The paper examines ASEAN’s political and security challenges and prospects in the coming two decades. The challenges facing ASEAN could be classified into six broad categories: (1) the shifting balance of power in the Asia Pacific; (2) the persistence of intra-ASEAN territorial conflicts; (3) the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, (4) the programs of military modernizations undertaken by ASEAN states and the resulting prospects for an intra-ASEAN arms race, (5) uncertainty and strife caused by demands for domestic political change, and (6) the dangers posed by transnational (non-traditional) security threats. The conditions for ASEAN to build a mature political-security community are also discussed.
{"title":"ASEAN 2030: Challenges of Building a Mature Political and Security Community","authors":"Amitav Acharya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2350586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2350586","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines ASEAN’s political and security challenges and prospects in the coming two decades. The challenges facing ASEAN could be classified into six broad categories: (1) the shifting balance of power in the Asia Pacific; (2) the persistence of intra-ASEAN territorial conflicts; (3) the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, (4) the programs of military modernizations undertaken by ASEAN states and the resulting prospects for an intra-ASEAN arms race, (5) uncertainty and strife caused by demands for domestic political change, and (6) the dangers posed by transnational (non-traditional) security threats. The conditions for ASEAN to build a mature political-security community are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123737407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the past decade of mounting global imbalances, many academics and policymakers have argued that the exchange rate of China's Renminbi – perceived by many as intentionally undervalued relative to the U.S. dollar – has contributed to China's substantial trade (and consequent current account) surpluses and the corresponding U.S. current account deficit. This paper provides an assessment of the legality of GATT/WTO trade remedies in counteracting persistent trade deficits induced by undervaluation. While motivated by the present flashpoint over Renminbi undervaluation, this paper considers the economics of undervaluation and trade generally, highlighting the risk that other countries might strategically adopt undervaluation in the future. If there are prospects for dynamic gains from undervaluation, countries may pursue self-interested undervaluation at the expense of long-run global financial stability absent an effective enforcement mechanism through the IMF and WTO to counteract such imbalances. This paper argues that the current GATT and IMF Articles of Agreement are adequate to fill the enforcement gap. These provide legal scope for the IMF to appropriately act to make an impartial first-stage assessment of whether intentional undervaluation was sustaining current account imbalances. Such a finding would then open an avenue for a second-stage complaint and remedy through the WTO dispute settlement process.
{"title":"An Evaluation of WTO Remedies for Currency Undervaluation","authors":"Grant Bishop","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312026","url":null,"abstract":"During the past decade of mounting global imbalances, many academics and policymakers have argued that the exchange rate of China's Renminbi – perceived by many as intentionally undervalued relative to the U.S. dollar – has contributed to China's substantial trade (and consequent current account) surpluses and the corresponding U.S. current account deficit. This paper provides an assessment of the legality of GATT/WTO trade remedies in counteracting persistent trade deficits induced by undervaluation. While motivated by the present flashpoint over Renminbi undervaluation, this paper considers the economics of undervaluation and trade generally, highlighting the risk that other countries might strategically adopt undervaluation in the future. If there are prospects for dynamic gains from undervaluation, countries may pursue self-interested undervaluation at the expense of long-run global financial stability absent an effective enforcement mechanism through the IMF and WTO to counteract such imbalances. This paper argues that the current GATT and IMF Articles of Agreement are adequate to fill the enforcement gap. These provide legal scope for the IMF to appropriately act to make an impartial first-stage assessment of whether intentional undervaluation was sustaining current account imbalances. Such a finding would then open an avenue for a second-stage complaint and remedy through the WTO dispute settlement process.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127811016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The politics, rules, and institutions of cooperation among nations have not kept up with the demands from global citizens for changes in the global political order. Whether norms and policies can make the global politics of managing the global economy more effective, more legitimate, and more responsive to the needs of the bottom half of the world’s population, for whom life remains harsh, remains to be seen. There is some cause for optimism, however: citizens everywhere are becoming more aware of and active in seeking changes in the global norms and rules that could make the global system and the global economy fairer—in processes if not outcomes—and less environmentally harmful.
{"title":"Global Markets, Global Citizens, and Global Governance in the 21st Century","authors":"N. Birdsall, C. Meyer, Alexis Sowa","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2364171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2364171","url":null,"abstract":"The politics, rules, and institutions of cooperation among nations have not kept up with the demands from global citizens for changes in the global political order. Whether norms and policies can make the global politics of managing the global economy more effective, more legitimate, and more responsive to the needs of the bottom half of the world’s population, for whom life remains harsh, remains to be seen. There is some cause for optimism, however: citizens everywhere are becoming more aware of and active in seeking changes in the global norms and rules that could make the global system and the global economy fairer—in processes if not outcomes—and less environmentally harmful.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"221 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122879490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-07-18DOI: 10.1080/15705854.2013.772722
J. van der Heijden, E. ten Heuvelhof
An important aspect of contemporary European policy-making is public participation. The European Commission increasingly mandates its Member States to involve the general public in policy-making through public participation. Public participation is generally considered to improve the legitimacy and democracy of the policy-making process and its outcomes. However, mandated public participation creates severe difficulties for Member States whose policy-making process may be characterized as a (neo)corporatist system of interest representation. This paper presents the case of the implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands, aiming to highlight these difficulties, to provide an example of how a Member State may cope with forced public participation in a (neo)corporatist environment, and to question whether and, if so, how mandated public participation actually results in a more democratic and legitimate policy-making process.
{"title":"Coping with Mandated Public Participation: The Case of Implementing the EU Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands","authors":"J. van der Heijden, E. ten Heuvelhof","doi":"10.1080/15705854.2013.772722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15705854.2013.772722","url":null,"abstract":"An important aspect of contemporary European policy-making is public participation. The European Commission increasingly mandates its Member States to involve the general public in policy-making through public participation. Public participation is generally considered to improve the legitimacy and democracy of the policy-making process and its outcomes. However, mandated public participation creates severe difficulties for Member States whose policy-making process may be characterized as a (neo)corporatist system of interest representation. This paper presents the case of the implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands, aiming to highlight these difficulties, to provide an example of how a Member State may cope with forced public participation in a (neo)corporatist environment, and to question whether and, if so, how mandated public participation actually results in a more democratic and legitimate policy-making process.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128253117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael M. Bechtel, Jens Hainmueller, Yotam Margalit
Why do voters agree to bear the costs of bailing out other countries? Despite the prominence of public opinion in the ongoing debate over the eurozone bailouts, voters' preferences on the topic are poorly understood. We conduct the first systematic analysis of this issue using observational and experimental survey data from Germany, the country shouldering the largest share of the EU's financial rescue fund. Testing a range of theoretical explanations, we find that individuals' own economic standing has limited explanatory power in accounting for their position on the bailouts. In contrast, social dispositions such as altruism and cosmopolitanism robustly correlate with support for the bailouts. The results indicate that the divide in public opinion over the bailouts is not drawn along distributive lines separating domestic winners and losers. Instead, the bailout debate is better understood as a foreign policy issue that pits economic nationalist sentiments versus greater cosmopolitan affinity and other-regarding concerns.
{"title":"Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide Over the Eurozone Bailouts","authors":"Michael M. Bechtel, Jens Hainmueller, Yotam Margalit","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2032147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2032147","url":null,"abstract":"Why do voters agree to bear the costs of bailing out other countries? Despite the prominence of public opinion in the ongoing debate over the eurozone bailouts, voters' preferences on the topic are poorly understood. We conduct the first systematic analysis of this issue using observational and experimental survey data from Germany, the country shouldering the largest share of the EU's financial rescue fund. Testing a range of theoretical explanations, we find that individuals' own economic standing has limited explanatory power in accounting for their position on the bailouts. In contrast, social dispositions such as altruism and cosmopolitanism robustly correlate with support for the bailouts. The results indicate that the divide in public opinion over the bailouts is not drawn along distributive lines separating domestic winners and losers. Instead, the bailout debate is better understood as a foreign policy issue that pits economic nationalist sentiments versus greater cosmopolitan affinity and other-regarding concerns.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125722593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Transparency requirements are central to the third pillar of the Basel prescriptions. The purpose of this article is to offer a simple theoretical model to analyze the impact of regulatory requirements for transparency on the balance sheet and profits of banks, focusing on the implementation of Basel’s requirements in emerging countries. We show how an increased transparency, which implies a rise in associated costs, especially operating costs, may result in lower profits for banks despite a reduced capital requirement. We also show the conditions under which these reduced profits occur, and in this respect what the consequences of the strengthened capital requirements introduced by Basel, in its third incarnation, are likely to be. We finally show that implementing Basel framework can have ambiguous effects in emerging countries, depending on parameters’ values.
{"title":"Implementing Basel Framework's Transparency Requirements in Emerging Countries: Bane or Boon?","authors":"Etienne Farvaque, Catherine Refait-Alexandre","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2381867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2381867","url":null,"abstract":"Transparency requirements are central to the third pillar of the Basel prescriptions. The purpose of this article is to offer a simple theoretical model to analyze the impact of regulatory requirements for transparency on the balance sheet and profits of banks, focusing on the implementation of Basel’s requirements in emerging countries. We show how an increased transparency, which implies a rise in associated costs, especially operating costs, may result in lower profits for banks despite a reduced capital requirement. We also show the conditions under which these reduced profits occur, and in this respect what the consequences of the strengthened capital requirements introduced by Basel, in its third incarnation, are likely to be. We finally show that implementing Basel framework can have ambiguous effects in emerging countries, depending on parameters’ values.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"55 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120879990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although the Lisbon Treaty recognises the necessity to limit the power of the European Union, some of its limitations are poorly expressed. As a result, the European Commission has the possibility to act arbitrarily by expanding Union power. The position of the Commission is pre‐eminent, notably with respect to the drafting of EU measures. Not only can the Commission expand Union power, but it may also favour certain actors at the expense of the principals (Member States and their citizens). Indeed, the Commission may apply definitions of the ‘common European interest’ that go beyond the preferences of the principals.
{"title":"Does the Lisbon Treaty Effectively Limit the Power of the European Union?","authors":"Émilie Ciclet","doi":"10.1111/ecaf.12019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12019","url":null,"abstract":"Although the Lisbon Treaty recognises the necessity to limit the power of the European Union, some of its limitations are poorly expressed. As a result, the European Commission has the possibility to act arbitrarily by expanding Union power. The position of the Commission is pre‐eminent, notably with respect to the drafting of EU measures. Not only can the Commission expand Union power, but it may also favour certain actors at the expense of the principals (Member States and their citizens). Indeed, the Commission may apply definitions of the ‘common European interest’ that go beyond the preferences of the principals.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"461 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134199531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Debate over the effectiveness of foreign aid has raged on despite a paucity of information about recipients’ actual views of development assistance, especially as citizens compare aid to domestic government programs. We argue that citizens may see foreign aid as an escape from clientelism because aid is less politicized than government programs, citizens trust donors more, and they support aid conditionality. They may also favor multilateral donors over bilateral donors for similar reasons. We test the argument with a randomized experiment on a subject pool of roughly 3,600 Ugandan citizens – to our knowledge the first nationally representative, large-n study of aid recipients. We randomly assigned the project funders – multilateral banks, bilateral donors, and a control implying the domestic government – for actual co-financed “pipeline” projects and invited citizens to sign a petition and send a text message in support. We find that citizens are significantly more willing to sign a petition or send a text message in favor of foreign aid projects compared to government programs. A companion survey to the experiment reveals evidence that citizens perceive aid as less prone to politicization. Some evidence suggests that Ugandans also see multilateral donors as superior to bilaterals. The findings suggest that recipients view foreign aid as relatively effective compared to domestic government programs.
{"title":"Which Devil in Development? A Randomized Study of Citizen Actions Supporting Foreign Aid in Uganda","authors":"H. Milner, D. Nielson, Michael G. Findley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2134409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2134409","url":null,"abstract":"Debate over the effectiveness of foreign aid has raged on despite a paucity of information about recipients’ actual views of development assistance, especially as citizens compare aid to domestic government programs. We argue that citizens may see foreign aid as an escape from clientelism because aid is less politicized than government programs, citizens trust donors more, and they support aid conditionality. They may also favor multilateral donors over bilateral donors for similar reasons. We test the argument with a randomized experiment on a subject pool of roughly 3,600 Ugandan citizens – to our knowledge the first nationally representative, large-n study of aid recipients. We randomly assigned the project funders – multilateral banks, bilateral donors, and a control implying the domestic government – for actual co-financed “pipeline” projects and invited citizens to sign a petition and send a text message in support. We find that citizens are significantly more willing to sign a petition or send a text message in favor of foreign aid projects compared to government programs. A companion survey to the experiment reveals evidence that citizens perceive aid as less prone to politicization. Some evidence suggests that Ugandans also see multilateral donors as superior to bilaterals. The findings suggest that recipients view foreign aid as relatively effective compared to domestic government programs.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115664010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ongoing European crisis has revealed many deficiencies in the existing European institutional architecture. One of the crucial deficiencies is the unsustainable European regional disparity between the most developed European regions and those regions that are falling behind — a gap that is growing. This pattern of development creates an unsustainable pattern for the future development of the EU. The gap between the advanced segments of society with access to up-to-date knowledge, skills, technology, capital, and other resources and the excluded segments of society is also growing within the advanced European regions. Such observations indicate the need for far stronger anti-dualist economic, social, and legal policy at all levels of European polity. The EU’s response to the crisis has been inadequate as it has ignored the diversity of needs as well as opportunities for local and regional populations across the EU. Instead of focusing the economic, social, and legal reconstruction on a “one size fits all” model imposed from the top, the EU should spur local and regional innovations, initiatives, and development dynamics from below. Thus, in the EU, we need more policy space as well as more opportunities for economic, legal, social, and political innovations at the local, regional, and national levels. We need to create an EU that supports — not suppresses — diversity, sustainability, plurality, and the co-existence of institutional models. The idea of subsidiarity, diversity, and initiatives from below should be revived in order to create a more sustainable future for the EU.
{"title":"European Regional Disparities: The Crucial Source of European Un-Sustainability","authors":"Matjaž Nahtigal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2248618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2248618","url":null,"abstract":"The ongoing European crisis has revealed many deficiencies in the existing European institutional architecture. One of the crucial deficiencies is the unsustainable European regional disparity between the most developed European regions and those regions that are falling behind — a gap that is growing. This pattern of development creates an unsustainable pattern for the future development of the EU. The gap between the advanced segments of society with access to up-to-date knowledge, skills, technology, capital, and other resources and the excluded segments of society is also growing within the advanced European regions. Such observations indicate the need for far stronger anti-dualist economic, social, and legal policy at all levels of European polity. The EU’s response to the crisis has been inadequate as it has ignored the diversity of needs as well as opportunities for local and regional populations across the EU. Instead of focusing the economic, social, and legal reconstruction on a “one size fits all” model imposed from the top, the EU should spur local and regional innovations, initiatives, and development dynamics from below. Thus, in the EU, we need more policy space as well as more opportunities for economic, legal, social, and political innovations at the local, regional, and national levels. We need to create an EU that supports — not suppresses — diversity, sustainability, plurality, and the co-existence of institutional models. The idea of subsidiarity, diversity, and initiatives from below should be revived in order to create a more sustainable future for the EU.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130752085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines Brazil's unique experience with bilateral investment treaties (BITs) – the country signed fourteen of them in the 90's, but none was ever enacted. The case is puzzling for a number of reasons; first, the Brazilian political system is notorious for its concentration of power in the executive branch, and BITs were an initiative of the executive. Moreover, the executive has been particularly successful at enacting international treaties in the country; 98 percent of those signed between 1988 and 2006 were ratified, half of them within eighteen months. Finally, the Brazilian Congress approved various investor-friendly policies that required even higher voting thresholds in the same period that BITs were being negotiated. We use primary legislative data and interviews with policymakers and bureaucrats to argue that concentrated but strong ideological opposition in Congress certainly contributed to the difficulties of BIT enactment, but an unresolved executive – which addressed most investor's demands through alternative channels – was the main factor in explaining non-ratification. Ultimately, our findings imply that the literature on BIT needs to open the black box of the executive in order to better understand the determinants of treaties' enactment.
{"title":"The Non-Ratification of Bilateral Investment Treaties in Brazil: A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation","authors":"Leany Barreiro Lemos, Daniela Campello","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2243120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2243120","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines Brazil's unique experience with bilateral investment treaties (BITs) – the country signed fourteen of them in the 90's, but none was ever enacted. The case is puzzling for a number of reasons; first, the Brazilian political system is notorious for its concentration of power in the executive branch, and BITs were an initiative of the executive. Moreover, the executive has been particularly successful at enacting international treaties in the country; 98 percent of those signed between 1988 and 2006 were ratified, half of them within eighteen months. Finally, the Brazilian Congress approved various investor-friendly policies that required even higher voting thresholds in the same period that BITs were being negotiated. We use primary legislative data and interviews with policymakers and bureaucrats to argue that concentrated but strong ideological opposition in Congress certainly contributed to the difficulties of BIT enactment, but an unresolved executive – which addressed most investor's demands through alternative channels – was the main factor in explaining non-ratification. Ultimately, our findings imply that the literature on BIT needs to open the black box of the executive in order to better understand the determinants of treaties' enactment.","PeriodicalId":236062,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: International Institutions eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116017425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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