Pub Date : 2023-12-28DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2802.16
M. Pizzi
The main goal of this paper is to show Nicholas de Cusa’s influence on the notion of Icon (icône) as counter-intentionality in Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of givenness. In order to do this, first, we offer a study of the early conception of Icon in Marion, as it appears in L’Idole et la distance (1977) and Dieu sans l’être (1982), showing the passage from an early conception of the icon to its first phenomenological formulation. As we will see, in this early period there is already an influence of the christian neoplatonic tradition (Dionysius the Areopagite). Secondly, we analyze the reception practiced by Marion of the Nicholas of Cusa’s thought. In this case, we indicate specifically how the Cusanian notion of eicona dei appears as a fundamental historical antecedent of the Icon as a saturated phenomenon, thus revealing the importance of Christian Neoplatonism in the phenomenology of givenness.
本文的主要目的是说明尼古拉斯-德-库萨（Nicholas de Cusa）对让-吕克-马里昂（Jean-Luc Marion）给定现象学中作为反意向性的图标（icône）概念的影响。为此，我们首先研究了马里恩早期的图标概念，如其在《L'Idole et la distance》（1977 年）和《Dieu sans l'être》（1982 年）中的表述，展示了从早期图标概念到其首次现象学表述的过程。正如我们将看到的，在这一早期阶段，基督教的新柏拉图传统（狄奥尼修斯的阿雷奥帕吉特）已经对其产生了影响。其次，我们分析了马里恩对库萨的尼古拉思想的接受。在这种情况下，我们特别指出了库萨的 "eicona dei "概念是如何作为饱和现象的圣像的基本历史先驱出现的，从而揭示了基督教新柏拉图主义在给定现象学中的重要性。
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Pub Date : 2023-12-28DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2802.23
Dariusz Bęben
Jan Patočka’s extensive oeuvre contains eleven notebooks filled with randomly dated notes from 1946 to 1950. These documents originate from the so-called Strahov legacy, specifically manuscripts discovered in the 1990s in the Strahov library. This legacy includes a collection of Patočka’s manuscripts from the 1930s and 1940s. The 1980s were mainly devoted to the history of philosophy, the philosophy of history, and phenomenological reflections on the concept of the world. In 1971, Patočka deposited them in this renowned library in Prague without disclosing this information to anyone (Karfík 2000/2001).
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Pub Date : 2023-12-28DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2802.15
M. Kowalska
By defining consciousness as nothingness or simply as “nothing,” Sartre plays with several meanings of these terms: negativity and negation, distance, indetermination, irreducibility. The nothingness of consciousness takes on an ontological meaning: it is a “tearing away” from being-in-itself, a transcendence understood as the capacity to transcend what is, while retaining an epistemological meaning: it is what cannot be positively determined as “something” or as a property of being. Still, on the epistemological level as well as on the ontological level, it is indeed from “something,” from physical and social being, that the nothingness of consciousness draws its existence and its capacities. In my article, I examine different meanings that can be given to the “nothing” of consciousness in the light of the thought of Sartre himself, emphasizing the difference between two major meanings of negation: as opposition and as indetermination. Then I confront Sartre’s concept of consciousness with more recent considerations of different inspiration, notably from researchers like Chalmers, Damasio, Gallagher, and Zahavi. My thesis is that the Sartrean concept, semi-transcendental and semi-naturalist, does admit the search for a naturalist explanation of consciousness, but assigns its limit precisely through the concept of nothingness. En définissant la conscience comme néant, néantisation, ou simplement comme un « rien », Sartre joue avec plusieurs acceptions de ces termes : négativité et négation, distance, indētefmination, irréductibilité... Le néant de la conscience prend un sens ontologique : c’est un « arrachement » à l’être-en-soi, une transcendance entendue comme capacité de transcender ce qui est, tout en gardant un sens épistémologique : c’est ce qui ne peut pas être déterminé de manière positive comme « quelque chose » ou comme une propriété d’être. D’autre part, sur le plan épistémologique comme sur le plan ontologique, c’est bien de « quelque chore », de l’être physique et social, que le néant de la conscience tire son existence et ses capacités. Dans mon article, j’examine différents sens qu’on peut donner au « rien » de la conscience à la lumière de la pensée de Sartre lui-même, en mettant l’accent sur la différence entre deux sens majeurs de la négation : comme opposition et comme indétermination. Ensuite je confronte le concept sartrien de la conscience avec les considérations plus récentes et d’inspiration différente, notamment chez les chercheurs comme Chalmers, Damasio, Gallagher et Zahavi. Ma thèse est que le concept sartrien, semi-transcendantal et semi-naturaliste, admet bien la recherche d’une explication naturaliste de la conscience, mais lui assigne la limite précisément par le concept du néant.
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Pub Date : 2023-12-28DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2802.14
Ruud Welten
This article sets out to reinterpret Sartre’s famous analysis of the look in Being and Nothingness from the cultural-anthropological perspective developed in the posthumous Notebooks for an Ethics. In the latter, he comments on some passages by Michel Leiris on the cult of the zar, a North-African belief and practice involving spirit possession. The article also seeks to show the influence of cultural-anthropological thought on Sartre, asking about what new light these rather unexpected analyses may shed on his thinking about the relationship to the Other. I start with the doctrine of the look as we know it from Being and Nothingness. Then I examine how, in Sartre’s Notebooks, his account takes some new directions. The link with possession, already present—though underdeveloped—in Being and Nothingness, becomes clear. I briefly introduce Michel Leiris in order to interpret Sartre’s comments on the zar cult as described by Leiris. This opens up a new perspective on religion and the social. Finally, I offer some concluding considerations.
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Pub Date : 2023-12-28DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2802.24
Forum Philosophicum
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Pub Date : 2023-12-28DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2802.18
Małgorzata Hołda
This article investigates the rise of the feminine creative voice in the age of modernism through the lens of Virginia Woolf’s fictional and nonfictional writings. Her invaluable insights into the long history of women’s subjugation, as well as the fortunes of her contemporaries, provide a framework for an examination of how women established their position as capable members of society in the changing modern milieu. This essay examines Woolf’s novel To the Lighthouse, and her polemical essay A Room of One’s Own, with a view to demonstrating modern women’s path to creating their artistic identity. Drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity, I investigate women’s unique way of (re)gaining their confidence and articulating their own voice during the process of self-formation. Following Woolf’s lead, I consider their double status: as both an object of fascination in works of literature and a source of oppression in real life. I also use Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophy of historically effected consciousness (Wirkungsgeschichtes Bewusstsein) to reveal the productive interpretative distance that can help us unravel the complexities of the historical and contingent nature of the development of the female artistic genius. An interrogation of women’s imaginative self-manifestations opens the way to the discovery of crucial truths that pertain to the hermeneutics of female creativity.
本文通过弗吉尼亚-伍尔夫的虚构和非虚构作品，研究了现代主义时代女性创作声音的兴起。她对妇女长期被奴役的历史以及她同时代人的命运的宝贵见解，为研究妇女如何在不断变化的现代环境中确立其作为有能力的社会成员的地位提供了一个框架。这篇文章研究了伍尔夫的小说《到灯塔去》（To the Lighthouse）和她的论辩性散文《一个人的房间》（A Room of One's Own），旨在展示现代女性创造自己艺术身份的道路。借鉴保罗-里科尔（Paul Ricoeur）的叙事身份概念，我研究了女性在自我塑造过程中（重新）获得自信和表达自己声音的独特方式。以伍尔夫为榜样，我考虑了她们的双重身份：既是文学作品中令人着迷的对象，也是现实生活中压迫的根源。我还利用汉斯-格奥尔格-伽达默尔（Hans-Georg Gadamer）的历史影响意识哲学（Wirkungsgeschichtes Bewusstsein）来揭示富有成效的解释距离，它可以帮助我们揭示女性艺术天才发展的历史性和偶然性的复杂性。对女性想象力自我表现的审视，为发现与女性创造力诠释学相关的重要真理开辟了道路。
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Pub Date : 2023-12-28DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2802.19
Jan Wawrzyniak
The aim of this text is to elucidate certain aspects of the use of expressions such as “is true” and “it is true that” (henceforth “truth-expressions”) and, through this, some features of the concept of truth. It focuses on addressing the question of whether truth-expressions play the role of a predicate or an operator. The investigations pursued are intended to be grammatical—in Wittgenstein’s sense of the term. I begin with a short presentation of a widely held view about the role played by truth-expressions. I then contrast the Wittgensteinian conception of grammar with that of linguistics. I sketch Frege’s, Wittgenstein’s, Prior’s and Brandom’s central ideas regarding the issue under consideration. As a further step, I investigate the role of truth-expressions by examining several sentences in which they occur, and discuss objections to the proposed analysis. On my approach, truth expressions play the role of a predicate only when applied to sentences, and in all other cases function as operators. One advantage of such a position is that it enables a dissolution of the problem of truth-bearers: where truth-expressions are operators, the issue simply does not arise, and where they are predicates, it is sentences that are the truth-bearers.
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Pub Date : 2023-12-28DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2802.20
A. Słowikowski
This article suggests that the problem of Christianity’s involvement in the world of politics may be described as taking the form of a dialectic of Christian politics. This means that while the transcendent essence of Christianity is apolitical, the presence of the Christian message in the immanent world always brings with it political consequences and makes Christendom a part of political life. The dialectic is presented with reference to the thought of two key contemporary Christian thinkers: Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and Jacques Maritain (1882-1973). Both recognized the dialectical tension inherent in Christianity, but each found a different solution to this problem: whereas Kierkegaard denies Christianity any possibility of political involvement, Maritain concludes that such involvement is necessary for proper Christian existence in the world. The goal of this article is to uncover, on the basis of their considerations, a third, positive solution to the dialectic of Christian politics—a model that would demonstrate how the elements of the Christian ideal (transcendence) could be transferred to the temporal world (immanence), morally improving the latter without becoming falsified in it.
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Pub Date : 2023-12-28DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2802.17
J. Roggero
Recently, Jean-Luc Marion has developed the role of hermeneutics within his phenomenology of givenness. This paper aims to demonstrate that there is an aesthetic path to accessing hermeneutic engagement of a basic kind in his previous work. The Marionian hermeneutic management of the gap between what gives itself and what shows itself finds its heuristic model in the artist’s task of making the unseen visible, as becomes clear in his studies of painting.
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Pub Date : 2023-12-28DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2023.2802.21
Grzegorz Hołub
This article is about the method of philosophizing employed by Karol Wojtyła. He worked out his main ideas concerning the human person within a Thomistic framework, but at the same time made extensive use of the method typical of phenomenology. The article sets out to demonstrate that these two approaches do not exclude each other, but can instead be considered complementary. Phenomenology, in the version employed by Wojtyła, aims to do justice to the experience of the person, and its analysis helps us understand the richness of the latter. At the same time, all of the phenomena that pertain to the person demand further explanation, and this can be supplied by Thomistic metaphysics. The method devised by Wojtyła can be expressed in the formula “from phenomenon to foundation.”
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