Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2191563
Exequiel Lacovsky
ABSTRACT Building upon my book, “Nuclear Weapons Free Zones”, I assess the scope conditions for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia. In particular, I evaluate the role of the value of common security for states as a way to cope with nuclear threats, regional economic cooperation, regional institutions, democracy, regional powers, and nonproliferation entrepreneurship. In addition, I offer insights from other regions. While the existing conditions in the Northeast are not currently conducive for a NWFZ, Northeast Asia’s effort should be put into achieving the end of the DPRK nuclear program, the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and perhaps at a later stage, an NWFZ might be considered.
{"title":"A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia: Prospects and Insights from Other Regions","authors":"Exequiel Lacovsky","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2191563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2191563","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Building upon my book, “Nuclear Weapons Free Zones”, I assess the scope conditions for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia. In particular, I evaluate the role of the value of common security for states as a way to cope with nuclear threats, regional economic cooperation, regional institutions, democracy, regional powers, and nonproliferation entrepreneurship. In addition, I offer insights from other regions. While the existing conditions in the Northeast are not currently conducive for a NWFZ, Northeast Asia’s effort should be put into achieving the end of the DPRK nuclear program, the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and perhaps at a later stage, an NWFZ might be considered.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"6 1","pages":"148 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42126745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2221486
S. Bidgood
ABSTRACT Bilateral strategic stability between the United States and Russia is not a new concept, but it is one that is both evolving and contested. It faces two interrelated challenges that make its operationalization difficult today. First, as Michael Gerson has observed, it has “no single, universally accepted definition”, and there is little agreement on “which factors contribute to and detract from it”. Second, efforts to negotiate US-Russia bilateral arms control and risk reduction measures designed to advance strategic stability can become stymied as a result because negotiators lack a common goal. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine represents an inflection point for strategic stability on several levels. Against the backdrop of the impending expiration of New START and the arrival of what Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala call a third nuclear age, policymakers in Washington and Moscow should seek to reach a shared understanding of what strategic stability is and does as a means to its operationalization. Recognizing the challenges to doing so, particularly in the current environment, this article outlines two-phased approach to strategic stability dialogue that is informed by a philosophy of Pragmatism and translated into policy through mechanisms like backcasting and threatcasting. Its objective is to aid both sides in disambiguating their conceptualization of strategic stability while prioritizing approaches that can strengthen its most desirable outcomes.
{"title":"What We Talk About When We Talk About US-Russia Strategic Stability","authors":"S. Bidgood","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2221486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2221486","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Bilateral strategic stability between the United States and Russia is not a new concept, but it is one that is both evolving and contested. It faces two interrelated challenges that make its operationalization difficult today. First, as Michael Gerson has observed, it has “no single, universally accepted definition”, and there is little agreement on “which factors contribute to and detract from it”. Second, efforts to negotiate US-Russia bilateral arms control and risk reduction measures designed to advance strategic stability can become stymied as a result because negotiators lack a common goal. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine represents an inflection point for strategic stability on several levels. Against the backdrop of the impending expiration of New START and the arrival of what Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala call a third nuclear age, policymakers in Washington and Moscow should seek to reach a shared understanding of what strategic stability is and does as a means to its operationalization. Recognizing the challenges to doing so, particularly in the current environment, this article outlines two-phased approach to strategic stability dialogue that is informed by a philosophy of Pragmatism and translated into policy through mechanisms like backcasting and threatcasting. Its objective is to aid both sides in disambiguating their conceptualization of strategic stability while prioritizing approaches that can strengthen its most desirable outcomes.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"6 1","pages":"9 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48754612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2221830
David Santoro
ABSTRACT How can the United States get past the Chinese “no” to engaging on nuclear arms control? What can and should the United States do in the immediate to short term to lay the groundwork for arms control negotiations with China to begin? This paper reviews the origins and evolution of US-China nuclear relations and the history of China’s perceptions of, and approach to, nuclear arms control, and the restraint regimes more generally. On that basis, it reflects on several first steps that the United States can and should take now to try and develop an arms control relationship with China. The paper argues that developing such a relationship will take time but that taking these, or some of these, steps now is important.
{"title":"Getting Past No: Developing a Nuclear Arms Control Relationship with China","authors":"David Santoro","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2221830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2221830","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How can the United States get past the Chinese “no” to engaging on nuclear arms control? What can and should the United States do in the immediate to short term to lay the groundwork for arms control negotiations with China to begin? This paper reviews the origins and evolution of US-China nuclear relations and the history of China’s perceptions of, and approach to, nuclear arms control, and the restraint regimes more generally. On that basis, it reflects on several first steps that the United States can and should take now to try and develop an arms control relationship with China. The paper argues that developing such a relationship will take time but that taking these, or some of these, steps now is important.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"6 1","pages":"68 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43030285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2178205
P. Davis
ABSTRACT The Russia–Ukraine war has caused decision-makers worldwide to acknowledge the thinkability (plausibility) of limited nuclear war. It has probably reduced any confidence China may have about being able easily and quickly to invade Taiwan. It will stimulate the United States to spur allies in Northeast Asia to beef up their own military capabilities by developing, purchasing and deploying advanced defensive weapons effective in actual war. Having experienced dilemmas in the Russia–Ukraine war, the United States may be even more reluctant to use nuclear weapons in defense of its allies and it may become less strident in discouraging its vulnerable allies in NE Asia from having nuclear weapons. Experience from the Russia–Ukraine war also highlights the importance of broad-ranging economic warfare as part of a response to aggression. Also, it highlights the importance of having the industrial capacity and agility to support long wars demanding massive numbers of precision conventional weapons. Finally, experience with the war should make both analysts and policymakers even more skeptical about best-estimate predictions or assessments. In particular, they should not assume away scenarios that involve long military-economic wars, countervalue attacks that blatantly violate laws of war, or even the intendedly limited use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
{"title":"Potential Implications of the Russia–Ukraine War for Northeast Asia","authors":"P. Davis","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2178205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2178205","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Russia–Ukraine war has caused decision-makers worldwide to acknowledge the thinkability (plausibility) of limited nuclear war. It has probably reduced any confidence China may have about being able easily and quickly to invade Taiwan. It will stimulate the United States to spur allies in Northeast Asia to beef up their own military capabilities by developing, purchasing and deploying advanced defensive weapons effective in actual war. Having experienced dilemmas in the Russia–Ukraine war, the United States may be even more reluctant to use nuclear weapons in defense of its allies and it may become less strident in discouraging its vulnerable allies in NE Asia from having nuclear weapons. Experience from the Russia–Ukraine war also highlights the importance of broad-ranging economic warfare as part of a response to aggression. Also, it highlights the importance of having the industrial capacity and agility to support long wars demanding massive numbers of precision conventional weapons. Finally, experience with the war should make both analysts and policymakers even more skeptical about best-estimate predictions or assessments. In particular, they should not assume away scenarios that involve long military-economic wars, countervalue attacks that blatantly violate laws of war, or even the intendedly limited use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"6 1","pages":"112 - 122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44452124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2219488
Paul Meyer
ABSTRACT For the last ten years the Disarmament NGO Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (CNWC) has conferred a “Distinguished Achievement” award on an individual who has contributed to advancing nuclear disarmament. Paul Meyer, an Adjunct Professor of International Studies at Simon Fraser University, a Director of the Canadian Pugwash Group and a former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament was the recipient of the 2022 award. In connection with the award, Meyer delivered on 28 November 2022 a public lecture at the University of Ottawa’s Centre for International Policy Studies. The lecture addressed contemporary nuclear threats, described current efforts at nuclear arms control and disarmament and proposed five actions that the Canadian Government could take to advance its disarmament goals.
{"title":"Nuclear Threats and Canada’s Disarmament Diplomacy","authors":"Paul Meyer","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2219488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2219488","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT For the last ten years the Disarmament NGO Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (CNWC) has conferred a “Distinguished Achievement” award on an individual who has contributed to advancing nuclear disarmament. Paul Meyer, an Adjunct Professor of International Studies at Simon Fraser University, a Director of the Canadian Pugwash Group and a former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament was the recipient of the 2022 award. In connection with the award, Meyer delivered on 28 November 2022 a public lecture at the University of Ottawa’s Centre for International Policy Studies. The lecture addressed contemporary nuclear threats, described current efforts at nuclear arms control and disarmament and proposed five actions that the Canadian Government could take to advance its disarmament goals.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"6 1","pages":"175 - 184"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46474695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2205572
Mycle Schneider, M. Ramana
ABSTRACT This commentary looks at how nuclear power has evolved in the last five decades since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in 1970. Using data on numbers of reactors constructed around the world, we show that the early expectations of a rapid growth of nuclear power plants around the world has not materialized. We also outline the trends in safeguards at nuclear facilities, namely the measures undertaken to prevent the diversion of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons, and highlight the potential risks due to the rapid growth in the amount of material that could potentially be diverted.
{"title":"Nuclear Energy and the Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Retrospective Examination","authors":"Mycle Schneider, M. Ramana","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2205572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2205572","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This commentary looks at how nuclear power has evolved in the last five decades since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in 1970. Using data on numbers of reactors constructed around the world, we show that the early expectations of a rapid growth of nuclear power plants around the world has not materialized. We also outline the trends in safeguards at nuclear facilities, namely the measures undertaken to prevent the diversion of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons, and highlight the potential risks due to the rapid growth in the amount of material that could potentially be diverted.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"6 1","pages":"165 - 174"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44798706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2219437
Marina Favaro, Heather Williams
ABSTRACT How will emerging technologies impact crisis escalation? What has been the escalatory – or de-escalatory – effect of emerging technologies in contemporary crises? And can the use of emerging technologies increase risks of nuclear use? To answer these questions, we use the ongoing war in Ukraine as a case study to identify how emerging technologies are being used in modern conflicts and the associated risks of escalation, potentially to include nuclear use. We argue that emerging technologies gave Russia a false sense of supremacy in the lead-up to the war in Ukraine and have largely failed to deliver Russia battlefield victories. As a result, Moscow has increased reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear threats. This reliance could be exacerbated in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine when Russia is conventionally weakened. Therefore, it is not the technologies themselves that increase risks of escalation, but their impact on decisionmakers’ perceptions of the potential costs of offensive military operations and escalation. Nonetheless, the role of emerging technologies in Ukraine should not inspire complacency because of the impact of new actors, new escalation pathways, and compressed timescales. These trends will have implications for nuclear policy and require more inclusive approaches to risk reduction and arms control, to include an increased focus on behaviors rather than capabilities.
{"title":"False Sense of Supremacy: Emerging Technologies, the War in Ukraine, and the Risk of Nuclear Escalation","authors":"Marina Favaro, Heather Williams","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2219437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2219437","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How will emerging technologies impact crisis escalation? What has been the escalatory – or de-escalatory – effect of emerging technologies in contemporary crises? And can the use of emerging technologies increase risks of nuclear use? To answer these questions, we use the ongoing war in Ukraine as a case study to identify how emerging technologies are being used in modern conflicts and the associated risks of escalation, potentially to include nuclear use. We argue that emerging technologies gave Russia a false sense of supremacy in the lead-up to the war in Ukraine and have largely failed to deliver Russia battlefield victories. As a result, Moscow has increased reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear threats. This reliance could be exacerbated in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine when Russia is conventionally weakened. Therefore, it is not the technologies themselves that increase risks of escalation, but their impact on decisionmakers’ perceptions of the potential costs of offensive military operations and escalation. Nonetheless, the role of emerging technologies in Ukraine should not inspire complacency because of the impact of new actors, new escalation pathways, and compressed timescales. These trends will have implications for nuclear policy and require more inclusive approaches to risk reduction and arms control, to include an increased focus on behaviors rather than capabilities.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"6 1","pages":"28 - 46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49525890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2188859
Wook-Sik Cheong
ABSTRACT The Korean Peninsula is sliding irreversibly into a nuclear era. Since the Korean War, the nuclear threat of the United States toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been a constant. The variable was whether the DPRK would acquire its own nuclear arsenal. But the conclusion that the DPRK reached during the talks in 2018–2019—and more broadly, over the past three decades – is that dialogue and negotiations are pointless. In connection with that, it is very important to recognize that the DPRK has fundamentally changed since the summer of 2019. At the heart of that is the nuclear program on which the DPRK has staked its national pride. The Pyongyang regime under Kim Jong-un believes that its nuclear program will not only reinforce national security but also contribute to economic development by enabling spending cuts on conventional forces and promoting a shift from the military to the civilian economy. That process culminated in the adoption of a law about the DPRK’s nuclear policy by the Supreme People’s Assembly on 8 September 2022. Kim declared on that occasion that defining nuclear policy in law had “made our state’s status as a nuclear weapon state irreversible”. In short, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons have become another constant. This development means that a new approach is required to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue. In particular, the nuclear weapons-free zone, which was rarely discussed as a solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, should be reviewed as a methodology for denuclearization.
{"title":"The DPRK’s Changed Nuclear Doctrine: Factors and Implications","authors":"Wook-Sik Cheong","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2188859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2188859","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Korean Peninsula is sliding irreversibly into a nuclear era. Since the Korean War, the nuclear threat of the United States toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been a constant. The variable was whether the DPRK would acquire its own nuclear arsenal. But the conclusion that the DPRK reached during the talks in 2018–2019—and more broadly, over the past three decades – is that dialogue and negotiations are pointless. In connection with that, it is very important to recognize that the DPRK has fundamentally changed since the summer of 2019. At the heart of that is the nuclear program on which the DPRK has staked its national pride. The Pyongyang regime under Kim Jong-un believes that its nuclear program will not only reinforce national security but also contribute to economic development by enabling spending cuts on conventional forces and promoting a shift from the military to the civilian economy. That process culminated in the adoption of a law about the DPRK’s nuclear policy by the Supreme People’s Assembly on 8 September 2022. Kim declared on that occasion that defining nuclear policy in law had “made our state’s status as a nuclear weapon state irreversible”. In short, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons have become another constant. This development means that a new approach is required to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue. In particular, the nuclear weapons-free zone, which was rarely discussed as a solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, should be reviewed as a methodology for denuclearization.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"6 1","pages":"136 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45812384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2178204
Anastasia Barannikova
ABSTRACT The armed conflict in Ukraine that began roughly a year ago involves nuclear powers and will therefore have long-term implications for global security, nuclear deterrence, and the strategies of many countries. Its influence on Russia, which directly and openly participates in the conflict, is obvious. Russia will have to adjust its nuclear posture and deployment in the European theater in response to changing situations and emerging challenges. At the same time, the question arises whether the situation in Ukraine will influence its nuclear posture and deployment in Asia and the potential impacts related to nuclear weapons use in the region. This paper attempts to analyze possible changes, accounting for the specifics of Northeast Asia and Russia’s role and interests in the region.
{"title":"Russia’s Nuclear Deployment, Posture and Alert Status in NEA in the Context of the Ukraine Situation","authors":"Anastasia Barannikova","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2178204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2178204","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The armed conflict in Ukraine that began roughly a year ago involves nuclear powers and will therefore have long-term implications for global security, nuclear deterrence, and the strategies of many countries. Its influence on Russia, which directly and openly participates in the conflict, is obvious. Russia will have to adjust its nuclear posture and deployment in the European theater in response to changing situations and emerging challenges. At the same time, the question arises whether the situation in Ukraine will influence its nuclear posture and deployment in Asia and the potential impacts related to nuclear weapons use in the region. This paper attempts to analyze possible changes, accounting for the specifics of Northeast Asia and Russia’s role and interests in the region.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"6 1","pages":"101 - 111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48853252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2182155
Gregory Kulacki
ABSTRACT If Northeast Asia is to have a nuclear weapons-free future, the United States and China must cooperate to make it happen. Unfortunately, decision-makers in both nuclear-armed states are preparing for a future military conflict and are upgrading their nuclear arsenals. In the United States, decision-makers are dependent on a cadre of security bureaucrats who circumscribe acceptable policy options. A review of the past and the present shows that the orthodox policies produced by these bureaucrats failed to resolve longstanding security problems in Northeast Asia: problems that decision-makers try to keep at bay with threats and preparations to use nuclear weapons. If US decision-makers were willing to see that history through Chinese eyes, with the aim of understanding how it influences Chinese decisions and actions in the present, the prospects for a nuclear-free future in Northeast Asia might be brighter.
{"title":"US-China Relations and Nuclear Weapons in Northeast Asia","authors":"Gregory Kulacki","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2182155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2182155","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT If Northeast Asia is to have a nuclear weapons-free future, the United States and China must cooperate to make it happen. Unfortunately, decision-makers in both nuclear-armed states are preparing for a future military conflict and are upgrading their nuclear arsenals. In the United States, decision-makers are dependent on a cadre of security bureaucrats who circumscribe acceptable policy options. A review of the past and the present shows that the orthodox policies produced by these bureaucrats failed to resolve longstanding security problems in Northeast Asia: problems that decision-makers try to keep at bay with threats and preparations to use nuclear weapons. If US decision-makers were willing to see that history through Chinese eyes, with the aim of understanding how it influences Chinese decisions and actions in the present, the prospects for a nuclear-free future in Northeast Asia might be brighter.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"6 1","pages":"123 - 135"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49278891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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