This article explores the English translations of contemporary Ukrainian war poetry featured in the two anthologies Lysty z Ukrainy (Letters from Ukraine, 2016) and Words for War: New Poems from Ukraine (2017), through the prism of Jacques Derrida’s concept of “relevant.” It argues that although the economy of the original poems could not always be sustained, these translations nonetheless remain relevant primarily thanks to what they do rather than what they say. After contextualizing the recent (re)emergence of war poems as a genre of Ukrainian literature and providing an overview of the two translation anthologies, the article compares the Ukrainian originals with their English translations and discusses the various translation challenges. It then returns to Derrida’s own case study to extend the modifier “relevant” beyond its “economic” parameters to apply it more broadly to translation’s socio-political significance. It concludes with a discussion of how the two anthologies in question reflect the state of the reception of contemporary Ukrainian literature in the English-speaking world and how the translations they feature inform our understanding of the (un)translatability of poetry.
本文通过雅克·德里达“相关”概念的棱镜，探讨了Lysty z Ukmaining（《乌克兰来信》，2016）和Words for war:New Poems from Ukraine（2017）两本选集中当代乌克兰战争诗歌的英译本，尽管如此，这些翻译仍然具有相关性，这主要归功于它们所做的，而不是它们所说的。在将战争诗作为乌克兰文学的一种流派最近（重新）出现的背景置于背景之下，并对这两本翻译选集进行了概述之后，本文将乌克兰语原作与英语译本进行了比较，并讨论了各种翻译挑战。然后，它回到德里达自己的案例研究，将修饰语“相关”扩展到其“经济”参数之外，以更广泛地应用于翻译的社会政治意义。最后讨论了这两本选集如何反映英语世界对当代乌克兰文学的接受状态，以及它们的翻译如何影响我们对诗歌（不）可译性的理解。
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Each year, the Research Program on Religion and Culture at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) sponsors the Bohdan Bociurkiw Memorial Lecture. These lectures honour the memory of Professor Bohdan Bociurkiw, one of the founders of the CIUS and an eminent political scientist and internationally-renowned specialist in human rights, Soviet religious policy, and the history of the Ukrainian churches. They bring to Edmonton prominent scholars to speak on research at the intersection of Professor Bociurkiw’s interests in politics, religion, and history in Ukraine. The article below constitutes an expanded version of the 2021 Bohdan Bociurkiw Memorial Lecture, given by Professor José Casanova of Georgetown University. Professor Casanova is one of the world's top scholars in the sociology of religion and a senior fellow at the Berkley Center, where his work focuses on globalization, religions, and secularization. His best-known work, Public Religions in the Modern World (U of Chicago P, 1994), has become a modern classic in the field and has been translated into several languages. Since the 1990s, Professor Casanova has been a close observer of the evolution of civil society, nationalism, and religious pluralism in Ukraine. Indeed, in 2017, he published Beyond Secularization: Religious and Secular Dynamics in Our Global Age in Ukrainian. On 5 January 2019, Bartholomew I, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople signed a tomos, or decree, that officially recognized and established the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and granted it self-government, or autocephaly. This act formalized a major rift in Orthodox Christianity, as the Moscow Patriarchate, which claims canonical jurisdiction in Ukraine, then broke off relations with Constantinople. The hope that the new church would heal the rifts in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, bringing together the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church into one, was not immediately realized. Moreover, in addition to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, too, claims the mantle of the Kyivan religious tradition. In his lecture, Professor Casanova brings his sociologist’s eye to the question of the competition of three different national churches in present-day Ukraine and the
{"title":"The Three Kyivan Churches of Ukraine and the Three Romes","authors":"J. Casanova","doi":"10.21226/ewjus714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus714","url":null,"abstract":"Each year, the Research Program on Religion and Culture at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) sponsors the Bohdan Bociurkiw Memorial Lecture. These lectures honour the memory of Professor Bohdan Bociurkiw, one of the founders of the CIUS and an eminent political scientist and internationally-renowned specialist in human rights, Soviet religious policy, and the history of the Ukrainian churches. They bring to Edmonton prominent scholars to speak on research at the intersection of Professor Bociurkiw’s interests in politics, religion, and history in Ukraine. The article below constitutes an expanded version of the 2021 Bohdan Bociurkiw Memorial Lecture, given by Professor José Casanova of Georgetown University. Professor Casanova is one of the world's top scholars in the sociology of religion and a senior fellow at the Berkley Center, where his work focuses on globalization, religions, and secularization. His best-known work, Public Religions in the Modern World (U of Chicago P, 1994), has become a modern classic in the field and has been translated into several languages. Since the 1990s, Professor Casanova has been a close observer of the evolution of civil society, nationalism, and religious pluralism in Ukraine. Indeed, in 2017, he published Beyond Secularization: Religious and Secular Dynamics in Our Global Age in Ukrainian. On 5 January 2019, Bartholomew I, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople signed a tomos, or decree, that officially recognized and established the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and granted it self-government, or autocephaly. This act formalized a major rift in Orthodox Christianity, as the Moscow Patriarchate, which claims canonical jurisdiction in Ukraine, then broke off relations with Constantinople. The hope that the new church would heal the rifts in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, bringing together the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate), Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church into one, was not immediately realized. Moreover, in addition to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, too, claims the mantle of the Kyivan religious tradition. In his lecture, Professor Casanova brings his sociologist’s eye to the question of the competition of three different national churches in present-day Ukraine and the","PeriodicalId":31621,"journal":{"name":"EastWest Journal of Ukrainian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45317625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From the Editor-in-Chief: Russia's War against Ukraine","authors":"S. Krys","doi":"10.21226/ewjus703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus703","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":31621,"journal":{"name":"EastWest Journal of Ukrainian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41322113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Leonid Heretz, translator. History of Ukraine-Rus': Economic, Cultural, and National Life in the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries. By Mykhailo Hrushevsky.","authors":"Anatole Upart","doi":"10.21226/ewjus716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus716","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":31621,"journal":{"name":"EastWest Journal of Ukrainian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41546853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
History seems to be repeating itself, not as farce but as yet another tragedy. It reveals many of its driving forces at turning points. Those who manage to notice them, get the opportunity to rethink the past from a different perspective. The Russian-Ukrainian ongoing war of 2022 is one such fateful event. I am confident it will start a new chapter not only in history but also in the historiography of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Historians are usually more comfortable when they keep a distance from the object of their studies. I have no such distance; I am a deeply involved observer. When this essay is published, a reader will be better informed than the author about the course of events in Ukraine. However, although many details and aspects of the war remain in the shadow, I have a strong feeling of déjà vu, in particular when it comes to Russia. Tibor Szamuely once stressed: “Of all the burdens Russia has had to bear, heaviest and most relentless of all has been the weight of her past” (qtd. in Hedlund 267). The burden is heavy indeed because Russian history is cyclical. Over and over, Russia reproduces similar patterns of political, social, and cultural life that grew from the old Byzantine matrix. The persistence of geopolitical and imperial-religious foundations in Russian identity is truly impressive. During upheavals, a thin layer of Western polish peels off the Russian face, and she turns to Europe her “ugly Asian mug,” as Aleksandr Blok put it in 1918 (Blok 79).1 This is when the real, inner (glubinnaia) Russia reveals herself in the gloomy carcass of the Muscovite Tsardom. The “inner” Russia never was and never will be part of Europe. It always was a “garrison state,” a citadel of Orthodoxy, which remained in a state of permanent war both at its borders and beyond. It is to this Russia that Putin appeals when he calls his subjects to unmask “national traitors” who are guilty of looking to the West. Such xenophobic rhetoric at the highest political level has not been heard since Stalin’s campaign against the “rootless cosmopolites.” However, it is not difficult to find similar antiWestern paroxysms of hatred in each epoch of Russian history. The structure of Russian history has not changed since the Middle Ages. The same may be
{"title":"The Russian War against Ukraine: Cyclic History vs Fatal Geography","authors":"V. Kravchenko","doi":"10.21226/ewjus711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus711","url":null,"abstract":"History seems to be repeating itself, not as farce but as yet another tragedy. It reveals many of its driving forces at turning points. Those who manage to notice them, get the opportunity to rethink the past from a different perspective. The Russian-Ukrainian ongoing war of 2022 is one such fateful event. I am confident it will start a new chapter not only in history but also in the historiography of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Historians are usually more comfortable when they keep a distance from the object of their studies. I have no such distance; I am a deeply involved observer. When this essay is published, a reader will be better informed than the author about the course of events in Ukraine. However, although many details and aspects of the war remain in the shadow, I have a strong feeling of déjà vu, in particular when it comes to Russia. Tibor Szamuely once stressed: “Of all the burdens Russia has had to bear, heaviest and most relentless of all has been the weight of her past” (qtd. in Hedlund 267). The burden is heavy indeed because Russian history is cyclical. Over and over, Russia reproduces similar patterns of political, social, and cultural life that grew from the old Byzantine matrix. The persistence of geopolitical and imperial-religious foundations in Russian identity is truly impressive. During upheavals, a thin layer of Western polish peels off the Russian face, and she turns to Europe her “ugly Asian mug,” as Aleksandr Blok put it in 1918 (Blok 79).1 This is when the real, inner (glubinnaia) Russia reveals herself in the gloomy carcass of the Muscovite Tsardom. The “inner” Russia never was and never will be part of Europe. It always was a “garrison state,” a citadel of Orthodoxy, which remained in a state of permanent war both at its borders and beyond. It is to this Russia that Putin appeals when he calls his subjects to unmask “national traitors” who are guilty of looking to the West. Such xenophobic rhetoric at the highest political level has not been heard since Stalin’s campaign against the “rootless cosmopolites.” However, it is not difficult to find similar antiWestern paroxysms of hatred in each epoch of Russian history. The structure of Russian history has not changed since the Middle Ages. The same may be","PeriodicalId":31621,"journal":{"name":"EastWest Journal of Ukrainian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49334006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Myroslava M. Mudrak. Nova generatsiia i mystets'kyi modernizm v Ukraini.","authors":"O. S. Ilnytzkyj","doi":"10.21226/ewjus718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus718","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":31621,"journal":{"name":"EastWest Journal of Ukrainian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47488302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article considers a range of literary texts about the war in Donbas and argues that one of the primary representational strategies employed by Ukrainian writers has been the use of “parapolemics.” The article operates with Kate McLoughlin’s definition of this term as a focus on the “outskirts” of armed conflict, but also relates the idea to concepts drawn from trauma studies. While, on the one hand, the use of parapolemics may be a way of avoiding direct representation of wartime violence and death, the opportunities it affords are extremely valuable: focusing on the “backstage” of war and eschewing direct representation of violence allows writers to explore otherwise marginalized, and highly complex, dimensions of wartime experience. At the same time, connecting the parapolemic approach to ideas taken from trauma theory, particularly relating to empathy and responsibility, allows us to understand how parapolemics provide a way of reflecting both on the ethics of representing war and the of self-other relationships that arise in wartime.
{"title":"Writing around War: Parapolemics, Trauma, and Ethics in Ukrainian Representations of the War in the Donbas","authors":"U. Blacker","doi":"10.21226/ewjus706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus706","url":null,"abstract":"The article considers a range of literary texts about the war in Donbas and argues that one of the primary representational strategies employed by Ukrainian writers has been the use of “parapolemics.” The article operates with Kate McLoughlin’s definition of this term as a focus on the “outskirts” of armed conflict, but also relates the idea to concepts drawn from trauma studies. While, on the one hand, the use of parapolemics may be a way of avoiding direct representation of wartime violence and death, the opportunities it affords are extremely valuable: focusing on the “backstage” of war and eschewing direct representation of violence allows writers to explore otherwise marginalized, and highly complex, dimensions of wartime experience. At the same time, connecting the parapolemic approach to ideas taken from trauma theory, particularly relating to empathy and responsibility, allows us to understand how parapolemics provide a way of reflecting both on the ethics of representing war and the of self-other relationships that arise in wartime.","PeriodicalId":31621,"journal":{"name":"EastWest Journal of Ukrainian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41827572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Against a background of increasing electoral support of populist political actors in Europe and beyond, this study offers an exploratory inquiry into modern Ukrainian populism. The article examines populist communication, broadcast on the most highly rated Ukrainian television political talk shows, on the eve of the 2019 presidential election, which was completed in two rounds. A qualitative content analysis of populist communication acts (n=283) shows that Ukrainian viewers were exposed to diverse political discourses containing empty, anti-elitist, emergency, and complete populism, depending on which channel(s) they watched. The dominance of one or another type of populism on the studied channels mirrors the dynamics of media-political parallelism typical of Ukrainian commercial television. The study also examines the roles of different actors—moderators, journalists, and politicians—in either restricting or facilitating populism in the talk show studios. The populism-related reactions collected during this analysis (n=145) are discussed through the prism of normative roles, with a focus on gatekeeping, interpretation, and initiation. Implications for the stakeholders involved in the process of production, moderation, and consumption of political talk shows are presented.
{"title":"“We Will not Get Another Chance if We Lose This Battle Now”: Populism on Ukrainian Television Political Talk Shows ahead of the Presidential Election in 2019","authors":"Kostiantyn Yanchenko","doi":"10.21226/ewjus560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus560","url":null,"abstract":"Against a background of increasing electoral support of populist political actors in Europe and beyond, this study offers an exploratory inquiry into modern Ukrainian populism. The article examines populist communication, broadcast on the most highly rated Ukrainian television political talk shows, on the eve of the 2019 presidential election, which was completed in two rounds. A qualitative content analysis of populist communication acts (n=283) shows that Ukrainian viewers were exposed to diverse political discourses containing empty, anti-elitist, emergency, and complete populism, depending on which channel(s) they watched. The dominance of one or another type of populism on the studied channels mirrors the dynamics of media-political parallelism typical of Ukrainian commercial television. The study also examines the roles of different actors—moderators, journalists, and politicians—in either restricting or facilitating populism in the talk show studios. The populism-related reactions collected during this analysis (n=145) are discussed through the prism of normative roles, with a focus on gatekeeping, interpretation, and initiation. Implications for the stakeholders involved in the process of production, moderation, and consumption of political talk shows are presented.","PeriodicalId":31621,"journal":{"name":"EastWest Journal of Ukrainian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44018609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Trimarium Initiative (TI) is a platform for co-operation of twelve central and eastern European (CEE) countries of the eastern flank of the European Union (EU), introduced by Poland and Croatia in 2015. The TI is based on member co-operation in the development of transport and communication, energy, raw materials (gas and oil) transfer infrastructure, and digitization. The region is an important and rapidly growing market, and the TI goal is to boost economic co-operation among these twelve countries. Ukraine is not an EU member state, so it cannot be a full member of the TI; however, several TI infrastructural projects are open to Ukrainian companies. As Russia’s aggressive energy policy impacts Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states, Scandinavia, and Slovakia, the TI has a potential to meet this challenge. Transport and communication and energy transit infrastructure are promising areas of co-operation among TI countries and Ukraine. U.S. support has added optimism and prestige to the initiative.
{"title":"Twelve EU Countries on the Eastern Flank of NATO: What about Ukraine?","authors":"Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski","doi":"10.21226/ewjus514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21226/ewjus514","url":null,"abstract":"The Trimarium Initiative (TI) is a platform for co-operation of twelve central and eastern European (CEE) countries of the eastern flank of the European Union (EU), introduced by Poland and Croatia in 2015. The TI is based on member co-operation in the development of transport and communication, energy, raw materials (gas and oil) transfer infrastructure, and digitization. The region is an important and rapidly growing market, and the TI goal is to boost economic co-operation among these twelve countries. Ukraine is not an EU member state, so it cannot be a full member of the TI; however, several TI infrastructural projects are open to Ukrainian companies. As Russia’s aggressive energy policy impacts Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states, Scandinavia, and Slovakia, the TI has a potential to meet this challenge. Transport and communication and energy transit infrastructure are promising areas of co-operation among TI countries and Ukraine. U.S. support has added optimism and prestige to the initiative.","PeriodicalId":31621,"journal":{"name":"EastWest Journal of Ukrainian Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44797864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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