In common with many developing countries, Bangladesh faces problems in raising sufficient tax revenues to fund its economic and social development. To address this problem and to improve economic efficiency and growth, a major tax reform program was initiated in 1991 which centred on the introduction of a valued-added tax (VAT) to replace a range of narrowly-based consumption taxes. This paper revisit the basic structure of VAT system of Bangladesh and attempt to analysis the contribution and performance of VAT in Bangladesh as comparing to other developing countries and also attempt to identify and provide some suggestions in possible area where attention and improved performance are required to enhance the contribution of VAT in economic development of Bangladesh. The relevant data shows that the performance of VAT was quite satisfactory in the initial years - but subsequently VAT collection has remained stagnant at a certain level. As a result, VAT is unable to meet the objectives for which it was introduced. The reasons behind this performance are many, such as: a relatively small number of VAT tax-payers, a general lack of awareness, and a weak monitoring system etc. There is still scope for improving the revenue collection from VAT: by increasing the number of VAT taxpayers; reforming the VAT administration; creating intensive awareness among the people, revisiting the list of VAT exempted items and increasing the efficiency of the monitoring system.
{"title":"Consumption Taxes in Developing Countries - The Case of the Bangladesh VAT","authors":"Andrew M. C. Smith, A. Islam, M. Moniruzzaman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2028663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2028663","url":null,"abstract":"In common with many developing countries, Bangladesh faces problems in raising sufficient tax revenues to fund its economic and social development. To address this problem and to improve economic efficiency and growth, a major tax reform program was initiated in 1991 which centred on the introduction of a valued-added tax (VAT) to replace a range of narrowly-based consumption taxes. This paper revisit the basic structure of VAT system of Bangladesh and attempt to analysis the contribution and performance of VAT in Bangladesh as comparing to other developing countries and also attempt to identify and provide some suggestions in possible area where attention and improved performance are required to enhance the contribution of VAT in economic development of Bangladesh. The relevant data shows that the performance of VAT was quite satisfactory in the initial years - but subsequently VAT collection has remained stagnant at a certain level. As a result, VAT is unable to meet the objectives for which it was introduced. The reasons behind this performance are many, such as: a relatively small number of VAT tax-payers, a general lack of awareness, and a weak monitoring system etc. There is still scope for improving the revenue collection from VAT: by increasing the number of VAT taxpayers; reforming the VAT administration; creating intensive awareness among the people, revisiting the list of VAT exempted items and increasing the efficiency of the monitoring system.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115633817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-06-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01342.x
Z. Onder, S. Ozyildirim
The pervasive existence of government‐owned banks in emerging economies is often justified by their provision of access to credit in remote and underdeveloped regions that are ignored by private banks. This paper analyses whether credits provided by government‐owned and private banks have a significant role in regional growth and whether this role changes in politically connected areas in Turkey. Our findings imply that private banks significantly improve the economic well‐being in all Turkish provinces regardless of their development level or their political connection with the ruling party. However, credits by government‐owned banks are found to be positively related to the per capita growth rate only in the less developed provinces that are advocates of the ruling political party and also developed but not politically connected provinces. These results suggest that government‐owned bank credits, as implied by the political view, are used for funding politically desirable projects or politically connected borrowers.
{"title":"Political Connection, Bank Credits and Growth: Evidence from Turkey","authors":"Z. Onder, S. Ozyildirim","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01342.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01342.x","url":null,"abstract":"The pervasive existence of government‐owned banks in emerging economies is often justified by their provision of access to credit in remote and underdeveloped regions that are ignored by private banks. This paper analyses whether credits provided by government‐owned and private banks have a significant role in regional growth and whether this role changes in politically connected areas in Turkey. Our findings imply that private banks significantly improve the economic well‐being in all Turkish provinces regardless of their development level or their political connection with the ruling party. However, credits by government‐owned banks are found to be positively related to the per capita growth rate only in the less developed provinces that are advocates of the ruling political party and also developed but not politically connected provinces. These results suggest that government‐owned bank credits, as implied by the political view, are used for funding politically desirable projects or politically connected borrowers.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134062663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this discussion paper is not only to activate a debate over the interrelation between rising income inequality and economic policy measures but also to initiate comparative research in several European countries and North America. It discusses the consequences of a rising income inequality and its implications for state activities and economic policy. Using a simple model it becomes evident that an increasing income inequality leads to higher government spending, as a share of Gross Domestic Product, though the state does not take over more responsibilities. It also leads to a higher tax share though rates of taxation are not increased. This forces economic politicians to act. If they want to prevent an increase of these shares in order not to fall behind in the international competition, they must accept a rising public debt and/or must move away from socially accepted value judgments about "social standards", the degree of redistribution by taxes and/or an "adequate" supply of public goods. This might result in disenchantment with politics.
{"title":"A Call for Comparative Research: Consequences of a Rising Income Inequality for State Activities","authors":"Renate Neubäumer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1820942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1820942","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this discussion paper is not only to activate a debate over the interrelation between rising income inequality and economic policy measures but also to initiate comparative research in several European countries and North America. It discusses the consequences of a rising income inequality and its implications for state activities and economic policy. Using a simple model it becomes evident that an increasing income inequality leads to higher government spending, as a share of Gross Domestic Product, though the state does not take over more responsibilities. It also leads to a higher tax share though rates of taxation are not increased. This forces economic politicians to act. If they want to prevent an increase of these shares in order not to fall behind in the international competition, they must accept a rising public debt and/or must move away from socially accepted value judgments about \"social standards\", the degree of redistribution by taxes and/or an \"adequate\" supply of public goods. This might result in disenchantment with politics.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"36 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113959500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption-based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax-financed increase in government spending dominates both lump-sum and consumption tax-financing. Replacing the lump-sum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.
{"title":"The Dual Nature of Public Goods and Congestion: The Role of Fiscal Policy Revisited","authors":"S. Chatterjee, Sugata Ghosh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.930440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.930440","url":null,"abstract":"The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption-based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax-financed increase in government spending dominates both lump-sum and consumption tax-financing. Replacing the lump-sum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127463273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The macroeconomic regime implanted in Brazil during the second administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and largely maintained by his successor, is typical of those of the advanced countries. The anchor is provided by an inflation-targeting regime (with a target inflation rate somewhat greater than in most advanced countries, of 4.5 percent a year, with a band around it of +/–2 percent). The exchange rate floats. The float is often described as free, but given the extent of recent reserve accumulation it would not qualify as a free float as understood by most economists. Fiscal policy has actually been more ambitious under the Lula regime, resulting for a time in a primary surplus of at least 4.25 percent of GDP (subsequently reduced to allow for a higher rate of public investment, and also temporarily reduced further to help combat the crisis). Monetary policy has then been directed at achieving the inflation target given fiscal policy, which--given history--has implied maintaining high interest rates. While the majority of the framework in Brazil is acceptable, it is a bit too laissez-faire in that the exchange rate should be targeted at a rate consistent with macroeconomic balance, which the authorities should treat as a reference rate.
{"title":"Exchange Rate Policy in Brazil","authors":"J. Williamson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1718601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1718601","url":null,"abstract":"The macroeconomic regime implanted in Brazil during the second administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and largely maintained by his successor, is typical of those of the advanced countries. The anchor is provided by an inflation-targeting regime (with a target inflation rate somewhat greater than in most advanced countries, of 4.5 percent a year, with a band around it of +/–2 percent). The exchange rate floats. The float is often described as free, but given the extent of recent reserve accumulation it would not qualify as a free float as understood by most economists. Fiscal policy has actually been more ambitious under the Lula regime, resulting for a time in a primary surplus of at least 4.25 percent of GDP (subsequently reduced to allow for a higher rate of public investment, and also temporarily reduced further to help combat the crisis). Monetary policy has then been directed at achieving the inflation target given fiscal policy, which--given history--has implied maintaining high interest rates. While the majority of the framework in Brazil is acceptable, it is a bit too laissez-faire in that the exchange rate should be targeted at a rate consistent with macroeconomic balance, which the authorities should treat as a reference rate.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133640389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper tackles the monetary policy performance in Brazil, Chile and South Africa under inflation targeting framework. Furthermore, it provides an empirical assessment through using the unrestricted Vector Auto-regression (VAR) and Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) approaches depending on data spans the period from the first quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of 2007. On the other hand, it utilizes the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic to test for possible structural changes due to the adoption of inflation targeting regime in those countries. The main findings are as follows: inflation targeting does make a difference in the performance of monetary policy in those countries. Furthermore, the experience of Brazil, Chile and South Africa provides important lessons for other emerging market economies to adopt such a framework.
{"title":"Inflation Targeting in Brazil, Chile and South Africa: An Empirical Investigation of Their Monetary Policy Framework","authors":"M. Kamal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1727606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1727606","url":null,"abstract":"This paper tackles the monetary policy performance in Brazil, Chile and South Africa under inflation targeting framework. Furthermore, it provides an empirical assessment through using the unrestricted Vector Auto-regression (VAR) and Structural Vector Auto-regression (SVAR) approaches depending on data spans the period from the first quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of 2007. On the other hand, it utilizes the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic to test for possible structural changes due to the adoption of inflation targeting regime in those countries. The main findings are as follows: inflation targeting does make a difference in the performance of monetary policy in those countries. Furthermore, the experience of Brazil, Chile and South Africa provides important lessons for other emerging market economies to adopt such a framework.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121938120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-08-01DOI: 10.5089/9781455205271.001
Asmaa A ElGanainy, A. Weber
This paper employs several econometric techniques to estimate the Armenian output gap. The findings indicate that the output gap is significantly positive in 2007 and 2008 and decreased dramatically in 2009. The paper uses these results to estimate a New Keynesian Phillips curve for Armenia, suggesting a significant role of the output gap and inflation expectations in determining current inflation. Finally, the underlying fiscal stance over the period 2000-09 is assessed by estimating the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance. Most of Armenia’s fiscal deficit is found to be structural. Fiscal policy, while providing counter-cyclical support in 2009, has been largely pro-cyclical in the past.
{"title":"Estimates of the Output Gap in Armenia with Applications to Monetary and Fiscal Policy","authors":"Asmaa A ElGanainy, A. Weber","doi":"10.5089/9781455205271.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781455205271.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper employs several econometric techniques to estimate the Armenian output gap. The findings indicate that the output gap is significantly positive in 2007 and 2008 and decreased dramatically in 2009. The paper uses these results to estimate a New Keynesian Phillips curve for Armenia, suggesting a significant role of the output gap and inflation expectations in determining current inflation. Finally, the underlying fiscal stance over the period 2000-09 is assessed by estimating the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance. Most of Armenia’s fiscal deficit is found to be structural. Fiscal policy, while providing counter-cyclical support in 2009, has been largely pro-cyclical in the past.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114848560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is often argued that tax competition may lead to a "race to the bottom". Such a race may hold indeed in the case of the pure case of factor mobility (such as capital mobility). However, in this paper we emphasize the unique feature of labor migration, that may nullify the "race to the bottom" hypothesis. Labor migration is governed by net-of-tax factor rewards and the benefits that the welfare state provides. Tax rates are determined in a political economy set up which takes into account the effect of taxes and migration on factor rewards and the fiscal burden imposed by migration on the decisive voter.The paper models the host country stylistically as a member of the core of an economic union (i.e., a core EU welfare state member state), with tax financed benefits which is able to control the volume and the skill-composition of migration. The source country is modeled as an accession country to an economic union (i.e., through the EU enlargement treaty), with its own welfare (tax-benefit) policy. We let these two countries engage in fiscal competition. Using numerical simulations we examine how the migration policies are affected by whether the skilled or the unskilled are in power. We also analyze differences for tax policies between free and controlled migration, and the role of productivity gap.
{"title":"Fiscal and Migration Competition","authors":"A. Razin, E. Sadka","doi":"10.3386/w16224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w16224","url":null,"abstract":"It is often argued that tax competition may lead to a \"race to the bottom\". Such a race may hold indeed in the case of the pure case of factor mobility (such as capital mobility). However, in this paper we emphasize the unique feature of labor migration, that may nullify the \"race to the bottom\" hypothesis. Labor migration is governed by net-of-tax factor rewards and the benefits that the welfare state provides. Tax rates are determined in a political economy set up which takes into account the effect of taxes and migration on factor rewards and the fiscal burden imposed by migration on the decisive voter.The paper models the host country stylistically as a member of the core of an economic union (i.e., a core EU welfare state member state), with tax financed benefits which is able to control the volume and the skill-composition of migration. The source country is modeled as an accession country to an economic union (i.e., through the EU enlargement treaty), with its own welfare (tax-benefit) policy. We let these two countries engage in fiscal competition. Using numerical simulations we examine how the migration policies are affected by whether the skilled or the unskilled are in power. We also analyze differences for tax policies between free and controlled migration, and the role of productivity gap.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130310114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-03-01DOI: 10.5089/9781451982237.001.A001
Era Dabla‐Norris, Richard I Allen, Luis-Felipe Zanna, T. Prakash, Eteri Kvintradze, V. Lledo, Irene Yackovlev, S. Gollwitzer
This paper presents, for the first time, multi-dimensional indices of the quality of budget institutions in low-income countries. The indices allow for benchmarking against the performance of middle-income countries, across regions, and according to different institutional arrangements that deliver good fiscal performance. Using the constructed indices, the paper provides preliminary empirical support for the hypotheses that strong budget institutions help improve fiscal balances and public external debt outcomes; and countries with stronger fiscal institutions have better scope to conduct countercyclical policies.
{"title":"Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Low-Income Countries","authors":"Era Dabla‐Norris, Richard I Allen, Luis-Felipe Zanna, T. Prakash, Eteri Kvintradze, V. Lledo, Irene Yackovlev, S. Gollwitzer","doi":"10.5089/9781451982237.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451982237.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents, for the first time, multi-dimensional indices of the quality of budget institutions in low-income countries. The indices allow for benchmarking against the performance of middle-income countries, across regions, and according to different institutional arrangements that deliver good fiscal performance. Using the constructed indices, the paper provides preliminary empirical support for the hypotheses that strong budget institutions help improve fiscal balances and public external debt outcomes; and countries with stronger fiscal institutions have better scope to conduct countercyclical policies.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"149 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115586975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many of the most pernicious economic institutions and policies create entry barriers or manipulate factor prices to transfer resources from entrepreneurs and workers to groups that hold political power. These inefficiencies partly result from the fact that direct and efficient fiscal instruments that can be used for taxation and redistribution of resources are absent. One might then conclude that increasing state capacity and expanding the set of available fiscal instruments should improve the allocation of resources by preventing the use of these inefficient, indirect methods of redistribution. This reasoning ignores the effect of greater state capacity and the change in the set of available fiscal instruments on the political equilibrium, however. Because the availability of more efficient means of taxation increases the potential benefits of controlling state power, it also intensifies costly political conflict aimed at capturing the control of the state. This indirect effect counteracts the benefits from more efficient taxation and may dominate the direct benefits. The paper establishes the possibility that the allocation of resources may deteriorate substantially in response to an autonomous increase in state capacity and the set of fiscal instruments. It also argues that in the British case, which is a key historical example that points to the central role of increased state capacity in economic development, this change was not autonomous; instead, it was an equilibrium response to changes in political institutions that placed better checks on the exercise of power by the executive. This reasoning suggests that the study of the effect of fiscal capacity and the evaluation of policies aimed at increasing state capacity in less-developed economies should be done in the context of dynamic models of political economy, in which fiscal capacity and political constraints are jointly determined.
{"title":"Institutions, Factor Prices and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?","authors":"D. Acemoglu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1540249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1540249","url":null,"abstract":"Many of the most pernicious economic institutions and policies create entry barriers or manipulate factor prices to transfer resources from entrepreneurs and workers to groups that hold political power. These inefficiencies partly result from the fact that direct and efficient fiscal instruments that can be used for taxation and redistribution of resources are absent. One might then conclude that increasing state capacity and expanding the set of available fiscal instruments should improve the allocation of resources by preventing the use of these inefficient, indirect methods of redistribution. This reasoning ignores the effect of greater state capacity and the change in the set of available fiscal instruments on the political equilibrium, however. Because the availability of more efficient means of taxation increases the potential benefits of controlling state power, it also intensifies costly political conflict aimed at capturing the control of the state. This indirect effect counteracts the benefits from more efficient taxation and may dominate the direct benefits. The paper establishes the possibility that the allocation of resources may deteriorate substantially in response to an autonomous increase in state capacity and the set of fiscal instruments. It also argues that in the British case, which is a key historical example that points to the central role of increased state capacity in economic development, this change was not autonomous; instead, it was an equilibrium response to changes in political institutions that placed better checks on the exercise of power by the executive. This reasoning suggests that the study of the effect of fiscal capacity and the evaluation of policies aimed at increasing state capacity in less-developed economies should be done in the context of dynamic models of political economy, in which fiscal capacity and political constraints are jointly determined.","PeriodicalId":247622,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Fiscal & Monetary Policy in Developing Economies (Topic)","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123333409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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