Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.1992217
Amy F. Woolf
ABSTRACT The United States and Russia agreed to extend the 2010 New START Treaty in February 2021. Many analysts believed that this step would reinvigorate the US-Russian arms control process, lead to deeper reductions in nuclear weapons, and possibly pave the path to nuclear disarmament. However, the United States and Russia might find it difficult to agree on an agenda for the next round of arms control negotiations, and neither may be willing to accept deeper reductions in their numbers of nuclear weapons. Changes in the international security environment, stresses in the US-Russian relationship, and increases in the size and scope of China’s nuclear arsenal may all impede progress. As a result, the next steps in arms control may focus on transparency, communication, norms, and risk reduction measures, both as a way to mitigate the risk of nuclear war and to, possibly, create the conditions needed for further reductions in the future.
{"title":"Promoting Nuclear Disarmament through Bilateral Arms Control: Will New START Extension Pave the Path to Disarmament?","authors":"Amy F. Woolf","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.1992217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1992217","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The United States and Russia agreed to extend the 2010 New START Treaty in February 2021. Many analysts believed that this step would reinvigorate the US-Russian arms control process, lead to deeper reductions in nuclear weapons, and possibly pave the path to nuclear disarmament. However, the United States and Russia might find it difficult to agree on an agenda for the next round of arms control negotiations, and neither may be willing to accept deeper reductions in their numbers of nuclear weapons. Changes in the international security environment, stresses in the US-Russian relationship, and increases in the size and scope of China’s nuclear arsenal may all impede progress. As a result, the next steps in arms control may focus on transparency, communication, norms, and risk reduction measures, both as a way to mitigate the risk of nuclear war and to, possibly, create the conditions needed for further reductions in the future.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"4 1","pages":"309 - 320"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45068572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.2015919
Nobuyasu Abe
ABSTRACT US President Joe Biden is expected to issue a new Nuclear Posture Review report soon. It may include as a policy goal a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in US military strategy. In that context, the issue of the modernization of the US nuclear deterrent will be addressed. Even if the land-based leg of the triad were somehow curtailed, the United States would be able to keep its allies reassured as long as its overall nuclear deterrence capability was perceived to be maintained. A reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in the overall US military doctrine should be welcomed. In that sense, adoption of a nuclear no-first-use or sole-purpose policy should also be welcomed even though some Japanese officials and experts may oppose it. Decreasing the role of nuclear weapons requires strengthening conventional deterrence unless the overall security situation is improved – a point that is not very well recognized in Japan. This shift will not be easy for Japan, where economic growth has been very low for decades and defense spending is virtually capped at around 1% of the gross national product. The US stance vis-à-vis the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will draw attention in Japan, where there is considerable support for the treaty.
{"title":"The Biden Nuclear Posture Review and Its Implications for US Asia-Pacific Allies","authors":"Nobuyasu Abe","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.2015919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.2015919","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT US President Joe Biden is expected to issue a new Nuclear Posture Review report soon. It may include as a policy goal a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in US military strategy. In that context, the issue of the modernization of the US nuclear deterrent will be addressed. Even if the land-based leg of the triad were somehow curtailed, the United States would be able to keep its allies reassured as long as its overall nuclear deterrence capability was perceived to be maintained. A reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in the overall US military doctrine should be welcomed. In that sense, adoption of a nuclear no-first-use or sole-purpose policy should also be welcomed even though some Japanese officials and experts may oppose it. Decreasing the role of nuclear weapons requires strengthening conventional deterrence unless the overall security situation is improved – a point that is not very well recognized in Japan. This shift will not be easy for Japan, where economic growth has been very low for decades and defense spending is virtually capped at around 1% of the gross national product. The US stance vis-à-vis the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will draw attention in Japan, where there is considerable support for the treaty.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"4 1","pages":"235 - 250"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47424588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.1993632
Paul Meyer
ABSTRACT The Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been in a prolonged state of paralysis. Since its negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, it has not produced any other agreement and has been unable even to agree on a Programme of Work. The dysfunction of the CD has been a product of its extreme version of the consensus rule for decision-making and a counter-productive dynamic among its 65 member states that privileges national preference over the collective good that compromise could yield. The bankruptcy of the CD erodes the credibility of the multilateral disarmament enterprise as does the complicity of its members in perpetuating a diplomatic charade. Moving its core issues out of the CD and into negotiating forums not vulnerable to a de facto “veto” provides an escape route for those states genuinely interested in making progress. Without the political will to engage in creative diplomacy to break out of the CD’s straitjacket, the outlook for the future of the UN’s “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum” looks bleak.
{"title":"Does the Conference of Disarmament Have a Future?","authors":"Paul Meyer","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.1993632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1993632","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been in a prolonged state of paralysis. Since its negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, it has not produced any other agreement and has been unable even to agree on a Programme of Work. The dysfunction of the CD has been a product of its extreme version of the consensus rule for decision-making and a counter-productive dynamic among its 65 member states that privileges national preference over the collective good that compromise could yield. The bankruptcy of the CD erodes the credibility of the multilateral disarmament enterprise as does the complicity of its members in perpetuating a diplomatic charade. Moving its core issues out of the CD and into negotiating forums not vulnerable to a de facto “veto” provides an escape route for those states genuinely interested in making progress. Without the political will to engage in creative diplomacy to break out of the CD’s straitjacket, the outlook for the future of the UN’s “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum” looks bleak.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"4 1","pages":"287 - 294"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49243061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.1993644
Z. Mian
ABSTRACT The United Nations General Assembly in 2019 held its first annual conference with the “aim of elaborating a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction”. This process will need to consider what might be the core obligations relating to nuclear weapons to include in the long sought for treaty and zone. The measures suggested in this article draw on and would serve to reinforce commitments that many states in the region have already accepted or offered support for, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The article also suggests some general principles and time-bound measures drawn from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that if adopted could enable a sustained period of confidence-building to stabilize a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. If a core aim of the Zone is to strengthen the stability of the region against nuclear proliferation risks, a shutdown of nuclear power programs would offer enduring benefits.
{"title":"Establishing Nuclear Weapons Obligations for a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction","authors":"Z. Mian","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.1993644","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1993644","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The United Nations General Assembly in 2019 held its first annual conference with the “aim of elaborating a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction”. This process will need to consider what might be the core obligations relating to nuclear weapons to include in the long sought for treaty and zone. The measures suggested in this article draw on and would serve to reinforce commitments that many states in the region have already accepted or offered support for, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The article also suggests some general principles and time-bound measures drawn from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that if adopted could enable a sustained period of confidence-building to stabilize a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. If a core aim of the Zone is to strengthen the stability of the region against nuclear proliferation risks, a shutdown of nuclear power programs would offer enduring benefits.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"4 1","pages":"295 - 308"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45901998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.1994744
Gregory Kulacki
ABSTRACT The current nuclear deterrence strategy of the US-Japan alliance, which is based on the threat to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict with China, is not credible and is counterproductive. A new strategy, based on diplomacy rather than threats, is needed. Unfortunately, time is no longer on the side of the alliance. China has been waiting for the United States to advance two critical international nuclear arms control agreements for twenty-five years. Chinese diplomats say they are still willing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. But the Chinese military seems to be pursuing an expansion of Chinese nuclear forces that will be difficult stop if it gets much farther along. Since a likely motivation for this expansion is to convince the US-Japan alliance that its current deterrence strategy can never succeed, reviving nuclear arms control diplomacy is the only viable means to reduce the risk of Chinese nuclear attacks against Japan.
{"title":"The Nuclear Deterrence Strategy of the US-Japan Alliance is Failing but Can Be Fixed","authors":"Gregory Kulacki","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.1994744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1994744","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The current nuclear deterrence strategy of the US-Japan alliance, which is based on the threat to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict with China, is not credible and is counterproductive. A new strategy, based on diplomacy rather than threats, is needed. Unfortunately, time is no longer on the side of the alliance. China has been waiting for the United States to advance two critical international nuclear arms control agreements for twenty-five years. Chinese diplomats say they are still willing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. But the Chinese military seems to be pursuing an expansion of Chinese nuclear forces that will be difficult stop if it gets much farther along. Since a likely motivation for this expansion is to convince the US-Japan alliance that its current deterrence strategy can never succeed, reviving nuclear arms control diplomacy is the only viable means to reduce the risk of Chinese nuclear attacks against Japan.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"4 1","pages":"222 - 234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44367307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.2017137
Nobumasa Akiyama
ABSTRACT In debates on the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the issue that has attracted the most attention in Japan is whether or not the declaratory policy of “no first use” or “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons will be adopted. There is a strong argument in favor of declaratory policies as a method to promote nuclear disarmament. However, it is unlikely that the adoption of a declaratory policy at this time will lead to progress in nuclear disarmament in Northeast Asia. This is because the security environment in the region is undergoing major changes. Force asymmetries, such as the medium-range missile gap between the United States and China, and the pursuit of a deterrent architecture based on entanglement between nuclear, conventional, cyber, and space domains, as well as the rise of emerging technologies that influence the modality of strategic stability, will have a significant impact on deterrence and arms control. Japan is moving toward ensuring the credibility of deterrence within the Japan-US alliance. Under such a circumstance, instead of focusing on declaratory policies to reduce nuclear risks and threats, it is important to establish communication mechanisms among stakeholders in the regional security for crisis management and a multi-layered mechanism to discuss issues of common interest, such as the impact of emerging technologies. Confidence building through these mechanisms for risk management and strategic dialogue provides a foundation for declaratory policies functioning for enhancing nuclear disarmament.
{"title":"Arms Control Dialogue is Japan’s Interest: An Agenda for a New Nuclear Posture Review","authors":"Nobumasa Akiyama","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.2017137","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.2017137","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In debates on the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the issue that has attracted the most attention in Japan is whether or not the declaratory policy of “no first use” or “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons will be adopted. There is a strong argument in favor of declaratory policies as a method to promote nuclear disarmament. However, it is unlikely that the adoption of a declaratory policy at this time will lead to progress in nuclear disarmament in Northeast Asia. This is because the security environment in the region is undergoing major changes. Force asymmetries, such as the medium-range missile gap between the United States and China, and the pursuit of a deterrent architecture based on entanglement between nuclear, conventional, cyber, and space domains, as well as the rise of emerging technologies that influence the modality of strategic stability, will have a significant impact on deterrence and arms control. Japan is moving toward ensuring the credibility of deterrence within the Japan-US alliance. Under such a circumstance, instead of focusing on declaratory policies to reduce nuclear risks and threats, it is important to establish communication mechanisms among stakeholders in the regional security for crisis management and a multi-layered mechanism to discuss issues of common interest, such as the impact of emerging technologies. Confidence building through these mechanisms for risk management and strategic dialogue provides a foundation for declaratory policies functioning for enhancing nuclear disarmament.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"4 1","pages":"202 - 221"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46196530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.1993643
Mao Sato
ABSTRACT Seventy-six years after the atomic bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world continues to face challenges to the existing arms control framework, part of the broader problem of the stagnation of multilateralism. There is a desperate need to reinvent the architecture of nuclear disarmament. While it seems almost impossible for the political deadlock to be broken with regard to entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the power of science continues to create a unique avenue for confidence-building measures (CBMs) to meet the needs of both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. This paper re-examines the value of science as a tool for arms control verification by separating the issue of the CTBT’s non-entry into force from the immediate application of its verification regime. The progress of nuclear-test-ban monitoring can be measured against scientific indicators, irrespective of the status of the remaining Annex II countries. The CTBT has already practically satisfied its core function of monitoring nuclear testing with the existing structure. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization has been progressing as an agent of CBMs, the development of civilian and scientific applications of the verification regime, and a capacity-building effort to attract more states to join the cause, and by doing so, sustaining nuclear-test-ban moratoriums.
{"title":"Advancing Nuclear Test Verification without Entry into Force of the CTBT","authors":"Mao Sato","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.1993643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1993643","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Seventy-six years after the atomic bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world continues to face challenges to the existing arms control framework, part of the broader problem of the stagnation of multilateralism. There is a desperate need to reinvent the architecture of nuclear disarmament. While it seems almost impossible for the political deadlock to be broken with regard to entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the power of science continues to create a unique avenue for confidence-building measures (CBMs) to meet the needs of both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. This paper re-examines the value of science as a tool for arms control verification by separating the issue of the CTBT’s non-entry into force from the immediate application of its verification regime. The progress of nuclear-test-ban monitoring can be measured against scientific indicators, irrespective of the status of the remaining Annex II countries. The CTBT has already practically satisfied its core function of monitoring nuclear testing with the existing structure. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization has been progressing as an agent of CBMs, the development of civilian and scientific applications of the verification regime, and a capacity-building effort to attract more states to join the cause, and by doing so, sustaining nuclear-test-ban moratoriums.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"4 1","pages":"251 - 267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43571112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.2012054
S. De Silva
ABSTRACT South Asia, surrounded by the Indian Ocean, is a favorite theatre to continue with the contemporary global strategic power competition of nuclear states. The non-nuclear states in South Asia simply cannot afford to remain complacent about the rapid nuclearisation that is taking place in the region since it results in adverse impacts on their security. Strangely, its underlying security impacts are somewhat ignored and never fully grasped by the non-nuclear states for various reasons. In this setting the author brings out the account of Sri Lanka’s role in disarmament in the passage of South Asia’s gradual transformation into a volatile nuclear region. It also questions the popular opinion whether the cause of disarmament happens to be an exclusive mater to be dealt by the nuclear club. The objective of this paper is to discuss the role that Sri Lanka traditionally played in global disarmament and the effects of third-party security concerns she faces under the emerging nuclear shadow.
{"title":"Disarmament, Indian Ocean and Strategic Externalities: The Case of Sri Lanka","authors":"S. De Silva","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.2012054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.2012054","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT South Asia, surrounded by the Indian Ocean, is a favorite theatre to continue with the contemporary global strategic power competition of nuclear states. The non-nuclear states in South Asia simply cannot afford to remain complacent about the rapid nuclearisation that is taking place in the region since it results in adverse impacts on their security. Strangely, its underlying security impacts are somewhat ignored and never fully grasped by the non-nuclear states for various reasons. In this setting the author brings out the account of Sri Lanka’s role in disarmament in the passage of South Asia’s gradual transformation into a volatile nuclear region. It also questions the popular opinion whether the cause of disarmament happens to be an exclusive mater to be dealt by the nuclear club. The objective of this paper is to discuss the role that Sri Lanka traditionally played in global disarmament and the effects of third-party security concerns she faces under the emerging nuclear shadow.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"4 1","pages":"268 - 286"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41810693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.2015920
S. Squassoni
ABSTRACT Ambassador Robert Gallucci is Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, where he earlier served as the Dean. He led the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation as president from 2009 to 2014. His career in the US Department of State spanned 21 years and included serving as Special Envoy to deal with the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) overseeing the disarmament of Iraq and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. He led the US negotiation of the Agreed Framework with North Korea in 1994. In this interview, he shares his critical views on the connections between nuclear deterrence, arms control, and missile defenses and suggests ways in which new technical capabilities might alter deterrence calculations. The interview took place on 5 November 2021 and was edited for clarity for the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (J-PAND).
{"title":"Deterrence and Arms Control: An Interview with Robert Gallucci","authors":"S. Squassoni","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.2015920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.2015920","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Ambassador Robert Gallucci is Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, where he earlier served as the Dean. He led the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation as president from 2009 to 2014. His career in the US Department of State spanned 21 years and included serving as Special Envoy to deal with the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) overseeing the disarmament of Iraq and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. He led the US negotiation of the Agreed Framework with North Korea in 1994. In this interview, he shares his critical views on the connections between nuclear deterrence, arms control, and missile defenses and suggests ways in which new technical capabilities might alter deterrence calculations. The interview took place on 5 November 2021 and was edited for clarity for the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (J-PAND).","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"4 1","pages":"321 - 329"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41485292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-05DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.1890867
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN), Nautilus Institute
ABSTRACT This report is an outcome document of the Nagasaki 75th Anniversary Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios Project, an international initiative aimed at exploring how the far-reaching effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (and future pandemics) could alter the landscape for nuclear risk and disarmament. The project was convened as a series of online workshops in October-November 2020, and co-sponsored by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, in cooperation with the Nagasaki University Planetary Health Project and the Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA). The goals of the workshop were to (1) develop an analytical understanding of the interrelated nature of the co-occurring existential threats of nuclear weapons and global pandemics; (2) explore potential levers and pathways to influence the future under various conditions; and (3) identify concrete strategies to reduce the risk of nuclear war and resume nuclear disarmament by state and non-state actors, particularly in the Northeast Asia region.
{"title":"Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks: The Nagasaki 75th Anniversary pandemic-nuclear nexus scenarios final report","authors":"Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN), Nautilus Institute","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.1890867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1890867","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This report is an outcome document of the Nagasaki 75th Anniversary Pandemic-Nuclear Nexus Scenarios Project, an international initiative aimed at exploring how the far-reaching effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (and future pandemics) could alter the landscape for nuclear risk and disarmament. The project was convened as a series of online workshops in October-November 2020, and co-sponsored by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, in cooperation with the Nagasaki University Planetary Health Project and the Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA). The goals of the workshop were to (1) develop an analytical understanding of the interrelated nature of the co-occurring existential threats of nuclear weapons and global pandemics; (2) explore potential levers and pathways to influence the future under various conditions; and (3) identify concrete strategies to reduce the risk of nuclear war and resume nuclear disarmament by state and non-state actors, particularly in the Northeast Asia region.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"4 1","pages":"6 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/25751654.2021.1890867","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49193495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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