Pub Date : 2012-08-01DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.3.133
Y. C. Kim
{"title":"Nepotism or Networking?: The Effectiveness of Social Networks in the Labor Market","authors":"Y. C. Kim","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.3.133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.3.133","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32627,"journal":{"name":"KDI Journal of Economic Policy","volume":"34 1","pages":"133-186"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68935125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-01DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.2.1
Y. C. Kim, G. Loury
We develop an identity choice model within the context of a stereotyping-cumsignaling framework. The model allows us to explore implications of the fact that, when individuals can choose identity, then the distribution of abilities within distinct identity groups becomes endogenous. This is significant because, when identity is exogenous and if the ability distributions within groups are the same, then inequality of group reputations in equilibrium can only arise if there is a positive feedback between group reputation and individual human capital investment activities (Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993). Here we show that when group membership is endogenous then the logic of individuals’ identity choices leads there to be a positive selection of higher ability individuals into the group with a better reputation. This happens because those for whom human-capital-investment is less costly are also those who stand to gain more from joining the favored group. As a result, ability distributions within distinct groups can endogenously diverge, reinforcing incentive-feedbacks. We develop the theoretical framework that can examine the positive selection and the endogenous group formation. The model implies that inequality deriving from stereotyping of endogenously constructed social groups is at least as great as the inequality that can emerge between exogenously given groups.
我们在刻板印象和信号框架的背景下开发了一个身份选择模型。该模型允许我们探索这样一个事实的含义，即当个人可以选择身份时，那么在不同身份群体中的能力分布就变成了内生的。这一点很重要，因为当身份是外生的，如果群体内的能力分布是相同的，那么只有在群体声誉和个人人力资本投资活动之间存在正反馈的情况下，均衡中的群体声誉不平等才会出现(Arrow, 1973;Coate and lury, 1993)。当群体成员是内生的，那么个体的身份选择逻辑会导致高能力个体积极选择进入具有良好声誉的群体。这是因为对那些人力资本投资成本较低的人来说，加入受青睐的群体也会获得更多的收益。因此，不同群体内部的能力分布可能会出现内生分化，从而强化激励反馈。我们发展了可以检验积极选择和内生群体形成的理论框架。该模型表明，内因建构的社会群体的刻板印象所产生的不平等至少与外因给定群体之间可能出现的不平等一样大。
{"title":"Stereotypes and Inequality: A 'Signaling' Theory of Identity Choice","authors":"Y. C. Kim, G. Loury","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.2.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.2.1","url":null,"abstract":"We develop an identity choice model within the context of a stereotyping-cumsignaling framework. The model allows us to explore implications of the fact that, when individuals can choose identity, then the distribution of abilities within distinct identity groups becomes endogenous. This is significant because, when identity is exogenous and if the ability distributions within groups are the same, then inequality of group reputations in equilibrium can only arise if there is a positive feedback between group reputation and individual human capital investment activities (Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993). Here we show that when group membership is endogenous then the logic of individuals’ identity choices leads there to be a positive selection of higher ability individuals into the group with a better reputation. This happens because those for whom human-capital-investment is less costly are also those who stand to gain more from joining the favored group. As a result, ability distributions within distinct groups can endogenously diverge, reinforcing incentive-feedbacks. We develop the theoretical framework that can examine the positive selection and the endogenous group formation. The model implies that inequality deriving from stereotyping of endogenously constructed social groups is at least as great as the inequality that can emerge between exogenously given groups.","PeriodicalId":32627,"journal":{"name":"KDI Journal of Economic Policy","volume":"34 1","pages":"1-15"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68934789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-03-01DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.87
김영준
{"title":"Economic Openness and Labor Allocation between Skilled and Less-skilled Sectors","authors":"김영준","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.87","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.87","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32627,"journal":{"name":"KDI Journal of Economic Policy","volume":"34 1","pages":"87-133"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68934665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-03-01DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.1
박영철
{"title":"A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Supervision and Monetary Policy in Emerging Economies","authors":"박영철","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32627,"journal":{"name":"KDI Journal of Economic Policy","volume":"34 1","pages":"1-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68934865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-03-01DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.53
이시욱
{"title":"Estimation of Embodied Technological Progress in Korean Manufacturing","authors":"이시욱","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.53","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32627,"journal":{"name":"KDI Journal of Economic Policy","volume":"34 1","pages":"53-85"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68934438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-03-01DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.29
정대희
{"title":"Margin and Funding Liquidity: An Empirical Analysis on the Covered Interest Parity in Korea","authors":"정대희","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2012.34.1.29","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32627,"journal":{"name":"KDI Journal of Economic Policy","volume":"34 1","pages":"29-52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68934883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.1
Thomas Bishop, Cheolbeom Park
Available evidence suggests that the average marginal propensity to consume (MPC) from the 2001 tax rebate in the US was not nearly as large as that from previous tax cuts. We examine if this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the widespread use of credit cards has made borrowing accessible for most US households by constructing a model that simulates the dynamic effect of relaxed borrowing constraints. Our model uses Kreps-Porteus preferences which account for independent measures of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, both of which can theoretically affect the willingness to save or spend. Our model shows that the average MPC drops substantially immediately after borrowing constraints are relaxed because few consumers have binding borrowing constraints at that time. The model also shows that consumers gradually reduce their wealth after borrowing constraints are relaxed, causing more of them to have binding constraints over time, which in turn causes the average MPC to rise gradually to a new steady state value that is slightly lower than the original value. This dynamic pattern of the MPC suggests that a greater ability to borrow with credit cards could explain the lower effectiveness of the 2001 tax rebate. In addition, the model predicts that consumers choose to hold lower amounts of liquid assets for precautionary reasons when they have a greater ability to borrow unsecured debt.
{"title":"Borrowing Constraints and the Marginal Propensity to Consume","authors":"Thomas Bishop, Cheolbeom Park","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.1","url":null,"abstract":"Available evidence suggests that the average marginal propensity to consume (MPC) from the 2001 tax rebate in the US was not nearly as large as that from previous tax cuts. We examine if this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the widespread use of credit cards has made borrowing accessible for most US households by constructing a model that simulates the dynamic effect of relaxed borrowing constraints. Our model uses Kreps-Porteus preferences which account for independent measures of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, both of which can theoretically affect the willingness to save or spend. Our model shows that the average MPC drops substantially immediately after borrowing constraints are relaxed because few consumers have binding borrowing constraints at that time. The model also shows that consumers gradually reduce their wealth after borrowing constraints are relaxed, causing more of them to have binding constraints over time, which in turn causes the average MPC to rise gradually to a new steady state value that is slightly lower than the original value. This dynamic pattern of the MPC suggests that a greater ability to borrow with credit cards could explain the lower effectiveness of the 2001 tax rebate. In addition, the model predicts that consumers choose to hold lower amounts of liquid assets for precautionary reasons when they have a greater ability to borrow unsecured debt.","PeriodicalId":32627,"journal":{"name":"KDI Journal of Economic Policy","volume":"33 1","pages":"1-25"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68934748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.119
Kwang-Ho Kim
The storm and flood insurance, which was introduced recently to substitute the disaster relief system to moderate government"s financial burden and enhance people"s effort to reduce damage, seems to suffer various problems. This paper conducts a theoretical analysis on various aspects of the storm and flood insurance to provide insight on those issues and draw policy implications. First, the coexistence of disaster relief with the storm and flood insurance is likely to harm the penetration of the storm and flood insurance. Second, the current premium system is likely to induce people to make less efforts to reduce damage due to moral hazard problem. Third, current support for damage-reducing efforts may not fulfill its purpose and hence should be scrutinized carefully.
{"title":"A Theoretical Study on Storm and Flood Insurance in Korea","authors":"Kwang-Ho Kim","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.119","url":null,"abstract":"The storm and flood insurance, which was introduced recently to substitute the disaster relief system to moderate government\"s financial burden and enhance people\"s effort to reduce damage, seems to suffer various problems. This paper conducts a theoretical analysis on various aspects of the storm and flood insurance to provide insight on those issues and draw policy implications. First, the coexistence of disaster relief with the storm and flood insurance is likely to harm the penetration of the storm and flood insurance. Second, the current premium system is likely to induce people to make less efforts to reduce damage due to moral hazard problem. Third, current support for damage-reducing efforts may not fulfill its purpose and hence should be scrutinized carefully.","PeriodicalId":32627,"journal":{"name":"KDI Journal of Economic Policy","volume":"33 1","pages":"119-142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68934765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.85
이수일
{"title":"Improving the Ownership Regulation in the Broadcasting Industry","authors":"이수일","doi":"10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23895/KDIJEP.2011.33.4.85","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32627,"journal":{"name":"KDI Journal of Economic Policy","volume":"33 1","pages":"85-118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68934823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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