Price of Value, measured by the ratio of market price to accounting-based valuation, subsumes the power of book-to-market and to a large extent of various quality measures in predicting the cross-section of average returns. Price-of-value strategies generate significantly higher returns than traditional value and other anomaly strategies even after common factors adjustments, and provides natural hedge against momentum strategies. A four factor model using the Market, Small-Minus-Big, Momentum, and Price-Value Divergence Factor improves over alternative factor models.
{"title":"Price of Value and the Divergence Factor","authors":"L. Cong, Nathan George, Guojun Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2925577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2925577","url":null,"abstract":"Price of Value, measured by the ratio of market price to accounting-based valuation, subsumes the power of book-to-market and to a large extent of various quality measures in predicting the cross-section of average returns. Price-of-value strategies generate significantly higher returns than traditional value and other anomaly strategies even after common factors adjustments, and provides natural hedge against momentum strategies. A four factor model using the Market, Small-Minus-Big, Momentum, and Price-Value Divergence Factor improves over alternative factor models.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114851527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The “monopoly” authorized by the Patent Act refers to the exclusionary power of individual patents. That is not the same thing as the acquisition of individual patent rights into portfolios that dominate a market, something that the Patent Act never justifies and that the antitrust laws rightfully prohibit.Most patent assignments are procompetitive and serve to promote the efficient commercialization of patented inventions. However, patent acquisitions may also be used to combine substitute patents from external patentees, giving the acquirer an unearned monopoly position in the relevant technology market. A producer requires only one of the substitutes, but by acquiring the combination it can impede product market rivals by limiting their access to important technological inputs. Similarly, a patent assertion entity may acquire substitute patents to eliminate inter-licensor competition, enabling it to charge supra-competitive license fees, much like a merger or cartel. For example, by acquiring two or more substitute patents that collectively dominate a market a PAE can effectively monopolize the technology for that market. Such anticompetitive practices are regularly condemned in conventional product contexts, but the courts have not yet applied the same antitrust logic to patent markets. And they passively encourage anticompetitive patent acquisitions by awarding large damages when such patents are infringed.We propose that infringement damages for an externally acquired patent be denied if the acquisition served materially to expand or perpetuate the plaintiff’s dominant position in the relevant technology market. By weakening enforcement, this limits the patent holder’s ability to use such acquisitions to anticompetitive ends. We do not suggest that a dominant patent holder should be prohibited from securing external patent rights in the relevant technology market, but simply that it should obtain them through nonexclusive licensing, not transactions that restrict third party access. This is as valuable to patent policy as it is to antitrust, for it will tend to increase innovation by discouraging systematic monopoly in technology markets.
{"title":"Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits on Damages for Externally Acquired Patents","authors":"Erik N. Hovenkamp, Herbert Hovenkamp","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2767098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2767098","url":null,"abstract":"The “monopoly” authorized by the Patent Act refers to the exclusionary power of individual patents. That is not the same thing as the acquisition of individual patent rights into portfolios that dominate a market, something that the Patent Act never justifies and that the antitrust laws rightfully prohibit.Most patent assignments are procompetitive and serve to promote the efficient commercialization of patented inventions. However, patent acquisitions may also be used to combine substitute patents from external patentees, giving the acquirer an unearned monopoly position in the relevant technology market. A producer requires only one of the substitutes, but by acquiring the combination it can impede product market rivals by limiting their access to important technological inputs. Similarly, a patent assertion entity may acquire substitute patents to eliminate inter-licensor competition, enabling it to charge supra-competitive license fees, much like a merger or cartel. For example, by acquiring two or more substitute patents that collectively dominate a market a PAE can effectively monopolize the technology for that market. Such anticompetitive practices are regularly condemned in conventional product contexts, but the courts have not yet applied the same antitrust logic to patent markets. And they passively encourage anticompetitive patent acquisitions by awarding large damages when such patents are infringed.We propose that infringement damages for an externally acquired patent be denied if the acquisition served materially to expand or perpetuate the plaintiff’s dominant position in the relevant technology market. By weakening enforcement, this limits the patent holder’s ability to use such acquisitions to anticompetitive ends. We do not suggest that a dominant patent holder should be prohibited from securing external patent rights in the relevant technology market, but simply that it should obtain them through nonexclusive licensing, not transactions that restrict third party access. This is as valuable to patent policy as it is to antitrust, for it will tend to increase innovation by discouraging systematic monopoly in technology markets.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121835130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
José-María Da-Rocha, Diego Restuccia, Marina M. Tavares
What accounts for differences in output per capita and total factor productivity (TFP) across countries? Empirical evidence points to resource misallocation across heterogeneous production units as an important factor. We study misallocation in a general equilibrium model of establishment productivity where the distribution of productivity is characterized in closed form and responds to the same policy distortions that create misallocation. In this framework, policy distortions not only misallocate resources across a given set of productive units (static effect), but also create disincentives for productivity improvement thereby altering the productivity distribution and equilibrium prices (dynamic effect), further lowering aggregate output and TFP. The dynamic effect is substantial contributing to a doubling of the static misallocation effect. Reducing the dispersion in distortions by 25 percentage points to the level of the U.S. benchmark economy implies an increasein relative aggregate output of 123 percent, where 54 percent arises from factor misallocation(static effect).
{"title":"Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity with Endogenous Establishment-Level Productivity","authors":"José-María Da-Rocha, Diego Restuccia, Marina M. Tavares","doi":"10.3386/W23339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W23339","url":null,"abstract":"What accounts for differences in output per capita and total factor productivity (TFP) across countries? Empirical evidence points to resource misallocation across heterogeneous production units as an important factor. We study misallocation in a general equilibrium model of establishment productivity where the distribution of productivity is characterized in closed form and responds to the same policy distortions that create misallocation. In this framework, policy distortions not only misallocate resources across a given set of productive units (static effect), but also create disincentives for productivity improvement thereby altering the productivity distribution and equilibrium prices (dynamic effect), further lowering aggregate output and TFP. The dynamic effect is substantial contributing to a doubling of the static misallocation effect. Reducing the dispersion in distortions by 25 percentage points to the level of the U.S. benchmark economy implies an increasein relative aggregate output of 123 percent, where 54 percent arises from factor misallocation(static effect).","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121310716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
N. Bloom, E. Brynjolfsson, L. Foster, Ron S. Jarmin, Megha Patnaik, Itay Saporta Eksten, J. Van Reenen
Partnering with the Census we implement a new survey of “structured” management practices in 32,000 US manufacturing plants. We find an enormous dispersion of management practices across plants, with 40% of this variation across plants within the same firm. This management variation accounts for about a fifth of the spread of productivity, a similar fraction as that accounted for by R&D, and twice as much as explained by IT. We find evidence for four “drivers” of management: competition, business environment, learning spillovers and human capital. Collectively, these drivers account for about a third of the dispersion of structured management practices.
{"title":"What Drives Differences in Management?","authors":"N. Bloom, E. Brynjolfsson, L. Foster, Ron S. Jarmin, Megha Patnaik, Itay Saporta Eksten, J. Van Reenen","doi":"10.3386/W23300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W23300","url":null,"abstract":"Partnering with the Census we implement a new survey of “structured” management practices in 32,000 US manufacturing plants. We find an enormous dispersion of management practices across plants, with 40% of this variation across plants within the same firm. This management variation accounts for about a fifth of the spread of productivity, a similar fraction as that accounted for by R&D, and twice as much as explained by IT. We find evidence for four “drivers” of management: competition, business environment, learning spillovers and human capital. Collectively, these drivers account for about a third of the dispersion of structured management practices.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116086355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Firms may be reluctant to provide general training if workers can quit and use their gained skills elsewhere. "Training contracts" that impose a penalty for premature quitting can help alleviate this inefficiency. Using plausibly exogenous contractual variation from a leading trucking firm, we show that two training contracts significantly reduced post-training quitting, particularly when workers are approaching the end of their contracts. Simulating a structural model, we show that observed worker quit behavior exhibits aspects of optimization (for one of the two contracts), and that the contracts increased firm profits from training and reduced worker welfare relative to no contract.
{"title":"Training Contracts, Employee Turnover, and the Returns from Firm-Sponsored General Training","authors":"M. Hoffman, S. Burks","doi":"10.3386/W23247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W23247","url":null,"abstract":"Firms may be reluctant to provide general training if workers can quit and use their gained skills elsewhere. \"Training contracts\" that impose a penalty for premature quitting can help alleviate this inefficiency. Using plausibly exogenous contractual variation from a leading trucking firm, we show that two training contracts significantly reduced post-training quitting, particularly when workers are approaching the end of their contracts. Simulating a structural model, we show that observed worker quit behavior exhibits aspects of optimization (for one of the two contracts), and that the contracts increased firm profits from training and reduced worker welfare relative to no contract.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115617829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-02-17DOI: 10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000286
R. Bruner, R. M. Conroy, Kenneth M. Eades, S. Carr
In July 2001, a new CEO joins this small manufacturer of CD-ROMs and DVDs to discover that the firm is in the midst of a financial crisis, induced by rapid growth. The CEO asks an analyst for help with five tasks: (1) review historical performance of the firm; (2) forecast financing requirements for the next two years; (3) exercise the forecasting model to identify â¬Skey driverâ¬? assumptions; (4) estimate Star Riverâ¬"s weighted average cost of capital; and (5) analyze a proposed investment in a packaging machine. The analyst must offer insights and recommendations based on the work. The aim of the case is to exercise studentsâ¬" abilities in financial forecasting and analysis and in the analysis of capital projects. Generally, the case offers a good omnibus review of foundational tools and concepts.
{"title":"Star River Electronics Ltd","authors":"R. Bruner, R. M. Conroy, Kenneth M. Eades, S. Carr","doi":"10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000286","url":null,"abstract":"In July 2001, a new CEO joins this small manufacturer of CD-ROMs and DVDs to discover that the firm is in the midst of a financial crisis, induced by rapid growth. The CEO asks an analyst for help with five tasks: (1) review historical performance of the firm; (2) forecast financing requirements for the next two years; (3) exercise the forecasting model to identify â¬Skey driverâ¬? assumptions; (4) estimate Star Riverâ¬\"s weighted average cost of capital; and (5) analyze a proposed investment in a packaging machine. The analyst must offer insights and recommendations based on the work. The aim of the case is to exercise studentsâ¬\" abilities in financial forecasting and analysis and in the analysis of capital projects. Generally, the case offers a good omnibus review of foundational tools and concepts.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132041517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-02-17DOI: 10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000116
Gosia Glinska, S. Venkataraman, B. Parmar, S. Sarasvathy
The case chronicles the development of Lumni, Inc., an international start-up offering innovative mechanisms for financing higher education. It focuses on: the details of decision making required to transform an idea into a viable business; building partnerships; the challenge associated with raising venture capital; and the challenges of creating a new market where human capital can be traded to finance higher education.
{"title":"Felipe Vergara and Lumni: Launching an Innovation in a Developing Economy","authors":"Gosia Glinska, S. Venkataraman, B. Parmar, S. Sarasvathy","doi":"10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000116","url":null,"abstract":"The case chronicles the development of Lumni, Inc., an international start-up offering innovative mechanisms for financing higher education. It focuses on: the details of decision making required to transform an idea into a viable business; building partnerships; the challenge associated with raising venture capital; and the challenges of creating a new market where human capital can be traded to finance higher education.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"284 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124539494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-02-13DOI: 10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000080
Anton Ovchinnikov, Elena Loutskina
In the early months of the 2007-08 financial crisis, a loan manager faces a real estate financing decision. Should he approve a bullet structure three-year loan to a longstanding client, a legendary Texan developer? The developer, who near retirement downsized his business, is seeking financing for his only project: residential or commercial development on an attractive piece of land in suburban Houston. The loan manager considers the decision in light of the mortgage market turmoil, seeing commercial projects as safer, but also factoring that the residential market could bring higher returns if the market stabilizes soon. The manager collects the data and asks an analyst to assess the risks; that ultimately requires assessing the economics of both projects from both the bank’s and the developer’s perspectives. The bank could still change the interest rate on the loan to receive adequate compensation for the risk it carries, but the loan manager knows that doing so will change their long-term client willingness to take on the loan.
{"title":"Crawford Development Co. And Southeast Bank of Texas","authors":"Anton Ovchinnikov, Elena Loutskina","doi":"10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000080","url":null,"abstract":"In the early months of the 2007-08 financial crisis, a loan manager faces a real estate financing decision. Should he approve a bullet structure three-year loan to a longstanding client, a legendary Texan developer? The developer, who near retirement downsized his business, is seeking financing for his only project: residential or commercial development on an attractive piece of land in suburban Houston. The loan manager considers the decision in light of the mortgage market turmoil, seeing commercial projects as safer, but also factoring that the residential market could bring higher returns if the market stabilizes soon. The manager collects the data and asks an analyst to assess the risks; that ultimately requires assessing the economics of both projects from both the bank’s and the developer’s perspectives. The bank could still change the interest rate on the loan to receive adequate compensation for the risk it carries, but the loan manager knows that doing so will change their long-term client willingness to take on the loan.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123358964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-02-07DOI: 10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000237
R. Bruner, Robert Hengelbrok, S. Carr
In early 2002, an analyst, Tom Baumann, must propose terms for leasing one of his company's advanced factory-automation systems to a major customer. From the lessor's standpoint, the challenge is simply to design an annuity stream that yields a present value equal to, or greater than, the value of the asset being leased. Certain factors, however, serve to complicate the analysis. The tax exposure and debt rating of the customer are uncertain, leaving the analyst to estimate the impact of alternative lease terms under different tax and interest-rate assumptions. Also, the customer is considering leasing competing systems from companies in Germany and Japan; these competing proposals limit Primus's flexibility in tailoring its proposal. In short, the students task is to design lease terms that exploit the lessee's tax and interest-rate exposure within constraints set by competitive terms.
{"title":"Primus Automation Division, 2002","authors":"R. Bruner, Robert Hengelbrok, S. Carr","doi":"10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/CASE.DARDEN.2016.000237","url":null,"abstract":"In early 2002, an analyst, Tom Baumann, must propose terms for leasing one of his company's advanced factory-automation systems to a major customer. From the lessor's standpoint, the challenge is simply to design an annuity stream that yields a present value equal to, or greater than, the value of the asset being leased. Certain factors, however, serve to complicate the analysis. The tax exposure and debt rating of the customer are uncertain, leaving the analyst to estimate the impact of alternative lease terms under different tax and interest-rate assumptions. Also, the customer is considering leasing competing systems from companies in Germany and Japan; these competing proposals limit Primus's flexibility in tailoring its proposal. In short, the student\u0019s task is to design lease terms that exploit the lessee's tax and interest-rate exposure within constraints set by competitive terms.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125339534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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