This paper provides an analysis of the Commission’s Intel Decision and is structured as follows. Section II gives some introductory thoughts on the general legal and economic framework with respect to abuse of dominance cases. Section III goes on to describe the legal and economic framework of the Decision, whilst Section IV looks at certain issues relating to the Decision’s factual findings. Section V addresses a number of issues relating to the harm resulting from Intel’s conduct and Section VI then briefly examines the fine. Section VII concludes.
{"title":"When the Chips are Down: Some Reflections on the European Commission's Intel Decision","authors":"Nicholas Banasevic, P. Hellstrom","doi":"10.1093/JECLAP/LPQ021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JECLAP/LPQ021","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an analysis of the Commission’s Intel Decision and is structured as follows. Section II gives some introductory thoughts on the general legal and economic framework with respect to abuse of dominance cases. Section III goes on to describe the legal and economic framework of the Decision, whilst Section IV looks at certain issues relating to the Decision’s factual findings. Section V addresses a number of issues relating to the harm resulting from Intel’s conduct and Section VI then briefly examines the fine. Section VII concludes.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114239890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the controlling role of European competition law in the energy market restructuring in EU after the gradual liberalisation process of previous years and defines the application of European competition law to this framework of restructuring. The particular focus of this paper lies on the steps taken mainly by EC Commission, in order to control the concentrations in energy market, which derived from the gradual involvement of the private sector in the market and the lift of barriers in energy market, while we highlight the major points concerning competition regulation, which are related to the effort for the establishment of a European single energy market. Control pertains mainly to the concentrations implemented on a community level but also on a member state level. Examined specifically are the community and member states control powers and interventions. In the first case the European Commission has exclusive power and in the second, the competent authorities with the support of the national Competition Commission and the national Regulatory Authority. We frequently refer to European case law and specific Commission's Decisions. We note that this paper constitutes a part of a broader research paper on the interaction between European Competition Law and Energy Market Regulation.
{"title":"European Competition Law & Control of Energy Market Restructuring","authors":"Michael D. Diathesopoulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1629134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1629134","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the controlling role of European competition law in the energy market restructuring in EU after the gradual liberalisation process of previous years and defines the application of European competition law to this framework of restructuring. The particular focus of this paper lies on the steps taken mainly by EC Commission, in order to control the concentrations in energy market, which derived from the gradual involvement of the private sector in the market and the lift of barriers in energy market, while we highlight the major points concerning competition regulation, which are related to the effort for the establishment of a European single energy market. Control pertains mainly to the concentrations implemented on a community level but also on a member state level. Examined specifically are the community and member states control powers and interventions. In the first case the European Commission has exclusive power and in the second, the competent authorities with the support of the national Competition Commission and the national Regulatory Authority. We frequently refer to European case law and specific Commission's Decisions. We note that this paper constitutes a part of a broader research paper on the interaction between European Competition Law and Energy Market Regulation.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130444974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Barriers to labour mobility in Canada remain a problem, even though Canadian governments have taken steps to reduce them. In the study, the author says Canada’s regulated professions and skilled trades, which represent about 11 percent of the workforce, face barriers to mobility that have negative implications for the country’s productivity, labour supply and future economic prospects. Like the rest of the world, Canada will face a labour crunch in the next 10 years. Unless Canada ensures that its professionals and skilled workers can work anywhere in the country, it could limit the ability to attract the people the economy needs.
{"title":"Who Can Work Where: Reducing Barriers to Labour Mobility in Canada","authors":"R. Knox","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1626414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1626414","url":null,"abstract":"Barriers to labour mobility in Canada remain a problem, even though Canadian governments have taken steps to reduce them. In the study, the author says Canada’s regulated professions and skilled trades, which represent about 11 percent of the workforce, face barriers to mobility that have negative implications for the country’s productivity, labour supply and future economic prospects. Like the rest of the world, Canada will face a labour crunch in the next 10 years. Unless Canada ensures that its professionals and skilled workers can work anywhere in the country, it could limit the ability to attract the people the economy needs.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121218690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The pursuit of economic growth has been the single most important policy goal across the world for the last five decades. The default assumption is that – financial crisis aside – growth will continue indefinitely. Not just for the poorest countries, where a better quality of life is undeniably needed between for the richest nations where the excess of material wealth adds little to happiness and is beginning to threaten the foundations of our well being. The myth of growth has failed us. It has failed the two billion people who still live on less than $2 a day. It has failed, spectacularly, in its own terms to provide economic stability and secure people’s livelihoods. India has come a long way in terms of economic growth. Softer indicators – aspirations, health and literacy – are all registering distinct improvements. Spending power opportunities and splurging propensity have been shooting up. Poverty ratios have gone down, the per capita income is growing, the economy is expanding at a fast pace. Poverty ratios have gone down not the number of poor. Poor still remain vulnerable largely unprotected – socially, economically or legally. The shift to inclusive growth as a policy discourse is of recent vintage. This shift marks a broadening of concerns about inequality. The focus has been on how the excluded group can participate in aggregate growth. This takes policy discussions to the domains of education, health, basic infrastructure, agricultural productivity basic urban services and so on. Without addressing those issues India’s longer term development prospects would be in threat. Structural inequalities in India are not only deep and persistent, they are also intimately linked with institutional structures in the political, social and economic domains – and they are likely to impede the transformations necessary for long term growth.
{"title":"India: Growth Sans Development","authors":"T. Das","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1611747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1611747","url":null,"abstract":"The pursuit of economic growth has been the single most important policy goal across the world for the last five decades. The default assumption is that – financial crisis aside – growth will continue indefinitely. Not just for the poorest countries, where a better quality of life is undeniably needed between for the richest nations where the excess of material wealth adds little to happiness and is beginning to threaten the foundations of our well being. The myth of growth has failed us. It has failed the two billion people who still live on less than $2 a day. It has failed, spectacularly, in its own terms to provide economic stability and secure people’s livelihoods. India has come a long way in terms of economic growth. Softer indicators – aspirations, health and literacy – are all registering distinct improvements. Spending power opportunities and splurging propensity have been shooting up. Poverty ratios have gone down, the per capita income is growing, the economy is expanding at a fast pace. Poverty ratios have gone down not the number of poor. Poor still remain vulnerable largely unprotected – socially, economically or legally. The shift to inclusive growth as a policy discourse is of recent vintage. This shift marks a broadening of concerns about inequality. The focus has been on how the excluded group can participate in aggregate growth. This takes policy discussions to the domains of education, health, basic infrastructure, agricultural productivity basic urban services and so on. Without addressing those issues India’s longer term development prospects would be in threat. Structural inequalities in India are not only deep and persistent, they are also intimately linked with institutional structures in the political, social and economic domains – and they are likely to impede the transformations necessary for long term growth.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"53 Pt 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130702152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop and empirically test an institutional governance theory for explaining the decisions by the 50 US State Governments to adopt Generally Accepted Accounting Principles( GAAP) for external financial reporting. Governmental accounting studies have generally explained the choice of an accounting method in terms of the economic consequences of these choices for managerial welfare and other microeconomic determinants of those decisions. Our study develops an institutional governance theory and demonstrates that institutional governance variables in conjunction with traditional economic agency variables can improve the explanatory power of government accounting choice models. Our empirical results are consistent with the stipulations of the institutional governance theory.
{"title":"TOWARD AN EMPIRICAL INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE THEORY: Analyses of the Decisions by the 50 U.S. State Governments to Adopt Generally Accepted Accounting Principles","authors":"V. L. Carpenter, R. Cheng, Ehsan H. Feroz","doi":"10.22495/COCV4I4P3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22495/COCV4I4P3","url":null,"abstract":"We develop and empirically test an institutional governance theory for explaining the decisions by the 50 US State Governments to adopt Generally Accepted Accounting Principles( GAAP) for external financial reporting. Governmental accounting studies have generally explained the choice of an accounting method in terms of the economic consequences of these choices for managerial welfare and other microeconomic determinants of those decisions. Our study develops an institutional governance theory and demonstrates that institutional governance variables in conjunction with traditional economic agency variables can improve the explanatory power of government accounting choice models. Our empirical results are consistent with the stipulations of the institutional governance theory.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128601431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The theoretical concept of agency costs developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (2005) are used to study the assumed relationship between the quality of a firm's governance and its decision to issue a profit warning (PW), when it is overvalued. Based on a sample of Canadian companies between 2000 and 2004, results only partially support our hypotheses. The characteristics of the board seem to only play a secondary role in the decision to issue a profit warning when the firm is overvalued. Nonetheless, as expected, our study reveals the negative impact on the profit warning decision of the governance mechanisms based on market values that aim at aligning the interest of the managers and directors with those of the shareholders.
{"title":"Governance and the Decision to Issue a Profit Warning","authors":"Claude Francoeur, R. Labelle, Isabelle Martinez","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1159465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1159465","url":null,"abstract":"The theoretical concept of agency costs developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (2005) are used to study the assumed relationship between the quality of a firm's governance and its decision to issue a profit warning (PW), when it is overvalued. Based on a sample of Canadian companies between 2000 and 2004, results only partially support our hypotheses. The characteristics of the board seem to only play a secondary role in the decision to issue a profit warning when the firm is overvalued. Nonetheless, as expected, our study reveals the negative impact on the profit warning decision of the governance mechanisms based on market values that aim at aligning the interest of the managers and directors with those of the shareholders.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129166451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For much of the twentieth century electricity generation and transmission in New Zealand was dominated by centralized state ownership and control with local authority ownership of distribution and retailing. Radical reform of the sector commenced in the early 1980s with the progressive corporatisation and unbundling of these sub-sectors limited privatizations and a shift towards "light-handed" non-industry specific regulation. These reforms contained inherent tensions that quickly manifested themselves in a political stand-off over the electricity price path required to support new generation investment. In turn this standoff spurred the industry-led development of a voluntary self-governing wholesale electricity market. With a change of government in 1999 increasing re-centralization of industry governance and regulation resulted in part justified on the grounds of winter power "crises" in 2001 and 2003 involving significant wholesale electricity price spikes (although blackouts were a regular and more disruptive occurrence prior to the reforms). With the return to centralized industry governance and shift towards heavy-handed regulation - but now with greater private sector investment in the sector - system supply and security issues persist and questions remain over the likely effect of these policy reversals on required new investment.
{"title":"Decentralization and Re-Centralization of Electricity Industry Governance in New Zealand","authors":"R. Meade","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.895467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.895467","url":null,"abstract":"For much of the twentieth century electricity generation and transmission in New Zealand was dominated by centralized state ownership and control with local authority ownership of distribution and retailing. Radical reform of the sector commenced in the early 1980s with the progressive corporatisation and unbundling of these sub-sectors limited privatizations and a shift towards \"light-handed\" non-industry specific regulation. These reforms contained inherent tensions that quickly manifested themselves in a political stand-off over the electricity price path required to support new generation investment. In turn this standoff spurred the industry-led development of a voluntary self-governing wholesale electricity market. With a change of government in 1999 increasing re-centralization of industry governance and regulation resulted in part justified on the grounds of winter power \"crises\" in 2001 and 2003 involving significant wholesale electricity price spikes (although blackouts were a regular and more disruptive occurrence prior to the reforms). With the return to centralized industry governance and shift towards heavy-handed regulation - but now with greater private sector investment in the sector - system supply and security issues persist and questions remain over the likely effect of these policy reversals on required new investment.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116492782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study explores the effect of regulatory and political constraints on the level of CEO compensation for 87 state-regulated electric utilities during 1978-1990. The results suggest that political pressures may constrain top executive pay levels in this industry. First, CEOs of firms operating in regulatory environments characterized by investment banks as relatively "proconsumer" receive lower compensation than do CEOs of firms in environments ranked as more friendly to investors. Second, CEO pay is lower for utilities with relatively high or rising rates, or a higher proportion of industrial customers. Finally, attributes of the commission appointment and tenure rules affect CEO compensation in ways consistent with the political constraint hypothesis.
{"title":"Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry","authors":"P. Joskow, N. Rose, Catherine Wolfram","doi":"10.3386/W4980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W4980","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the effect of regulatory and political constraints on the level of CEO compensation for 87 state-regulated electric utilities during 1978-1990. The results suggest that political pressures may constrain top executive pay levels in this industry. First, CEOs of firms operating in regulatory environments characterized by investment banks as relatively \"proconsumer\" receive lower compensation than do CEOs of firms in environments ranked as more friendly to investors. Second, CEO pay is lower for utilities with relatively high or rising rates, or a higher proportion of industrial customers. Finally, attributes of the commission appointment and tenure rules affect CEO compensation in ways consistent with the political constraint hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124434264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139344289.015
J. Viñuales
This chapter analyzes the important litigation risks arising for States as a result of the environmental regulation of foreign investment transactions. Legal commentators have traditionally framed this issue from the perspective of investment or trade law. The question is the extent to which a given environmental measure is consistent with investment or trade disciplines. This is of course not the only way to frame the issue. Instead of assuming that the framework of reference is either investment or trade law and the ‘object’ to be evaluated is the ‘environmental measure’, one could change the terms of the equation and assess the consistency of an ‘investment scheme’ with environmental disciplines. This change in perspective would have significant legal consequences. If ‘environmental measures’ are only permissible within the bounds set by investment (or trade) disciplines, then they are in practice subordinated to investment (or trade) protection. The main argument underlying this approach is the legal priority of international law over domestic law. A domestic (environmental) measure must be consistent with international (investment or trade) standards. But this approach does not take into account the possibility that at least some domestic environmental measures may be required or authorised (I shall use the term ‘induced’) by international environmental law. In this case, the rule giving priority to international law over domestic law would not apply and there would be no legal reason, as a matter of principle, to consider that an internationally-induced environmental measure inconsistent with an investment (or trade) discipline is illegal under international law. To the extent that the requirements of the applicable international environmental and investment (or trade) standards conflict with each other, their priority would have to be determined on the basis of a different set of conflict rules, which would not include the rule giving priority to international law over domestic law. As the chapter shows, this alternative model faces some important practical obstacles. But this is not to say that the scope for the environmental regulation of foreign investment schemes is not expanding through other avenues. Investment disciplines are increasingly being interpreted so as to leave considerable room for the accommodation of environmental considerations through a variety of legal concepts, such as environmental differentiation, the level of reasonableness expected from investors, the police powers doctrine or the scope of the necessity/emergency clauses.
{"title":"The Environmental Regulation of Foreign Investment Schemes under International Law","authors":"J. Viñuales","doi":"10.1017/CBO9781139344289.015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139344289.015","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyzes the important litigation risks arising for States as a result of the environmental regulation of foreign investment transactions. Legal commentators have traditionally framed this issue from the perspective of investment or trade law. The question is the extent to which a given environmental measure is consistent with investment or trade disciplines. This is of course not the only way to frame the issue. Instead of assuming that the framework of reference is either investment or trade law and the ‘object’ to be evaluated is the ‘environmental measure’, one could change the terms of the equation and assess the consistency of an ‘investment scheme’ with environmental disciplines. This change in perspective would have significant legal consequences. If ‘environmental measures’ are only permissible within the bounds set by investment (or trade) disciplines, then they are in practice subordinated to investment (or trade) protection. The main argument underlying this approach is the legal priority of international law over domestic law. A domestic (environmental) measure must be consistent with international (investment or trade) standards. But this approach does not take into account the possibility that at least some domestic environmental measures may be required or authorised (I shall use the term ‘induced’) by international environmental law. In this case, the rule giving priority to international law over domestic law would not apply and there would be no legal reason, as a matter of principle, to consider that an internationally-induced environmental measure inconsistent with an investment (or trade) discipline is illegal under international law. To the extent that the requirements of the applicable international environmental and investment (or trade) standards conflict with each other, their priority would have to be determined on the basis of a different set of conflict rules, which would not include the rule giving priority to international law over domestic law. As the chapter shows, this alternative model faces some important practical obstacles. But this is not to say that the scope for the environmental regulation of foreign investment schemes is not expanding through other avenues. Investment disciplines are increasingly being interpreted so as to leave considerable room for the accommodation of environmental considerations through a variety of legal concepts, such as environmental differentiation, the level of reasonableness expected from investors, the police powers doctrine or the scope of the necessity/emergency clauses.","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"14 19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116495855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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