Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2205552
A. Nadibaidze, Nicolò Miotto
ABSTRACT Military applications of artificial intelligence (AI) are said to impact strategic stability, broadly defined as the absence of incentives for armed conflict between nuclear powers. While previous research explores the potential implications of AI for nuclear deterrence based on technical characteristics, little attention has been dedicated to understanding how policymakers of nuclear powers conceive of AI technologies and their impacts. This paper argues that the relationship between AI and strategic stability is not only given through the technical nature of AI, but also constructed by policymakers’ beliefs about these technologies and other states’ intentions to use them. Adopting a constructivist perspective, we investigate how decision-makers from the United States and Russia talk about military AI by analyzing US and Russian official discourses from 2014–2023 and 2017-2023, respectively. We conclude that both sides have constructed a threat out of their perceived competitors’ AI capabilities, reflecting their broader perspectives of strategic stability, as well as the social context characterized by distrust and feelings of competition. Their discourses fuel a cycle of misperceptions which could be addressed via confidence building measures. However, this competitive cycle is unlikely to improve due to ongoing tensions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
{"title":"The Impact of AI on Strategic Stability is What States Make of It: Comparing US and Russian Discourses","authors":"A. Nadibaidze, Nicolò Miotto","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2205552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2205552","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Military applications of artificial intelligence (AI) are said to impact strategic stability, broadly defined as the absence of incentives for armed conflict between nuclear powers. While previous research explores the potential implications of AI for nuclear deterrence based on technical characteristics, little attention has been dedicated to understanding how policymakers of nuclear powers conceive of AI technologies and their impacts. This paper argues that the relationship between AI and strategic stability is not only given through the technical nature of AI, but also constructed by policymakers’ beliefs about these technologies and other states’ intentions to use them. Adopting a constructivist perspective, we investigate how decision-makers from the United States and Russia talk about military AI by analyzing US and Russian official discourses from 2014–2023 and 2017-2023, respectively. We conclude that both sides have constructed a threat out of their perceived competitors’ AI capabilities, reflecting their broader perspectives of strategic stability, as well as the social context characterized by distrust and feelings of competition. Their discourses fuel a cycle of misperceptions which could be addressed via confidence building measures. However, this competitive cycle is unlikely to improve due to ongoing tensions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41435596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2223804
Ulrich Kühn
ABSTRACT The concept of strategic stability has come under immense pressure in recent years. It is not only conceptually fuzzy but nuclear multipolarity, novel technologies, an exacerbating crisis in arms control, and a growing acceptance of “softer” norms are all taking a toll. At the same time, nuclear weapon states are concerned with possible instability to a degree not seen since the most severe crises of the Cold War. This special issue seeks to clarify some of the profound challenges to strategic stability while also offering novel scholarly as well as policy-relevant approaches to better understanding and mitigating the risks of instability. The three articles and one commentary focus on the US-Russian dyad and pragmatic efforts to clarify the goals and means of strategic stability between Moscow and Washington; the impact of emerging technologies in Russia’s war against Ukraine; US and Russian leaders’ perceptions of artificial intelligence as a novel and threatening capability of competition; and possible US efforts to initiate an arms control dialogue with China by early discussions on crisis management.
{"title":"Strategic Stability in the 21st Century: An Introduction","authors":"Ulrich Kühn","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2223804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2223804","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The concept of strategic stability has come under immense pressure in recent years. It is not only conceptually fuzzy but nuclear multipolarity, novel technologies, an exacerbating crisis in arms control, and a growing acceptance of “softer” norms are all taking a toll. At the same time, nuclear weapon states are concerned with possible instability to a degree not seen since the most severe crises of the Cold War. This special issue seeks to clarify some of the profound challenges to strategic stability while also offering novel scholarly as well as policy-relevant approaches to better understanding and mitigating the risks of instability. The three articles and one commentary focus on the US-Russian dyad and pragmatic efforts to clarify the goals and means of strategic stability between Moscow and Washington; the impact of emerging technologies in Russia’s war against Ukraine; US and Russian leaders’ perceptions of artificial intelligence as a novel and threatening capability of competition; and possible US efforts to initiate an arms control dialogue with China by early discussions on crisis management.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49083275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2220168
Stephen J. Herzog
{"title":"The Hegemon’s Tool Kit: US Leadership and the Politics of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,","authors":"Stephen J. Herzog","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2220168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2220168","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44714721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2023.2201367
D. V. von Hippel
ABSTRACT The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, and the ongoing (as of this writing) conflict that has followed, has prompted many of the actors responsible for determining military and nuclear weapons strategy and policy to rethink their approaches. In Northeast Asia the combinations of the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, tensions over Taiwan, and other regional disputes with the lessons of the Ukraine conflict have caused the nations of the region that have nuclear weapons, and those that do not but are covered under the US “nuclear umbrella”, to at least consider changes in how nuclear weapons might be deployed and, as a final resort, used. These actors include the United States, China, Russia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. This article compiles and summarizes the opinions of experts from or on each of these nations as to how the Ukraine conflict may influence perception of the utility and possible uses of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. The paper evaluates common changes in perception caused by the Ukraine conflict across the nations of the region, as well as differences, and notes the possible ways in which national changes in perception due to the Ukraine conflict may combine to make the danger of nuclear weapons use in the region even more serious than it has recently been. This article is based on work in the Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA).
{"title":"Implications of the 2022–2023 Situation in Ukraine for Possible Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia","authors":"D. V. von Hippel","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2023.2201367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2201367","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, and the ongoing (as of this writing) conflict that has followed, has prompted many of the actors responsible for determining military and nuclear weapons strategy and policy to rethink their approaches. In Northeast Asia the combinations of the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, tensions over Taiwan, and other regional disputes with the lessons of the Ukraine conflict have caused the nations of the region that have nuclear weapons, and those that do not but are covered under the US “nuclear umbrella”, to at least consider changes in how nuclear weapons might be deployed and, as a final resort, used. These actors include the United States, China, Russia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. This article compiles and summarizes the opinions of experts from or on each of these nations as to how the Ukraine conflict may influence perception of the utility and possible uses of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. The paper evaluates common changes in perception caused by the Ukraine conflict across the nations of the region, as well as differences, and notes the possible ways in which national changes in perception due to the Ukraine conflict may combine to make the danger of nuclear weapons use in the region even more serious than it has recently been. This article is based on work in the Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA).","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49419512","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2129948
S. Gibbons
ABSTRACT The hydroacoustic network of the International Monitoring System for verifying compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty consists of six hydrophone array stations and five land-based seismic stations for recording T-phases. We provide a comprehensive overview of the network with details of the station configurations and data accessibility. Since 2014, data from all stations on the territory of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (four hydrophone arrays and one T-phase station) have been freely available, and we demonstrate how this data can be obtained and displayed with openly available software and minimal amounts of code. We detail which open seismic stations may act as limited surrogates for closed IMS stations. We demonstrate how the most fundamental characteristics of the hydroacoustic data can be obtained using open software, and we advocate extensive exploitation of this data for interpreting both hydroacoustic and converted seismic signals. We demonstrate signals from the 2017 North Korean nuclear test on both seismic and hydrophone data. Optimizing procedures using the open data allows us to explore the likely capability for all stations, even if real-time detection and processing outside the CTBT system is currently limited to hydrophone stations HA01, HA08, HA10 and HA11.
{"title":"The Hydroacoustic Network of the CTBT International Monitoring System: Access and Exploitation","authors":"S. Gibbons","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2129948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2129948","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The hydroacoustic network of the International Monitoring System for verifying compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty consists of six hydrophone array stations and five land-based seismic stations for recording T-phases. We provide a comprehensive overview of the network with details of the station configurations and data accessibility. Since 2014, data from all stations on the territory of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (four hydrophone arrays and one T-phase station) have been freely available, and we demonstrate how this data can be obtained and displayed with openly available software and minimal amounts of code. We detail which open seismic stations may act as limited surrogates for closed IMS stations. We demonstrate how the most fundamental characteristics of the hydroacoustic data can be obtained using open software, and we advocate extensive exploitation of this data for interpreting both hydroacoustic and converted seismic signals. We demonstrate signals from the 2017 North Korean nuclear test on both seismic and hydrophone data. Optimizing procedures using the open data allows us to explore the likely capability for all stations, even if real-time detection and processing outside the CTBT system is currently limited to hydrophone stations HA01, HA08, HA10 and HA11.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43300394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2159750
R. Thakur, Shatabhisha Shetty, W. Sidhu
ABSTRACT Geopolitical tensions in Southern Asia are characterized by shared borders, major territorial disputes, history of wars, political volatility and instability. This fraught dynamic is compounded by China–India–Pakistan nuclear relations or the nuclear “trilemma” which is shaped by military developments, threat perceptions, as well as alliance, adversary and deterrence relations between the three nuclear-armed states. To mitigate the growing risks in Southern Asia and the impact across the Asia-Pacific, the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and the Toda Peace Institute have collaborated on a research project to map the contours of the China–India–Pakistan nuclear trilemma. The series of articles published in this special issue of the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament is a selection of nine papers commissioned for the project that address different aspects of the trilemma, examining bilateral, trilateral and plurilateral drivers; exploring practical nuclear risk reduction, crisis stability and confidence building measures and a potential nuclear restraint regime; and identify mechanisms and opportunities for tension reduction and conflict resolution in order to normalize interstate relations and promote people-people ties.
{"title":"Introduction: China–India-Pakistan Nuclear Trilemma and the Imperative of Risk Reduction Measures","authors":"R. Thakur, Shatabhisha Shetty, W. Sidhu","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2159750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2159750","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Geopolitical tensions in Southern Asia are characterized by shared borders, major territorial disputes, history of wars, political volatility and instability. This fraught dynamic is compounded by China–India–Pakistan nuclear relations or the nuclear “trilemma” which is shaped by military developments, threat perceptions, as well as alliance, adversary and deterrence relations between the three nuclear-armed states. To mitigate the growing risks in Southern Asia and the impact across the Asia-Pacific, the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and the Toda Peace Institute have collaborated on a research project to map the contours of the China–India–Pakistan nuclear trilemma. The series of articles published in this special issue of the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament is a selection of nine papers commissioned for the project that address different aspects of the trilemma, examining bilateral, trilateral and plurilateral drivers; exploring practical nuclear risk reduction, crisis stability and confidence building measures and a potential nuclear restraint regime; and identify mechanisms and opportunities for tension reduction and conflict resolution in order to normalize interstate relations and promote people-people ties.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47862707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2141053
Salman Bashir
ABSTRACT Asia-Pacific is the new locus of global power politics. To contain the rise of China, India has joined the United States in shaping a “geo-political” response to China’s “geo-economic” outreach. A “maritime dimension” has been added to the complex “continental” contestations between India–China and India-Pakistan, injecting new risks of nuclear instability in the region. Responsibly managing competition is emerging as a key theme. India’s nuclear and military modernization programs are status driven. The Indo-US defence partnership has led to a worsening of India–China relations and disturbed the tenuous strategic balance between Pakistan and India. A nuclear conflict between China and India is unlikely. Nuclear risks in South Asia remain high. Conventional imbalance and Indian bellicosity have compelled Pakistan to develop a doctrine of “full-spectrum” credible minimum nuclear deterrence.
{"title":"The China–India–Pakistan Nuclear Triangle: Consequential Choices for Asian Security","authors":"Salman Bashir","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2141053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2141053","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Asia-Pacific is the new locus of global power politics. To contain the rise of China, India has joined the United States in shaping a “geo-political” response to China’s “geo-economic” outreach. A “maritime dimension” has been added to the complex “continental” contestations between India–China and India-Pakistan, injecting new risks of nuclear instability in the region. Responsibly managing competition is emerging as a key theme. India’s nuclear and military modernization programs are status driven. The Indo-US defence partnership has led to a worsening of India–China relations and disturbed the tenuous strategic balance between Pakistan and India. A nuclear conflict between China and India is unlikely. Nuclear risks in South Asia remain high. Conventional imbalance and Indian bellicosity have compelled Pakistan to develop a doctrine of “full-spectrum” credible minimum nuclear deterrence.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48853661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2158702
T. Dalton
ABSTRACT Some scholars assess that Southern Asia comprises a nuclear chain or a deterrence trilemma. Although the region is home to three states with nuclear weapons, there is only one clear nuclear deterrence dyad. India and Pakistan have explored the contours of nuclear deterrence in several past military crises, while nuclear weapons have been notably absent from recent Sino-Indian border tensions. What factors or developments might push the region toward a nuclear deterrence multipolarity? The key variable is the India–China relationship and the extent to which nuclear weapons become more prominent in respective national security belief systems in New Delhi and Beijing. Notable trends already favor such a development, including changing geopolitics in the region, the rise of nationalist domestic politics, technology competition, and growing crisis escalation concerns. Two fulcrums that might tip the region from the status quo into a deterrence multipolarity are parallel nuclear posture changes in India and China that create nuclear coupling, and hardening of geopolitical alignments into more adversarial blocs. Preventing deterrence multipolarity through new nuclear confidence-building measures will be difficult owing to divergent interests, power and institutions in the region. Upgrades to existing nuclear CBMs may be more politically feasible. Even in the absence of new nuclear CBMs, however, China, India, and Pakistan could build predictability in the region and mitigate potential sources of conflict through new measures to manage common-pool resource competition, dangerous behaviours in space, and a range of crises and emergencies.
{"title":"Plus Ça Change? Prospects of a Nuclear Deterrence Multipolarity in Southern Asia","authors":"T. Dalton","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2158702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2158702","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Some scholars assess that Southern Asia comprises a nuclear chain or a deterrence trilemma. Although the region is home to three states with nuclear weapons, there is only one clear nuclear deterrence dyad. India and Pakistan have explored the contours of nuclear deterrence in several past military crises, while nuclear weapons have been notably absent from recent Sino-Indian border tensions. What factors or developments might push the region toward a nuclear deterrence multipolarity? The key variable is the India–China relationship and the extent to which nuclear weapons become more prominent in respective national security belief systems in New Delhi and Beijing. Notable trends already favor such a development, including changing geopolitics in the region, the rise of nationalist domestic politics, technology competition, and growing crisis escalation concerns. Two fulcrums that might tip the region from the status quo into a deterrence multipolarity are parallel nuclear posture changes in India and China that create nuclear coupling, and hardening of geopolitical alignments into more adversarial blocs. Preventing deterrence multipolarity through new nuclear confidence-building measures will be difficult owing to divergent interests, power and institutions in the region. Upgrades to existing nuclear CBMs may be more politically feasible. Even in the absence of new nuclear CBMs, however, China, India, and Pakistan could build predictability in the region and mitigate potential sources of conflict through new measures to manage common-pool resource competition, dangerous behaviours in space, and a range of crises and emergencies.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42174658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2110636
Kimiaki Kawai
ABSTRACT Japan’s security policy appears to be undergoing a qualitative change. Policymakers, however, have not provided sufficient explanation to the nation regarding such a shift. What is the qualitative change in Japan’s security policy premised on US extended nuclear deterrence? To answer this question, this article first analyzes changes both in Japanese policymakers’ understanding of US extended nuclear deterrence and the concept of nuclear deterrence, and the shift of Japan’s defense policies. Next, a comparison of deliberations in the National Diet of Japan during the Cold War and after the Cold War, and Japan’s defense policies during the Cold War and after the Cold War, respectively, reveals that while policymakers’ understanding of US extended nuclear deterrence and the concept of nuclear deterrence have not really changed, the security challenges surrounding Japan have shifted in focus from deterrence to response in the recognition of policymakers. With that, Japan’s policy premised on US extended nuclear deterrence has shifted from the stage of mere reliance to the stage of engagement with the United States. This is the qualitative change in Japan’s security policy premised on US extended nuclear deterrence. The implication of the shift is that the use of nuclear weapons itself is a potential policy issue, yet it remains unexamined. The final section points out that Japan’s engagement with the United States in extended nuclear deterrence advances the move toward solidification of US extended nuclear deterrence for Japan. It also discusses Japan’s security challenges associated with the ongoing solidification.
{"title":"Mission Unaccounted: Japan’s Shift of Role in US Extended Nuclear Deterrence","authors":"Kimiaki Kawai","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2110636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2110636","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Japan’s security policy appears to be undergoing a qualitative change. Policymakers, however, have not provided sufficient explanation to the nation regarding such a shift. What is the qualitative change in Japan’s security policy premised on US extended nuclear deterrence? To answer this question, this article first analyzes changes both in Japanese policymakers’ understanding of US extended nuclear deterrence and the concept of nuclear deterrence, and the shift of Japan’s defense policies. Next, a comparison of deliberations in the National Diet of Japan during the Cold War and after the Cold War, and Japan’s defense policies during the Cold War and after the Cold War, respectively, reveals that while policymakers’ understanding of US extended nuclear deterrence and the concept of nuclear deterrence have not really changed, the security challenges surrounding Japan have shifted in focus from deterrence to response in the recognition of policymakers. With that, Japan’s policy premised on US extended nuclear deterrence has shifted from the stage of mere reliance to the stage of engagement with the United States. This is the qualitative change in Japan’s security policy premised on US extended nuclear deterrence. The implication of the shift is that the use of nuclear weapons itself is a potential policy issue, yet it remains unexamined. The final section points out that Japan’s engagement with the United States in extended nuclear deterrence advances the move toward solidification of US extended nuclear deterrence for Japan. It also discusses Japan’s security challenges associated with the ongoing solidification.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45153841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2156253
M. Sethi
ABSTRACT The nuclear playground in Southern Asia is marked by an exceptional level of complexity. A number of players; their disparate thinking on how to establish deterrence; nuclear dyads that elongate into strategic chains; inter-twining of nuclear issues with conventional, space, cyber realms; disparities in military capabilities; historical animosities accentuated by unresolved territorial conflicts; divides that spawn ideologies, religions and civilizational issues; all make for an immensely complex situation. The consequent regional nuclear dynamics has fair potential for crisis and arms race instability. As a way to address the regional nuclear challenges, the paper explores the character of Pakistan–India and China–India nuclear dyads along three specific axes: drivers of conflict; points of commonalities, similarities and differences; and implications of these for their nuclear stockpiles. Armed with this understanding, it then offers some policy recommendations to address the concomitant dangers.
{"title":"Understanding the Nuclear Landscape in Southern Asia: Complexities and Possibilities","authors":"M. Sethi","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2156253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2156253","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The nuclear playground in Southern Asia is marked by an exceptional level of complexity. A number of players; their disparate thinking on how to establish deterrence; nuclear dyads that elongate into strategic chains; inter-twining of nuclear issues with conventional, space, cyber realms; disparities in military capabilities; historical animosities accentuated by unresolved territorial conflicts; divides that spawn ideologies, religions and civilizational issues; all make for an immensely complex situation. The consequent regional nuclear dynamics has fair potential for crisis and arms race instability. As a way to address the regional nuclear challenges, the paper explores the character of Pakistan–India and China–India nuclear dyads along three specific axes: drivers of conflict; points of commonalities, similarities and differences; and implications of these for their nuclear stockpiles. Armed with this understanding, it then offers some policy recommendations to address the concomitant dangers.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44789546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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