Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.5406/21543682.52.2.10
John M. Sweeney
In this book, Thomas Oord continues his ongoing explorations of, to borrow the title of Daniel Day Williams's classic work, The Spirit and the Forms of Love. In previous works—such as Defining Love: Philosophical, Scientific, and Theological Investigations; The Science of Love: The Wisdom of Well Being; and The Uncontrolling Love of God: An Open and Relational Account of Providence—Oord has explored the importance of love in a variety of contexts. Pluriform Love focuses on the ways in which love has been portrayed in much of the classical Christian tradition, both in traditional Christian theology and in the various biblical words for love (eros, agape, hesed, etc.).Chapter 1 presents the case that, for the most part, in Christian theology love has been ignored, misrepresented, or worse. All this downplaying of love has occurred despite the many, obvious scriptural references to love: Corinthians 13, The Great Commandments, “God is love” (1 John 4.8, 16), and so forth. In chapter 2, Oord presents and explains his definition of love as follows: “To love is to act intentionally, in relational response to God and others, to promote overall well-being.” Oord regularly refers to this definition in showing how traditional Christian views of love have met the criteria implicit in the definition.Chapters 3–6 provide critiques, both positive and negative, of various figures and perspectives in traditional Christian theology with regard to their views on the role of love. For example, in chapter 3, Anders Nygren's views on agape are evaluated, and in chapter 6, Augustine's views on eros are examined.In Chapters 7–9 Oord presents his constructive proposals for recovering the role of love as the primary attribute of the divine. Among these proposals are open and relational theology, essential kenosis, amipotence, and essential hesed, all of which lead to a theology of pluriform love.Oord has been, and remains, a leading figure in the open and relational theology movement. In this book, he describes open and relational theology as a broad movement that includes within it a variety of forms: process, feminism, free will theism, personalism, and more. While there are differences in detail, there are some commonalities among the various open and relational theologies, such as (1) a concern for an open future (the future is not predetermined by the divine or any other creatures), (2) an experiential relationship between the divine and the rest of creation—the divine influences creation and creation influences the divine, and (3) the belief that love is the most important characteristic of the divine.Essential kenosis involves the notion that the divine is both self-giving of its love and other-empowering in its actions and intentions, and that both self-giving and other-empowering are inherent traits of the divine and divine love. God does not choose to be loving; God cannot help but be loving. Essential kenosis shows itself in God's uncontrolling love.Amipotence
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Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.5406/21543682.52.2.02
Matthew David Segall
Abstract Alfred North Whitehead's first book as a professor of philosophy at Harvard University, Science and the Modern World, is not only a historical treatment of the rise and fall of scientific materialism. It also marks his turn to metaphysics in search of an alternative cosmological scheme that would replace matter in motion with organic process as that which is generic in Nature. Among the metaphysical innovations introduced in this book are the somewhat enigmatic “eternal objects.” The publication of the first and second volumes of Whitehead's Harvard Lectures on the philosophical presuppositions (HL1) and general metaphysical problems (HL2) of science provides students of his corpus with an opportunity to catch the thinker in the act of creating his concepts. In searching through student notes for glimpses of what Whitehead really meant, I have kept in mind his admonition that “no thinker thinks twice” (PR 29). Whitehead never ceased philosophizing, and surely he intended for us to continue thinking with but beyond the letter of his ideas. In this spirit and in light of HL1 and HL2, this article seeks to elucidate the role of eternal objects as a category of existence in Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, with the goal not simply of textual exegesis, but of showing how the meaning of the fifth category of existence (as he refers to eternal objects in PR) is exemplified in the gradual ingression of the idea in Whitehead's imagination. My aim is to sustain the effort at constructive thought he began, making his speculative hypothesis as explicit as possible so as to better prepare it for critical improvement (PR xiv).
怀特黑德(Alfred North Whitehead)作为哈佛大学哲学教授的第一本书《科学与现代世界》(Science and Modern World)，不仅是对科学唯物主义兴衰的历史论述。这也标志着他转向形而上学，寻找另一种宇宙学方案，用自然中普遍存在的有机过程取代运动中的物质。在这本书中引入的形而上学创新中，有一个有点神秘的“永恒的对象”。怀特黑德的《哈佛大学哲学前提讲座》(h1)和《科学的一般形而上学问题讲座》(HL2)的第一卷和第二卷的出版，为学习他的语料库的学生提供了一个捕捉这位思想家创造概念的机会。在翻阅学生笔记，寻找怀特黑德真正意思的一瞥时，我一直牢记着他的告诫:“没有思想家会三思而后行”(PR 29)。怀特海从来没有停止过他的哲学思考，他当然是想让我们继续思考，但要超越他的思想。本着这种精神，并根据HL1和HL2，本文试图阐明永恒对象作为存在范畴在怀特黑德的《有机体哲学》中的作用，其目的不仅仅是文本注释，而是展示第五种存在范畴的意义(正如他在PR中所指的永恒对象)是如何在怀特黑德的想象中逐渐渗入的。我的目标是维持他开始的建设性思想的努力，使他的推测假设尽可能明确，以便更好地为关键改进做好准备(PR xiv)。
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Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.5406/21543682.52.2.07
Brian Claude Macallan
Abstract The question of the nature of free will remains a perennial challenge for philosophy. The French philosopher Henri Bergson was one who sought to address this challenge. He argued that traditional conceptions of the free-will debate would not suffice. He suggested that both determinist and libertarian accounts fall foul of spatializing tendencies. Bergson's first major work, Time and Free Will, sought to ground his understanding of freedom, in contrast to traditional understandings, in the concept of duration. Bergson, however, actively resisted attempts to define clearly freedom, which he believed ultimately leads to a spatializing of freedom. By attending to Bergson's concept of duration in Time and Free Will, and how this concept relates to freedom, it becomes possible to articulate a positive conception of freedom. This becomes important when arguing for the validity of Bergson's ideas in the current climate. Thus, a positive conception of freedom for Bergson can be “defined” as “the creation of the new within the flow of duration.” It is, however, not something that can be defined, but is something that can be located.
自由意志的本质问题一直是哲学面临的一个长期挑战。法国哲学家亨利·柏格森(Henri Bergson)就是试图解决这一挑战的人之一。他认为自由意志辩论的传统观念是不够的。他认为，决定论和自由意志主义的解释都与空间化倾向相冲突。柏格森的第一部主要作品《时间与自由意志》(Time and Free Will)试图将他对自由的理解建立在持续时间概念的基础上，与传统的理解形成对比。然而，柏格森积极抵制给自由下明确定义的尝试，他认为这最终会导致自由的空间化。通过关注柏格森在《时间与自由意志》中关于持续时间的概念，以及这个概念如何与自由联系起来，就有可能清晰地表达出一个积极的自由概念。在当前的气候下，争论柏格森思想的有效性时，这一点变得很重要。因此，对于柏格森来说，一个积极的自由概念可以被“定义”为“在持续时间的流动中创造新的东西”。然而，它不是可以定义的东西，而是可以定位的东西。
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Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.5406/21543682.52.2.06
Alessia Giacone
Abstract In this article, I will respond to questions regarding the ontological status of relations by exploring Whitehead's pivotal notion of solidarity, especially focusing on the recently published Harvard lectures. Particularly, I shall investigate how solidarity become a metaphysical law in the development of Whitehead's thought, also exploiting other Whiteheadian works of the same period, such as Science and the Modern World and Religion in the Making. I will attempt to show that the comprehension of an immediate brute fact necessarily requires its metaphysical interpretation as an item in a world with some systematic relation to it. I will thus provide my interpretation on solidarity through a comparison with Hegel's notion of Wirklichkeit.
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Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.5406/21543682.52.2.03
Daniel Bella, Milan Stürmer
Abstract The recent publication of the stenographer's transcript of Whitehead's guest lecture on “social ethics” has shed new light on the relation between his metaphysics and ethics. Instead of including ethics in his philosophy, Whitehead treats it as a distinct, specialized science that does not share in the universality of metaphysics. The present article argues that an analysis of his lecture shows that a nonindividualist Whiteheadian ethics is possible without rupturing the coherence of Whitehead's system or contradicting the ontological or subjectivist principle. As part of a larger transition in Whitehead's thinking during the years 1925–1927, he reformulates the notion of the environment as inheritance and is therefore able to pose the question of the endurance of values at the level of society, which is the purview of ethics. Reconstructing the metaphysical background may provide a “stimulus to the imagination” for ethical debates today, especially in the field of environmental ethics.
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Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.5406/21543682.52.2.08
Adam C. Scarfe
This book gives novel, vivid, rich, and profound expression to Whitehead's cyclical phases of Romance, Precision, and Generalization, belonging to the rhythm of learning, as he asserted in Aims of Education. As De Jonghe writes, Whitehead “described positive educational growth as an ongoing process involving three intertwined phases: the Romance of discovery, the development of Precision and mastery, and the emergence of Generalization when the realization of connectedness allows to take purposeful action and to raise new questions” (3). According to De Jonghe, for Whitehead, these interrelated and interweaving cycles represented “phases of the emergence of understanding as individuals experience educational events” (3).One main focus in the book is to apply many of the principles that are found in Whitehead's educational philosophy to the practice of schooling in order to assist children to be able to adapt to and “embrace change” (229) as well as “to learn and thrive, even in difficult times” (1). This includes not only the maintenance of one's well-being (and that of others), but the capability of persisting in crisis situations (e.g., geological, biomedical, ecological) that seem characteristic of our age, as well as being resilient in the face of the “challenging social conditions” (1) of the contemporary American context where there is much divisiveness surrounding education and educational policies. To these ends, De Jonghe examines “exemplary educational events characteristic of each of the three phases of learning,” and, from an analysis of them, draws conclusions and makes recommendations that provide “clarity on how to provide the best education for our children” (3).At the beginning of each chapter, De Jonghe relates interesting portraits, vignettes, or narratives of events of student learning. These are fictionalized simulacra inspired by real-life educational experiences that she and others have had with students. She examines them in depth with reference especially to Whitehead's educational philosophy but also to those of Dewey, Piaget, Noddings, Bruner, and so forth. Each case exhibits some important component of one or more of Whitehead's cyclical phases or stages of learning, the cases being arranged according to the general flow from the stage of Romance, to Precision, and on to Generalization, which help to form “the organizing structure of the book” (228). Roughly, the cases and their analyses in chapters 1 through 4 are chiefly about Romance (e.g., feeling, emotion, curiosity, imagination, art, and play), those in chapters 5 through 9 exhibit Precision (e.g., measurement, analysis, critical thinking, problem-solving, depth of learning, and mastery), and those in chapters 10 through 14 concern Generalization (e.g., restoration of the health of relationships, community, ecological interdependence, harmony, humor, and wisdom). Then De Jonghe shows how the educators in question, after some perplexity, obstruction, or unidentifi
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Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.5406/21543682.52.2.09
Donald Wayne Viney
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Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.5406/21543682.52.2.04
Paul A. Bogaard
Abstract In this article, Whitehead's transition from a Philosophy of Evolution to a Philosophy of Organism is studied primarily on the basis of the evidence provided by the first two volumes of The Harvard Lectures of Alfred North Whitehead, especially the second volume that deals with the period 1925–1927 and that is subtitled General Metaphysical Problems of Science.
{"title":"From a Philosophy of Evolution to a Philosophy of Organism","authors":"Paul A. Bogaard","doi":"10.5406/21543682.52.2.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21543682.52.2.04","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, Whitehead's transition from a Philosophy of Evolution to a Philosophy of Organism is studied primarily on the basis of the evidence provided by the first two volumes of The Harvard Lectures of Alfred North Whitehead, especially the second volume that deals with the period 1925–1927 and that is subtitled General Metaphysical Problems of Science.","PeriodicalId":315123,"journal":{"name":"Process Studies","volume":"11 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135565480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.5406/21543682.52.2.05
Ronny Desmet
Abstract Whitehead's 1925–1927 Harvard lectures (HL2) are too rich in content to easily summarize. Consequently, I limit myself in the present article to giving an account pivoting around Whitehead's functional theory of reality and his epochal theory of time.
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Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.5406/21543682.52.1.06
Julien Tempone-Wiltshire, Tra-ill Dowie
The work of Gregory Bateson offers a metaphysical basis for a “process psychology,” that is, a view of psychological practice and research guided by an ontology of becoming—identifying change, difference, and relationship as the basic elements of a foundational metaphysics. This article explores the relevance of Bateson's recursive epistemology, his reconception of the Great Chain of Being, a first-principles approach to defining the nature of mind, and understandings of interaction and difference, pattern and symmetry, interpretation and context. Bateson's philosophical contributions will be drawn into relationship with Wittgenstein's philosophy of language as use, Melnyk's theory of causal levels of explanation, Korzybski's account of map and territory, the rejection of the heuristic rigidity of substantialist ontologies, and a cybernetics communication science-informed approach to contextual-bidirectionality of causality. We thereby arrive at an understanding of Bateson's process psychology that, given its ecological-systemic nature, is explanatorily applicable across the mind sciences. This process psychology equips us to answer the question: What is mind? Not by explanatory appeal to substantial entities contained within mind, but instead by recourse to the contextually relevant patterns for understanding mind to a particular purpose. We have thereby attended to the gulf between heuristics and fundamentals, between psychological models and an onto-epistemic account of reality. Insufficient attention has been given to characterizing the vital nature of Bateson's philosophical oeuvre to psychological practice. This article draws out Bateson's relevance to establishing foundational principles for a process psychology capable of reinvigorating psychological thought.
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