Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.14-a.nowak-gruca
Aleksandra Nowak-Gruca
Summary The copyright law enshrines the principle that copyright protection can be considered only in the case of works of human origin, which is mitigated in the Anglo-Saxon systems by introducing the category of computer-generated works. Nowadays we are dealing with a situation where, first of all, we are unable to precisely indicate the features of the subject of protection and copyright law grapples with an unresolved problem of distinguishing a work from other objects. Secondly, in the case of new phenomena such as the creation of AI, androids or cyborgs, there are difficulties with attributing the authorship of the work. This results in a too high level of uncertainty of legal effectiveness. The aim of the paper is to present the phenomenon of the work of cyborg artists in the context of the anthropocentric approach to the authorship of the work, which is dominant in copyright law. The central problem here is the question of the copyright status of works that arise as a result of shifting the boundaries of human possibilities.
{"title":"Cyborg Artwork","authors":"Aleksandra Nowak-Gruca","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.14-a.nowak-gruca","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.2.2022.14-a.nowak-gruca","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The copyright law enshrines the principle that copyright protection can be considered only in the case of works of human origin, which is mitigated in the Anglo-Saxon systems by introducing the category of computer-generated works. Nowadays we are dealing with a situation where, first of all, we are unable to precisely indicate the features of the subject of protection and copyright law grapples with an unresolved problem of distinguishing a work from other objects. Secondly, in the case of new phenomena such as the creation of AI, androids or cyborgs, there are difficulties with attributing the authorship of the work. This results in a too high level of uncertainty of legal effectiveness. The aim of the paper is to present the phenomenon of the work of cyborg artists in the context of the anthropocentric approach to the authorship of the work, which is dominant in copyright law. The central problem here is the question of the copyright status of works that arise as a result of shifting the boundaries of human possibilities.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"76 - 89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44652630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.2-e.jasiuk-r.wosiek
Ewa Jasiuk, Roman Wosiek
Summary The article focuses on a current and important issue called crowdfunding (i.e. social funding). At present, it constitutes a significant source of funding for companies in Poland. The authors try to define the process of crowdfunding in Poland both in economic and legal terms. Firstly, they discuss characteristic features determining crowdfunding and, what is more, models and types of crowdfunding. Secondly, a detailed analysis of legal regulations concerning social funding is conducted through the prism of national and the EU law. The research thesis presented in the article that there is a lack of regulations concerning crowdfunding and that there is a need to regulate the issue is verified and confirmed. It is worth mentioning that some activities aimed at regulating the processes of crowdfunding can be noticed. Unfortunately, there are still no complex legal regulations of the phenomenon in our country.
{"title":"Crowdfunding as a Source of Financing for Companies in Poland – Economics and Legal Issues","authors":"Ewa Jasiuk, Roman Wosiek","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.2-e.jasiuk-r.wosiek","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.2-e.jasiuk-r.wosiek","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article focuses on a current and important issue called crowdfunding (i.e. social funding). At present, it constitutes a significant source of funding for companies in Poland. The authors try to define the process of crowdfunding in Poland both in economic and legal terms. Firstly, they discuss characteristic features determining crowdfunding and, what is more, models and types of crowdfunding. Secondly, a detailed analysis of legal regulations concerning social funding is conducted through the prism of national and the EU law. The research thesis presented in the article that there is a lack of regulations concerning crowdfunding and that there is a need to regulate the issue is verified and confirmed. It is worth mentioning that some activities aimed at regulating the processes of crowdfunding can be noticed. Unfortunately, there are still no complex legal regulations of the phenomenon in our country.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"27 - 44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45626910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.1-k.slebzak-m.j.zielinski
Krzysztof Ślebzak, M. Zieliński
Summary The study in question is about civil liability of audit firms. The authors attempt to reconstruct the liability regime for damage caused by audit firms under the Act of 11 May 2017 on statutory auditors, audit firms and public supervision. The considerations lead to an answer to the question whether under the law as it stands there is an independent regime of civil liability of audit firms, and if so, whether it is permissible to apply thereto the provisions of the Civil Code relating to torts and contractual liability and to what extent. Resolving this issue also allows for a reference to other specific issues relating, inter alia, to the scope of application of statutory limits of liability, or qualifying breach of professional standards by the statutory auditors from the point of view of the premises of liability. The first part of the study addresses the issue of the separate civil liability of audit firms and contractual liability for the audit of separate financial statements towards the audited entity. The second part of the study addresses issues of contractual and tort liability against third parties for damages caused in connection with auditing individual financial statements of, as well as the liability of an audit firm in connection with auditing of consolidated financial statements and for the provision of activities other than audit. Conclusions of the paper are also be presented.
{"title":"Civil Liability of Audit Firms – Part II","authors":"Krzysztof Ślebzak, M. Zieliński","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.1-k.slebzak-m.j.zielinski","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.1-k.slebzak-m.j.zielinski","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The study in question is about civil liability of audit firms. The authors attempt to reconstruct the liability regime for damage caused by audit firms under the Act of 11 May 2017 on statutory auditors, audit firms and public supervision. The considerations lead to an answer to the question whether under the law as it stands there is an independent regime of civil liability of audit firms, and if so, whether it is permissible to apply thereto the provisions of the Civil Code relating to torts and contractual liability and to what extent. Resolving this issue also allows for a reference to other specific issues relating, inter alia, to the scope of application of statutory limits of liability, or qualifying breach of professional standards by the statutory auditors from the point of view of the premises of liability. The first part of the study addresses the issue of the separate civil liability of audit firms and contractual liability for the audit of separate financial statements towards the audited entity. The second part of the study addresses issues of contractual and tort liability against third parties for damages caused in connection with auditing individual financial statements of, as well as the liability of an audit firm in connection with auditing of consolidated financial statements and for the provision of activities other than audit. Conclusions of the paper are also be presented.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"5 - 26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43862340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.6-a.kania-chramega
Agnieszka Kania-Chramęga
Summary The article aims to draw attention to selected issues, inter alia imperfect legal solutions and potential interpretational discrepancies, generated by the present spin on the penalty of admonishment imposed on students by a rector for a lesser disciplinary breach of rules and regulations. The analysis conducted with the use of the formal-dogmatic method leads to a conclusion that de lege ferenda the legislator should clearly determine the legal character of the penalty of admonishment, as well as a rector’s procedural ‘decision’ on its imposition. The findings also indicate that a rector’s decision to impose a penalty of admonishment for a student’s act recognised in concerto as a lesser disciplinary breach of rules and regulations is not absolute in nature and, thus, it is difficult to treat it as a discretionary or arbitrary one. Analogically, it should be assumed that while classifying a disciplinary breach of rules and regulations as a lesser breach of law, it is of extraordinary importance to refer to the content of Article 1 § 2 CC and the provisions of Article 115 § 2 CC. As a result, it should also be indicated that what is especially important in order to explain the essence of a lesser disciplinary breach of rules and regulations is the output of the doctrine as well as penal case law, which tries to explain a concept of a ‘lesser offence’.
{"title":"Rector’s Decision Concerning the Recognition of a Student’s Act as a Lesser Disciplinary Breach","authors":"Agnieszka Kania-Chramęga","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.6-a.kania-chramega","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.6-a.kania-chramega","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article aims to draw attention to selected issues, inter alia imperfect legal solutions and potential interpretational discrepancies, generated by the present spin on the penalty of admonishment imposed on students by a rector for a lesser disciplinary breach of rules and regulations. The analysis conducted with the use of the formal-dogmatic method leads to a conclusion that de lege ferenda the legislator should clearly determine the legal character of the penalty of admonishment, as well as a rector’s procedural ‘decision’ on its imposition. The findings also indicate that a rector’s decision to impose a penalty of admonishment for a student’s act recognised in concerto as a lesser disciplinary breach of rules and regulations is not absolute in nature and, thus, it is difficult to treat it as a discretionary or arbitrary one. Analogically, it should be assumed that while classifying a disciplinary breach of rules and regulations as a lesser breach of law, it is of extraordinary importance to refer to the content of Article 1 § 2 CC and the provisions of Article 115 § 2 CC. As a result, it should also be indicated that what is especially important in order to explain the essence of a lesser disciplinary breach of rules and regulations is the output of the doctrine as well as penal case law, which tries to explain a concept of a ‘lesser offence’.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"102 - 116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45794738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.7-b.j.stefanska
B. J. Stefańska
Summary The article discusses the issue of erasure of conviction concerning the penalty imposing a fine or limitation of liberty apart from the penalty of deprivation of liberty. In the present legal state, it is not possible to solve the problem unequivocally. The exception is the penalty of a fine imposed together with the penalty of deprivation of liberty with the suspension of its execution. Thus, there is a need to make amendments to Criminal Code and introduce provisions determining conditions for erasure of all convictions at the same time. Using the formal-dogmatic method based on the linguistic-logical analysis of the provisions of Criminal Code regulating erasure of convictions, the author suggests a solution of the problems. Assuming that erasure of conviction takes place by virtue of law after the statutory period stipulated for the penalty of deprivation of liberty, the author believes that there is no obstacle to erasure of the whole sentence, both the fine and the penalty of limitation of liberty. At the same time, the author suggests adding Article 107 § 5a CC in the following wording: “In case of conviction under Article 37b or imposition of the penalty of a fine apart from the penalty of deprivation of liberty, erasure of the sentence shall take place after the periods stipulated in Article 107 § 1. 4 and 4a.”
{"title":"Erasure of Conviction Concerning Cumulative Penalties","authors":"B. J. Stefańska","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.7-b.j.stefanska","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.7-b.j.stefanska","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article discusses the issue of erasure of conviction concerning the penalty imposing a fine or limitation of liberty apart from the penalty of deprivation of liberty. In the present legal state, it is not possible to solve the problem unequivocally. The exception is the penalty of a fine imposed together with the penalty of deprivation of liberty with the suspension of its execution. Thus, there is a need to make amendments to Criminal Code and introduce provisions determining conditions for erasure of all convictions at the same time. Using the formal-dogmatic method based on the linguistic-logical analysis of the provisions of Criminal Code regulating erasure of convictions, the author suggests a solution of the problems. Assuming that erasure of conviction takes place by virtue of law after the statutory period stipulated for the penalty of deprivation of liberty, the author believes that there is no obstacle to erasure of the whole sentence, both the fine and the penalty of limitation of liberty. At the same time, the author suggests adding Article 107 § 5a CC in the following wording: “In case of conviction under Article 37b or imposition of the penalty of a fine apart from the penalty of deprivation of liberty, erasure of the sentence shall take place after the periods stipulated in Article 107 § 1. 4 and 4a.”","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"117 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48436422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.5-w.m.hrynicki
Wojciech M. Hrynicki
Summary The article discusses the issue of priority of jurisdiction proceedings over simplified complaint proceedings in enforcement proceedings in administration. The author notes that allegations included in common complaints may be similar to those included in the legal remedies available to the obliged (and other participants) in the enforcement proceedings in administration. At the same time, the author argues that filing a common complaint – instead of an appropriate legal remedy in the enforcement proceedings in administration – does not cause an automatic entitlement on the part of the body with general jurisdiction over complaints to deal with such a complaint outside the pending enforcement proceedings in administration. On the contrary, the regulations in force oblige to handle such a complaint within the framework of pending enforcement proceedings and this usually takes place, given the allegations of the complaint, within the framework of the initiated procedure of the appropriate legal remedy in these proceedings. The author emphasises that the primacy of jurisdiction proceedings means that the consideration and settlement of common complaints containing allegations against the conducted enforcement proceedings by a body of general jurisdiction for common complaints, instead of by an enforcement body (sometimes a supervisory body), should be qualified as consideration of a complaint by a body not competent in the case.
{"title":"Dealing With Common Complaints in Execution Proceedings in Administration","authors":"Wojciech M. Hrynicki","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.5-w.m.hrynicki","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.5-w.m.hrynicki","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The article discusses the issue of priority of jurisdiction proceedings over simplified complaint proceedings in enforcement proceedings in administration. The author notes that allegations included in common complaints may be similar to those included in the legal remedies available to the obliged (and other participants) in the enforcement proceedings in administration. At the same time, the author argues that filing a common complaint – instead of an appropriate legal remedy in the enforcement proceedings in administration – does not cause an automatic entitlement on the part of the body with general jurisdiction over complaints to deal with such a complaint outside the pending enforcement proceedings in administration. On the contrary, the regulations in force oblige to handle such a complaint within the framework of pending enforcement proceedings and this usually takes place, given the allegations of the complaint, within the framework of the initiated procedure of the appropriate legal remedy in these proceedings. The author emphasises that the primacy of jurisdiction proceedings means that the consideration and settlement of common complaints containing allegations against the conducted enforcement proceedings by a body of general jurisdiction for common complaints, instead of by an enforcement body (sometimes a supervisory body), should be qualified as consideration of a complaint by a body not competent in the case.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"83 - 101"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41655338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.9-s.krajnik
Szymon Krajnik
Summary The gloss on the Supreme Court ruling of 17 November 2021, V KK 384/21, presents opinions about the objective recognition of the result of the act of causing the so-called serious traffic accident resulting from inappropriate fastening of seat belts by a passenger. Approving of the Supreme Court’s ruling, the author of the gloss extends its justification, especially from the perspective of the concept of the objective recognition of a result and in the light of the rules of functional interpretation of law.
摘要最高法院2021年11月17日的裁决，V KK 384/21，就客观承认因乘客系安全带不当导致所谓严重交通事故的行为结果提出了意见。该书的作者赞同最高法院的裁决，特别是从客观承认结果的概念和法律功能解释规则的角度，扩展了其正当性。
{"title":"Gloss on the Supreme Court Ruling of 17 November 2021, V KK 384/21","authors":"Szymon Krajnik","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.9-s.krajnik","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.9-s.krajnik","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The gloss on the Supreme Court ruling of 17 November 2021, V KK 384/21, presents opinions about the objective recognition of the result of the act of causing the so-called serious traffic accident resulting from inappropriate fastening of seat belts by a passenger. Approving of the Supreme Court’s ruling, the author of the gloss extends its justification, especially from the perspective of the concept of the objective recognition of a result and in the light of the rules of functional interpretation of law.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"164 - 173"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44269855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.8-r.a.stefanski
Ryszard A. Stefański
Summary This scientific research-based article aims to analyse resolutions and rulings of the Supreme Court Criminal Chamber concerning substantive criminal law, penal fiscal law and law on misdemeanours passed in 2021 as the response to the so-called legal questions. They concerned the concept of a violent crime (Article 41a § 1 CC), liability for making false testimony for fear of penal liability (Article 233 § 1a CC), randomness-based nature of a game of chance (Article 2 par. 3 and 5 of Act of 19 November 2009 on games of chance), the change of a valid sentence passed for the commission of a crime in case the criminal classification changes and it becomes a misdemeanour instead of a crime (Article 2a § 1 Misdemeanour Code), and the concept of ‘predominant business activity’ laid down in Article 6 par. 2 of Act of 10 January 2018 establishing a ban on trading on Sundays and public holidays. The main scientific objective is to assess grounds for the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the provisions regulating the issues addressed in the questions to the organ. The main scientific theses indicate that the so-called legal questions to the Supreme Court play an important role in ensuring uniformity of common and military courts’ judgements because the justification provided by the Supreme Court is deepened. The research findings are original in character because they creatively extend the interpretation included in the analysed resolutions. The research is mainly of national relevance. The article is of considerable importance for jurisprudence: it contains a deepened dogmatic analysis and a big load of theoretical thought, as well as is useful for legal practice enriching the Supreme Court’s arguments and providing circumstances supporting different opinions.
{"title":"Review of the Resolutions of the Supreme Court Criminal Chamber Concerning Substantive Criminal Law, Penal Fiscal Law and Law on Misdemeanours Passed in 2021","authors":"Ryszard A. Stefański","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.8-r.a.stefanski","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.8-r.a.stefanski","url":null,"abstract":"Summary This scientific research-based article aims to analyse resolutions and rulings of the Supreme Court Criminal Chamber concerning substantive criminal law, penal fiscal law and law on misdemeanours passed in 2021 as the response to the so-called legal questions. They concerned the concept of a violent crime (Article 41a § 1 CC), liability for making false testimony for fear of penal liability (Article 233 § 1a CC), randomness-based nature of a game of chance (Article 2 par. 3 and 5 of Act of 19 November 2009 on games of chance), the change of a valid sentence passed for the commission of a crime in case the criminal classification changes and it becomes a misdemeanour instead of a crime (Article 2a § 1 Misdemeanour Code), and the concept of ‘predominant business activity’ laid down in Article 6 par. 2 of Act of 10 January 2018 establishing a ban on trading on Sundays and public holidays. The main scientific objective is to assess grounds for the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the provisions regulating the issues addressed in the questions to the organ. The main scientific theses indicate that the so-called legal questions to the Supreme Court play an important role in ensuring uniformity of common and military courts’ judgements because the justification provided by the Supreme Court is deepened. The research findings are original in character because they creatively extend the interpretation included in the analysed resolutions. The research is mainly of national relevance. The article is of considerable importance for jurisprudence: it contains a deepened dogmatic analysis and a big load of theoretical thought, as well as is useful for legal practice enriching the Supreme Court’s arguments and providing circumstances supporting different opinions.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"133 - 163"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69276568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.4-m.rogalski-p.szustakiewicz
M. Rogalski, Przemysław Szustakiewicz
Summary The concept of telecommunications secret, defined in the Telecommunications Act, has been in use in Polish law for several years. In connection with the entry into force of the European Electronic Communications Code, a draft Act on Electronic Communications was prepared, which includes provisions on the secrecy of electronic communications. The subject of the article will be to analyze whether the proposed regulations meet the requirements of the constitutional principle of the protection of confidentiality of communication and what is their relation to the provisions on the protection of personal data.
{"title":"The Definition and Scope of Electronic Communications Secret","authors":"M. Rogalski, Przemysław Szustakiewicz","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.4-m.rogalski-p.szustakiewicz","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.4-m.rogalski-p.szustakiewicz","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The concept of telecommunications secret, defined in the Telecommunications Act, has been in use in Polish law for several years. In connection with the entry into force of the European Electronic Communications Code, a draft Act on Electronic Communications was prepared, which includes provisions on the secrecy of electronic communications. The subject of the article will be to analyze whether the proposed regulations meet the requirements of the constitutional principle of the protection of confidentiality of communication and what is their relation to the provisions on the protection of personal data.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"59 - 82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43244659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-01DOI: 10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.3-s.balcarek
Szymon Balcarek
Summary The purpose of the article is to present the notion of liquidation preference clause, to describe its types, as well as to discuss its application in the light of the principle of freedom of contracts and certain institutions of Polish commercial law. The article uses the following research methods: formal-dogmatic analysis of legal norms, analysis of case law and legal doctrine, comparative method. The liquidation preference clause entitles certain shareholders of the company to be satisfied in a certain amount before the other shareholders in case of a liquidation event. A liquidation event may be understood both as liquidation of the company and events unrelated to the liquidation, such as sale or merger of companies. The limitations of the liquidation preference clause are set by the principle of freedom of contract. The author of this article advocates the admissibility of such a construction of the liquidation preference clause, that in case of its application excludes some partners from participation in income obtained in connection with the liquidation event. Pursuant to the provisions of the Polish Commercial Companies Code, there is a possibility to include the liquidation preference clause in the capital company agreement, by using the institution of preference of shares or granting personal rights to certain shareholders. In the opinion of the author the more appropriate institution considering the purpose of the liquidation preference clause is granting of personal rights to certain shareholders, which is an entity right connected with the person of the shareholder, and not a right connected with shares.
{"title":"Liquidation Preference Clause in the Light of Freedom of Contracts and Selected Institutions of Commercial Law","authors":"Szymon Balcarek","doi":"10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.3-s.balcarek","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26399/iusnovum.v16.1.2022.3-s.balcarek","url":null,"abstract":"Summary The purpose of the article is to present the notion of liquidation preference clause, to describe its types, as well as to discuss its application in the light of the principle of freedom of contracts and certain institutions of Polish commercial law. The article uses the following research methods: formal-dogmatic analysis of legal norms, analysis of case law and legal doctrine, comparative method. The liquidation preference clause entitles certain shareholders of the company to be satisfied in a certain amount before the other shareholders in case of a liquidation event. A liquidation event may be understood both as liquidation of the company and events unrelated to the liquidation, such as sale or merger of companies. The limitations of the liquidation preference clause are set by the principle of freedom of contract. The author of this article advocates the admissibility of such a construction of the liquidation preference clause, that in case of its application excludes some partners from participation in income obtained in connection with the liquidation event. Pursuant to the provisions of the Polish Commercial Companies Code, there is a possibility to include the liquidation preference clause in the capital company agreement, by using the institution of preference of shares or granting personal rights to certain shareholders. In the opinion of the author the more appropriate institution considering the purpose of the liquidation preference clause is granting of personal rights to certain shareholders, which is an entity right connected with the person of the shareholder, and not a right connected with shares.","PeriodicalId":33501,"journal":{"name":"Ius Novum","volume":"16 1","pages":"45 - 58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48549439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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