{"title":"Conceptual Foundations of Statistical Operators","authors":"Z. Maki","doi":"10.4288/kisoron1954.21.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron1954.21.9","url":null,"abstract":"量子力学において, 統計集団の状態をあらわすために用いられる統計作用素 (密度行列とも呼ばれる) の概念的基礎について討論する.通常の解釈論, すなわち広義のコペンハーゲン解釈の公理論的構成にしたがえば, 統計作用素と統計集団との対応は周知のごとくボルンの確率規則を用いて説明される.しかしここでは, それと異なり, 測定過程と統計作用素との間に (後者をば前者の操作の作用素表現として) 直接の対応を見出すことにより, 確率規則を経由することなく統計作用素の物理的意味を確定する方法について述べる.もしこの考え方が正しいならば, 量子力学の解釈論をより一層明確な仕方で展開することが可能となるであろう.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132670238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4288/KISORON1954.34.11
Keiichi Yamada
Epistemological contextualism holds that the truth-conditions of knowledge-attributing sentences depend on the contexts in which they are uttered. While Contextualists have presented solutions of the skeptical paradox with reference to this dependence, they are confronted with various criticisms. In this paper, I examine DeRose's solution of skepticism, and then elucidate why it fails to do justice to the persuasiveness of skeptical argument. Finally, as an alternative resolution of radical skepticism, I suggest the position of “radical contextualism” that claims not only standards of knowledge but of epistemic distinction (justification) depend on the context, and illustrate the justification model of radical contextualism in contrast with that of radical skepticism.
{"title":"How Does Contextualism Solve the Skeptical Paradox","authors":"Keiichi Yamada","doi":"10.4288/KISORON1954.34.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON1954.34.11","url":null,"abstract":"Epistemological contextualism holds that the truth-conditions of knowledge-attributing sentences depend on the contexts in which they are uttered. While Contextualists have presented solutions of the skeptical paradox with reference to this dependence, they are confronted with various criticisms. In this paper, I examine DeRose's solution of skepticism, and then elucidate why it fails to do justice to the persuasiveness of skeptical argument. Finally, as an alternative resolution of radical skepticism, I suggest the position of “radical contextualism” that claims not only standards of knowledge but of epistemic distinction (justification) depend on the context, and illustrate the justification model of radical contextualism in contrast with that of radical skepticism.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129614694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Role of Higher-order Expectations in David Lewis's Theory of Convention","authors":"Haruka Tsutsui","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.37.2_59","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.37.2_59","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"69 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133018639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4288/KISORON.45.1-2_1
Yasushi Ogusa
Dispositionalism of color claims that colors are dispositions to cause certain sorts of visual experiences in perceivers. Lately, this theory has been criticized as conflicting with the phenomenology of color experiences. Critics insist that our visual experiences represent colors not as dispositional properties, but as simple, monadic, intrinsic features of physical objects, and that this poses a serious threat to dispositionalism. First, I will examine four versions of this kind of objection and defend dispositionalism against them. Second, based on these considerations, I will explicate the notion of ‘certain sorts of visual experiences’ that dispositionalists refer to. More specifically, I will offer a promising view of color experiences through examining the phenomenon
{"title":"Defending Dispositionalism of Color:: The Phenomenology and the Ontology of Color","authors":"Yasushi Ogusa","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.45.1-2_1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.45.1-2_1","url":null,"abstract":"Dispositionalism of color claims that colors are dispositions to cause certain sorts of visual experiences in perceivers. Lately, this theory has been criticized as conflicting with the phenomenology of color experiences. Critics insist that our visual experiences represent colors not as dispositional properties, but as simple, monadic, intrinsic features of physical objects, and that this poses a serious threat to dispositionalism. First, I will examine four versions of this kind of objection and defend dispositionalism against them. Second, based on these considerations, I will explicate the notion of ‘certain sorts of visual experiences’ that dispositionalists refer to. More specifically, I will offer a promising view of color experiences through examining the phenomenon","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115094943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4288/KISORON.44.1-2_35
A. Takada
This paper argues for the event view of the story. According to the event view, stories are the specific type of complex events. Another competitor is the content view, according to which stories are abstract contents. First, I explain the event view is an attractive option for narrative approach in philosophy. Narrative approach regards lives as narratives. We can understand this, considering lives as the same type events as stories. Next, I argue that the event view can explain the identity of stories. The same story could be retold in different media with different details. The content view has trouble explaining that. Finally, in the case of fictional narratives, retelling of stories is amounts to trans-work transposition of fictional entities. This position is quite simple and respects much intution.
{"title":"The Ontology of Stories","authors":"A. Takada","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.44.1-2_35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.44.1-2_35","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues for the event view of the story. According to the event view, stories are the specific type of complex events. Another competitor is the content view, according to which stories are abstract contents. First, I explain the event view is an attractive option for narrative approach in philosophy. Narrative approach regards lives as narratives. We can understand this, considering lives as the same type events as stories. Next, I argue that the event view can explain the identity of stories. The same story could be retold in different media with different details. The content view has trouble explaining that. Finally, in the case of fictional narratives, retelling of stories is amounts to trans-work transposition of fictional entities. This position is quite simple and respects much intution.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128331687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The asymmetry of causation and backward causation are discussed. The problems are whether asymmetry of causation is objective or subjective, and what backward causation is. First, I survey and criticize three theories about causation: Dowe’s fork theory, Menzies and Price’s agency theory and Woodward’s manipulability theory. Next, I insist that we should distinguish between causal process and causal direction, and that the former objectively exists but the latter does not. Third, I clarify what backward causation is if the causal direction does not objectively exist. I focus on the relative direction of temporal axis in causal process. Forth and finally, I would like to apply my theory to the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics.
{"title":"Asymmetry of Causation and Possibility of Backward Causation","authors":"K. Morita","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.38.1_1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.38.1_1","url":null,"abstract":"The asymmetry of causation and backward causation are discussed. The problems are whether asymmetry of causation is objective or subjective, and what backward causation is. First, I survey and criticize three theories about causation: Dowe’s fork theory, Menzies and Price’s agency theory and Woodward’s manipulability theory. Next, I insist that we should distinguish between causal process and causal direction, and that the former objectively exists but the latter does not. Third, I clarify what backward causation is if the causal direction does not objectively exist. I focus on the relative direction of temporal axis in causal process. Forth and finally, I would like to apply my theory to the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133586153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A System of Paraconsistent Logic Equipped with Classical Negation","authors":"Toshiharu Waragai, Hitoshi Omori","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.36.1_9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.36.1_9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"891 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116175964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4288/KISORON1954.6.47
T. Indow
{"title":"Space concepts in psychology","authors":"T. Indow","doi":"10.4288/KISORON1954.6.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON1954.6.47","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117052366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is well known that the Continuum Hypothesis is independent from the axioms of set theory by the results of Kurt Godel and Paul Cohen. However, there are some set theorists who do not consider that this independency of the hypothesis is the ultimate answer of the continuum problem and who think the validity of the hypothesis should be determined. Recently, several ideas have been proposed to decide the hypothesis. In this paper, we introduce two ideas to determine the truth of the Continuum Hypothesis, which are related to the concept of forcing absoluteness. One is the concepet of forcing axioms, and the other is Ω-logic.
{"title":"Forcing Axioms and Ω-logic","authors":"T. Yorioka","doi":"10.4288/KISORON.36.2_45","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/KISORON.36.2_45","url":null,"abstract":"It is well known that the Continuum Hypothesis is independent from the axioms of set theory by the results of Kurt Godel and Paul Cohen. However, there are some set theorists who do not consider that this independency of the hypothesis is the ultimate answer of the continuum problem and who think the validity of the hypothesis should be determined. Recently, several ideas have been proposed to decide the hypothesis. In this paper, we introduce two ideas to determine the truth of the Continuum Hypothesis, which are related to the concept of forcing absoluteness. One is the concepet of forcing axioms, and the other is Ω-logic.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124364736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In The Aporia of Mind: Space, Body and Meaning, Noya tried to answer two difficult philosophical problems about the world and other minds. And his answers were given mainly by the elimination of person from his theory of Cyoubou. In this paper, I examine his arguments and explain why sceptics would not be fully satisfied with his solution. First, I argue that the explanation of the unity of multimodal perceptions should require person. Second, I insist that person is needed for the individualization of the body and show that the subject of experiences can be separated from that of acts. Finally, after showing the difference between actuality and reality, I point that Noya’s theory missed the problem of the other lives in the different actuality.
{"title":"Can Person be Eliminated in the Theory of Cyoubou ?:","authors":"Keiichi Yamada","doi":"10.4288/kisoron.47.1_47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4288/kisoron.47.1_47","url":null,"abstract":"In The Aporia of Mind: Space, Body and Meaning, Noya tried to answer two difficult philosophical problems about the world and other minds. And his answers were given mainly by the elimination of person from his theory of Cyoubou. In this paper, I examine his arguments and explain why sceptics would not be fully satisfied with his solution. First, I argue that the explanation of the unity of multimodal perceptions should require person. Second, I insist that person is needed for the individualization of the body and show that the subject of experiences can be separated from that of acts. Finally, after showing the difference between actuality and reality, I point that Noya’s theory missed the problem of the other lives in the different actuality.","PeriodicalId":331954,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124102909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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