{"title":"Russell's Paradox and the Theory of Classes in The Principles of Mathematics","authors":"Yasushi Nomura","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.41.1_23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.41.1_23","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131453349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scientific experiments are often in disputes. Their qualities are challenged. Doubts are casted if their results are proper or fake. Under such polemical circumstances, how did scientists reach agreements on the qualities of experiments and their proper outcomes? By appealing to his idea of ‘experimenters’ regress’, Harry Collins rejected an accepted answer to this question, and gave his own. This paper proposes a counterexample to his views that is taken from the ‘measurement networking’ for standard values of fundamental physical constants. Examinations of a sort of meta-analysis; i.e. statistical technique that is conventionally used in the networking, reveal that, in contrast to Collins’ answer, the agreements at issues can be attained only in a holistic way and simultaneously within the network.
{"title":"Meta-analytic Holism: In Response to Harry Collins: ― コリンズに応えて ―","authors":"Y. Deguchi","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.38.1_19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.38.1_19","url":null,"abstract":"Scientific experiments are often in disputes. Their qualities are challenged. Doubts are casted if their results are proper or fake. Under such polemical circumstances, how did scientists reach agreements on the qualities of experiments and their proper outcomes? By appealing to his idea of ‘experimenters’ regress’, Harry Collins rejected an accepted answer to this question, and gave his own. This paper proposes a counterexample to his views that is taken from the ‘measurement networking’ for standard values of fundamental physical constants. Examinations of a sort of meta-analysis; i.e. statistical technique that is conventionally used in the networking, reveal that, in contrast to Collins’ answer, the agreements at issues can be attained only in a holistic way and simultaneously within the network.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"110 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134358687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I defend the contingency view on the laws of nature: laws of nature hold in metaphysically contingent way. First, I present an argument to demonstrate that categorical properties exist, and point out that the contingency view follows if we accept the existence of categorical properties. Second, through the critical examination of the view that laws of nature hold in metaphysically necessary way, I point out that we should take the conceivability into consideration in deciding the range of possibility and hence we should accept the contingency view. Third, I argue that this paper’s approach to appeal to the conceivability mitigate the severity of a problem with categorical properties, that is, a problem of quiddity. Finally, I argue the philosophical implication of the contingency view in relation to contemporary Humeanism. In my view, though it may sound strange, those who support contemporary Humean metaphysics should take a rationalistic stance. 自然法則は何らかの仕方で必然性に関わる。自然法 則とは事物が従わ 、 な 、 け 、 れ 、 ば 、 な 、 ら 、 な 、 い規則性のことだか ら、それは現実だけでなく、反事実的な状況でも成り立 つ規則性でなければならない(それゆえ自然法則は現 実において単に偶然的に成り立つ一般性とは区別され る)。しかし、現実には成り立っていない別様の自然法 則が成り立つ可能性も、ひょっとして認められるので はないか。われわれは、もし別の自然法則が成り立っ ていたらどうなってしまうかを考えることができる。 たとえば仮に熱素説が成り立っていたとしたら、その ときどういう事態が生じるのかを考えることができる だろう(「熱を摩擦によって生じさせ続けたら、やがて 熱は生じなくなるだろう」というふうに)。そのときの ∗高崎経済大学経済学部 E-mail: taku.tanikawa@gmail.com 本稿の草稿に対して、千葉大学で行われた研究会にて 秋葉剛史氏をはじめとする参加者の方々から、そして それとは別の機会に柏端達也氏からコメントを頂くこ とができた。記して感謝したい。また、本論の議論に 対して重要な指摘をしてくださった二名の査読者に感 謝する。 思考の対象は、現実の自然法則が成り立っていない単 に可能的な状況にほかならない。それゆえわれわれの 思考を真剣に受け止めるならば、現実の自然法則は偶 然的に成り立っていると言いたくなる。われわれは物 事を現実の自然法則が認める範囲内でしか考えられな いわけでなく、その点でわれわれの思考が許す可能性 の範囲は自然法則が許す範囲より広いのである。この さい自然法則の偶然性は、自然法則それ自体とは別の 観点から言われている。つまり自然法則は、 、 形 、 而 、 上 、 学 、 的 、 に 、 偶 、 然 、 的 、 な 、 仕 、 方 、 で成り立つ。 だが、それに対して異論を唱える哲学者もいる。自 然法則は 、 形 、 而 、 上 、 学 、 的 、 に 、 必 、 然 、 的 、 な 、 仕 、 方 、 で成り立つ、とい うわけだ。そうした哲学者の一人に、アレクサンダー・ 1自然法則は形而上学的に偶然的な仕方で成立している とする代表的な哲学者は、D・M・アームストロングで ある(Armstrong (1983), chap.11)。また自然法則に 関して最善体系説をとるデイヴィド・ルイスも、たと えばミニマルな唯物論を定式化するという課題に取り 組むさいの議論から窺えるように、自然法則の成立を 形而上学的に偶然的としている(Lewis (1983))。
{"title":"Modal Status of Laws of Nature","authors":"T. Tanikawa","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.47.1_1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.47.1_1","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I defend the contingency view on the laws of nature: laws of nature hold in metaphysically contingent way. First, I present an argument to demonstrate that categorical properties exist, and point out that the contingency view follows if we accept the existence of categorical properties. Second, through the critical examination of the view that laws of nature hold in metaphysically necessary way, I point out that we should take the conceivability into consideration in deciding the range of possibility and hence we should accept the contingency view. Third, I argue that this paper’s approach to appeal to the conceivability mitigate the severity of a problem with categorical properties, that is, a problem of quiddity. Finally, I argue the philosophical implication of the contingency view in relation to contemporary Humeanism. In my view, though it may sound strange, those who support contemporary Humean metaphysics should take a rationalistic stance. 自然法則は何らかの仕方で必然性に関わる。自然法 則とは事物が従わ 、 な 、 け 、 れ 、 ば 、 な 、 ら 、 な 、 い規則性のことだか ら、それは現実だけでなく、反事実的な状況でも成り立 つ規則性でなければならない(それゆえ自然法則は現 実において単に偶然的に成り立つ一般性とは区別され る)。しかし、現実には成り立っていない別様の自然法 則が成り立つ可能性も、ひょっとして認められるので はないか。われわれは、もし別の自然法則が成り立っ ていたらどうなってしまうかを考えることができる。 たとえば仮に熱素説が成り立っていたとしたら、その ときどういう事態が生じるのかを考えることができる だろう(「熱を摩擦によって生じさせ続けたら、やがて 熱は生じなくなるだろう」というふうに)。そのときの ∗高崎経済大学経済学部 E-mail: taku.tanikawa@gmail.com 本稿の草稿に対して、千葉大学で行われた研究会にて 秋葉剛史氏をはじめとする参加者の方々から、そして それとは別の機会に柏端達也氏からコメントを頂くこ とができた。記して感謝したい。また、本論の議論に 対して重要な指摘をしてくださった二名の査読者に感 謝する。 思考の対象は、現実の自然法則が成り立っていない単 に可能的な状況にほかならない。それゆえわれわれの 思考を真剣に受け止めるならば、現実の自然法則は偶 然的に成り立っていると言いたくなる。われわれは物 事を現実の自然法則が認める範囲内でしか考えられな いわけでなく、その点でわれわれの思考が許す可能性 の範囲は自然法則が許す範囲より広いのである。この さい自然法則の偶然性は、自然法則それ自体とは別の 観点から言われている。つまり自然法則は、 、 形 、 而 、 上 、 学 、 的 、 に 、 偶 、 然 、 的 、 な 、 仕 、 方 、 で成り立つ。 だが、それに対して異論を唱える哲学者もいる。自 然法則は 、 形 、 而 、 上 、 学 、 的 、 に 、 必 、 然 、 的 、 な 、 仕 、 方 、 で成り立つ、とい うわけだ。そうした哲学者の一人に、アレクサンダー・ 1自然法則は形而上学的に偶然的な仕方で成立している とする代表的な哲学者は、D・M・アームストロングで ある(Armstrong (1983), chap.11)。また自然法則に 関して最善体系説をとるデイヴィド・ルイスも、たと えばミニマルな唯物論を定式化するという課題に取り 組むさいの議論から窺えるように、自然法則の成立を 形而上学的に偶然的としている(Lewis (1983))。","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131948941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Negative Entitlement","authors":"Kazuyoshi Kamiyama","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.37.1_19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.37.1_19","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133977916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Extensions of a System of Paraconsistent Logic PCL1","authors":"Hitoshi Omori, Toshiharu Waragai","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.39.2_51","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.39.2_51","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115914213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The common idea that a gene encodes a phenotypic character has played an important role in the theory of evolution, one of whose origin is population genetics. Today, the relationship between a gene and a phenotype is sometimes interpreted informationally, i.e., a gene conveys phenotypic information. In this study, the nature of genetic information about phenotypes is discussed by considering teleosemantics. It shows that phenotypic information is not carried by a single gene, but by a genome containing multiple genes and the regulatory regions which form the related gene
{"title":"Genetic Information about Phenotype: A Teleosemantic Point of View","authors":"T. Ishida","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.47.2_59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.47.2_59","url":null,"abstract":"The common idea that a gene encodes a phenotypic character has played an important role in the theory of evolution, one of whose origin is population genetics. Today, the relationship between a gene and a phenotype is sometimes interpreted informationally, i.e., a gene conveys phenotypic information. In this study, the nature of genetic information about phenotypes is discussed by considering teleosemantics. It shows that phenotypic information is not carried by a single gene, but by a genome containing multiple genes and the regulatory regions which form the related gene","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116803147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Is \"Scientific?\"","authors":"O. Kanamori","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv36zr00.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv36zr00.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117227771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is about the status of compositionality in our linguistic communication and its theorizing. The principle of compositionality has been regarded as an essential precondition under which semantic theories are built since the principle seems to properly explain some important facts about natural language, such as learnability and novelty. According to recent discussions, however, the precise understanding of compositionality casts doubt on its necessity. In this paper, I take a closer look at how we have started and improved our semantic investigations, and present a new argument for compositionality which is based on our linguistic intuition about the notion of un-synonymy and substitution. My point of the argument is that compositionality can serve as a useful tool for theorizing natural language semantics even if semantic rules themselves are described non-compositionally.
{"title":"Compositionality for What?: Methodological Argument from Un-synonymy and Substitution","authors":"Ryohei Takaya","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.49.1_49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.49.1_49","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is about the status of compositionality in our linguistic communication and its theorizing. The principle of compositionality has been regarded as an essential precondition under which semantic theories are built since the principle seems to properly explain some important facts about natural language, such as learnability and novelty. According to recent discussions, however, the precise understanding of compositionality casts doubt on its necessity. In this paper, I take a closer look at how we have started and improved our semantic investigations, and present a new argument for compositionality which is based on our linguistic intuition about the notion of un-synonymy and substitution. My point of the argument is that compositionality can serve as a useful tool for theorizing natural language semantics even if semantic rules themselves are described non-compositionally.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121552388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The topic of this paper is an intention. John Searle distinguished two types of intention: a prior intention and an intention in action. Subsequently, Hubert Dreyfus and Elisabeth Pacherie presented their views of intention in action. This paper places importance on Dreyfus’ view among three views of intention in action. In my view, on the one hand, Searle and Dreyfus discussed a propositional intention in action. Regarding this discussion, I argue that Dreyfus’ view is superior to Searle’s view. On the other hand, Pacherie presented the view of non-propositional intention in action. I argue against her view by invoking Dreyfus’ insights about a propositional intention in action.
{"title":"On an Intention in Action","authors":"Kodai Sato","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.48.1_21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.48.1_21","url":null,"abstract":"The topic of this paper is an intention. John Searle distinguished two types of intention: a prior intention and an intention in action. Subsequently, Hubert Dreyfus and Elisabeth Pacherie presented their views of intention in action. This paper places importance on Dreyfus’ view among three views of intention in action. In my view, on the one hand, Searle and Dreyfus discussed a propositional intention in action. Regarding this discussion, I argue that Dreyfus’ view is superior to Searle’s view. On the other hand, Pacherie presented the view of non-propositional intention in action. I argue against her view by invoking Dreyfus’ insights about a propositional intention in action.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123249627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4288/kisoron.42.2_105
Tomohisa Furuta
{"title":"The Works of Philosophy of Science in Japan: 1945-1960","authors":"Tomohisa Furuta","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.42.2_105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.42.2_105","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130352724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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