenues to the signatories according to the refunding rule. Our main finding is that for a sufficiently large scaling factor, the Rules Treaty approximates the globally optimal outcome in every state of the world. In this sense, newly arriving information is optimally processed. This is in stark contrast to treaties based on emission targets, even if countries fully comply with such targets. If countries are sufficiently homogeneous there exists, moreover, a refunding rule under which every country that abates more under the treaty than in the status quo ante can be compensated, so that all countries will participate voluntarily. If, however, countries are rather heterogeneous, some may decline to participate.
{"title":"Rules vs. Targets: Climate Treaties Under Uncertainty","authors":"H. Gersbach, Quirin Oberpriller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2039368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2039368","url":null,"abstract":"We demonstrate the advantages of a climate treaty based solely on rules for international permit markets when there is uncertainty about abatement costs and environmental damages. Such a ‘Rules Treaty’ comprises a scaling factor and a refunding rule. Each signatory can freely choose the number of permits it allocates to domestic firms. For every permit so issued, an international agency is allowed to issue additional permits in accordance with the scaling factor. The agency auctions all additional permits and refunds all the revenues to the signatories according to the refunding rule. Our main finding is that for a sufficiently large scaling factor, the Rules Treaty approximates the globally optimal outcome in every state of the world. In this sense, newly arriving information is optimally processed. This is in stark contrast to treaties based on emission targets, even if countries fully comply with such targets. If countries are sufficiently homogeneous there exists, moreover, a refunding rule under which every country that abates more under the treaty than in the status quo ante can be compensated, so that all countries will participate voluntarily. If, however, countries are rather heterogeneous, some may decline to participate.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130417960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses the proposals made by Ecuador during the debates that were conducted in the Organization of American States regarding the functioning of the Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. The author concludes that, despite the political motivations Ecuador might have had, its proposals have some basis, since there is in fact an unexplained preferential treatment to the right to freedom of expression that might cause some unwanted consequences.
{"title":"Is Ecuador That Wrong?: Analyzing the Ecuadorian Proposals Concerning the Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights","authors":"Oswaldo R. Ruiz-Chiriboga","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2034375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2034375","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the proposals made by Ecuador during the debates that were conducted in the Organization of American States regarding the functioning of the Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. The author concludes that, despite the political motivations Ecuador might have had, its proposals have some basis, since there is in fact an unexplained preferential treatment to the right to freedom of expression that might cause some unwanted consequences.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131109314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action holds out the promise of progress towards a climate treaty that includes greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions limitations commitments by all major emitting countries, including developing as well as developed countries. But as the UNFCCC process still faces significant obstacles, it needs to be supplemented, supported and furthered by concerted domestic and international efforts to build from the bottom up, a network of more limited and targeted regulatory and financial arrangements that would promote transnational cooperation, coordination and quantitative progress in reducing net GHG emissions. This paper focuses on specific transnational arrangements that are regulatory in character, involving standards, protocols, and other norms for products and production and process methods, for investments, financing, and trade, for generating and transmitting information, and other activities relevant to achieving GHG reductions. These transnational programs would focus to a considerable extent on achieving economic or environmental objectives other than climate protection, but in doing so would stimulate behavioral changes and instigate institutional arrangements that produce GHG reductions as a co-benefit. These regimes would involve not only major emitting countries but also firms, sub-national jurisdictions, civil society organizations (CSOs) and international organizations. These latter actors are not part of the UNFCCC process (other than as observers), but often already have significant economic and other non-climate incentives to undertake actions that will reduce GHG, or would readily respond to the deployment of such incentives. The strategy is to complement the universalist state-centered UNFCC process with a suite of concerted initiatives for regulatory and financial cooperation and coordination in specific fields involving non-state as well as state actors, focused on the most promising targets of opportunity for near-term emissions reductions.
{"title":"Building a More Effective Global Climate Regime Bottom-Up","authors":"R. Stewart, M. Oppenheimer, B. Rudyk","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2162756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2162756","url":null,"abstract":"The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action holds out the promise of progress towards a climate treaty that includes greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions limitations commitments by all major emitting countries, including developing as well as developed countries. But as the UNFCCC process still faces significant obstacles, it needs to be supplemented, supported and furthered by concerted domestic and international efforts to build from the bottom up, a network of more limited and targeted regulatory and financial arrangements that would promote transnational cooperation, coordination and quantitative progress in reducing net GHG emissions. This paper focuses on specific transnational arrangements that are regulatory in character, involving standards, protocols, and other norms for products and production and process methods, for investments, financing, and trade, for generating and transmitting information, and other activities relevant to achieving GHG reductions. These transnational programs would focus to a considerable extent on achieving economic or environmental objectives other than climate protection, but in doing so would stimulate behavioral changes and instigate institutional arrangements that produce GHG reductions as a co-benefit. These regimes would involve not only major emitting countries but also firms, sub-national jurisdictions, civil society organizations (CSOs) and international organizations. These latter actors are not part of the UNFCCC process (other than as observers), but often already have significant economic and other non-climate incentives to undertake actions that will reduce GHG, or would readily respond to the deployment of such incentives. The strategy is to complement the universalist state-centered UNFCC process with a suite of concerted initiatives for regulatory and financial cooperation and coordination in specific fields involving non-state as well as state actors, focused on the most promising targets of opportunity for near-term emissions reductions.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126989795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}