Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.30-d.minich
Dobrochna Minich
Summary In this paper, I analyse problem of interpretation of the Constitution in American doctrine. Starting point is the distinction between the concept of Originalism and Living Constitution. The author briefly presents the main assumptions of both concepts. On that background examines the concept by Jack M. Balkin. He described it as Living Originalism. Balkin in his theory combines the best of traditional Originalism and concept of Living Constitution. He combined Dworkin’s “moral reading” of the Constitution with traditional Originalism. For Balkin, Originalism is seen as a initial framework for governance (framework originalism). From Ronald Dworkin, he adopted a distinction between legal rules and legal principles, and the argument that principles express values. Balkin described his concept of Originalism as “method of text and principle”.
{"title":"Between Originalism and Living Constitution – Jack M. Balkin Concept of Interpretation of the Constitution","authors":"Dobrochna Minich","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.30-d.minich","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.30-d.minich","url":null,"abstract":"Summary In this paper, I analyse problem of interpretation of the Constitution in American doctrine. Starting point is the distinction between the concept of Originalism and Living Constitution. The author briefly presents the main assumptions of both concepts. On that background examines the concept by Jack M. Balkin. He described it as Living Originalism. Balkin in his theory combines the best of traditional Originalism and concept of Living Constitution. He combined Dworkin’s “moral reading” of the Constitution with traditional Originalism. For Balkin, Originalism is seen as a initial framework for governance (framework originalism). From Ronald Dworkin, he adopted a distinction between legal rules and legal principles, and the argument that principles express values. Balkin described his concept of Originalism as “method of text and principle”.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"130 - 145"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47502603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.24-m.gluchowski
Michał Głuchowski
Summary Upskirting consists in taking photographs or videotaping beneath women’s dresses or skirts, usually secretly. In accordance with Polish criminal law, the conduct matches the features of recording the image of a naked person under Article 191a § 1 CC only in extraordinary situations. Usually, a perpetrator is liable for a misdemeanour under Article 51 § 1 MC or Article 140 MC. On the other hand, many foreign legislations, inter alia England, Wales and Germany, have recently introduced criminal regulations penalising upskirting. A comparative legal analysis shows that the scope of application of Section 67A of the English Sexual Offences Act 2003 is much narrower than that of § 184k of the German Criminal Code. However, none of the countries has avoided errors in regulating upskirting. Based on their experiences, the following proposals de lege ferenda are formulated. It is necessary to introduce a new type of a prohibited act penalising recording and dissemination of an image of genitals, buttocks and underwear covering those body parts if they are hidden from third persons’ eyesight. However, the parts of body protected by this provision should not include breasts. The requirement of a perpetrator’s special motive laid down in the English regulation is disapproved. Moreover, the introduction of liability for acts other than recording or dissemination of such images like in the German law is criticised.
{"title":"Upskirting in Polish, English, Welsh and German Law: Penalisation of Secretly Taking Photographs or Videotaping Beneath Clothing","authors":"Michał Głuchowski","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.24-m.gluchowski","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.24-m.gluchowski","url":null,"abstract":"Summary Upskirting consists in taking photographs or videotaping beneath women’s dresses or skirts, usually secretly. In accordance with Polish criminal law, the conduct matches the features of recording the image of a naked person under Article 191a § 1 CC only in extraordinary situations. Usually, a perpetrator is liable for a misdemeanour under Article 51 § 1 MC or Article 140 MC. On the other hand, many foreign legislations, inter alia England, Wales and Germany, have recently introduced criminal regulations penalising upskirting. A comparative legal analysis shows that the scope of application of Section 67A of the English Sexual Offences Act 2003 is much narrower than that of § 184k of the German Criminal Code. However, none of the countries has avoided errors in regulating upskirting. Based on their experiences, the following proposals de lege ferenda are formulated. It is necessary to introduce a new type of a prohibited act penalising recording and dissemination of an image of genitals, buttocks and underwear covering those body parts if they are hidden from third persons’ eyesight. However, the parts of body protected by this provision should not include breasts. The requirement of a perpetrator’s special motive laid down in the English regulation is disapproved. Moreover, the introduction of liability for acts other than recording or dissemination of such images like in the German law is criticised.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":" ","pages":"27 - 44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48957220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.23-m.melezini
M. Melezini
Summary The article analyses and evaluates the proposal to amend the regulations concerning the penalty of deprivation of liberty that consists in the eradication of the fixed penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment from the catalogue of penalties laid down in Criminal Code and exceeding the upper time limit of the penalty of deprivation of liberty from up to 15 to up to 30 years. The article presents the opinions of the doctrine and the judicature on the nature and function of the penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment and other penalties of deprivation of liberty, points out practical difficulties indicated in the literature that are connected with the imposition of the fixed penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment in case of perpetrators cooperating in the commission of crime, and presents proposals to amend the regulations by means of successive CC amendment bills from 2000 up to now, as well as the opinion of the doctrine on the proposed changes. The considerations presented in the article lead to the conclusion that neither the proposal to eliminate the fixed penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment nor exceeding the so-called standard penalty of deprivation of liberty to 30 years deserves approval.
{"title":"On the Proposal to Change the Upper Limit on the Penalty of Deprivation of Liberty and Abandon the Penalty of 25 Years’ Imprisonment","authors":"M. Melezini","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.23-m.melezini","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.23-m.melezini","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article analyses and evaluates the proposal to amend the regulations concerning the penalty of deprivation of liberty that consists in the eradication of the fixed penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment from the catalogue of penalties laid down in Criminal Code and exceeding the upper time limit of the penalty of deprivation of liberty from up to 15 to up to 30 years. The article presents the opinions of the doctrine and the judicature on the nature and function of the penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment and other penalties of deprivation of liberty, points out practical difficulties indicated in the literature that are connected with the imposition of the fixed penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment in case of perpetrators cooperating in the commission of crime, and presents proposals to amend the regulations by means of successive CC amendment bills from 2000 up to now, as well as the opinion of the doctrine on the proposed changes. The considerations presented in the article lead to the conclusion that neither the proposal to eliminate the fixed penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment nor exceeding the so-called standard penalty of deprivation of liberty to 30 years deserves approval.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"7 - 26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46689804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.33-i.sierpowska
Iwona Sierpowska
Summary The subject of the gloss is a resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court in which the Court examined the rules of determining income in social assistance proceedings. While recognising the possibility of reducing income solely by the amount of alimony provided to an entitled person under the provisions of the family and guardianship code, the Supreme Administrative Court stated unequivocally that the privileged method of determining income cannot be used by persons who do not pay alimony and are obliged to make payments to the alimony fund. This gloss presents arguments supporting the theses contained in the resolution and their axiological justification. Moreover, it elaborates on the issues indirectly raised by the adjudicating panel, such as overdue alimony and amounts that are actually paid as part of alimony. This subject is important for determining the income of persons applying for support under the social assistance system as well as paying for benefits.
{"title":"Gloss on the Resolution of a Panel of Seven Judges of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 November 2021, I OPS 2/21","authors":"Iwona Sierpowska","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.33-i.sierpowska","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.33-i.sierpowska","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The subject of the gloss is a resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court in which the Court examined the rules of determining income in social assistance proceedings. While recognising the possibility of reducing income solely by the amount of alimony provided to an entitled person under the provisions of the family and guardianship code, the Supreme Administrative Court stated unequivocally that the privileged method of determining income cannot be used by persons who do not pay alimony and are obliged to make payments to the alimony fund. This gloss presents arguments supporting the theses contained in the resolution and their axiological justification. Moreover, it elaborates on the issues indirectly raised by the adjudicating panel, such as overdue alimony and amounts that are actually paid as part of alimony. This subject is important for determining the income of persons applying for support under the social assistance system as well as paying for benefits.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"188 - 201"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44451339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.32-m.gubala
Marcin Gubała
Summary The article is aimed at analysing regulations concerning administrative financial penalties laid down in Act of 20 July 2018: Law on higher education and science. The article discusses the issues important from the point of view of the entities of the system of higher education and science, especially universities. The analysis focuses on such issues as the role of administrative financial penalties in the supervision of the system of higher education and science, the subjective scope of the regulations concerning penalties, their legal nature and the procedure of imposing them. The analysis leads to the conclusion that administrative financial penalties constitute a novelty in the system of higher education and science, and Act: Law on higher education and science regulates all basic normative elements of those penalties with the exception of procedural matters, which are laid down in Code of Administrative Procedure. The analysis results in the establishment of the nature of hose penalties (they are relatively specified and the features of acts under the regulations are formulated by means of a general expression of administrative-legal ‘obligations’ stipulated in the statute, as well as by reference to conduct of a more defined nature), bodies competent to impose them, and the role of financial penalties in the system of higher education and science.
{"title":"Administrative Financial Penalties in the System of Higher Education and Science","authors":"Marcin Gubała","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.32-m.gubala","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.32-m.gubala","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article is aimed at analysing regulations concerning administrative financial penalties laid down in Act of 20 July 2018: Law on higher education and science. The article discusses the issues important from the point of view of the entities of the system of higher education and science, especially universities. The analysis focuses on such issues as the role of administrative financial penalties in the supervision of the system of higher education and science, the subjective scope of the regulations concerning penalties, their legal nature and the procedure of imposing them. The analysis leads to the conclusion that administrative financial penalties constitute a novelty in the system of higher education and science, and Act: Law on higher education and science regulates all basic normative elements of those penalties with the exception of procedural matters, which are laid down in Code of Administrative Procedure. The analysis results in the establishment of the nature of hose penalties (they are relatively specified and the features of acts under the regulations are formulated by means of a general expression of administrative-legal ‘obligations’ stipulated in the statute, as well as by reference to conduct of a more defined nature), bodies competent to impose them, and the role of financial penalties in the system of higher education and science.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"167 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41344433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.25-m.rzewuska
M. Rzewuska
Summary The publication is devoted to the issue of adopting an adult. Under the Polish legislation in force, only a minor may be adopted. The study considers the legitimacy of introducing regulations allowing the adoption of adults to the family and guardianship code. It was pointed out that such solutions were in force in earlier Polish legislation. The proposals of the Human Rights Defender submitted in this respect were presented. In an attempt to support the legitimacy of the postulate to introduce into the Polish legal system legal norms allowing the possibility of adopting an adult, reference was also made to selected foreign legal systems guaranteeing this type of possibility.
{"title":"Adopting an Adult Person – Postulates de Lege Ferenda","authors":"M. Rzewuska","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.25-m.rzewuska","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.25-m.rzewuska","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The publication is devoted to the issue of adopting an adult. Under the Polish legislation in force, only a minor may be adopted. The study considers the legitimacy of introducing regulations allowing the adoption of adults to the family and guardianship code. It was pointed out that such solutions were in force in earlier Polish legislation. The proposals of the Human Rights Defender submitted in this respect were presented. In an attempt to support the legitimacy of the postulate to introduce into the Polish legal system legal norms allowing the possibility of adopting an adult, reference was also made to selected foreign legal systems guaranteeing this type of possibility.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"45 - 62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43863114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.27-a.bera-adamczyk
Aneta Bera-Adamczyk
Summary The article is aimed at resolving a research problem on the basis of two methods: the axiological method and formal-dogmatic method, it also finds the answer to the question: what were the reasons which made the institution of limitation weak in terms of its axiological establishment within the civil law. The axiology of limitation consists of protection of the debtor. Creditor may withhold obligation by means of plea that the action was time-barred, it deprives creditor from the opportunity to claim the obligation. The shape of the given regulation makes the safety of the civil turnover jeopardised. The argumentation and the conclusions show clearly that limitation can both foster and prevent the stability of the civil turnover. This fact is a clear indication that the institution of limitation indeed shows its weakness in terms of its axiological establishment within the civil law.
{"title":"Axiology of the Limitation of Liability","authors":"Aneta Bera-Adamczyk","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.27-a.bera-adamczyk","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.27-a.bera-adamczyk","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article is aimed at resolving a research problem on the basis of two methods: the axiological method and formal-dogmatic method, it also finds the answer to the question: what were the reasons which made the institution of limitation weak in terms of its axiological establishment within the civil law. The axiology of limitation consists of protection of the debtor. Creditor may withhold obligation by means of plea that the action was time-barred, it deprives creditor from the opportunity to claim the obligation. The shape of the given regulation makes the safety of the civil turnover jeopardised. The argumentation and the conclusions show clearly that limitation can both foster and prevent the stability of the civil turnover. This fact is a clear indication that the institution of limitation indeed shows its weakness in terms of its axiological establishment within the civil law.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"79 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45430059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.31-b.opalinski
Bartłomiej Opaliński
Summary The article discusses the issues concerning the influence of the Polish legislative power on the functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal that started in the autumn of 2015. The analysis covers all legal acts passed between 2015 and 2017 that introduced changes in the structure and functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal and modified the status of its judges. The research made use of the innovative method devised by Professor Paweł Chmielnicki, which consists in the examination of substantial sources of law, i.e. real reasons for passing a given statute. The analysis covers, inter alia, materials developed by a group of specialists, including the author, employed by the Centre for Legislative Process Research at Lazarski University. The article shows that the changes in the Constitutional Tribunal do not serve to exercise citizens’ rights. They aim to strengthen the political authorities (the Parliament and its emanation, the Government) at the judicial power expense. It matches the general tendency visible after the 2015 parliamentary election targeted at weakening the position of the judiciary and personal influence of the legislative on this power. The activities do not follow the constitutional rule of separation of powers and are in conflict with the principle of separation and independence of courts and tribunals guaranteed by the Constitution. Taking into account the fact that authorities change in the conditions of a democratic system, the only panacea for the restoration of the shape and prestige of the Constitutional Tribunal is the change of the authorities. There will be an opportunity for that in the autumn of 2023.
{"title":"Subjection of the Constitutional Tribunal to the Organs of Political Authorities in Poland After 2015: Contribution to Considerations","authors":"Bartłomiej Opaliński","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.31-b.opalinski","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.3.2022.31-b.opalinski","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article discusses the issues concerning the influence of the Polish legislative power on the functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal that started in the autumn of 2015. The analysis covers all legal acts passed between 2015 and 2017 that introduced changes in the structure and functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal and modified the status of its judges. The research made use of the innovative method devised by Professor Paweł Chmielnicki, which consists in the examination of substantial sources of law, i.e. real reasons for passing a given statute. The analysis covers, inter alia, materials developed by a group of specialists, including the author, employed by the Centre for Legislative Process Research at Lazarski University. The article shows that the changes in the Constitutional Tribunal do not serve to exercise citizens’ rights. They aim to strengthen the political authorities (the Parliament and its emanation, the Government) at the judicial power expense. It matches the general tendency visible after the 2015 parliamentary election targeted at weakening the position of the judiciary and personal influence of the legislative on this power. The activities do not follow the constitutional rule of separation of powers and are in conflict with the principle of separation and independence of courts and tribunals guaranteed by the Constitution. Taking into account the fact that authorities change in the conditions of a democratic system, the only panacea for the restoration of the shape and prestige of the Constitutional Tribunal is the change of the authorities. There will be an opportunity for that in the autumn of 2023.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"146 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43737507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.20-m.sobota
M. Sobota
Summary The entry into force of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy has introduced a new pricing system for water services. The Directive identifies the polluter-pays principle and the principle of cost recovery as a basis for action to be taken by the Member States when setting up pricing systems for water services. The provisions of Article 2(38) and Article 9 of the Directive raised questions of interpretation. The research issue of this study is to determine the discretionary scope of the Member States of the European Union for the protection of waters under a pricing system for water services, and to interpret the concept of “services” used in the Directive in the context of the cost recovery principle and the polluter-pays principle. The author, on the basis of the adopted research method, i.e., interpretation of law, views of legal academics and commentators, case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, states that the Directive provides for a mechanism whereby each EU Member State determines the individual uses of water in a pricing system for water services on the basis of a country-specific definition of “water services”. The pricing system for water services is only one of the legal instruments for setting the principle of cost recovery and the polluter-pays principle in the Member States’ water management system, and its scope is based on geographical, economic and natural criteria.
{"title":"European Pricing System for Water Services as an Instrument for Shaping the Principle of Cost Recovery and the Polluter Pays Principle","authors":"M. Sobota","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.20-m.sobota","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.20-m.sobota","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The entry into force of Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy has introduced a new pricing system for water services. The Directive identifies the polluter-pays principle and the principle of cost recovery as a basis for action to be taken by the Member States when setting up pricing systems for water services. The provisions of Article 2(38) and Article 9 of the Directive raised questions of interpretation. The research issue of this study is to determine the discretionary scope of the Member States of the European Union for the protection of waters under a pricing system for water services, and to interpret the concept of “services” used in the Directive in the context of the cost recovery principle and the polluter-pays principle. The author, on the basis of the adopted research method, i.e., interpretation of law, views of legal academics and commentators, case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, states that the Directive provides for a mechanism whereby each EU Member State determines the individual uses of water in a pricing system for water services on the basis of a country-specific definition of “water services”. The pricing system for water services is only one of the legal instruments for setting the principle of cost recovery and the polluter-pays principle in the Member States’ water management system, and its scope is based on geographical, economic and natural criteria.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"176 - 190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44241220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.22-r.swirgon-skok
Renata Świrgoń-Skok
Summary This paper has discussed a variety of terms used in classical Roman law to denote land, namely: praedium, fundus, locus, possessio, villa, ager, solum. Apart from those, terminology used for land in the classical law period comprised: res quae solo continentur/tenentur (things related to land), res solo cohaerentes (things attached to land) or simply res soli (real property), while the term res immobiles, meaning real property, appeared in the sources of Roman law as late as in the post-classical period. The analysis of the selected sources of Roman law indicates that the scope of those terms was wider or narrower, which means that they sometimes coincided or overlapped, and as a result they were sometimes used interchangeably. The terminology in this respect fluctuated, and the scope of individual terms was being determined by Roman jurists when resolving individual cases. The preserved sources of Roman law indicate that although attempts were made to define individual terms used in respect of land, Roman lawyers did not fully develop a complete division of land into individual categories.
摘要本文讨论了古典罗马法中用于表示土地的各种术语，即：praedium、flounds、locus、所有物、villa、ager、solum。除此之外，古典法时期用于土地的术语包括：res quae solo continentur/tenentur（与土地有关的事物）、res solo cohaerentes（附属于土地的事物）或简单的res soli（不动产），而res不动产一词，意为不动产，早在后古典时期就出现在罗马法的渊源中。对选定的罗马法来源的分析表明，这些术语的范围更广或更窄，这意味着它们有时重合或重叠，因此它们有时可以互换使用。这方面的术语起伏不定，个别术语的范围由罗马法学家在解决个别案件时确定。保存下来的罗马法律资料表明，尽管有人试图定义与土地有关的个别术语，但罗马律师并没有完全将土地划分为个别类别。
{"title":"Terminology used to Denote Real Property in the Sources of Classical Roman Law","authors":"Renata Świrgoń-Skok","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.22-r.swirgon-skok","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.22-r.swirgon-skok","url":null,"abstract":"Summary This paper has discussed a variety of terms used in classical Roman law to denote land, namely: praedium, fundus, locus, possessio, villa, ager, solum. Apart from those, terminology used for land in the classical law period comprised: res quae solo continentur/tenentur (things related to land), res solo cohaerentes (things attached to land) or simply res soli (real property), while the term res immobiles, meaning real property, appeared in the sources of Roman law as late as in the post-classical period. The analysis of the selected sources of Roman law indicates that the scope of those terms was wider or narrower, which means that they sometimes coincided or overlapped, and as a result they were sometimes used interchangeably. The terminology in this respect fluctuated, and the scope of individual terms was being determined by Roman jurists when resolving individual cases. The preserved sources of Roman law indicate that although attempts were made to define individual terms used in respect of land, Roman lawyers did not fully develop a complete division of land into individual categories.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"205 - 217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46001510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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