This paper describes how governments and regulators could introduce selective de-regulation based on exempting corporations from existing practices when they amend their constitution to provide superior outcomes for investors and other stakeholders. An example is presented on how a company achieved this objective to raise additional venture finance while also allowing the regulator to exempt it from the compliance processes and costs of changing auditors. The paper uses system science to argue that the introduction of self-enforcing co-regulation based on outcomes rather than practices would introduce competition for developing the most efficient and effective processes for both companies and regulators.
{"title":"Outcome Based Self-Enforcing Co-Regulation: A De-Regulation Strategy to Reduce the Cost of Equity, Compliance and Regulation","authors":"S. Turnbull","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.977366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.977366","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes how governments and regulators could introduce selective de-regulation based on exempting corporations from existing practices when they amend their constitution to provide superior outcomes for investors and other stakeholders. An example is presented on how a company achieved this objective to raise additional venture finance while also allowing the regulator to exempt it from the compliance processes and costs of changing auditors. The paper uses system science to argue that the introduction of self-enforcing co-regulation based on outcomes rather than practices would introduce competition for developing the most efficient and effective processes for both companies and regulators.","PeriodicalId":340197,"journal":{"name":"Comparative & Global Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126307635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The intensity of enforcement efforts by securities regulators varies widely among financially developed nations, but countries with "common law origins" appear to systematically expend more on securities regulation than countries with "civil law origins." However, whether this variable of relative enforcement intensity explains the greater financial development of countries with common law origins or is instead the product of that differential in development remains open to question and depends on the direction of causality. This paper examines several explanations and prefers the hypothesis that enforcement intensity is a product of the level of retail ownership in the jurisdiction, with a high level of retail ownership creating a political demand for greater enforcement. Even more striking than this disparity between "common law" and "civil law" countries, however, is the outlier position of the United States, whose public and private enforcement efforts dwarf those of other nations. The United States is unique not in its expenditures on securities regulation, but in the amount and severity of the penalties it imposes. Enforcement efforts can be sensibly measured either in terms of "inputs" (i.e., budget and staff size) or outputs (i.e., enforcement actions brought or financial sanctions levied). After adjustment for market size or GDP, the U.S. does not differ materially from other common law countries in its expenditures, but it brings far more enforcement actions and imposes far greater financial penalties. For example, in 2005/06, the financial penalties imposed by the SEC exceeded those imposed by the U.K.'s Financial Services Agency ("FSA") by a thirty to one ratio, which, even after adjustment for differences in market capitalization, still translates into a ten to one ratio. The greater emphasis on enforcement in the United States is also evident in a comparison of the budgets of the major securities regulators, with the SEC devoting a percentage of its budget to enforcement that more than doubles that of the FSA. Behind this varying emphasis on enforcement may lie different approaches to regulation: an "ex ante" advisory and consulting approach elsewhere and an "ex post," deterrence-oriented emphasis in the United States. The greater use of public enforcement in the United States is more than paralleled by corresponding disparities in private enforcement and the use of the criminal sanction. Virtually alone, the United States recognizes the class action and the contingent fee. The actual financial sanctions imposed by private enforcement in the United States exceed those imposed by public enforcement, and the margin appears to be increasing. The only nation to rival the U.S. among "common law origin" countries is Australia, which actually devotes a higher percentage of its securities regulator's budget to enforcement and also uses the criminal sanction heavily. Australia is also characterized by a high level of retail ownership. What h
{"title":"Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement","authors":"J. Coffee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.967482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.967482","url":null,"abstract":"The intensity of enforcement efforts by securities regulators varies widely among financially developed nations, but countries with \"common law origins\" appear to systematically expend more on securities regulation than countries with \"civil law origins.\" However, whether this variable of relative enforcement intensity explains the greater financial development of countries with common law origins or is instead the product of that differential in development remains open to question and depends on the direction of causality. This paper examines several explanations and prefers the hypothesis that enforcement intensity is a product of the level of retail ownership in the jurisdiction, with a high level of retail ownership creating a political demand for greater enforcement. Even more striking than this disparity between \"common law\" and \"civil law\" countries, however, is the outlier position of the United States, whose public and private enforcement efforts dwarf those of other nations. The United States is unique not in its expenditures on securities regulation, but in the amount and severity of the penalties it imposes. Enforcement efforts can be sensibly measured either in terms of \"inputs\" (i.e., budget and staff size) or outputs (i.e., enforcement actions brought or financial sanctions levied). After adjustment for market size or GDP, the U.S. does not differ materially from other common law countries in its expenditures, but it brings far more enforcement actions and imposes far greater financial penalties. For example, in 2005/06, the financial penalties imposed by the SEC exceeded those imposed by the U.K.'s Financial Services Agency (\"FSA\") by a thirty to one ratio, which, even after adjustment for differences in market capitalization, still translates into a ten to one ratio. The greater emphasis on enforcement in the United States is also evident in a comparison of the budgets of the major securities regulators, with the SEC devoting a percentage of its budget to enforcement that more than doubles that of the FSA. Behind this varying emphasis on enforcement may lie different approaches to regulation: an \"ex ante\" advisory and consulting approach elsewhere and an \"ex post,\" deterrence-oriented emphasis in the United States. The greater use of public enforcement in the United States is more than paralleled by corresponding disparities in private enforcement and the use of the criminal sanction. Virtually alone, the United States recognizes the class action and the contingent fee. The actual financial sanctions imposed by private enforcement in the United States exceed those imposed by public enforcement, and the margin appears to be increasing. The only nation to rival the U.S. among \"common law origin\" countries is Australia, which actually devotes a higher percentage of its securities regulator's budget to enforcement and also uses the criminal sanction heavily. Australia is also characterized by a high level of retail ownership. What h","PeriodicalId":340197,"journal":{"name":"Comparative & Global Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128073117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-03-01DOI: 10.1108/IJOTB-10-01-2007-B001
M. Mollah
Administrative Decentralization seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government. Administrative Decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and managing of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies. This paper will search for a common theoretical framework of decentralization, then analyzes and assesses the initiatives for decentralization of administration that have been constructed after the emergence of Bangladesh. The major issues and problems of implementation of the decentralization policies in Bangladesh are also discussed suggesting policy measures. This paper is analytical in nature.
{"title":"Administrative Decentralization in Bangladesh: Theory and Practice","authors":"M. Mollah","doi":"10.1108/IJOTB-10-01-2007-B001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOTB-10-01-2007-B001","url":null,"abstract":"Administrative Decentralization seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government. Administrative Decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and managing of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies. This paper will search for a common theoretical framework of decentralization, then analyzes and assesses the initiatives for decentralization of administration that have been constructed after the emergence of Bangladesh. The major issues and problems of implementation of the decentralization policies in Bangladesh are also discussed suggesting policy measures. This paper is analytical in nature.","PeriodicalId":340197,"journal":{"name":"Comparative & Global Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"161 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121026723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Does bounded rationality make paternalism more attractive? This Essay argues that errors will be larger when suppliers have stronger incentives or lower costs of persuasion and when consumers have weaker incentives to learn the truth. These comparative statics suggest that bounded rationality will often increase the costs of government decisionmaking relative to private decisionmaking, because consumers have better incentives to overcome errors than government decisionmakers, consumers have stronger incentives to choose well when they are purchasing than when they are voting and it is more costly to change the beliefs of millions of consumers than a handful of bureaucrats. As such, recognizing the limits of human cognition may strengthen the case for limited government.
{"title":"Paternalism and Psychology","authors":"E. Glaeser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.860865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.860865","url":null,"abstract":"Does bounded rationality make paternalism more attractive? This Essay argues that errors will be larger when suppliers have stronger incentives or lower costs of persuasion and when consumers have weaker incentives to learn the truth. These comparative statics suggest that bounded rationality will often increase the costs of government decisionmaking relative to private decisionmaking, because consumers have better incentives to overcome errors than government decisionmakers, consumers have stronger incentives to choose well when they are purchasing than when they are voting and it is more costly to change the beliefs of millions of consumers than a handful of bureaucrats. As such, recognizing the limits of human cognition may strengthen the case for limited government.","PeriodicalId":340197,"journal":{"name":"Comparative & Global Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132946495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is concerned with the effects of regulations that prohibit the use of information to risk-rate premiums in a life insurance market. In particular, new information derived from genetic tests is likely to become very relevant in the near to medium term future. Many governments have prohibited the use of this information in ratemaking, thereby generating regulatory adverse selection. In our model, individuals early in their lives neither know their desired level of life insurance later in life nor their mortality risk, but learn both over time. We obtain both positive and normative results which differ qualitatively from those obtained in standard, static models. In particular, we show that legislation prohibiting the use of results from genetic screening tests for ratemaking purposes in the life insurance market may increase welfare.
{"title":"Regulatory Adverse Selection in the Life Insurance Market","authors":"Mattias Polborn, Michael Hoy, A. Sadanand","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.757505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.757505","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is concerned with the effects of regulations that prohibit the use of information to risk-rate premiums in a life insurance market. In particular, new information derived from genetic tests is likely to become very relevant in the near to medium term future. Many governments have prohibited the use of this information in ratemaking, thereby generating regulatory adverse selection. In our model, individuals early in their lives neither know their desired level of life insurance later in life nor their mortality risk, but learn both over time. We obtain both positive and normative results which differ qualitatively from those obtained in standard, static models. In particular, we show that legislation prohibiting the use of results from genetic screening tests for ratemaking purposes in the life insurance market may increase welfare.","PeriodicalId":340197,"journal":{"name":"Comparative & Global Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131326934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cost-benefit analysis is analyzed using a model of agency delegation. In this model an agency observes the state of the world and issues a regulation, which the president may approve or reject. Cost-benefit analysis enables the president to observe the state of the world (in one version of the model), or is a signal that an agency may issue (in another version). The roles of the courts, Congress, and interest groups are also considered. It is argued that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis increases the amount of regulation, including the amount of regulation that fails cost-benefit analysis; that the president has no incentive to compel agencies to issue cost-benefit analysis, because agencies will do so when it is in the president's interest, and otherwise will not do so; that presidents benefit from cost-benefit analysis even when they do not seek efficient policies; that agencies and their supporters ought to endorse cost-benefit analysis, not resist it; and that cost-benefit analysis reduces the influence of interest groups. Evidence for these claims is discussed. Finally, it is argued that courts should force agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses in ordinary conditions, but that they should not force agencies to comply with them.
{"title":"Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective","authors":"E. Posner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.265655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.265655","url":null,"abstract":"Cost-benefit analysis is analyzed using a model of agency delegation. In this model an agency observes the state of the world and issues a regulation, which the president may approve or reject. Cost-benefit analysis enables the president to observe the state of the world (in one version of the model), or is a signal that an agency may issue (in another version). The roles of the courts, Congress, and interest groups are also considered. It is argued that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis increases the amount of regulation, including the amount of regulation that fails cost-benefit analysis; that the president has no incentive to compel agencies to issue cost-benefit analysis, because agencies will do so when it is in the president's interest, and otherwise will not do so; that presidents benefit from cost-benefit analysis even when they do not seek efficient policies; that agencies and their supporters ought to endorse cost-benefit analysis, not resist it; and that cost-benefit analysis reduces the influence of interest groups. Evidence for these claims is discussed. Finally, it is argued that courts should force agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses in ordinary conditions, but that they should not force agencies to comply with them.","PeriodicalId":340197,"journal":{"name":"Comparative & Global Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131691384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When supervisors have imperfect information about the soundness of banks, they may be unaware of insolvency problems that develop in the interval between on-site examinations. Supervising banks more often will alleviate this problem but will increase the costs of supervision. This paper analyzes the trade-offs that supervisors face between the cost of supervision and their need to monitor banks effectively. We first characterize the optimal supervisory policy, in terms of the time between examinations and the closure rule at examinations, and compare it with the policy of an independent supervisor. We then show that making this supervisor accountable for deposit insurance losses in general reduces the excessive forbearance of the independent supervisor and may also improve on the time between examinations. Finally, we extend our analysis to the impact of depositor-preference laws on supervisors' monitoring incentives and show that these laws may lead to conflicting effects on the time between examinations and closure policy vis-a-vis the social optimum.
{"title":"Optimal Supervisory Policies and Depositor-Preference Laws","authors":"H. Pagès, João A. C. Santos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.267271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.267271","url":null,"abstract":"When supervisors have imperfect information about the soundness of banks, they may be unaware of insolvency problems that develop in the interval between on-site examinations. Supervising banks more often will alleviate this problem but will increase the costs of supervision. This paper analyzes the trade-offs that supervisors face between the cost of supervision and their need to monitor banks effectively. We first characterize the optimal supervisory policy, in terms of the time between examinations and the closure rule at examinations, and compare it with the policy of an independent supervisor. We then show that making this supervisor accountable for deposit insurance losses in general reduces the excessive forbearance of the independent supervisor and may also improve on the time between examinations. Finally, we extend our analysis to the impact of depositor-preference laws on supervisors' monitoring incentives and show that these laws may lead to conflicting effects on the time between examinations and closure policy vis-a-vis the social optimum.","PeriodicalId":340197,"journal":{"name":"Comparative & Global Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123861608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Резюме: В настоящата студия се разглежда въпросът за деконцентрацията в държавното управление и по-точно кои са административно-териториалните единици, в които се деконцентрира държавната васт. Изяснават се въпросите, касаещи административно-териториално устройство на Република България, а също и редът за извършване на административно-териториални промени. Изследва се правният статут на областната администрация и начинът, по който това е регламентирано в нашето законодателство, както и съпоставка с аналогични правни институти в чужди правни системи. Обобщават се и се систематизират постигнатите резултати от направените у нас административни реформи.
{"title":"Правни аспекти на деконцентрацията на държавното управление в областта (Legal Aspects of Deconcentration of State Governance in the District)","authors":"Darina Dimitrova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3330568","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3330568","url":null,"abstract":"Резюме: В настоящата студия се разглежда въпросът за деконцентрацията в държавното управление и по-точно кои са административно-териториалните единици, в които се деконцентрира държавната васт. Изяснават се въпросите, касаещи административно-териториално устройство на Република България, а също и редът за извършване на административно-териториални промени. Изследва се правният статут на областната администрация и начинът, по който това е регламентирано в нашето законодателство, както и съпоставка с аналогични правни институти в чужди правни системи. Обобщават се и се систематизират постигнатите резултати от направените у нас административни реформи.","PeriodicalId":340197,"journal":{"name":"Comparative & Global Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122512874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper seeks to explore the synergies between budget and policy through the use of what was called ‘spending conditionality’ in the EU and ‘conditional spending’ in the U.S. It adopts a legal comparative perspective and investigates the EU's very recent practice of conditioning public spending granted to EU Member States against the U.S. long-standing experience on the matter. The paper argues that the analysis of the U.S. experience with conditional spending facilitates a better understanding of the phenomenon in the EU and may usefully enrich the EU policy-thinking on conditionality in future financial frameworks. In particular, the comparative study shows that conditionality may prove an effective governance device to advance important Union-wide policy objectives at the state level. At the same time, the study shows that when used inside established constitutional systems, conditionality is not free from constitutional contestation, and must be tailored in a way that complies with the essential constitutional principles underlying the exercise of power in a federal, multi-level government. Most important, this work shows that the eventual failures of conditionality are very hard to correct through ex-post administrative and judicial control tools. Therefore, a thoughtful ex ante policy planning of conditionality is crucial for its effective operation. The last part of the paper identifies several lessons learned in this respect.
{"title":"The Rise of Spending Conditionality in the EU: What Can EU Learn from the U.S. Conditional Spending Doctrine and Policies?","authors":"V. Viță","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3062680","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3062680","url":null,"abstract":"This paper seeks to explore the synergies between budget and policy through the use of what was called ‘spending conditionality’ in the EU and ‘conditional spending’ in the U.S. It adopts a legal comparative perspective and investigates the EU's very recent practice of conditioning public spending granted to EU Member States against the U.S. long-standing experience on the matter. The paper argues that the analysis of the U.S. experience with conditional spending facilitates a better understanding of the phenomenon in the EU and may usefully enrich the EU policy-thinking on conditionality in future financial frameworks. In particular, the comparative study shows that conditionality may prove an effective governance device to advance important Union-wide policy objectives at the state level. At the same time, the study shows that when used inside established constitutional systems, conditionality is not free from constitutional contestation, and must be tailored in a way that complies with the essential constitutional principles underlying the exercise of power in a federal, multi-level government. Most important, this work shows that the eventual failures of conditionality are very hard to correct through ex-post administrative and judicial control tools. Therefore, a thoughtful ex ante policy planning of conditionality is crucial for its effective operation. The last part of the paper identifies several lessons learned in this respect.","PeriodicalId":340197,"journal":{"name":"Comparative & Global Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124615782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bulgarian Abstract: Статията разглежда въпроса дали Общинският съвет е субект на публичното право. За целта са посочени признаците субектите в правото и са съпоставени термините “субект”, “социална даденост” и “колектив”. От изложените аргументи се прави изводът, че Общинският съвет е орган на държавата и в частност на общината, а субект на правото е самата община.
English Abstract: The article faces the problem whether the Municipal Council is a subject of the Public Law or not. To deal with the problem the author points out the features of the subject in legislation and compares the terms “subject”, “social reality” and “team”. On the basis of the arguments put forward, a conclusion is made that the Municipal Council a representative of the State, in particular of the municipality, while a subject of the law is the municipality itself.
{"title":"Към въпроса за правното качество на Общинския съвет (On the Problem About the Legal Status of the Municipal Council)","authors":"Darina Dimitrova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3330174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3330174","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Bulgarian Abstract:</b> Статията разглежда въпроса дали Общинският съвет е субект на публичното право. За целта са посочени признаците субектите в правото и са съпоставени термините “субект”, “социална даденост” и “колектив”. От изложените аргументи се прави изводът, че Общинският съвет е орган на държавата и в частност на общината, а субект на правото е самата община.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The article faces the problem whether the Municipal Council is a subject of the Public Law or not. To deal with the problem the author points out the features of the subject in legislation and compares the terms “subject”, “social reality” and “team”. On the basis of the arguments put forward, a conclusion is made that the Municipal Council a representative of the State, in particular of the municipality, while a subject of the law is the municipality itself.","PeriodicalId":340197,"journal":{"name":"Comparative & Global Administrative Law eJournal","volume":"5 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131893730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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