Pub Date : 2023-06-22DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.13
Forum Philosophicum
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Pub Date : 2023-06-22DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.01
R. Swinburne
This is the opening talk of the conference Christian Philosophy and Its Challenges organised by Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow on 20-22 September 2022 in Poland. The talk was given by Richard Swinburne, Emeritus Professor at the University of Oxford, and was later edited into this openning essay of the issue dedicated to Christian Philosophy.
{"title":"A Christian Theodicy","authors":"R. Swinburne","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.01","url":null,"abstract":"This is the opening talk of the conference Christian Philosophy and Its Challenges organised by Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow on 20-22 September 2022 in Poland. The talk was given by Richard Swinburne, Emeritus Professor at the University of Oxford, and was later edited into this openning essay of the issue dedicated to Christian Philosophy.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47976263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-22DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.00
J. Kucharski, Jakub Pruś
In September 2022 the Institute of Philosophy of Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow hosted the second international conference “Christian Philosophy and Its Challenges.” The conference gathered over 50 philosophers from all around the world, representing many different denominations of Christianity. They sought to identify the main challenges facing Christian philosophy today; particularly noteworthy areas of investigation included: the problem of evil, ancient and medieval inspirations in Christian philosophy, Christian ethics, the relationship between theology and philosophy, and the identity of Christian faith itself. In his introductory essay “A Christian Theodicy,” which was presented at the conference opening, Richard Swinburne attempts to advance discussion on the fundamental question: the problem of evil. He presents a series of arguments which seek to demonstrate that God has the right to permit evil and that humanity is free to choose between good and bad, good and bad, leading to the conclusion that there is no contradiction between the existence of an ultimately good and omnipotent God and the evil in the world. This seems an excellent introduction to this issue, since the problem of evil remains—as many scholars emphasise—one of the most crucial problems for Christian philosophy. In his paper, Juan Manuel Burgos sheds some light on the very idea of Christian philosophy and its tasks for today. He emphasises the role of individual Christians making philosophy instead of a particular philosophical system based on Christian beliefs, corresponding to the phrase attributed to Cardinal Newman: “We do not need Christian philosophy. We need Christians making good philosophy.” Helpfully, Burgos introduces three categories: Christian philosophy, Christian philosophers, and Christians making philosophy, which could prove useful in understanding the questions of Christian faith. Similarly, in a paper entitled “Demarcating the Foundations of Analytic
2022年9月，位于克拉科夫的耶稣会依纳爵大学哲学研究所主办了第二届“基督教哲学及其挑战”国际会议。这次会议聚集了来自世界各地的50多名哲学家，他们代表了基督教的许多不同教派。他们试图找出当今基督教哲学面临的主要挑战;特别值得注意的调查领域包括:邪恶的问题，古代和中世纪基督教哲学的灵感，基督教伦理，神学和哲学之间的关系，以及基督教信仰本身的身份。在会议开幕式上发表的介绍文章《基督教神正论》(A Christian Theodicy)中，理查德·斯温伯恩(Richard Swinburne)试图推进对基本问题的讨论:邪恶的问题。他提出了一系列的论点，试图证明上帝有权允许邪恶，人类可以自由选择好与坏，好与坏，从而得出结论，在一个最终善良和全能的上帝的存在与世界上的邪恶之间没有矛盾。这似乎是对这个问题的一个极好的介绍，因为邪恶的问题仍然是——正如许多学者所强调的——基督教哲学中最关键的问题之一。在他的论文中，胡安·曼努埃尔·布尔戈斯(Juan Manuel Burgos)阐明了基督教哲学的思想及其今天的任务。他强调了基督徒个人创造哲学的作用，而不是基于基督教信仰的特定哲学体系，这与红衣主教纽曼的那句话相呼应:“我们不需要基督教哲学。我们需要基督徒创造好的哲学。”布尔戈斯介绍了三个类别:基督教哲学、基督教哲学家和基督徒创造哲学，这有助于理解基督教信仰的问题。同样，在一篇名为“划分分析的基础”的论文中
{"title":"Editors’ Note","authors":"J. Kucharski, Jakub Pruś","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.00","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.00","url":null,"abstract":"In September 2022 the Institute of Philosophy of Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow hosted the second international conference “Christian Philosophy and Its Challenges.” The conference gathered over 50 philosophers from all around the world, representing many different denominations of Christianity. They sought to identify the main challenges facing Christian philosophy today; particularly noteworthy areas of investigation included: the problem of evil, ancient and medieval inspirations in Christian philosophy, Christian ethics, the relationship between theology and philosophy, and the identity of Christian faith itself. In his introductory essay “A Christian Theodicy,” which was presented at the conference opening, Richard Swinburne attempts to advance discussion on the fundamental question: the problem of evil. He presents a series of arguments which seek to demonstrate that God has the right to permit evil and that humanity is free to choose between good and bad, good and bad, leading to the conclusion that there is no contradiction between the existence of an ultimately good and omnipotent God and the evil in the world. This seems an excellent introduction to this issue, since the problem of evil remains—as many scholars emphasise—one of the most crucial problems for Christian philosophy. In his paper, Juan Manuel Burgos sheds some light on the very idea of Christian philosophy and its tasks for today. He emphasises the role of individual Christians making philosophy instead of a particular philosophical system based on Christian beliefs, corresponding to the phrase attributed to Cardinal Newman: “We do not need Christian philosophy. We need Christians making good philosophy.” Helpfully, Burgos introduces three categories: Christian philosophy, Christian philosophers, and Christians making philosophy, which could prove useful in understanding the questions of Christian faith. Similarly, in a paper entitled “Demarcating the Foundations of Analytic","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44620952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-22DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.04
Jakub Pruś, Marcin Będkowski
The purpose of this paper is to analyse and compare two concepts which tend to be treated as synonymous, and to show the difference between them: these are critical thinking and logical culture. Firstly, we try to show that these cannot be considered identical or strictly equivalent: i.e. that the concept of logical culture includes more than just critical thinking skills. Secondly, we try to show that Christian philosophers, when arguing about philosophical matters and teaching philosophy to students, should not focus only on critical thinking skills, but rather also consider logical culture. This, as we argue, may help to improve debate both within and outside of Christian philosophy.
{"title":"How Can Christian Philosophers Improve Their Arguments?","authors":"Jakub Pruś, Marcin Będkowski","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.04","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to analyse and compare two concepts which tend to be treated as synonymous, and to show the difference between them: these are critical thinking and logical culture. Firstly, we try to show that these cannot be considered identical or strictly equivalent: i.e. that the concept of logical culture includes more than just critical thinking skills. Secondly, we try to show that Christian philosophers, when arguing about philosophical matters and teaching philosophy to students, should not focus only on critical thinking skills, but rather also consider logical culture. This, as we argue, may help to improve debate both within and outside of Christian philosophy.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48475694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-22DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.03
Jon Kelly
Analytic theology is a thriving research program at the intersection of theology and analytic philosophy. Prior to Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea’s launch of “analytic theology” in 2009, the discipline functioned under the moniker “philosophical theology.” Considerable ink has been spilled on what is analytic theology in the past decade, and most recently by William Wood (2021). Some theologians (e.g., Abraham 2009) have argued that it is systematic theology while others (e.g., Coakley 2013) have been content to remain in a family resemblance class rooted in philosophical theology. At the same time, analytic theology has welcomed Christian philosophers (e.g., Beall 2021) who have migrated into Christian doctrine via philosophy of religion. These philosophers are not systematic theologians, but, rather, philosophical theologians. This essay analyzes the relation between analytic theology, philosophical theology, and philosophy by examining their starting points and how they perceive and access truth, and then proposes a spectrum to graph their overlapping zones of research. I conclude that philosophical theology stands at the heart of the disciplines and thus remains an appropriate term for analytic theologians and Christian philosophers working somewhere in the vicinity of Jerusalem.
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Pub Date : 2022-12-27DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.08
W. Płotka
The author argues that static and genetic phenomenological methods are complementary, rather than opposite, and by claiming this, the article presents a discussion with Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl’s philosophy. It is claimed that for an adequate understanding of the two forms of a phenomenological method, one has to take into consideration especially Husserl’s B III 10 signature manuscripts. By referring to the manuscripts, the author reconstructs the object, limits, presuppositions, aims and character of both ways of inquiry. Moreover, the author claims that the differentiation of the two forms of the phenomenological method steams from Husserl’s inquiries into the concept of consciousness as defined in Ideas I.
作者认为静态现象学方法和遗传现象学方法是互补的，而不是相反的，并通过声称这一点，本文与德里达对胡塞尔哲学的解释进行了讨论。有人声称，为了充分理解现象学方法的两种形式，必须特别考虑胡塞尔的B III 10签名手稿。作者通过查阅手稿，重新建构了两种探究方式的对象、限度、前提、目的和特征。此外，作者声称现象学方法的两种形式的区别源于胡塞尔对《思想一》中定义的意识概念的探索。
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Pub Date : 2022-12-27DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.10
Adriana Warmbier
The paper considers the problem of various different forms of pre‑cognitive affective appraisal and their role in the process of gaining self-knowledge. According to the phenomenological approach, if we are to understand our inner states (our emotional experiences), these cannot be extracted from the context within which they arise. Emotions not only refer to the inner states of the subject, but also to the outer world to which they are a form of response. Brentano, Husserl and Scheler claimed that emotions are directed towards values. It is to this essential feature of emotional experience that I would like to turn. I shall therefore re-examine Sartre’s views concerning affectivity (i.e. the capacity to reveal evaluatively significant qualities of one’s environment), as well as the dual-aspect theory of (reflective and non-reflective) consciousness. The main argument of this paper is that a plausible account of the essential role of affectivity in the emotions may be provided on the basis of a phenomenological theory of pre-reflective consciousness and its relation to reflexivity. I will focus on three different claims about pre-reflective (affective) consciousness. According to the first of these, a large part of cognition is of a prelinguistic (pre-reflective) nature; I argue that the evaluative content of emotion is not only conceptually determined, but may also take a non-conceptual form (as affective appraisal). The second claim refers to the notion of affect, which ought to be distinguished from (unintentional) bodily sensations. The third conceives of the relation between pre-reflective (affective) consciousness and reflective consciousness (propositional attitudes) as normative (rather than causal). I aim to demonstrate that a plausible view of emotional affectivity must appeal to a phenomenological account of the pre-reflective aspect of consciousness.
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Pub Date : 2022-12-27DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.13
Magdalena Kozak
The purpose of the following article is to juxtapose and compare the concept of shame as seen by two contemporary French philosophers, Jean Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas. The fundamental problem that is posed in this article concerns the role and significance of the impact of shame on the formation of human subjectivity. For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, the subject attempts to bear the burden of being in a heroic way and the experience of shame proves to be an important experience in this process. Is it an ontological or ethical experience? Or perhaps metaphysical? For both J.P. Sartre and E. Levinas, shame is a relational experience, i.e., it occurs in relation to You. But does this Other have to come to me from outside? In Sartre’s case, shame appears in the experience of the gaze of the Other, and it is a traumatic experience. The Other interferes with my freedom and challenges me as a subject. The experience of shame makes me aware of my subjugation by the Other. In Levinas, the experience of shame comes originally from within myself. The shame of my own existence demands justification. I can be ashamed in relation to myself. I can be a menace of myself. I don’t need the presence of another human being for this. What unites and what separates the two philosophers in interpreting the experience of shame for human subjectivity?
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Pub Date : 2022-12-27DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.16
Marta Ples-Bęben
Works by Gaston Bachelard, both in the field of the philosophy of science and in the field of the philosophy of poetic imagination, were reissued in France many times. These reissues were unchanged reprints of the origi‐ nal editions, which were always very interesting in terms of content, but sometimes underdeveloped in terms of form. Obviously, this is not the most important aspect of these works, as we can undoubtedly agree with Jean‐Jacques Wunenburger. 1 Nevertheless, a disordered form, especially in terms of bibliographic references, is a certain difficulty for researchers of this philosophy and may be a prelude to its unauthorized readings. Let us add that Bachelard’s works originally came out in various publishing houses, including Librairie José Corti, Les Presses universitaires de France, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, Librairie Félix Alcan, Les Éditions Gallimard. It had an impact on the availability of individual titles, as they were reis‐ sued on different terms and with different frequency.
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Pub Date : 2022-12-27DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.09
G. Causse
The transmission of the craft and the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder have in common that they involve a relationship of act to act between the master and the apprentice on the one hand, and between the therapist and the patient on the other. Phenomenology has from the outset considered movement as inherent to the flesh: Hardy thus hypothesises that the origin of the flesh is a gesture. For all that, his description remains largely dependent on a flesh that is primarily perceptive: this gesture can thus be qualified as an aesthetic gesture. But if the flesh is as much mobile as it is perceptive, would there not be another gesture that generates the flesh in movement that is not linked to perception? Housset takes a step in this direction and allows us to hypothesize the kinesic gesture which, alone, allows us to account for the two experiences mentioned above.
{"title":"Le geste : de l’esthétique au kinésique","authors":"G. Causse","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2022.2702.09","url":null,"abstract":"The transmission of the craft and the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder have in common that they involve a relationship of act to act between the master and the apprentice on the one hand, and between the therapist and the patient on the other. Phenomenology has from the outset considered movement as inherent to the flesh: Hardy thus hypothesises that the origin of the flesh is a gesture. For all that, his description remains largely dependent on a flesh that is primarily perceptive: this gesture can thus be qualified as an aesthetic gesture. But if the flesh is as much mobile as it is perceptive, would there not be another gesture that generates the flesh in movement that is not linked to perception? Housset takes a step in this direction and allows us to hypothesize the kinesic gesture which, alone, allows us to account for the two experiences mentioned above.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41531919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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