Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.1017/S135824612100028X
D. Chastain
Abstract In response to Bernard Williams’ suspicion that we would inevitably become bored with immortal life, John Martin Fischer has argued that we could continue to enjoy repeatable pleasures such as fine wine, beautiful music, and spiritual experiences. In more recent work on near-death experiences, Fischer has also explored the non-religious meaning of spiritual experiences in more depth. I join this deeper exploration of spiritual experience, and I also join Williams’ critics who question his view that character and desire are needed to explain the desirability of life, while providing additional reason for concern that Williams’ way of valuing life may itself actually be a cause of boredom with life. With an eye to spiritual experience, I indicate how we can distance ourselves even further from Williams’ view, and I suggest how the attitude that life is good but death is not bad emerges from spiritual experience, as expressed in numerous religious and secular spiritual traditions. This lends support to the conclusion that radically extended life is desirable even if not actively desired.
{"title":"Desirability without Desire: Life Extension, Boredom and Spiritual Experience","authors":"D. Chastain","doi":"10.1017/S135824612100028X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S135824612100028X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In response to Bernard Williams’ suspicion that we would inevitably become bored with immortal life, John Martin Fischer has argued that we could continue to enjoy repeatable pleasures such as fine wine, beautiful music, and spiritual experiences. In more recent work on near-death experiences, Fischer has also explored the non-religious meaning of spiritual experiences in more depth. I join this deeper exploration of spiritual experience, and I also join Williams’ critics who question his view that character and desire are needed to explain the desirability of life, while providing additional reason for concern that Williams’ way of valuing life may itself actually be a cause of boredom with life. With an eye to spiritual experience, I indicate how we can distance ourselves even further from Williams’ view, and I suggest how the attitude that life is good but death is not bad emerges from spiritual experience, as expressed in numerous religious and secular spiritual traditions. This lends support to the conclusion that radically extended life is desirable even if not actively desired.","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134407745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.1017/s1358246121000357
{"title":"PHS volume 90 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s1358246121000357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1358246121000357","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128862523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1017/S1358246121000138
Elizabeth Fricker
Abstract It is argued that many means-end skills are mere drudgery, and there is no case from well-being to regret that the advance of technology has replaced them with machines. But a case is made that for humans possessing some skills is important for well-being, and that certain core skills are important for it. It is argued that these include navigational skills. While the march of technology has tended to promote human well-being, there is now some cause for concern that silicone chip technology is de-skilling us to an extent that impacts negatively on well-being.
{"title":"Should We Worry About Silicone Chip Technology De-Skilling Us?","authors":"Elizabeth Fricker","doi":"10.1017/S1358246121000138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246121000138","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is argued that many means-end skills are mere drudgery, and there is no case from well-being to regret that the advance of technology has replaced them with machines. But a case is made that for humans possessing some skills is important for well-being, and that certain core skills are important for it. It is argued that these include navigational skills. While the march of technology has tended to promote human well-being, there is now some cause for concern that silicone chip technology is de-skilling us to an extent that impacts negatively on well-being.","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114621424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1017/S1358246121000126
K. Jenkins
Abstract In this paper, I aim to shed some light on what rape myths are and what we can do about them. I start by giving a brief overview of some common rape myths. I then use two philosophical tools to offer a perspective on rape myths. First, I show that we can usefully see rape myths as an example of what Miranda Fricker has termed ‘epistemic injustice’, which is a type of wrong that concerns our role as knowers. Then, I show that it is important to recognise that rape myths are instances of misogyny. This word is of course a more familiar one, but I'll be drawing on a specific philosophical account of what misogyny is, developed by Kate Manne, that I think is useful here. Finally, I briefly consider some upshots of these claims.
{"title":"Rape Myths: What are They and What can We do About Them?","authors":"K. Jenkins","doi":"10.1017/S1358246121000126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246121000126","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I aim to shed some light on what rape myths are and what we can do about them. I start by giving a brief overview of some common rape myths. I then use two philosophical tools to offer a perspective on rape myths. First, I show that we can usefully see rape myths as an example of what Miranda Fricker has termed ‘epistemic injustice’, which is a type of wrong that concerns our role as knowers. Then, I show that it is important to recognise that rape myths are instances of misogyny. This word is of course a more familiar one, but I'll be drawing on a specific philosophical account of what misogyny is, developed by Kate Manne, that I think is useful here. Finally, I briefly consider some upshots of these claims.","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122871409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1017/S1358246121000102
L. Bright
Abstract It's natural to think of scientists as truth seekers, people driven by an intense curiosity to understand the natural world. Yet this picture of scientists and scientific inquiry sits uncomfortably with the reality and prevalence of scientific fraud. If one wants to get at the truth about nature, why lie? Won't that just set inquiry back, as people pursue false leads? To understand why this occurs – and what can be done about it – we need to understand the social structures scientists work within, and how some of the institutions which enable science to be such a successful endeavour all things considered, also abet and encourage fraud.
{"title":"Why Do Scientists Lie?","authors":"L. Bright","doi":"10.1017/S1358246121000102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246121000102","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It's natural to think of scientists as truth seekers, people driven by an intense curiosity to understand the natural world. Yet this picture of scientists and scientific inquiry sits uncomfortably with the reality and prevalence of scientific fraud. If one wants to get at the truth about nature, why lie? Won't that just set inquiry back, as people pursue false leads? To understand why this occurs – and what can be done about it – we need to understand the social structures scientists work within, and how some of the institutions which enable science to be such a successful endeavour all things considered, also abet and encourage fraud.","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121926921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1017/S1358246121000059
I. Kidd, H. Carel
Abstract In this paper we propose that our understanding of pathocentric epistemic injustices can be enriched if they are theorised in terms of predicaments. These are the wider socially scaffolded structures of epistemic challenges, dangers, needs, and threats experienced by ill persons due to their particular emplacement within material, social, and epistemic structures. In previous work we have described certain aspects of these predicaments, such as pathocentric epistemic injustices and pathophobia. A wider systematic perspective is needed to integrate these and other concepts. By thinking predicamentally, we can better understand the interrelated social, epistemic, and practical obstacles experienced by ill persons and connect the many concepts available for theorising them (microaggessions, epistemic injustices, and so on).
{"title":"The Predicament of Patients","authors":"I. Kidd, H. Carel","doi":"10.1017/S1358246121000059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246121000059","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper we propose that our understanding of pathocentric epistemic injustices can be enriched if they are theorised in terms of predicaments. These are the wider socially scaffolded structures of epistemic challenges, dangers, needs, and threats experienced by ill persons due to their particular emplacement within material, social, and epistemic structures. In previous work we have described certain aspects of these predicaments, such as pathocentric epistemic injustices and pathophobia. A wider systematic perspective is needed to integrate these and other concepts. By thinking predicamentally, we can better understand the interrelated social, epistemic, and practical obstacles experienced by ill persons and connect the many concepts available for theorising them (microaggessions, epistemic injustices, and so on).","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"18 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132285654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1017/S1358246121000096
H. Mercier
Abstract Are we gullible? Can we be easily influenced by what others tell us, even if they do not deserve our trust? Many strands of research, from social psychology to cultural evolution suggest that humans are by nature conformist and eager to follow prestigious leaders. By contrast, an evolutionary perspective suggests that humans should be vigilant towards communicated information, so as not to be misled too often. Work in experimental psychology shows that humans are equipped with sophisticated mechanisms that allow them to carefully evaluate communicated information. These open vigilance mechanisms lead us to reject messages that clash with our prior beliefs, unless the source of the message has earned our trust, or provides good arguments, in which case we can adaptively change our minds. These mechanisms make us largely immune to mass persuasion, explaining why propaganda, political campaigns, advertising, and other attempts at persuading large groups nearly always fall in deaf ears. However, some false beliefs manage to spread through communication. I argue that most popular false beliefs are held reflectively, which means that they have little effect on our thoughts and behaviors, and that many false beliefs can be socially beneficial. Accepting such beliefs thus reflects a much weaker failure in our evaluation of communicated information than might at first appear.
{"title":"How Good Are We At Evaluating Communicated Information?","authors":"H. Mercier","doi":"10.1017/S1358246121000096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246121000096","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Are we gullible? Can we be easily influenced by what others tell us, even if they do not deserve our trust? Many strands of research, from social psychology to cultural evolution suggest that humans are by nature conformist and eager to follow prestigious leaders. By contrast, an evolutionary perspective suggests that humans should be vigilant towards communicated information, so as not to be misled too often. Work in experimental psychology shows that humans are equipped with sophisticated mechanisms that allow them to carefully evaluate communicated information. These open vigilance mechanisms lead us to reject messages that clash with our prior beliefs, unless the source of the message has earned our trust, or provides good arguments, in which case we can adaptively change our minds. These mechanisms make us largely immune to mass persuasion, explaining why propaganda, political campaigns, advertising, and other attempts at persuading large groups nearly always fall in deaf ears. However, some false beliefs manage to spread through communication. I argue that most popular false beliefs are held reflectively, which means that they have little effect on our thoughts and behaviors, and that many false beliefs can be socially beneficial. Accepting such beliefs thus reflects a much weaker failure in our evaluation of communicated information than might at first appear.","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125089792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1017/S1358246121000084
L. Alcoff
Abstract I argue here that first person speech on sexual violence remains an important dimension of the movement for social change in regard to sexual violence, and that the public speech of survivors faces at least three groups of obstacles: 1) the problem of epistemic injustice, that is, injustice in the sphere of knowledge 2) the problem of language and power, and 3) the problem of dominant discourses. I explain and develop these points and end with a final argument concerning the critical importance of speaking publicly on these areas of human experience.
{"title":"‘To Possess the Power to Speak’","authors":"L. Alcoff","doi":"10.1017/S1358246121000084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246121000084","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I argue here that first person speech on sexual violence remains an important dimension of the movement for social change in regard to sexual violence, and that the public speech of survivors faces at least three groups of obstacles: 1) the problem of epistemic injustice, that is, injustice in the sphere of knowledge 2) the problem of language and power, and 3) the problem of dominant discourses. I explain and develop these points and end with a final argument concerning the critical importance of speaking publicly on these areas of human experience.","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125576489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1017/S1358246121000011
P. Adamson
Abstract In this paper I challenge the notion that medieval philosophy was characterized by strict adherence to authority. In particular, I argue that to the contrary, self-consciously critical reflection on authority was a widespread intellectual virtue in the Islamic world. The contrary vice, called ‘taqlīd’, was considered appropriate only for those outside the scholarly elite. I further suggest that this idea was originally developed in the context of Islamic law and was then passed on to authors who worked within the philosophical tradition.
{"title":"Received Wisdom: The Use of Authority in Medieval Islamic Philosophy","authors":"P. Adamson","doi":"10.1017/S1358246121000011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246121000011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper I challenge the notion that medieval philosophy was characterized by strict adherence to authority. In particular, I argue that to the contrary, self-consciously critical reflection on authority was a widespread intellectual virtue in the Islamic world. The contrary vice, called ‘taqlīd’, was considered appropriate only for those outside the scholarly elite. I further suggest that this idea was originally developed in the context of Islamic law and was then passed on to authors who worked within the philosophical tradition.","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129705278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-01DOI: 10.1017/S1358246121000023
Sanford C. Goldberg
Abstract Good conversations are one of the great joys of life. Online (social media) ‘conversations’ rarely seem to make the grade. In this paper I use some tools from philosophy in an attempt to illuminate what might be going wrong.
{"title":"The Promise and Pitfalls of Online ‘Conversations’","authors":"Sanford C. Goldberg","doi":"10.1017/S1358246121000023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246121000023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Good conversations are one of the great joys of life. Online (social media) ‘conversations’ rarely seem to make the grade. In this paper I use some tools from philosophy in an attempt to illuminate what might be going wrong.","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"203 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124932255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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