Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.13-j.kosonoga
Jacek Kosonoga
Summary The paper covers the issue of the accelerated penal procedure. It discusses conditions for the application of this mode under Polish law and presents them against the background of regulations in force in other countries, including Germany, France, Spain, Portugal and Belgium. The assumption of the study was to assess Polish legal solutions and to demonstrate the basic similarities and differences between laws of the aforesaid countries.
{"title":"Accelerated Proceedings in Criminal Cases Viewed from Comparative Law Perspective","authors":"Jacek Kosonoga","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.13-j.kosonoga","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.13-j.kosonoga","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The paper covers the issue of the accelerated penal procedure. It discusses conditions for the application of this mode under Polish law and presents them against the background of regulations in force in other countries, including Germany, France, Spain, Portugal and Belgium. The assumption of the study was to assess Polish legal solutions and to demonstrate the basic similarities and differences between laws of the aforesaid countries.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"54 - 75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43655693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.17-a.lazarska
Aneta Łazarska
Summary The aim of the article is to discuss the effects of the amendment to Code of Civil Procedure introduced by Act of 28 May 2021 within the scope of a change of a court bench composition in appeal proceedings. The new solutions are controversial and in some aspects interfere with the principle of judicial independence. By reversing the principle of a collective composition in favour of a one-person composition, there were insufficient guarantees for the continuation of the so-called unchanged bench composition for old cases, which may violate the principle of invariability of a bench composition. Secondly, entrusting a decision on a court composition to a court president that is an administrative body did not provide sufficient guarantees for respect for judicial independence. A court president’s decision on whether it is necessary to designate a bench due to the complexity or precedent-like nature of a case also raises objections. It is not within a court president’s competence to assess a nature of a case on which a judge adjudicates. On the other hand, classified conditions for establishing collective benches cause that the discussed regulation will be very rarely applied.
{"title":"Second Instance Court’s Bench Composition in Civil Proceedings","authors":"Aneta Łazarska","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.17-a.lazarska","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.17-a.lazarska","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The aim of the article is to discuss the effects of the amendment to Code of Civil Procedure introduced by Act of 28 May 2021 within the scope of a change of a court bench composition in appeal proceedings. The new solutions are controversial and in some aspects interfere with the principle of judicial independence. By reversing the principle of a collective composition in favour of a one-person composition, there were insufficient guarantees for the continuation of the so-called unchanged bench composition for old cases, which may violate the principle of invariability of a bench composition. Secondly, entrusting a decision on a court composition to a court president that is an administrative body did not provide sufficient guarantees for respect for judicial independence. A court president’s decision on whether it is necessary to designate a bench due to the complexity or precedent-like nature of a case also raises objections. It is not within a court president’s competence to assess a nature of a case on which a judge adjudicates. On the other hand, classified conditions for establishing collective benches cause that the discussed regulation will be very rarely applied.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"125 - 146"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43706141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.16-p.k.sowinski
Piotr Krzysztof Sowiński
Summary The article constitutes a comparative legal study of mediation based on for procedural regulations, i.e. Act of 6 June 1997: Code of Criminal Procedure, Act of 17 November 1964: Code of Civil Procedure, Act of 14 June 1960: Code of Administrative Procedure, and Act of 30 August 2002: Law on the Proceedings before Administrative Courts carried out with the use of a dogmatic method. The author analyses the solutions that, in his opinion, make it possible to propose a thesis on far-reaching convergence of the basic, and at the same time of normative provenance, principles of mediation. The principles include amicability, voluntariness (optionality), commonness, loyalty to parties, confidentiality and non-openness of mediation, as well as a mediator’s impartiality. The above-mentioned convergence does not mean complete homogeneity of particular solutions or their non-defectiveness, which is exemplified by Article 2591 CPC and Article 83 § 4 CAP. It is also shown that the domestic solutions are in conformity with the solutions recommended by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
{"title":"Convergence of the Basic Principles of Mediation in Criminal, Civil, Administrative and Judicial-Administrative Matters","authors":"Piotr Krzysztof Sowiński","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.16-p.k.sowinski","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.16-p.k.sowinski","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article constitutes a comparative legal study of mediation based on for procedural regulations, i.e. Act of 6 June 1997: Code of Criminal Procedure, Act of 17 November 1964: Code of Civil Procedure, Act of 14 June 1960: Code of Administrative Procedure, and Act of 30 August 2002: Law on the Proceedings before Administrative Courts carried out with the use of a dogmatic method. The author analyses the solutions that, in his opinion, make it possible to propose a thesis on far-reaching convergence of the basic, and at the same time of normative provenance, principles of mediation. The principles include amicability, voluntariness (optionality), commonness, loyalty to parties, confidentiality and non-openness of mediation, as well as a mediator’s impartiality. The above-mentioned convergence does not mean complete homogeneity of particular solutions or their non-defectiveness, which is exemplified by Article 2591 CPC and Article 83 § 4 CAP. It is also shown that the domestic solutions are in conformity with the solutions recommended by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"103 - 124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44506424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.15-p.kasprzyk
Piotr Kasprzyk
Summary Liability for damage caused as a result of an aviation accident means first of all liability of an air carrier for damage done to passengers and liability of an aircraft user for damage done to third persons. However, it is also possible to impute liability to other entities, such as an aircraft manufacturer, a service institution, en entity managing an aerodrome, an institution providing air traffic services, or even aviation supervision authorities. The article analyses potential grounds for those entities’ liability. Liability of aviation personnel is not covered in the article.
{"title":"Civil Liability of Entities Other Than Aircraft Operators for Aviation Accidents","authors":"Piotr Kasprzyk","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.15-p.kasprzyk","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.15-p.kasprzyk","url":null,"abstract":"Summary Liability for damage caused as a result of an aviation accident means first of all liability of an air carrier for damage done to passengers and liability of an aircraft user for damage done to third persons. However, it is also possible to impute liability to other entities, such as an aircraft manufacturer, a service institution, en entity managing an aerodrome, an institution providing air traffic services, or even aviation supervision authorities. The article analyses potential grounds for those entities’ liability. Liability of aviation personnel is not covered in the article.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"90 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43598136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.10-m.kulik-m.mozgawa
M. Kulik, Marek Mozgawa
Summary The article discusses the issue of the degree of social harmfulness of acts detrimental to goods obtained through immoral means (specifically, infringement of copyright to legally produced pornographic films). All film productions (also those of a pornographic nature) are works within the meaning of the Polish Act of 4 February 1994 on Copyright and Related Rights. The protection of rights to them is not limited by any moral assessments, but by objectively verifiable features of the work. For legal pornographic works, while their content itself may be regarded as controversial or even unacceptable from the point of view of social norms, the assessment of the social harmfulness of the act is determined not by their content but by the degree of the infringement of the object of protection. The moral assessment of the content contained in the work is irrelevant, if the content is in itself legal and disseminated lawfully, because the protection of non-property rights and, in particular, property rights to a work is not about the protection of the content of those works, but about the author’s rights. The finding that the act involved the dissemination of a someone else’s pornographic work cannot serve as a basis for considering the degree of social harmfulness of the offence as negligible. It is only the degree of copyright infringement that matters in the specific case.
{"title":"Social Harmfulness of Offences Committed Against Goods Acquired Through Immoral Means","authors":"M. Kulik, Marek Mozgawa","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.10-m.kulik-m.mozgawa","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.10-m.kulik-m.mozgawa","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article discusses the issue of the degree of social harmfulness of acts detrimental to goods obtained through immoral means (specifically, infringement of copyright to legally produced pornographic films). All film productions (also those of a pornographic nature) are works within the meaning of the Polish Act of 4 February 1994 on Copyright and Related Rights. The protection of rights to them is not limited by any moral assessments, but by objectively verifiable features of the work. For legal pornographic works, while their content itself may be regarded as controversial or even unacceptable from the point of view of social norms, the assessment of the social harmfulness of the act is determined not by their content but by the degree of the infringement of the object of protection. The moral assessment of the content contained in the work is irrelevant, if the content is in itself legal and disseminated lawfully, because the protection of non-property rights and, in particular, property rights to a work is not about the protection of the content of those works, but about the author’s rights. The finding that the act involved the dissemination of a someone else’s pornographic work cannot serve as a basis for considering the degree of social harmfulness of the offence as negligible. It is only the degree of copyright infringement that matters in the specific case.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"7 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44195428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.21-m.osiecki
Mateusz Osiecki
Summary In the ongoing climate crisis, more and more states of the world undertake initiatives that would reduce negative impact of dangerous growth of global average temperature, including droughts, drowning of coastal cities and water shortage. Recently, an ambitious idea to provide huge supplies of water for the population of the United Arab Emirates was initiated by one of Emirati businessmen – Mr Abdulla Alsheni, who plans to tow a huge Antarctic iceberg to the coast of Emirates. The plan itself is a logistic challenge, but at the same time may raise certain concerns on its compliance with international law. Hereby article has as an aim response to a question whether an act of towing an Antarctic iceberg would breach international law provisions, particularly those related to Antarctic Treaty System and law of the seas.
{"title":"United Arab Emirates “Iceberg Project” – Would an Ambitious Concept Comply with International Law?","authors":"Mateusz Osiecki","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.21-m.osiecki","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.21-m.osiecki","url":null,"abstract":"Summary In the ongoing climate crisis, more and more states of the world undertake initiatives that would reduce negative impact of dangerous growth of global average temperature, including droughts, drowning of coastal cities and water shortage. Recently, an ambitious idea to provide huge supplies of water for the population of the United Arab Emirates was initiated by one of Emirati businessmen – Mr Abdulla Alsheni, who plans to tow a huge Antarctic iceberg to the coast of Emirates. The plan itself is a logistic challenge, but at the same time may raise certain concerns on its compliance with international law. Hereby article has as an aim response to a question whether an act of towing an Antarctic iceberg would breach international law provisions, particularly those related to Antarctic Treaty System and law of the seas.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"191 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49072071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.18-a.ziolkowska
A. Ziółkowska
Summary The present study concerns the issue of suability of a rector’s decision on the suspension of a student’s rights. The author tries to define the appellate measures that a student has the right to use and the consequences of lodging them. The critical issue consists in the necessity to delimit a student’s suspension as a disciplinary penalty imposed as a result of a disciplinary proceeding conducted by the disciplinary commission in the mode and on terms specified in the Act on Higher Education and Science and appropriate application of the Code of Criminal Procedure and suspension as a result of an administrative decision issued by a university rector before the initiation of an explanatory proceeding or in the course of a disciplinary proceeding. The starting point was to define the legal nature of the relationship between a student and a university as an administrative institution managed by a rector. The considerations lead to the necessity to adopt a presumption that a rector’s decision in a case in question is a form of an administrative decision. Only the adoption of this optics leads to the reconstruction of appellate measures that enable a student – in case of those that are not final – to use non-devolutive appellate measures in the form of a motion to reconsider a case, which is classified as a horizontal instance, or a complaint to an administrative court in accordance with Article 52 § 3 Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts. The legislator left the choice of the legal remedy to a student. A student still has the right to lodge a complaint about a final decision to an administrative court.
{"title":"Suability of a Rector’s Decisions to Suspend a Student’s Rights","authors":"A. Ziółkowska","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.18-a.ziolkowska","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.18-a.ziolkowska","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The present study concerns the issue of suability of a rector’s decision on the suspension of a student’s rights. The author tries to define the appellate measures that a student has the right to use and the consequences of lodging them. The critical issue consists in the necessity to delimit a student’s suspension as a disciplinary penalty imposed as a result of a disciplinary proceeding conducted by the disciplinary commission in the mode and on terms specified in the Act on Higher Education and Science and appropriate application of the Code of Criminal Procedure and suspension as a result of an administrative decision issued by a university rector before the initiation of an explanatory proceeding or in the course of a disciplinary proceeding. The starting point was to define the legal nature of the relationship between a student and a university as an administrative institution managed by a rector. The considerations lead to the necessity to adopt a presumption that a rector’s decision in a case in question is a form of an administrative decision. Only the adoption of this optics leads to the reconstruction of appellate measures that enable a student – in case of those that are not final – to use non-devolutive appellate measures in the form of a motion to reconsider a case, which is classified as a horizontal instance, or a complaint to an administrative court in accordance with Article 52 § 3 Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts. The legislator left the choice of the legal remedy to a student. A student still has the right to lodge a complaint about a final decision to an administrative court.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"147 - 163"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42182736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.19-m.sieradzka
Małgorzata Sieradzka
Summary The article discusses the issues related to the legalisation of an advertising medium located by a public road at the distance that is shorter than the one required by the Act on public roads. Both the type of the medium and its location affect the obligation to notify an organ or obtain a building permit. A special issue in this regard is the possibility of obtaining a road administrator’s consent for the placement of an advertising device in spite of the fact that the minimum distance of advertisements from the outer edge of a road was not taken into consideration in the course of the legalisation proceeding. Despite the lack of legal regulations of this matter, possible solutions are indicated.
{"title":"The Issue of Legalising an Advertising Medium Located by a Public Road at a Distance Shorter than the One Required by Act on Public Roads","authors":"Małgorzata Sieradzka","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.19-m.sieradzka","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.19-m.sieradzka","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article discusses the issues related to the legalisation of an advertising medium located by a public road at the distance that is shorter than the one required by the Act on public roads. Both the type of the medium and its location affect the obligation to notify an organ or obtain a building permit. A special issue in this regard is the possibility of obtaining a road administrator’s consent for the placement of an advertising device in spite of the fact that the minimum distance of advertisements from the outer edge of a road was not taken into consideration in the course of the legalisation proceeding. Despite the lack of legal regulations of this matter, possible solutions are indicated.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"164 - 175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49475482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.12-c.kulesza
C. Kulesza
Summary The aim of this paper is to compare the American and European standards of the inadmissibility of evidence of unlawful police entrapment. In US criminal procedure, which permits active forms of entrapment, the US Supreme Court and most federal courts apply a subjective test for the entrapment defence, focusing on the predisposition of the person provoked to commit the crime and, less often, an objective test examining the legality of government agents’ actions. The Strasbourg standard (including German cases) is based on two tests: a substantive one (examining both the predisposition of the person being provoked and the legality of the police actions) and a procedural one, which consists in verifying the reliability of the national courts’ recognition of the charge of incitement to commit a crime by the police The basic difference between the analysed standards is to be found in the effects of illegal entrapment. In the US system, it is a justification to the perpetrator’s responsibility for a crime committed as a result of entrapment, and the Strasbourg standard allows for sanctioning the negative effects of such illegal evidence to be convalidated in criminal trial when the Court considers that “the trial as a whole was fair”.
{"title":"Inadmissibility of Police Entrapment Evidence in the US and German Trials in the Light of the Case-Law of the US Supreme Court and the ECTHR","authors":"C. Kulesza","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.12-c.kulesza","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.12-c.kulesza","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The aim of this paper is to compare the American and European standards of the inadmissibility of evidence of unlawful police entrapment. In US criminal procedure, which permits active forms of entrapment, the US Supreme Court and most federal courts apply a subjective test for the entrapment defence, focusing on the predisposition of the person provoked to commit the crime and, less often, an objective test examining the legality of government agents’ actions. The Strasbourg standard (including German cases) is based on two tests: a substantive one (examining both the predisposition of the person being provoked and the legality of the police actions) and a procedural one, which consists in verifying the reliability of the national courts’ recognition of the charge of incitement to commit a crime by the police The basic difference between the analysed standards is to be found in the effects of illegal entrapment. In the US system, it is a justification to the perpetrator’s responsibility for a crime committed as a result of entrapment, and the Strasbourg standard allows for sanctioning the negative effects of such illegal evidence to be convalidated in criminal trial when the Court considers that “the trial as a whole was fair”.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"37 - 53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46045811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.11-k.nazar
K. Nazar
Summary The article discusses the statutory features of the offence of incest in the Polish Penal Code from 1997 (Article 201) and the results of empirical research carried out. Doubts were raised in doctrine about the rationalization of the prohibition of incest and the definition of the object of protection of this crime. The conduct that constitutes the actus reus as well as the subject and the subjective side of the offence of incest were also analysed. The research material was the files of cases under Article 201 of the Penal Code registered in all public prosecutor’s offices in Poland in 2013–2014 (389 cases). Research was intended to was primarily to identify the criminological picture of the offence of incest and its scale compared to total crime figures in Poland and the policy of punishing. The next aim of the research was to characterise the families, in which incestuous acts took place, and thus to answer the key questions in this context: whether incest is a factor determining the so-called family pathology or maybe it is a phenomenon conditioned by it and whether it occurs spontaneously or is connected with sexual violence in the family. The results of the research show that the so-called “regular incest” (voluntary on both sides), qualified only under Article 201 of the Polish Penal Code, is relatively rare in the practice of the judiciary. Most cases of incestuous sexual relations were combined with the crime type of sexual abuse of a minor or rape. These results seem to confirm the thesis that incest is rarely the only committed offence, but is most often related to domestic sexual violence. They also support the thesis that incest is a phenomenon conditioned by already existing family dysfunctionality, not its cause.
{"title":"Incest. Penal-Law and Criminological Aspects","authors":"K. Nazar","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.11-k.nazar","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.11-k.nazar","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article discusses the statutory features of the offence of incest in the Polish Penal Code from 1997 (Article 201) and the results of empirical research carried out. Doubts were raised in doctrine about the rationalization of the prohibition of incest and the definition of the object of protection of this crime. The conduct that constitutes the actus reus as well as the subject and the subjective side of the offence of incest were also analysed. The research material was the files of cases under Article 201 of the Penal Code registered in all public prosecutor’s offices in Poland in 2013–2014 (389 cases). Research was intended to was primarily to identify the criminological picture of the offence of incest and its scale compared to total crime figures in Poland and the policy of punishing. The next aim of the research was to characterise the families, in which incestuous acts took place, and thus to answer the key questions in this context: whether incest is a factor determining the so-called family pathology or maybe it is a phenomenon conditioned by it and whether it occurs spontaneously or is connected with sexual violence in the family. The results of the research show that the so-called “regular incest” (voluntary on both sides), qualified only under Article 201 of the Polish Penal Code, is relatively rare in the practice of the judiciary. Most cases of incestuous sexual relations were combined with the crime type of sexual abuse of a minor or rape. These results seem to confirm the thesis that incest is rarely the only committed offence, but is most often related to domestic sexual violence. They also support the thesis that incest is a phenomenon conditioned by already existing family dysfunctionality, not its cause.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"20 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48778824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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