In the process of presenting his theory of conversational implicature, Paul Grice (1975) segmented cases of conversational implicature into three groups: Group A, where no maxims are violated; Group B, where the violation of a maxim is to be explained by the supposition of a clash with another maxim; and Group C, which involves the exploitation of a maxim. Yukiko Kawaguchi, however, claimed in her 2001 article that this categorization is ill-grounded. This paper proposes, in opposition to Kawaguchi, an interpretation of Grice’s theory of conversational implicature which accords with his treatment of conversational implicature and provides reasonable evidence in support of his categorization of it.
Paul Grice(1975)在提出会话含意理论的过程中，将会话含意的情况分为三组:A组，即不违反任何准则的情况;B组，违反某一准则的情况可以用与另一准则发生冲突的假设来解释;C组则涉及对格言的运用。然而，Yukiko Kawaguchi在她2001年的文章中声称，这种分类是没有根据的。本文针对川口对格赖斯会话含义理论的解释，提出了一种与他对会话含义的处理相一致的解释，并为他对会话含义的分类提供了合理的证据。
{"title":"Three Ways to Infringe a Conversational Maxim: Grice’s Theory of Conversational Implicature as a Theory of Action","authors":"Nayuta Miki","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.49.1_33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.49.1_33","url":null,"abstract":"In the process of presenting his theory of conversational implicature, Paul Grice (1975) segmented cases of conversational implicature into three groups: Group A, where no maxims are violated; Group B, where the violation of a maxim is to be explained by the supposition of a clash with another maxim; and Group C, which involves the exploitation of a maxim. Yukiko Kawaguchi, however, claimed in her 2001 article that this categorization is ill-grounded. This paper proposes, in opposition to Kawaguchi, an interpretation of Grice’s theory of conversational implicature which accords with his treatment of conversational implicature and provides reasonable evidence in support of his categorization of it.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132684327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4288/KISORON1954.34.29
K. Morita
There are three received approaches to scientific explanation: causal, unification and pragmatics. However, I will try to highlight the insufficiency of these approaches in this paper, furthermore instead, suggest a new approach: explanation by showing the essence of the phenomena. 'The essence of the phenomena' is what distinguishes the class of phenomena in question from the other classes of phenomena. Therefore, unification surely plays an important role in the scientific explanation, but its role is to clarify the essence of the phenomena.
{"title":"Scientific Explanation and the Essence of Natural Phenomena","authors":"K. Morita","doi":"10.4288/KISORON1954.34.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON1954.34.29","url":null,"abstract":"There are three received approaches to scientific explanation: causal, unification and pragmatics. However, I will try to highlight the insufficiency of these approaches in this paper, furthermore instead, suggest a new approach: explanation by showing the essence of the phenomena. 'The essence of the phenomena' is what distinguishes the class of phenomena in question from the other classes of phenomena. Therefore, unification surely plays an important role in the scientific explanation, but its role is to clarify the essence of the phenomena.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133628910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"View Point of Quantum Brachistochrone ( Quantum and Information)","authors":"A. Hosoya","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.36.1_31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.36.1_31","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129950438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scientific experiments are often in disputes. Their qualities are challenged. Doubts are casted if their results are proper or fake. Under such polemical circumstances, how did scientists reach agreements on the qualities of experiments and their proper outcomes? By appealing to his idea of ‘experimenters’ regress’, Harry Collins rejected an accepted answer to this question, and gave his own. This paper proposes a counterexample to his views that is taken from the ‘measurement networking’ for standard values of fundamental physical constants. Examinations of a sort of meta-analysis; i.e. statistical technique that is conventionally used in the networking, reveal that, in contrast to Collins’ answer, the agreements at issues can be attained only in a holistic way and simultaneously within the network.
{"title":"Meta-analytic Holism: In Response to Harry Collins: ― コリンズに応えて ―","authors":"Y. Deguchi","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.38.1_19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.38.1_19","url":null,"abstract":"Scientific experiments are often in disputes. Their qualities are challenged. Doubts are casted if their results are proper or fake. Under such polemical circumstances, how did scientists reach agreements on the qualities of experiments and their proper outcomes? By appealing to his idea of ‘experimenters’ regress’, Harry Collins rejected an accepted answer to this question, and gave his own. This paper proposes a counterexample to his views that is taken from the ‘measurement networking’ for standard values of fundamental physical constants. Examinations of a sort of meta-analysis; i.e. statistical technique that is conventionally used in the networking, reveal that, in contrast to Collins’ answer, the agreements at issues can be attained only in a holistic way and simultaneously within the network.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"110 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134358687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I defend the contingency view on the laws of nature: laws of nature hold in metaphysically contingent way. First, I present an argument to demonstrate that categorical properties exist, and point out that the contingency view follows if we accept the existence of categorical properties. Second, through the critical examination of the view that laws of nature hold in metaphysically necessary way, I point out that we should take the conceivability into consideration in deciding the range of possibility and hence we should accept the contingency view. Third, I argue that this paper’s approach to appeal to the conceivability mitigate the severity of a problem with categorical properties, that is, a problem of quiddity. Finally, I argue the philosophical implication of the contingency view in relation to contemporary Humeanism. In my view, though it may sound strange, those who support contemporary Humean metaphysics should take a rationalistic stance. 自然法則は何らかの仕方で必然性に関わる。自然法 則とは事物が従わ 、 な 、 け 、 れ 、 ば 、 な 、 ら 、 な 、 い規則性のことだか ら、それは現実だけでなく、反事実的な状況でも成り立 つ規則性でなければならない(それゆえ自然法則は現 実において単に偶然的に成り立つ一般性とは区別され る)。しかし、現実には成り立っていない別様の自然法 則が成り立つ可能性も、ひょっとして認められるので はないか。われわれは、もし別の自然法則が成り立っ ていたらどうなってしまうかを考えることができる。 たとえば仮に熱素説が成り立っていたとしたら、その ときどういう事態が生じるのかを考えることができる だろう(「熱を摩擦によって生じさせ続けたら、やがて 熱は生じなくなるだろう」というふうに)。そのときの ∗高崎経済大学経済学部 E-mail: taku.tanikawa@gmail.com 本稿の草稿に対して、千葉大学で行われた研究会にて 秋葉剛史氏をはじめとする参加者の方々から、そして それとは別の機会に柏端達也氏からコメントを頂くこ とができた。記して感謝したい。また、本論の議論に 対して重要な指摘をしてくださった二名の査読者に感 謝する。 思考の対象は、現実の自然法則が成り立っていない単 に可能的な状況にほかならない。それゆえわれわれの 思考を真剣に受け止めるならば、現実の自然法則は偶 然的に成り立っていると言いたくなる。われわれは物 事を現実の自然法則が認める範囲内でしか考えられな いわけでなく、その点でわれわれの思考が許す可能性 の範囲は自然法則が許す範囲より広いのである。この さい自然法則の偶然性は、自然法則それ自体とは別の 観点から言われている。つまり自然法則は、 、 形 、 而 、 上 、 学 、 的 、 に 、 偶 、 然 、 的 、 な 、 仕 、 方 、 で成り立つ。 だが、それに対して異論を唱える哲学者もいる。自 然法則は 、 形 、 而 、 上 、 学 、 的 、 に 、 必 、 然 、 的 、 な 、 仕 、 方 、 で成り立つ、とい うわけだ。そうした哲学者の一人に、アレクサンダー・ 1自然法則は形而上学的に偶然的な仕方で成立している とする代表的な哲学者は、D・M・アームストロングで ある(Armstrong (1983), chap.11)。また自然法則に 関して最善体系説をとるデイヴィド・ルイスも、たと えばミニマルな唯物論を定式化するという課題に取り 組むさいの議論から窺えるように、自然法則の成立を 形而上学的に偶然的としている(Lewis (1983))。
{"title":"Modal Status of Laws of Nature","authors":"T. Tanikawa","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.47.1_1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.47.1_1","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I defend the contingency view on the laws of nature: laws of nature hold in metaphysically contingent way. First, I present an argument to demonstrate that categorical properties exist, and point out that the contingency view follows if we accept the existence of categorical properties. Second, through the critical examination of the view that laws of nature hold in metaphysically necessary way, I point out that we should take the conceivability into consideration in deciding the range of possibility and hence we should accept the contingency view. Third, I argue that this paper’s approach to appeal to the conceivability mitigate the severity of a problem with categorical properties, that is, a problem of quiddity. Finally, I argue the philosophical implication of the contingency view in relation to contemporary Humeanism. In my view, though it may sound strange, those who support contemporary Humean metaphysics should take a rationalistic stance. 自然法則は何らかの仕方で必然性に関わる。自然法 則とは事物が従わ 、 な 、 け 、 れ 、 ば 、 な 、 ら 、 な 、 い規則性のことだか ら、それは現実だけでなく、反事実的な状況でも成り立 つ規則性でなければならない(それゆえ自然法則は現 実において単に偶然的に成り立つ一般性とは区別され る)。しかし、現実には成り立っていない別様の自然法 則が成り立つ可能性も、ひょっとして認められるので はないか。われわれは、もし別の自然法則が成り立っ ていたらどうなってしまうかを考えることができる。 たとえば仮に熱素説が成り立っていたとしたら、その ときどういう事態が生じるのかを考えることができる だろう(「熱を摩擦によって生じさせ続けたら、やがて 熱は生じなくなるだろう」というふうに)。そのときの ∗高崎経済大学経済学部 E-mail: taku.tanikawa@gmail.com 本稿の草稿に対して、千葉大学で行われた研究会にて 秋葉剛史氏をはじめとする参加者の方々から、そして それとは別の機会に柏端達也氏からコメントを頂くこ とができた。記して感謝したい。また、本論の議論に 対して重要な指摘をしてくださった二名の査読者に感 謝する。 思考の対象は、現実の自然法則が成り立っていない単 に可能的な状況にほかならない。それゆえわれわれの 思考を真剣に受け止めるならば、現実の自然法則は偶 然的に成り立っていると言いたくなる。われわれは物 事を現実の自然法則が認める範囲内でしか考えられな いわけでなく、その点でわれわれの思考が許す可能性 の範囲は自然法則が許す範囲より広いのである。この さい自然法則の偶然性は、自然法則それ自体とは別の 観点から言われている。つまり自然法則は、 、 形 、 而 、 上 、 学 、 的 、 に 、 偶 、 然 、 的 、 な 、 仕 、 方 、 で成り立つ。 だが、それに対して異論を唱える哲学者もいる。自 然法則は 、 形 、 而 、 上 、 学 、 的 、 に 、 必 、 然 、 的 、 な 、 仕 、 方 、 で成り立つ、とい うわけだ。そうした哲学者の一人に、アレクサンダー・ 1自然法則は形而上学的に偶然的な仕方で成立している とする代表的な哲学者は、D・M・アームストロングで ある(Armstrong (1983), chap.11)。また自然法則に 関して最善体系説をとるデイヴィド・ルイスも、たと えばミニマルな唯物論を定式化するという課題に取り 組むさいの議論から窺えるように、自然法則の成立を 形而上学的に偶然的としている(Lewis (1983))。","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131948941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Negative Entitlement","authors":"Kazuyoshi Kamiyama","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.37.1_19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.37.1_19","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133977916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Growth of Knowledge:The Nature and Prospects of Popper's Three Worlds Theory","authors":"Kento Ikeda","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.50.1_1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.50.1_1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116891510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Plausibility of Ontic Structural Realism","authors":"Rei Nouchi","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.37.1_9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.37.1_9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121482380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4288/kisoron.45.1-2_35
Yoshiyuki Yokoro
The aim of this paper is to give appropriate rejoinders to some typical objections to Epistemic Sortalism (ES) and thus to vindicate ES from them. ES argues that in epistemically individuating an object, a subject of perception needs to grasp under which sortal concept the object falls. ES has been, however, questioned lately in terms of both the possibility of misconceptions or ignorance of sortal concepts and the conflict with some current psychological research. I shall show that these objections pose no threat to ES, by examining the notion of ‘individuation’ and thereby reorganizing ES as a specific epistemological theory concerning discriminating and identifying knowledge. Based on the relevant ontology, i.e., the constitution view, newly reconstructed ES requires an individuator to grasp the sortal concept of an object as an epistemic evidence.
{"title":"A Plea for Epistemic Sortalism:: Individuation and the Grasp of Sortal Concepts","authors":"Yoshiyuki Yokoro","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.45.1-2_35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.45.1-2_35","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to give appropriate rejoinders to some typical objections to Epistemic Sortalism (ES) and thus to vindicate ES from them. ES argues that in epistemically individuating an object, a subject of perception needs to grasp under which sortal concept the object falls. ES has been, however, questioned lately in terms of both the possibility of misconceptions or ignorance of sortal concepts and the conflict with some current psychological research. I shall show that these objections pose no threat to ES, by examining the notion of ‘individuation’ and thereby reorganizing ES as a specific epistemological theory concerning discriminating and identifying knowledge. Based on the relevant ontology, i.e., the constitution view, newly reconstructed ES requires an individuator to grasp the sortal concept of an object as an epistemic evidence.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128519479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4288/kisoron.45.1-2_69
Eisuke Sakakibara
{"title":"Kohji Ishihara, Yukihiro Nobuhara, & Masanari Itokawa eds. Philosophy of Psychiatry 1: Science and Philosophy of Psychiatry : （シリーズ精神医学の哲学 第1巻、東京大学出版会、2016年）","authors":"Eisuke Sakakibara","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.45.1-2_69","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.45.1-2_69","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126880287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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