Pub Date : 2017-11-01DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226611235.003.0004
E. Berndt, M. Trusheim
Precision medicines inherently fragment treatment populations, generating small-population markets, creating high-priced "niche busters" rather than broadly prescribed "blockbusters". It is plausible to expect that small markets will attract limited entry in which a small number of interdependent differentiated product oligopolists will compete, each possessing market power. Multiple precision medicine market situations now resemble game theory constructs such as the prisoners' dilemma and Bertrand competition. The examples often involve drug developer choices created by setting the cut-off value for the companion diagnostics to define the precision medicine market niches and their payoffs. Precision medicine game situations may also involve payers and patients who attempt to change the game to their advantage or whose induced behaviors alter the payoffs for the developers. The variety of games may predictably array themselves across the lifecycle of each precision medicine indication niche and so may become linked into a sequentially evolving meta-game. We hypothesize that certain precision medicine areas such as inflammatory diseases are becoming complex simultaneous multi-games in which distinct precision medicine niches compete. Those players that learn the most rapidly and apply those learnings the most asymmetrically will be advantaged in this ongoing information pharms race.
{"title":"The Information Pharms Race and Competitive Dynamics of Precision Medicine: Insights from Game Theory","authors":"E. Berndt, M. Trusheim","doi":"10.7208/chicago/9780226611235.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226611235.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Precision medicines inherently fragment treatment populations, generating small-population markets, creating high-priced \"niche busters\" rather than broadly prescribed \"blockbusters\". It is plausible to expect that small markets will attract limited entry in which a small number of interdependent differentiated product oligopolists will compete, each possessing market power. Multiple precision medicine market situations now resemble game theory constructs such as the prisoners' dilemma and Bertrand competition. The examples often involve drug developer choices created by setting the cut-off value for the companion diagnostics to define the precision medicine market niches and their payoffs. Precision medicine game situations may also involve payers and patients who attempt to change the game to their advantage or whose induced behaviors alter the payoffs for the developers. The variety of games may predictably array themselves across the lifecycle of each precision medicine indication niche and so may become linked into a sequentially evolving meta-game. We hypothesize that certain precision medicine areas such as inflammatory diseases are becoming complex simultaneous multi-games in which distinct precision medicine niches compete. Those players that learn the most rapidly and apply those learnings the most asymmetrically will be advantaged in this ongoing information pharms race.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125041590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alex Bell, Raj Chetty, Xavier Jaravel, Neviana Petkova, J. Van Reenen
We characterize the factors that determine who becomes an inventor in America by using de-identified data on 1.2 million inventors from patent records linked to tax records. We establish three sets of results. First, children from high-income (top 1%) families are ten times as likely to become inventors as those from below-median income families. There are similarly large gaps by race and gender. Differences in innate ability, as measured by test scores in early childhood, explain relatively little of these gaps. Second, exposure to innovation during childhood has significant causal effects on children's propensities to become inventors. Growing up in a neighborhood or family with a high innovation rate in a specific technology class leads to a higher probability of patenting in exactly the same technology class. These exposure effects are gender-specific: girls are more likely to become inventors in a particular technology class if they grow up in an area with more female inventors in that technology class. Third, the financial returns to inventions are extremely skewed and highly correlated with their scientific impact, as measured by citations. Consistent with the importance of exposure effects and contrary to standard models of career selection, women and disadvantaged youth are as under-represented among high-impact inventors as they are among inventors as a whole. We develop a simple model of inventors' careers that matches these empirical results. The model implies that increasing exposure to innovation in childhood may have larger impacts on innovation than increasing the financial incentives to innovate, for instance by reducing tax rates. In particular, there are many "lost Einsteins" - individuals who would have had highly impactful inventions had they been exposed to innovation.
{"title":"Who Becomes an Inventor in America? The Importance of Exposure to Innovation","authors":"Alex Bell, Raj Chetty, Xavier Jaravel, Neviana Petkova, J. Van Reenen","doi":"10.3386/W24062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W24062","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize the factors that determine who becomes an inventor in America by using de-identified data on 1.2 million inventors from patent records linked to tax records. We establish three sets of results. First, children from high-income (top 1%) families are ten times as likely to become inventors as those from below-median income families. There are similarly large gaps by race and gender. Differences in innate ability, as measured by test scores in early childhood, explain relatively little of these gaps. Second, exposure to innovation during childhood has significant causal effects on children's propensities to become inventors. Growing up in a neighborhood or family with a high innovation rate in a specific technology class leads to a higher probability of patenting in exactly the same technology class. These exposure effects are gender-specific: girls are more likely to become inventors in a particular technology class if they grow up in an area with more female inventors in that technology class. Third, the financial returns to inventions are extremely skewed and highly correlated with their scientific impact, as measured by citations. Consistent with the importance of exposure effects and contrary to standard models of career selection, women and disadvantaged youth are as under-represented among high-impact inventors as they are among inventors as a whole. We develop a simple model of inventors' careers that matches these empirical results. The model implies that increasing exposure to innovation in childhood may have larger impacts on innovation than increasing the financial incentives to innovate, for instance by reducing tax rates. In particular, there are many \"lost Einsteins\" - individuals who would have had highly impactful inventions had they been exposed to innovation.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115149348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P. Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, M. Lequien, Stefanie Stantcheva
We study how strongly individuals respond to tax simplicity and how they learn about the complexities of the tax system. We focus on the self-employed, who can more easily adjust to tax incentives and whose responses directly stem from their own understanding of the tax system. We use new French tax returns data from 1994 to 2012. France serves as a good quasi-laboratory: it has three fiscal regimes – or modes of taxation – for the self-employed, which differ in their monetary tax incentives and in their tax simplicity. Two key features are that, first, these regimes are subject to eligibility thresholds; we find large excess masses (bunching) right below the latter. Second, the regimes impact different agents heterogeneously and have changed extensively over time. Taken together, these two key elements give us measures of tax responses (the bunching) as well as the variation needed to jointly estimate a value of tax simplicity and taxable income elasticities. They also give us an opportunity to study how individuals learn about and respond over time to changing policy parameters. We estimate a large value for tax simplicity of up to 650 euros per year per individual depending on the regime and activity. We also find sizable costs of tax complexity; agents are not immediately able to understand what the right regime choice is, leave significant money on the table, and learn over time. The cost of complexity is “regressive” in that it affects mostly the uneducated, low income, and low skill agents. Agents who can be viewed as more informed and knowledgeable (e.g., the more educated or high-skilled) are more likely to make the correct regime choice and to learn faster.
{"title":"Tax Simplicity and Heterogeneous Learning","authors":"P. Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, M. Lequien, Stefanie Stantcheva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3132923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3132923","url":null,"abstract":"We study how strongly individuals respond to tax simplicity and how they learn about the complexities of the tax system. We focus on the self-employed, who can more easily adjust to tax incentives and whose responses directly stem from their own understanding of the tax system. We use new French tax returns data from 1994 to 2012. France serves as a good quasi-laboratory: it has three fiscal regimes – or modes of taxation – for the self-employed, which differ in their monetary tax incentives and in their tax simplicity. Two key features are that, first, these regimes are subject to eligibility thresholds; we find large excess masses (bunching) right below the latter. Second, the regimes impact different agents heterogeneously and have changed extensively over time. Taken together, these two key elements give us measures of tax responses (the bunching) as well as the variation needed to jointly estimate a value of tax simplicity and taxable income elasticities. They also give us an opportunity to study how individuals learn about and respond over time to changing policy parameters. We estimate a large value for tax simplicity of up to 650 euros per year per individual depending on the regime and activity. We also find sizable costs of tax complexity; agents are not immediately able to understand what the right regime choice is, leave significant money on the table, and learn over time. The cost of complexity is “regressive” in that it affects mostly the uneducated, low income, and low skill agents. Agents who can be viewed as more informed and knowledgeable (e.g., the more educated or high-skilled) are more likely to make the correct regime choice and to learn faster.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116360303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Asset prices plunged between 2007 and 2010 but then rebounded from 2010 to 2016. The most telling finding is that median wealth plummeted by 44 percent over years 2007 to 2010. The inequality of net worth, after almost two decades of little movement, went up sharply from 2007 to 2010, and relative indebtedness for the middle class expanded. The sharp fall in median net worth and the rise in overall wealth inequality over these years are largely traceable to the high leverage of middle class families and the high share of homes in their portfolio. Mean and median wealth rebounded from 2010 to 2016, by 17 and 28 percent, respectively. While mean wealth surpassed its previous peak in 2007, median wealth was still down by 34 percent. More than 100 percent of the recovery in both was due to a high return on wealth but this factor was offset by negative savings. Relative indebtedness continued to fall for the middle class from 2010 to 2016, and wealth inequality increased somewhat. The racial and ethnic disparity in wealth holdings widened considerably between 2007 and 2016, and the wealth of households under age 45 declined in relative terms.
{"title":"Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 2016: Has Middle Class Wealth Recovered?","authors":"E. Wolff","doi":"10.3386/W24085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W24085","url":null,"abstract":"Asset prices plunged between 2007 and 2010 but then rebounded from 2010 to 2016. The most telling finding is that median wealth plummeted by 44 percent over years 2007 to 2010. The inequality of net worth, after almost two decades of little movement, went up sharply from 2007 to 2010, and relative indebtedness for the middle class expanded. The sharp fall in median net worth and the rise in overall wealth inequality over these years are largely traceable to the high leverage of middle class families and the high share of homes in their portfolio. Mean and median wealth rebounded from 2010 to 2016, by 17 and 28 percent, respectively. While mean wealth surpassed its previous peak in 2007, median wealth was still down by 34 percent. More than 100 percent of the recovery in both was due to a high return on wealth but this factor was offset by negative savings. Relative indebtedness continued to fall for the middle class from 2010 to 2016, and wealth inequality increased somewhat. The racial and ethnic disparity in wealth holdings widened considerably between 2007 and 2016, and the wealth of households under age 45 declined in relative terms.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127627841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economy-wide institutional deficiencies causing factor misallocation have been emphasized as essential determinants of aggregate TFP differences. This paper argues that production flexibility at the micro-level is an economic characteristic that should be given priority in TFP aggregation exercises. We investigate a heterogeneous firms model with two distinct notions of flexibility: (i) the firm-specific capacity to optimize over a set of production techniques that serve to organize capital and labor; and, (ii) the industry-specific substitutability between efficient units of capital and labor. We show the presence of a strong interaction between "ability to choose techniques" and "input substitutability": high complementarity at the industry-level amplifies imperfections associated with techniques choice at the firm-level. Using the micro-founded structure, we develop measures for factor, output and technique distortions across a distribution of firms and quantify their TFP effects. For a broad range of U.S. manufacturing industry clusters, technique distortions generate more TFP losses than misallocation resulting from capital and output distortions, with larger TFP gains from removing technique distortions in industries that exhibit high degrees of factor complementarity. Our key quantitative results are robust to outliers, production function specification, mismeasurement and parameterization of the model and are strongly present in developing country datasets.
{"title":"Production Flexibility, Misallocation and Total Factor Productivity","authors":"Burak R. Uras, Ping Wang","doi":"10.3386/w23970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w23970","url":null,"abstract":"Economy-wide institutional deficiencies causing factor misallocation have been emphasized as essential determinants of aggregate TFP differences. This paper argues that production flexibility at the micro-level is an economic characteristic that should be given priority in TFP aggregation exercises. We investigate a heterogeneous firms model with two distinct notions of flexibility: (i) the firm-specific capacity to optimize over a set of production techniques that serve to organize capital and labor; and, (ii) the industry-specific substitutability between efficient units of capital and labor. We show the presence of a strong interaction between \"ability to choose techniques\" and \"input substitutability\": high complementarity at the industry-level amplifies imperfections associated with techniques choice at the firm-level. Using the micro-founded structure, we develop measures for factor, output and technique distortions across a distribution of firms and quantify their TFP effects. For a broad range of U.S. manufacturing industry clusters, technique distortions generate more TFP losses than misallocation resulting from capital and output distortions, with larger TFP gains from removing technique distortions in industries that exhibit high degrees of factor complementarity. Our key quantitative results are robust to outliers, production function specification, mismeasurement and parameterization of the model and are strongly present in developing country datasets.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127168897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Online Appendix to 'Depreciating Licenses'","authors":"E. Weyl, Anthony Lee Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3034480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3034480","url":null,"abstract":"This is the online appendix for \"Depreciating Licenses.\" The main text can be found here: <a href='https://ssrn.com/abstract=2744810'>https://ssrn.com/abstract=2744810</a>","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132042751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Alexander Ljungqvist, M. Richardson, Daniel Wolfenzon
We analyze the determinants of buyout funds’ investment decisions. We argue that when there is imperfect competition for private equity funds, the timing of funds’ investment decisions, their risk‐taking behavior, and their subsequent returns depend on changes in the demand for private equity, conditions in the credit market, and fund managers’ ability to influence perceptions of their talent. We investigate these hypotheses using a proprietary dataset of 207 U.S. buyout funds that invested in 1,957 buyout targets over a 30‐year period. Our dataset contains precisely dated cash inflows and outflows in every portfolio company, links every buyout target to an identifiable buyout fund, and is free from reporting and survivor biases. Thus, we are able to characterize every buyout fund's precise investment choices. Our findings are as follows. First, established funds accelerate their investment flows and earn higher returns when investment opportunities improve, competition for deal flow eases, and credit market conditions loosen. Second, the investment behavior of first‐time funds is less sensitive to market conditions. Third, younger funds invest in riskier buyouts, in an effort to establish a track record. Finally, following periods of good performance, funds become more conservative, and this effect is stronger for first‐time funds.
{"title":"The Investment Behavior of Buyout Fund: Theory and Evidence","authors":"Alexander Ljungqvist, M. Richardson, Daniel Wolfenzon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.478061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.478061","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the determinants of buyout funds’ investment decisions. We argue that when there is imperfect competition for private equity funds, the timing of funds’ investment decisions, their risk‐taking behavior, and their subsequent returns depend on changes in the demand for private equity, conditions in the credit market, and fund managers’ ability to influence perceptions of their talent. We investigate these hypotheses using a proprietary dataset of 207 U.S. buyout funds that invested in 1,957 buyout targets over a 30‐year period. Our dataset contains precisely dated cash inflows and outflows in every portfolio company, links every buyout target to an identifiable buyout fund, and is free from reporting and survivor biases. Thus, we are able to characterize every buyout fund's precise investment choices. Our findings are as follows. First, established funds accelerate their investment flows and earn higher returns when investment opportunities improve, competition for deal flow eases, and credit market conditions loosen. Second, the investment behavior of first‐time funds is less sensitive to market conditions. Third, younger funds invest in riskier buyouts, in an effort to establish a track record. Finally, following periods of good performance, funds become more conservative, and this effect is stronger for first‐time funds.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127063101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this dissertation, I use historical patent data and natural experiments to show how policies and institutions affect invention. Chapter 1 shows that establishing new colleges causes 33% more patents per year in places that get a college, but few of these additional patents come from the college's graduates. Chapter 2 uses alcohol prohibition to show that informal social interactions are important for invention: shuttering saloons decreased patenting by 15%. The effect is strongest immediately after prohibition begins. Chapter 3 plots demographic trends of inventors; blacks and females are persistently underrepresented. Chapter 4 describes several historical patent datasets in detail.
{"title":"Dissertation Executive Summary: Fuel of Interest and Fire of Genius: Essays on the Economic History of Innovation","authors":"Michael J. Andrews","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3081168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3081168","url":null,"abstract":"In this dissertation, I use historical patent data and natural experiments to show how policies and institutions affect invention. Chapter 1 shows that establishing new colleges causes 33% more patents per year in places that get a college, but few of these additional patents come from the college's graduates. Chapter 2 uses alcohol prohibition to show that informal social interactions are important for invention: shuttering saloons decreased patenting by 15%. The effect is strongest immediately after prohibition begins. Chapter 3 plots demographic trends of inventors; blacks and females are persistently underrepresented. Chapter 4 describes several historical patent datasets in detail.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124926379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Persistent performance in venture capital is routinely interpreted as evidence for skill. We present a dynamic model of delegated investment with endogenous fund heterogeneity and deal flow, which generates performance persistence without skill differences and predicts mean reversion in long-term performance. Investors working with multiple funds use contingent payments and tiered contracts to induce proper project nurturing and managerial effort. Successful funds receive continuation contracts that tolerate investment failure and encourage innovation, and subsequently finance entrepreneurs through a path-dependent assortative matching favoring incumbents. Recent empirical findings corroborate the model’s general implications, and the economic mechanisms are robust to short-term contracting, endogenous bargaining, and double moral hazard issues.
{"title":"Persistent Blessings of Luck: Theory and an Application to Venture Capital","authors":"L. Cong, Yizhou Xiao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2920918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2920918","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Persistent performance in venture capital is routinely interpreted as evidence for skill. We present a dynamic model of delegated investment with endogenous fund heterogeneity and deal flow, which generates performance persistence without skill differences and predicts mean reversion in long-term performance. Investors working with multiple funds use contingent payments and tiered contracts to induce proper project nurturing and managerial effort. Successful funds receive continuation contracts that tolerate investment failure and encourage innovation, and subsequently finance entrepreneurs through a path-dependent assortative matching favoring incumbents. Recent empirical findings corroborate the model’s general implications, and the economic mechanisms are robust to short-term contracting, endogenous bargaining, and double moral hazard issues.","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131180730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This note discusses the legal issues entrepreneurs must consider as they form their company as a legal entity. In Q&A format, the note concisely defines the types of entity available and discusses when and how to engage a lawyer. Excerpt UVA-ENT-0072 LEGAL ISSUES FOR NEW VENTURES: CHOICE OF LAWYER AND CHOICE OF ENTITY Introduction Moving a new business from the idea stage to that of legal entity is an exciting step in the entrepreneurial process. In this note, we explore some of the typical and essential questions an entrepreneur might ask during this phase of development. Questions . . .
{"title":"Legal Issues for New Ventures: Choice of Lawyer and Choice of Entity","authors":"S. Sarasvathy, Richard White, M. Ishrat","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2974250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2974250","url":null,"abstract":"This note discusses the legal issues entrepreneurs must consider as they form their company as a legal entity. In Q&A format, the note concisely defines the types of entity available and discusses when and how to engage a lawyer. \u0000Excerpt \u0000UVA-ENT-0072 \u0000LEGAL ISSUES FOR NEW VENTURES: \u0000CHOICE OF LAWYER AND CHOICE OF ENTITY \u0000Introduction \u0000Moving a new business from the idea stage to that of legal entity is an exciting step in the entrepreneurial process. In this note, we explore some of the typical and essential questions an entrepreneur might ask during this phase of development. \u0000Questions \u0000. . .","PeriodicalId":325993,"journal":{"name":"Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Research Paper Series","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129701272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：