Descartes may have produced the paradigmatic image of modern philosophy when he donned his winter dressing gown, settled into his favorite armchair by the fire, and began a private meditation by wondering whether the flame in front of him were anything more than a dream. Like most skeptical recitals, the force of Descartes’ method arises through the mobilization of best cases for knowing; that is, through casting doubt on something so certain that one begins to question one’s ability to know anything at all. By impugning precisely those axioms we held most assured, Descartes demonstrates philosophy’s propensity to challenge our most fundamental assumptions, yet he simultaneously leverages the significance of the philosophical enterprise against more everyday or ordinary claims to knowledge, that of course the fire really burns. In doing so, Descartes opens up the possibility that a critic of skepticism will be more inclined to doubt the sanity of philosophical inquiry than to admit that the flame, or the greater external world, may be nothing more than a dream, or the conjuring of an evil demon. So the profundity or inanity of philosophy seems to turn on the whim of human temperament, and in particular, on my reaction to the idea that I may be mistaken about everything I claim to know.
{"title":"Knowing the Skeptic","authors":"Micah L. Mccreary","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi8.5790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi8.5790","url":null,"abstract":"Descartes may have produced the paradigmatic image of modern philosophy when he donned his winter dressing gown, settled into his favorite armchair by the fire, and began a private meditation by wondering whether the flame in front of him were anything more than a dream. Like most skeptical recitals, the force of Descartes’ method arises through the mobilization of best cases for knowing; that is, through casting doubt on something so certain that one begins to question one’s ability to know anything at all. By impugning precisely those axioms we held most assured, Descartes demonstrates philosophy’s propensity to challenge our most fundamental assumptions, yet he simultaneously leverages the significance of the philosophical enterprise against more everyday or ordinary claims to knowledge, that of course the fire really burns. In doing so, Descartes opens up the possibility that a critic of skepticism will be more inclined to doubt the sanity of philosophical inquiry than to admit that the flame, or the greater external world, may be nothing more than a dream, or the conjuring of an evil demon. So the profundity or inanity of philosophy seems to turn on the whim of human temperament, and in particular, on my reaction to the idea that I may be mistaken about everything I claim to know.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121800930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I remember distinctly the moment I learned that David Lewis had died. It was during my years as a postdoctoral fellow, when I was more than a little isolated, and so it turned out to have been some time—months, maybe—since the event. I recall thinking: the world in which I thought I was living, during those months, turned out not to be the actual world, and so I turned out not to be the person I thought I was, but merely a counterpart of that person. And thus arose the half-formed thought (still only half-formed now, alas) that therein lay some insight into what is actually at stake in the conflict between counterpart theory and transworld identity.
{"title":"In Memoriam","authors":"Abraham D. Stone","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi7.4914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi7.4914","url":null,"abstract":"I remember distinctly the moment I learned that David Lewis had died. It was during my years as a postdoctoral fellow, when I was more than a little isolated, and so it turned out to have been some time—months, maybe—since the event. I recall thinking: the world in which I thought I was living, during those months, turned out not to be the actual world, and so I turned out not to be the person I thought I was, but merely a counterpart of that person. And thus arose the half-formed thought (still only half-formed now, alas) that therein lay some insight into what is actually at stake in the conflict between counterpart theory and transworld identity.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126891457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We hurried to get the front row seats. Even to nineteen-year-olds, it was clear that what was happening in that lecture hall—fittingly, it was Emerson 105—was worth waking up for, worth pushing to the front for, as if we couldn’t get close enough. And what we couldn’t get close enough to was Stanley Cavell lecturing on Western philosophy—a course humbly called “Hum 5” (“Humanities 5: Introduction to Western Philosophy”)—looking back, now forty years later, I can say it was probably the most significant intellectual experience of my life. Cavell’s commanding presence—that big head, fixed gaze, and seriousness of purpose—made his entrance onto the dais, raincoat and brief case in hand, an anticipated event. But what dawns on me now is that it wasn’t so much Cavell’s presence or even what he said that made us feel a shared sense of urgency, but rather how he said it, how he performed this urgency that made us feel like we were somewhere else—a world viewed through Cavell’s mind.
{"title":"Listening to Cavell","authors":"K. Young","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi7.4504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi7.4504","url":null,"abstract":"We hurried to get the front row seats. Even to nineteen-year-olds, it was clear that what was happening in that lecture hall—fittingly, it was Emerson 105—was worth waking up for, worth pushing to the front for, as if we couldn’t get close enough. And what we couldn’t get close enough to was Stanley Cavell lecturing on Western philosophy—a course humbly called “Hum 5” (“Humanities 5: Introduction to Western Philosophy”)—looking back, now forty years later, I can say it was probably the most significant intellectual experience of my life. Cavell’s commanding presence—that big head, fixed gaze, and seriousness of purpose—made his entrance onto the dais, raincoat and brief case in hand, an anticipated event. But what dawns on me now is that it wasn’t so much Cavell’s presence or even what he said that made us feel a shared sense of urgency, but rather how he said it, how he performed this urgency that made us feel like we were somewhere else—a world viewed through Cavell’s mind.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116217311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is of course a great honor for me to say a few words about Stanley on this occasion, and to say a few things about what he has brought to philosophy, what he has meant to me, and what his work contributes to American writing. And it is also clear that I have been given an impossible task, as anyone will know who has so much as an inkling of the variety and sweep of the texts, the questions, and the human phenomena that he has made available to philosophical reflection over the course of his many books.
{"title":"Cavell as a Way into Philosophy","authors":"R. Moran","doi":"10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4282","url":null,"abstract":"It is of course a great honor for me to say a few words about Stanley on this occasion, and to say a few things about what he has brought to philosophy, what he has meant to me, and what his work contributes to American writing. And it is also clear that I have been given an impossible task, as anyone will know who has so much as an inkling of the variety and sweep of the texts, the questions, and the human phenomena that he has made available to philosophical reflection over the course of his many books.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124515014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A year has elapsed since Stanley Cavell died, and in that time those who knew him and read his work, have been coming to terms with his permanent departure. For many it has not been easy, and part of this difficulty includes trying to say something in writing about what the loss has meant, or might entail, or perhaps better, what it stirs in us.
{"title":"Editorial Comment","authors":"David Larocca","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi7.4280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi7.4280","url":null,"abstract":"A year has elapsed since Stanley Cavell died, and in that time those who knew him and read his work, have been coming to terms with his permanent departure. For many it has not been easy, and part of this difficulty includes trying to say something in writing about what the loss has meant, or might entail, or perhaps better, what it stirs in us.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126488543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Let me start by saying how significant it is for me to take part in this conference commemorating and celebrating Stanley Cavell. I am grateful to Cathleen Cavell and Richard Moran for this opportunity, not only to speak, but mainly to listen to dear friends, friends whose companionship was indelibly marked by our common love for Stanley, by the admiration for his thinking, and by the inspiration and sustenance he provided for our own work. What I will say will be inflected by the way Stanley touched my life and work. I must apologize therefore for having to speak, in the short and precious time I have, also a bit about myself. As I wrote these remarks I thought that I will most likely not be the only one to choose to speak of the ideal, the paradigm of the unity of person and thought that is Stanley Cavell. It is what was so striking to me when I first encountered him; it also became central to my dissertation project with him, and it remains to this day that through which I think of his continuous presence in my concerns with philosophy.
{"title":"Stanley Cavell, with Time","authors":"Eli Friedlander","doi":"10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4287","url":null,"abstract":"Let me start by saying how significant it is for me to take part in this conference commemorating and celebrating Stanley Cavell. I am grateful to Cathleen Cavell and Richard Moran for this opportunity, not only to speak, but mainly to listen to dear friends, friends whose companionship was indelibly marked by our common love for Stanley, by the admiration for his thinking, and by the inspiration and sustenance he provided for our own work. \u0000What I will say will be inflected by the way Stanley touched my life and work. I must apologize therefore for having to speak, in the short and precious time I have, also a bit about myself. As I wrote these remarks I thought that I will most likely not be the only one to choose to speak of the ideal, the paradigm of the unity of person and thought that is Stanley Cavell. It is what was so striking to me when I first encountered him; it also became central to my dissertation project with him, and it remains to this day that through which I think of his continuous presence in my concerns with philosophy.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123786479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sandra Laugier describes Stanley Cavell’s contribution to philosophy as the bringing back of the human voice into central consideration: “For Cavell, the stakes of ordinary language philosophy (particularly Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s work) are to make it understood that language is spoken; pronounced by a human voice within a form of life.” How can I then express my own voice when all of my expressions are those of others? In other words, how is it that a child becomes part of her or his form of life? How does she or he claim her or his own voice? Presenting the transmission of language this way implies another way of seeing what language is, what learning language is, and finally what subjectivity in language is.
{"title":"The Child’s Claim to the Transmission of Language","authors":"Yves Érard","doi":"10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4292","url":null,"abstract":"Sandra Laugier describes Stanley Cavell’s contribution to philosophy as the bringing back of the human voice into central consideration: “For Cavell, the stakes of ordinary language philosophy (particularly Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s work) are to make it understood that language is spoken; pronounced by a human voice within a form of life.” How can I then express my own voice when all of my expressions are those of others? In other words, how is it that a child becomes part of her or his form of life? How does she or he claim her or his own voice? Presenting the transmission of language this way implies another way of seeing what language is, what learning language is, and finally what subjectivity in language is.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123832148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I AM HONORED TO BE HERE, with members of the Cavell family, with friends and with colleagues, to celebrate the life and work of Stanley Cavell, to whom I owe inestimably large debts of gratitude and whom I remember with the greatest affection and admiration. Cavell’s role in my life was that of a philosophical parent. He is well known to have held that “philosophy is the education of grownups,” and the sort of parenting I am talking about involved opening the door of philosophy for my young adult self. This was not a matter of induction into a theoretical research program of the type that then already dominated academic philosophy. Cavell’s way was to prompt students to confront and interrogate our own intellectual responses, leading us to ask “why we do what we do, judge as we judge,” and positioning us to think for ourselves. This is a demanding pedagogical enterprise, and Cavell devoted singular amounts of time and energy to supporting the young thinkers around him. What I am going to recount is the story of two extraordinary things that he did as my teacher, circumstances all the more arresting in that I was not officially his student.
{"title":"For My Teacher, Stanley Cavell","authors":"Alice Crary","doi":"10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4286","url":null,"abstract":"I AM HONORED TO BE HERE, with members of the Cavell family, with friends and with colleagues, to celebrate the life and work of Stanley Cavell, to whom I owe inestimably large debts of gratitude and whom I remember with the greatest affection and admiration. \u0000Cavell’s role in my life was that of a philosophical parent. He is well known to have held that “philosophy is the education of grownups,” and the sort of parenting I am talking about involved opening the door of philosophy for my young adult self. This was not a matter of induction into a theoretical research program of the type that then already dominated academic philosophy. Cavell’s way was to prompt students to confront and interrogate our own intellectual responses, leading us to ask “why we do what we do, judge as we judge,” and positioning us to think for ourselves. This is a demanding pedagogical enterprise, and Cavell devoted singular amounts of time and energy to supporting the young thinkers around him. What I am going to recount is the story of two extraordinary things that he did as my teacher, circumstances all the more arresting in that I was not officially his student. ","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133334264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” first published in 1965, and later collected in Must We Mean What We Say?, Stanley Cavell wrote: We know the efforts of such philosophers as Frege and Husserl to undo the “psychologizing” of logic (like Kant’s undoing Hume’s psychologizing of knowledge): now, the shortest way I might describe such a book as the Philosophical Investigations is to say that it attempts to undo the psychologizing of psychology, to show the necessity controlling our application of psychological and behavioral categories; even, one could say, show the necessities in human action and passion themselves. And at the same time it seems to turn all of philosophy into psychology—matters of what we call things, how we treat them, what their role is in our lives. Frege, of course, insisted on distinguishing between what is thought in any act of thinking, the content of thought, which he conceived of as having a propositional form, and the thinking of it. A thought is what can be common to different acts of thinking, whether of one’s own or of another. It is thus essentially public, essentially shareable, unowned. By contrast the thinking of a thought is necessarily someone’s, necessarily owned, and so in that sense private. Frege depsychologized logic, by excluding the psychological from it. The logical must bear no trace of the psychological, for if that were not so, there would be nothing that could be true or false—and so no judgment, no belief, no propositional attitude, as thoughts have subsequently come to be called. There would be in Thomas Rickett’s memorable words, merely “mooing.” The first person is consequently banished from the logical order, for a first person thought is constituted by the thinking of it. But in depsychologizing logic as he did, Frege seemed to have psychologized psychology. Thus, in speaking of the Investigations as undoing the psychologizing of psychology, I take it, Stanley meant that it seeks to undo what Frege did. However, this doesn’t mean undoing what Frege undid, that is, erasing the sharp boundary between the logical and the psychological, but rather to not cede the psychological to psychology: what the PI calls for is to further what Frege began, but, as it were, against Frege. In other words, Stanley saw Wittgenstein as reintroducing the first person as essential to the logical order, the order of what we think.
在1965年首次出版的《现代哲学的美学问题》中，后来收录在《我们必须言行一致吗?》， Stanley Cavell写道:我们知道像弗雷格和胡塞尔这样的哲学家试图取消逻辑的“心理化”(就像康德取消休谟的知识的心理化):现在，我可以用最简短的方式来描述《哲学研究》这样一本书，它试图取消心理学的心理化，以表明控制我们对心理和行为范畴的应用的必要性;甚至可以说，它表现了人类行为和激情本身的必要性。与此同时，它似乎把所有的哲学都变成了心理学——我们如何称呼事物，我们如何对待它们，它们在我们生活中扮演什么角色。当然，弗雷格坚持把任何思维活动中的思维，即他认为具有命题形式的思维内容，与思维内容的思维加以区分。思想是不同的思维行为所共有的东西，无论是自己的还是别人的。因此，它本质上是公共的、可共享的、无主的。相反，一个思想的思想必然是某人的，必然是私有的，因此在这个意义上是私有的。弗雷格通过排除逻辑中的心理因素，将逻辑去心理化。逻辑的东西一定不能有心理的痕迹，因为如果没有心理的痕迹，就没有什么东西可以是真或假，也就没有判断，没有信仰，没有命题的态度，也就没有后来被称为思想的东西了。用托马斯·里基特(Thomas Rickett)那句令人难忘的话来说，就是“移动”。因此，第一人称被排除在逻辑秩序之外，因为第一人称思维是由对它的思考构成的。但在他对逻辑进行去心理化的过程中，弗雷格似乎把心理学心理化了。因此，说到《调查》消解了心理学的心理学化，我认为斯坦利的意思是，它试图消解弗雷格所做的事情。然而，这并不意味着要取消弗雷格所取消的东西，也就是说，消除逻辑和心理学之间的尖锐界限，而是不把心理学让给心理学:PI所要求的是进一步推进弗雷格所开始的，但实际上是反对弗雷格的。换句话说，斯坦利认为维特根斯坦重新引入了第一人称对于逻辑秩序，我们思考的秩序至关重要。
{"title":"Undoing the Psychologizing of the Psychological","authors":"Arata Hamawaki","doi":"10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4291","url":null,"abstract":"In “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” first published in 1965, and later collected in Must We Mean What We Say?, Stanley Cavell wrote: \u0000We know the efforts of such philosophers as Frege and Husserl to undo the “psychologizing” of logic (like Kant’s undoing Hume’s psychologizing of knowledge): now, the shortest way I might describe such a book as the Philosophical Investigations is to say that it attempts to undo the psychologizing of psychology, to show the necessity controlling our application of psychological and behavioral categories; even, one could say, show the necessities in human action and passion themselves. And at the same time it seems to turn all of philosophy into psychology—matters of what we call things, how we treat them, what their role is in our lives. \u0000Frege, of course, insisted on distinguishing between what is thought in any act of thinking, the content of thought, which he conceived of as having a propositional form, and the thinking of it. A thought is what can be common to different acts of thinking, whether of one’s own or of another. It is thus essentially public, essentially shareable, unowned. By contrast the thinking of a thought is necessarily someone’s, necessarily owned, and so in that sense private. Frege depsychologized logic, by excluding the psychological from it. The logical must bear no trace of the psychological, for if that were not so, there would be nothing that could be true or false—and so no judgment, no belief, no propositional attitude, as thoughts have subsequently come to be called. There would be in Thomas Rickett’s memorable words, merely “mooing.” The first person is consequently banished from the logical order, for a first person thought is constituted by the thinking of it. But in depsychologizing logic as he did, Frege seemed to have psychologized psychology. Thus, in speaking of the Investigations as undoing the psychologizing of psychology, I take it, Stanley meant that it seeks to undo what Frege did. However, this doesn’t mean undoing what Frege undid, that is, erasing the sharp boundary between the logical and the psychological, but rather to not cede the psychological to psychology: what the PI calls for is to further what Frege began, but, as it were, against Frege. In other words, Stanley saw Wittgenstein as reintroducing the first person as essential to the logical order, the order of what we think.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128820253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A year after the publication in 1969 of Must We Mean What We Say?, Stanley Cavell observes in the elegant Preface he wrote for the 2001 edition, the effect on him, as he put it, “of putting the book behind me, or perhaps I should say, of having it to stand behind, freed me for I suppose the most productive, or palpably so, nine months of my life, in which I recast the salvageable and necessary material of my Ph.D. dissertation as the opening three parts of what would become The Claim of Reason and completed small books on film (The World Viewed) and Thoreau (The Senses of Walden). I consider those small books to form a trio with Must We Mean What We Say?, different paths leading from the same desire for philosophy.” If those three books form a trio, I take the fourth part of The Claim of Reason, completed in 1978, and Pursuits of Happiness, which in 1978 he was already writing, to form a duo—not, I would say, different paths leading from the same desire for philosophy, but from the trio’s achievement of philosophy.
{"title":"In Pursuit of 'Pursuits of Happiness'","authors":"W. Rothman","doi":"10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/CJCS.VI7.4284","url":null,"abstract":"A year after the publication in 1969 of Must We Mean What We Say?, Stanley Cavell observes in the elegant Preface he wrote for the 2001 edition, the effect on him, as he put it, “of putting the book behind me, or perhaps I should say, of having it to stand behind, freed me for I suppose the most productive, or palpably so, nine months of my life, in which I recast the salvageable and necessary material of my Ph.D. dissertation as the opening three parts of what would become The Claim of Reason and completed small books on film (The World Viewed) and Thoreau (The Senses of Walden). I consider those small books to form a trio with Must We Mean What We Say?, different paths leading from the same desire for philosophy.” If those three books form a trio, I take the fourth part of The Claim of Reason, completed in 1978, and Pursuits of Happiness, which in 1978 he was already writing, to form a duo—not, I would say, different paths leading from the same desire for philosophy, but from the trio’s achievement of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"189 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124192295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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