Hegel is not an author who plays a starring role in Cavell’s work like that of Austin, Wittgenstein, or Emerson. Cavell mentions him rarely, and almost always in passing. This is hardly surprising. Given that Cavell draws as heavily as he does upon Kant, whom Hegel regularly attacks, and Kierkegaard, who regularly attacks Hegel, one might expect that Hegel’s more important claims and ideas would be uncongenial to Cavell, and incompatible with the main lines of his work. Moreover, Cavell’s early and lasting embrace of Romanticism would seem to preclude the embrace of an author who lambasts the leading Jena Romantic Friedrich von Schlegel as the purveyor of a corrosive amoral subjectivism. Appearances, however, can be deceiving, and in the essay that follows I demonstrate that there are good reasons to believe that Hegel has influenced Cavell considerably more than one might suppose.
{"title":"Hegel and Cavell on Meaning and Sublation","authors":"A. Norris","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6247","url":null,"abstract":"Hegel is not an author who plays a starring role in Cavell’s work like that of Austin, Wittgenstein, or Emerson. Cavell mentions him rarely, and almost always in passing. This is hardly surprising. Given that Cavell draws as heavily as he does upon Kant, whom Hegel regularly attacks, and Kierkegaard, who regularly attacks Hegel, one might expect that Hegel’s more important claims and ideas would be uncongenial to Cavell, and incompatible with the main lines of his work. Moreover, Cavell’s early and lasting embrace of Romanticism would seem to preclude the embrace of an author who lambasts the leading Jena Romantic Friedrich von Schlegel as the purveyor of a corrosive amoral subjectivism. Appearances, however, can be deceiving, and in the essay that follows I demonstrate that there are good reasons to believe that Hegel has influenced Cavell considerably more than one might suppose.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114286091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
That human (op)positions, contradiction and conflict, permeate our world is obvious; however, if, we (human beings) share a conceptual scheme, common to us all, how then we can agree and disagree, accept and reject, admit or repress, recognize and misrecognize so much in our worlds—between others and ourselves—is not obvious, or needs to be recounted. Notwithstanding, we want to reconsider our shared conceptual scheme—the necessities apart from which we cannot say what we ordinarily say, or even do. To be sure, the (op)positions result from these necessities. It is that sort of necessity, so to say, logic, or “what is common to us all,” that “we” want to describe, figure out or find out in ordinary language. To acknowledge a Cavellian insinuation: the necessities, being human, we must affirm and deny at once (i.e. the sense I sketch out from the epigraph above). In this essay, I claim that that is a dialectic inherent in ordinary language (in human forms of life).
{"title":"Philosophy of Mind Becomes Aesthetics","authors":"Moses Estrada-Alvarez","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6250","url":null,"abstract":"That human (op)positions, contradiction and conflict, permeate our world is obvious; however, if, we (human beings) share a conceptual scheme, common to us all, how then we can agree and disagree, accept and reject, admit or repress, recognize and misrecognize so much in our worlds—between others and ourselves—is not obvious, or needs to be recounted. Notwithstanding, we want to reconsider our shared conceptual scheme—the necessities apart from which we cannot say what we ordinarily say, or even do. To be sure, the (op)positions result from these necessities. It is that sort of necessity, so to say, logic, or “what is common to us all,” that “we” want to describe, figure out or find out in ordinary language. To acknowledge a Cavellian insinuation: the necessities, being human, we must affirm and deny at once (i.e. the sense I sketch out from the epigraph above). In this essay, I claim that that is a dialectic inherent in ordinary language (in human forms of life).","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130014606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Here is a passage from the discussion of rhythm in music in Hegel’s Aesthetics that will, I suggest, help us to make sense of some important ideas in Cavell about the achievement of selfhood. This runs some risk of explicating the obscure, Cavell, by reference to the unintelligible, Hegel, but Hegel also helps us here specifically to focus on the ontology and ontogeny of selfhood.
{"title":"Cavell and the Achievement of Selfhood","authors":"Richard Eldridge","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6244","url":null,"abstract":"Here is a passage from the discussion of rhythm in music in Hegel’s Aesthetics that will, I suggest, help us to make sense of some important ideas in Cavell about the achievement of selfhood. This runs some risk of explicating the obscure, Cavell, by reference to the unintelligible, Hegel, but Hegel also helps us here specifically to focus on the ontology and ontogeny of selfhood.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114061477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay, I seek to follow and draw upon resources in Ludwig Wittgenstein (and in an important contemporary follower of his, Iain McGilchrist) in order to pose a radical question. I question here the conventional “wisdom” across philosophical traditions (and cleaved to equally strongly by Cavell and Derrida, and for that matter by Richard Dawkins and Donald Davidson), that says—or rather even, simply assumes—that we are finite beings.
{"title":"Against “Finitude”","authors":"R. Read","doi":"10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18192/cjcs.vi9.6245","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I seek to follow and draw upon resources in Ludwig Wittgenstein (and in an important contemporary follower of his, Iain McGilchrist) in order to pose a radical question. I question here the conventional “wisdom” across philosophical traditions (and cleaved to equally strongly by Cavell and Derrida, and for that matter by Richard Dawkins and Donald Davidson), that says—or rather even, simply assumes—that we are finite beings.","PeriodicalId":342666,"journal":{"name":"Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124307586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In an earlier essay, I once drew a comparison between Theodor W. Adorno’s remark that, “philosophy, which once appeared obsolete, sustains itself because the moment for its actualization has been lost,” and Stanley Cavell’s suggestion that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “Investigations can be seen as a philosophy of culture, one that relates itself to its time as a time in which the continuation of philosophy is at stake.” In this essay, I’d like to compare Adorno’s remark to a different but related remark of Cavell’s, namely his thought that “philosophy ends in a recovery from a terminable loss.” He pursues this thought in remarks on Emerson, noting that “philosophy begins in loss, in finding yourself at a loss, as Wittgenstein more or less says.” Many different traditions—Marxism, American transcendentalism, ordinary language philosophy, just to name a few—animate these thoughts. This is not the place to detail and tease out the ramifications and significances of each; instead, I want to take this very short essay merely to raise a different point of relation than I raised before (in a deep way, then, this essay—and especially its short length—may be seen as a sort of afterword to my earlier remarks).
在早些时候的一篇文章中，我曾经比较过西奥多·阿多诺(Theodor W. Adorno)的评论，“哲学，曾经显得过时，维持自己，因为它的实现时刻已经失去了”，和斯坦利·卡维尔(Stanley Cavell)的建议，路德维希·维特根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)的“研究可以被视为一种文化哲学，一种将自己与时代联系起来的哲学，在这个时代，哲学的延续受到威胁。”在这篇文章中，我想将阿多诺的评论与卡维尔的另一个不同但相关的评论进行比较，即他认为“哲学结束于从一个不可终结的损失中恢复过来”。他在对爱默生的评论中追求这一思想，指出“哲学始于迷失，始于发现自己处于迷失之中，正如维特根斯坦或多或少所说的那样。”许多不同的传统——马克思主义、美国先验主义、普通语言哲学，仅举几例——激发了这些思想。这里不是详细梳理每一个分支和意义的地方;相反，我想用这篇很短的文章来提出一个与我之前提出的不同的关系点(从更深的角度来说，这篇文章——尤其是它的短长度——可以被看作是我之前评论的一种后记)。
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Aside from being one of the best books ever written on film, Stanley Cavell’s 1979 masterpiece Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage is surely also one of the best investigations we have into the institution of marriage. Here as elsewhere, Cavell has multiple targets in his sights. Along with mapping out a new subgenre within the screwball comedy and moving the then-newly christened discipline of film studies forward, his aims are also philosophical (searching for the ways in which these films “disquiet the foundations of our lives”), sociological (searching for cultural connections between the two waves of feminism), and matrimonial. Cavell is trying to discover what makes marriages work, and under what conditions a married pair might be able to find the “thirst for remarriage” that he takes as its essential element. Moving well beyond accounting for filmic portrayals of the married state, Pursuits is a virtuosic exploration of marriage itself, with countless insights to offer.
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When I wrote the following pages, or rather the bulk of them, I was seated in cafés in Paris, intermittently employed as an adjunct professor, and engaged in a struggle to find my professional place and philosophical voice. I lived in this way for almost six years. At present I am a tenured professor at a prestigious French engineering school, seated at my desk and enjoying the sense of well-being and intellectual liberty that such a position provides.
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The phrase, “epistemology of moods,” appears in Stanley Cavell’s writings in the late 1970’s, as The Claim of Reason is published and Cavell begins the direct engagement with Emerson around which his work will pivot for the rest of his career. Indeed, it is as an “epistemologist of moods” that Emerson first appeals to Cavell in his own right, and not as merely a “second-hand Thoreau.” The phrase is an odd one. Most of us would not think that knowledge and mood are connected in the way it suggests: my foul mood may make it difficult for me to concentrate on, say, my taxes, but it does not appear to otherwise affect my ability to know how much or how little I owe—and the same could be said of Sextus’ honey, Descartes’ ball of wax, Price’s tomato, and Clarke’s block of cheese. The oddity of the phrase is, if anything, even more marked when coming from Cavell: though Cavell is deeply interested in questions of self-knowledge, and of our ability to speak for one another and in that sense know one another, he is not an epistemologist; and when he writes of epistemology he often uses phrases like traditional epistemology or classical epistemology that distance him from it. Cavell does not share the traditional epistemologist’s interest in determining what, if anything, might warrant our claims to knowledge of the empirical world or the existence of “other minds”; and “the truth of skepticism” that he announces and explores is not the truth of the claims of the epistemological skeptic regarding such matters. While the epistemologist seeks to assure himself of the certainty of his knowledge, Cavell seeks to understand our disappointment with the knowledge we have. What, then, does Cavell mean by this phrase? What is the epistemology of moods?
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The eighth issue of Conversations is open-themed. Nonetheless, the articles gathered here coalesce around issues of feeling it. This is perhaps not altogether anomalous as all good writing is in some capacity a matter of feeling. But beginning with Andrew Norris, we are invited to consider how Cavell’s moods inflect not simply his writing, but from there, his world and possibly the world. Managing to maintain attachments to professional philosophy after explicitly describing the world in a mooded way is perhaps amongst Cavell’s notable (even Heideggarian) achievements. Next, Brad Tabas reminds us that our place in the universe costs money, is expensive—and that philosophy requires coming to terms with a mood of cannibalism that accompanies the stark realization and possibility that my voice or mood negates another’s. Philosophy or thinking or what have you quite possibly eats itself. Michael McCreary notes a similar mood of failed catharsis in Dostoevsky’s Underground Man and by so doing, provides a sorely needed Cavellian commentary on the possibility of failed expression, of what happens when the costs of mooding the world results not in ordinary transcendence, but extraordinary rage. Charles Djordjevic looks to what one might perhaps term a Cavellian sense of “play” to deal with extraordinary railings. The move to take language on holiday, that is, is not indicative necessarily of Wittgensteinian error but perhaps a type of philosophical therapy afforded to human beings by virtue of (a Kierkegaardian) faith. Lucas Thompson more subtly exposes the lack of faith in contemporary treatment of Cavell’s philosophical work on film, exposing the naïve belief that takes Cavell to be naïve for not engaging forcefully enough in “ideology critique”; not only does Thompson champion Cavell’s genre of remarriage comedies in rebuttal, but he ably adds another film to the mix. Lastly, a welcome and spirited addendum concludes the issue in dialogic exchange. Two recently published Cavellian authors, Rex Butler and Catherine Wheatley, discuss how Cavell might be better integrated into a wider, more contentious, and certainly more mooded, world of gender and identity politics.
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This essay aims to offer a response to Cavell and his invitation for just such responses, as I read him. It offers a reading of later Wittgenstein based on a different mythology than Cavell’s modernist mythological one. Specifically, I aim to provide a myth that sees words in their metaphysical uses not as in exile, as a cast out of the garden of the everyday by the machinations of serpentine philosophers. Instead, I offer a myth that sees the metaphysical use as a holiday for our words, a form of unrestrained playfulness that is a facet of how we learn our ways about with them. In turn, this optimistic myth casts a philosopher not as an individual engaged in a tragically heroic, but ultimately futile, seeking of the “kingdom of the everyday” but as a person who has come to understand the axis of our real needs. I shall unfold such a myth later and hope to show that it gives us a means to dance. Pursuant to this, my mythology casts metaphysics not as an inherent flaw, a manifestation of our inability to live with our finitude, but as a playful response to it.
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