This paper proposes an exploration of relationships and exchanges between the philosophies of Cavell and Kuhn by the study of aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Although the notions of language games and family resemblances used by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions have been elaborated by Wittgenstein, Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein inspired that of Kuhn. I will attempt to show that against this background, Cavell’s conception of the relations of arts, works of arts, and artists, can be relevantly compared to Kuhn’s conception of the relations of sciences, scientific successes, and scientific practitioners. Three ways of elucidating the mutual exchanges between Cavell and Kuhn may be distinguished: One consists in clarifying the ways in which Cavell and Kuhn explicitly mutually inspired each other. Another one consists in clarifying that Cavell’s Wittgenstein inspired Kuhn. And a third one consists in clarifying that Wittgenstein inspired both Kuhn and Cavell and the ways in which he inspired them. This third way is not exclusive of the first two and even contributes to these by rendering explicit their stakes. For at stake is not only the restitution of the truth of an exegetical mediation: that Kuhn’s Wittgenstein cannot be truly understood without accounting for Cavell’s Wittgenstein. Rather the transitive character of the mediation implied by interpretation does not substitute for the intransitive character of a thoroughly philosophical inheritance. It is not the case that because Kuhn was inspired by Cavell who was inspired by Wittgenstein, that Kuhn could be inspired only by Cavell’s Wittgenstein, and not by Wittgenstein. Further, the question is not only philological but philosophical if we take into account the methods and the philosophy of Wittgenstein. To use an image: that a path was indicated by someone to someone else could not have implied that what was indicated by a person to another was oneself; this much was already known to us with the old fable of the moon, the finger and the sage. With this paper I will thus first seek to establish the relevance of the comparison of Cavell’s conception of the relations of arts, works of arts, and artists with Kuhn’s conception of the relations of sciences, scientific successes, and scientific practitioners. Then I will attempt to render explicit the unrestrictive limits of this comparison both to account for the mutual exchanges between Cavell and Kuhn and consider or bring out some symmetries and asymmetries concerning the place of paradigms in sciences and arts.
{"title":"Autonomy, Constitutivity, Exemplars, Paradigms","authors":"Timur Ųcan","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6613","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes an exploration of relationships and exchanges between the philosophies of Cavell and Kuhn by the study of aspects of the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Although the notions of language games and family resemblances used by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions have been elaborated by Wittgenstein, Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein inspired that of Kuhn. I will attempt to show that against this background, Cavell’s conception of the relations of arts, works of arts, and artists, can be relevantly compared to Kuhn’s conception of the relations of sciences, scientific successes, and scientific practitioners. Three ways of elucidating the mutual exchanges between Cavell and Kuhn may be distinguished: One consists in clarifying the ways in which Cavell and Kuhn explicitly mutually inspired each other. Another one consists in clarifying that Cavell’s Wittgenstein inspired Kuhn. And a third one consists in clarifying that Wittgenstein inspired both Kuhn and Cavell and the ways in which he inspired them. This third way is not exclusive of the first two and even contributes to these by rendering explicit their stakes. For at stake is not only the restitution of the truth of an exegetical mediation: that Kuhn’s Wittgenstein cannot be truly understood without accounting for Cavell’s Wittgenstein. Rather the transitive character of the mediation implied by interpretation does not substitute for the intransitive character of a thoroughly philosophical inheritance. It is not the case that because Kuhn was inspired by Cavell who was inspired by Wittgenstein, that Kuhn could be inspired only by Cavell’s Wittgenstein, and not by Wittgenstein. Further, the question is not only philological but philosophical if we take into account the methods and the philosophy of Wittgenstein. To use an image: that a path was indicated by someone to someone else could not have implied that what was indicated by a person to another was oneself; this much was already known to us with the old fable of the moon, the finger and the sage. With this paper I will thus first seek to establish the relevance of the comparison of Cavell’s conception of the relations of arts, works of arts, and artists with Kuhn’s conception of the relations of sciences, scientific successes, and scientific practitioners. Then I will attempt to render explicit the unrestrictive limits of this comparison both to account for the mutual exchanges between Cavell and Kuhn and consider or bring out some symmetries and asymmetries concerning the place of paradigms in sciences and arts.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121526896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The editors of this special issue of Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies invited contributors to write on Stanley Cavell and Thomas Kuhn. Unfortunately, this paper will end with Kuhn. The reason is simple: I found that I couldn’t begin writing anything on Cavell and the new before I had set up the literary and historical framework for the project, and before I had discussed Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work on aspect-seeing and Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). These are the parts of my work in progress that I’ll share here.
{"title":"The Question of the New","authors":"T. Moi","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6611","url":null,"abstract":"The editors of this special issue of Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies invited contributors to write on Stanley Cavell and Thomas Kuhn. Unfortunately, this paper will end with Kuhn. The reason is simple: I found that I couldn’t begin writing anything on Cavell and the new before I had set up the literary and historical framework for the project, and before I had discussed Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work on aspect-seeing and Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). These are the parts of my work in progress that I’ll share here. ","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114369587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In one of the excerpts from memory composing his autobiography, Stanley Cavell recalls attending “an informal but extended discussion among professional philosophers” with Thomas Kuhn, then his colleague at Berkeley. It was the first such meeting the two friends had sat through together, and Cavell describes the vivid impression left on the historian of science: “As we left the scene Kuhn pressed his fingers to his forehead as if it ached. ‘I wouldn’t have believed it. You people don’t behave like academics in any other field. You treat each other as if you are all mad.’” The perception, Cavell notes, “seemed right […] but normal enough, and because normal, suddenly revelatory.” Kuhn’s response clearly anticipates topics and arguments that would come to inform The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Articulated within the terms of those arguments, the exasperating scene becomes one of philosophical discussion in the absence of a paradigm, unable to take place upon an assumed common ground.
{"title":"A Willingness for Crisis","authors":"P. Jenner","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6614","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6614","url":null,"abstract":"In one of the excerpts from memory composing his autobiography, Stanley Cavell recalls attending “an informal but extended discussion among professional philosophers” with Thomas Kuhn, then his colleague at Berkeley. It was the first such meeting the two friends had sat through together, and Cavell describes the vivid impression left on the historian of science: “As we left the scene Kuhn pressed his fingers to his forehead as if it ached. ‘I wouldn’t have believed it. You people don’t behave like academics in any other field. You treat each other as if you are all mad.’” The perception, Cavell notes, “seemed right […] but normal enough, and because normal, suddenly revelatory.” Kuhn’s response clearly anticipates topics and arguments that would come to inform The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Articulated within the terms of those arguments, the exasperating scene becomes one of philosophical discussion in the absence of a paradigm, unable to take place upon an assumed common ground. ","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129074534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When we refer to something as automatic in ordinary language, we tend to speak of it as unconscious and working by itself —machinic, repetitive, needing no intervention or control from others to move along its natural course. If a process is automatic, we regularly assume that it happens independently of the human will. What is automated, in other words, will go on until non-human physical constraints prevent it from further labor, such as when the battery is dead in the robot or when the electricity goes out as the washing machine is running its usual course, or when one of its parts is worn out and needs repair. But if the machine “decides” that it is too tired or having a moody afternoon and wants to stop working mid-way through a task, we can’t help feeling very alarmed. Usually, we see automatism as precluding autonomy. Its automatic nature seems to suggest that it is, or ought to be, heteronomous in the sense that its course of action remains the same until it is told otherwise, e.g., when someone else turns the switch on or off. The contrast between the two statuses is prevalent in philosophical discourses as well, notably Descartes’ thought experiment that an automaton designed to look like an animal would be hard to distinguish from the real thing, but a machine that imitates humans would be far easier to detect, due to the latter’s language and general reasoning abilities, which reflect the fact that it is guided by immaterial mind.
{"title":"From Automatism to Autonomy","authors":"Ruochen Bo","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6615","url":null,"abstract":"When we refer to something as automatic in ordinary language, we tend to speak of it as unconscious and working by itself —machinic, repetitive, needing no intervention or control from others to move along its natural course. If a process is automatic, we regularly assume that it happens independently of the human will. What is automated, in other words, will go on until non-human physical constraints prevent it from further labor, such as when the battery is dead in the robot or when the electricity goes out as the washing machine is running its usual course, or when one of its parts is worn out and needs repair. But if the machine “decides” that it is too tired or having a moody afternoon and wants to stop working mid-way through a task, we can’t help feeling very alarmed. Usually, we see automatism as precluding autonomy. Its automatic nature seems to suggest that it is, or ought to be, heteronomous in the sense that its course of action remains the same until it is told otherwise, e.g., when someone else turns the switch on or off. The contrast between the two statuses is prevalent in philosophical discourses as well, notably Descartes’ thought experiment that an automaton designed to look like an animal would be hard to distinguish from the real thing, but a machine that imitates humans would be far easier to detect, due to the latter’s language and general reasoning abilities, which reflect the fact that it is guided by immaterial mind.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121518257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay is a creative inheritance destined for a volume celebrating the ongoing relevance of Thomas Kuhn and Stanley Cavell. But if it is inspired by, and converses with them, it is neither a reconstruction of their conversations nor a textual exegesis, but an attempt to reflect critically on the rationality of Earthlings in the Anthropocene while drawing orientation from Kuhn and Cavell. Arguably, such philosophical modernism is in spirit intensely Cavellian. Pursuing Emersonian self-reliance, this paper aims to make “philosophy yet another kind of problem for itself.” Therefore, this text is not Kuhnian. It couldn’t be — Kuhn claimed that his “vocation” was to be a “historian of science,” a member of the “American Historical, not the American Philosophical, Association.” But in its concern with science and history, and above all in its acceptance that our current historical context, the Anthropocene, cannot be thought outside of paradigmatic shifts within the history of science, notably the development of planetary science as a comparative and thus inter- planetary model for understanding our own terrestrial condition, what follows is Kuhnian.
{"title":"The Claim of Reason in a Planetary Age","authors":"Brad Tabas","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6616","url":null,"abstract":"This essay is a creative inheritance destined for a volume celebrating the ongoing relevance of Thomas Kuhn and Stanley Cavell. But if it is inspired by, and converses with them, it is neither a reconstruction of their conversations nor a textual exegesis, but an attempt to reflect critically on the rationality of Earthlings in the Anthropocene while drawing orientation from Kuhn and Cavell. Arguably, such philosophical modernism is in spirit intensely Cavellian. Pursuing Emersonian self-reliance, this paper aims to make “philosophy yet another kind of problem for itself.” Therefore, this text is not Kuhnian. It couldn’t be — Kuhn claimed that his “vocation” was to be a “historian of science,” a member of the “American Historical, not the American Philosophical, Association.” But in its concern with science and history, and above all in its acceptance that our current historical context, the Anthropocene, cannot be thought outside of paradigmatic shifts within the history of science, notably the development of planetary science as a comparative and thus inter- planetary model for understanding our own terrestrial condition, what follows is Kuhnian.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117052409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Conventionality and novelty — these two concepts came to occupy a prominent role in the philosophical discussions on both sciences and the arts in the second half of the twentieth century. These domains had established themselves as two autonomous and very different expressions of human creativity. Though they represent two ways of interpreting the world, the two cultures getting polarized to the extent of denying any imbrications is an unpleasant scenario. Discourses addressing the growing divorce between the sciences and the arts began to take shape in the 1950s. In the science world, methodological pluralism and a consequent multiplicity of truth(s) shattered the positivist view of scientific progress as an advancement towards a single, unchanging, worldview. With “progress” in science itself becoming a dubious concept, the status of science as a progressive discourse began to look like an exaggerated claim. The absence of ahistorical, atemporal truth foregrounds conventions as the decisive factor for the knowledge claims constituting the body of science, as exemplified by Thomas Kuhn’s idea of the paradigm. Around this time, when the conventionality of knowledge was coming to prominence, similar ideas emphasizing the conventionality of art appeared in philosophical discourse.
{"title":"The “New” in Science and Art","authors":"Arya Mohan","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6612","url":null,"abstract":"Conventionality and novelty — these two concepts came to occupy a prominent role in the philosophical discussions on both sciences and the arts in the second half of the twentieth century. These domains had established themselves as two autonomous and very different expressions of human creativity. Though they represent two ways of interpreting the world, the two cultures getting polarized to the extent of denying any imbrications is an unpleasant scenario. Discourses addressing the growing divorce between the sciences and the arts began to take shape in the 1950s. In the science world, methodological pluralism and a consequent multiplicity of truth(s) shattered the positivist view of scientific progress as an advancement towards a single, unchanging, worldview. With “progress” in science itself becoming a dubious concept, the status of science as a progressive discourse began to look like an exaggerated claim. The absence of ahistorical, atemporal truth foregrounds conventions as the decisive factor for the knowledge claims constituting the body of science, as exemplified by Thomas Kuhn’s idea of the paradigm. Around this time, when the conventionality of knowledge was coming to prominence, similar ideas emphasizing the conventionality of art appeared in philosophical discourse. ","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"209 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114967709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The tenth issue of Conversations takes as its starting point the mutually expressed importance of the intellectual relationship and friendship between Stanley Cavell and the historian of science Thomas Kuhn. Their dialogue is all the more striking given that both thinkers were as concerned with difficulties of communication as with its achievement. Yet there is no hint of a struggle with incommensurability in Kuhn’s claim that Cavell was “the only person with whom I have been able to explore my ideas in incomplete sentences.” Cavell likewise explained, in The Claim of Reason, that the work owed much to having been “at times almost in possession of the something you might call an intellectual community” while working with Kuhn at Berkeley. This issue springs from these conversations between Cavell and Kuhn, exploring and extending their encounters through readings which cross Cavell with Kuhn and Kuhn with Cavell, and in so doing extending our understanding of each, while also illustrating the ways in which their work can still provide inspiration for grappling with science, art, and philosophy.
{"title":"Editorial Comment","authors":"Brad Tabas, Paul Jenner","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi10.6610","url":null,"abstract":"The tenth issue of Conversations takes as its starting point the mutually expressed importance of the intellectual relationship and friendship between Stanley Cavell and the historian of science Thomas Kuhn. Their dialogue is all the more striking given that both thinkers were as concerned with difficulties of communication as with its achievement. Yet there is no hint of a struggle with incommensurability in Kuhn’s claim that Cavell was “the only person with whom I have been able to explore my ideas in incomplete sentences.” Cavell likewise explained, in The Claim of Reason, that the work owed much to having been “at times almost in possession of the something you might call an intellectual community” while working with Kuhn at Berkeley. This issue springs from these conversations between Cavell and Kuhn, exploring and extending their encounters through readings which cross Cavell with Kuhn and Kuhn with Cavell, and in so doing extending our understanding of each, while also illustrating the ways in which their work can still provide inspiration for grappling with science, art, and philosophy.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126477350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cavell’s goal in The Claim of Reason has been to “bring the human voice back into philosophy.” For Cavell, the stakes of ordinary language philosophy (particularly Wittgenstein and Austin’s work; see Toril Moi, Avner Baz) are to make it understood that language is spoken; pronounced by a human voice within a form of life. In The Claim of Reason, his aim is to shift the question of the common/shared use of language—central to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations—toward the less-explored question of the definition of the subject as voice, and the re-introduction of the voice into philosophy as a redefinition of subjectivity in language.
{"title":"The Claim of Reason as a Study of the Human Voice","authors":"S. Laugier","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6246","url":null,"abstract":"Cavell’s goal in The Claim of Reason has been to “bring the human voice back into philosophy.” For Cavell, the stakes of ordinary language philosophy (particularly Wittgenstein and Austin’s work; see Toril Moi, Avner Baz) are to make it understood that language is spoken; pronounced by a human voice within a form of life. In The Claim of Reason, his aim is to shift the question of the common/shared use of language—central to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations—toward the less-explored question of the definition of the subject as voice, and the re-introduction of the voice into philosophy as a redefinition of subjectivity in language.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"320 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115771113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the special challenges in approaching Stanley Cavell’s writing on the arts is how to understand the relation between what are often read as theoretical generalities with Cavell’s particular interpretations of individual works. The latter are not presented as mere applications of the former, while the former are clearly meant to be something more than mere generalizations from the latter. When it comes to Cavell’s writings on film, we find a representative methodological statement in the Foreword to the 1979 enlarged edition of The World Viewed, where he asserts that “what constitutes an ‘element’ of the medium of film is not knowable prior” to discoveries by filmmaking and criticism itself. He refers to this “reciprocity between element and significance” as “the cinematic circle.” But how are we to orient ourselves within the cinematic circle? What about those places in Cavell’s own writing where theoretical generalities and individual readings seem divorced?
{"title":"Cavell on Color","authors":"Byron Davies","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6249","url":null,"abstract":"One of the special challenges in approaching Stanley Cavell’s writing on the arts is how to understand the relation between what are often read as theoretical generalities with Cavell’s particular interpretations of individual works. The latter are not presented as mere applications of the former, while the former are clearly meant to be something more than mere generalizations from the latter. When it comes to Cavell’s writings on film, we find a representative methodological statement in the Foreword to the 1979 enlarged edition of The World Viewed, where he asserts that “what constitutes an ‘element’ of the medium of film is not knowable prior” to discoveries by filmmaking and criticism itself. He refers to this “reciprocity between element and significance” as “the cinematic circle.” But how are we to orient ourselves within the cinematic circle? What about those places in Cavell’s own writing where theoretical generalities and individual readings seem divorced?","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134222830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ninth issue of Conversations responds to Cavell’s thoughts against the backdrop of the history of philosophy in general, and phenomenology, especially Hegel and Heidegger; unfolding metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, political, and aesthetic ramifications. It is against that backdrop, that the question arises about the nature and function of dialectic in wording the world, the other, or ourselves, as acknowledged by Paul Franks and Espen Hammer. The idea of the issue arose with an essay (an “attempt”) I was working on, about Cavell, Wittgenstein, and Hegel, at University of Leeds, while also reading The Phenomenology of Spirit with the Hegel Reading Group at the University of Oxford (Michaelmas term, 2020), and, meeting with the Cavellian Reading Group (that at the University of Cambridge, now an international group), upon sharing the idea of the essay with Amir Khan, this started a series of discussions, which eventually resulted in an invitation to guest edit this issue.
{"title":"Editorial Comment","authors":"Moses Estrada-Alvarez","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6243","url":null,"abstract":"The ninth issue of Conversations responds to Cavell’s thoughts against the backdrop of the history of philosophy in general, and phenomenology, especially Hegel and Heidegger; unfolding metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, political, and aesthetic ramifications. It is against that backdrop, that the question arises about the nature and function of dialectic in wording the world, the other, or ourselves, as acknowledged by Paul Franks and Espen Hammer. The idea of the issue arose with an essay (an “attempt”) I was working on, about Cavell, Wittgenstein, and Hegel, at University of Leeds, while also reading The Phenomenology of Spirit with the Hegel Reading Group at the University of Oxford (Michaelmas term, 2020), and, meeting with the Cavellian Reading Group (that at the University of Cambridge, now an international group), upon sharing the idea of the essay with Amir Khan, this started a series of discussions, which eventually resulted in an invitation to guest edit this issue.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131531842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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