Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.11
Forum Philosophicum
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Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.06
Kamila Drapało
{"title":"Małgorzata Hołda. On Beauty and Being: Hans-Georg Gadamer’s and Virginia Woolf’s Hermeneutics of the Beautiful. Berlin: Peter Lang, 2021.","authors":"Kamila Drapało","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.06","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1970-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69962501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.03
Gert-Jan van der Heiden
It is well-known that the early Heidegger offers important reflec- tions on the Christian experience of life in his accounts of Saint Paul and Saint Augustine. Yet, what is the systematic meaning of Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion? This essay aims to discuss this question by connecting themes from Die Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens to Heidegger’s attempt to provide his own version of phenomenology in Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. Heidegger’s position with respect to Husserl’s phenomenology becomes clearer, I argue, when his problematization of the onto-theological structures he discerns at the heart of the philosophers he discusses, such as Descartes and Augustine, is taken into account and when it is shown how the phenomenology of religion exceeds the boundaries of a phenomenology that studies consciousness alone. In fact, the explication of the (purified) Christian experience of life and the concep- tion of God at stake in this experience allows Heidegger to articulate a form of phenomenology purified from onto-theological tendencies.
众所周知，早期海德格尔在他对圣保罗和圣奥古斯丁的描述中提供了对基督徒生活经验的重要反思。然而，海德格尔的宗教现象学的系统意义是什么?本文旨在通过将《Die Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens》的主题与海德格尔在《Die phänomenologische Forschung》中提供自己的现象学版本的尝试联系起来，来讨论这个问题。我认为，当海德格尔对他所讨论的哲学家(如笛卡尔和奥古斯丁)的核心本体-神学结构的问题化被考虑在内，以及当他展示了宗教现象学如何超越了仅研究意识的现象学的界限时，他对胡塞尔现象学的立场变得更加清晰。事实上，对(净化过的)基督教生活经验和在这种经验中处于危险中的上帝概念的解释，使海德格尔能够阐明一种从本体神学倾向中净化出来的现象学形式。
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Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.06
Madgalena Hoły-Łuczaj
“No one can take the other’s dying away from him,” as Martin Heidegger famously claimed, but what he was significantly silent about was that beings, both human and non-human, can mutually contribute to each other’s death. By focusing on the interrelatedness of deaths, this paper presents a reversal of the Heideggerian perspective on the relation between Dasein’s mineness and “being-toward-death.” Drawing upon the structural meaning of death, which consists in the fact that no one can replace me in that I will die, I show that the phenomenon of contributing-toward-the-death-of-others individuates Dasein as well. This will allow us to reread the threat of the They in the context of the Anthro- pocene, elucidating the non-transferable character of my share in others’ death. Finally, the paper aims to deepen our understanding of the change in the character of death which has been brought about by technology in the Anthropocene.
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Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.04
Wojciech Szczerba
The article refers to the issue of freedom from a philosophical perspective. First of all, it discusses Plato’s metaphor of the cave in Politeia, in which the philosopher writes of freedom in its individual and collective forms. Then the article indicates how the metaphor was read by such contemporary philosophers as Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, who interpret Plato’s metaphor from existential-phenomenological and political perspectives. Heidegger stresses the freedom of a human being, who in the light of the subjective existential experience begins to live objectively in an authentic way. He frees himself up from the impersonal-I. A person, who experienced the truth as un-concealment, is not enslaved anymore to the impersonality of the crowd. He is able to face his own mortality and to take responsibility for his own fate. A special expression of freedom is shown in his care for others, even if it means risking one’s life. Hannah Arendt interprets Plato’s metaphor from the perspective of political philosophy. Her assessment becomes some kind of memento. What if the prisoners of the cave simply do not want to leave their place? Does the philosopher have a right forcefully to pull them out of the cavern? What is better, the attitude of Socrates, who dialogues with people or the attitude of Plato, who simply lectures the mob? In this way Arendt refers to the concept of freedom, as it is sketched in Plato’s cave. At the same time, she argues with Heidegger’s interpretation of the Platonic metaphor. Heidegger stresses the freedom of a human being, who in the light of the subjective existential experience begins to live objectively in an authentic way. He frees himself up from the impersonal-I. Human, who experienced the truth as un-concealment and freedom, is not enslaved anymore with the impersonality of the crowd, which reject individualism and authenticity. He is able to face his own mortality and to take responsibility for his own fate. A special expression of so understood freedom is shown in his care for others, even if this way he risks his own life. Hannah Arendt interprets Plato’s metaphor rather from the perspective of political philosophy. Her assessment, rooted in the very foundation of the political-philosophical thought becomes some kind of memento. What if the prisoners of the cave, simply do not want to leave their place? Does the philosopher have a right to forcefully pull them out of the cave of shadows? What is better, the attitude of Socrates, who dialogues with people and treats them as equal partners or the attitude of Plato, who simply lectures the mob?
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Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.05
Piotr Duchliński, P. Mazur
The aim of the article is to outline the concept of transcendentalising reduction and to demonstrate what role it plays in Thomistic metaphysics. An adaptive interpretation has been used in the analyses by applying phenomenological thinking based on epoche reduction to Thomistic metaphysics. It was used to present the structure of transcendentalising reduction, which consists of several different epoché. Consistently applied, this reduction should lead to a neutralised concept of being as a subject of metaphysics expressed in the formula “being as being”. In conclusion, we note that the proposed interpretation opens the door to further research in which phenomenology could be used in metaphysical studies to a greater extent than has been the case to date.
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Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.07
G. Seidel
Heidegger revisits German idealism after the “turn” in his thought in the mid-1930’s. There are a couple of reasons for this. One is philosophical, if not “theological” in his sense of that term. The other is personal. This later reason is emphasized by Otto Pöggeler, who suggests that after 1945 Heidegger sought to understand what had gone wrong in the tragic European debacle. Heidegger will lay the blame at the doorstep of what he terms onto-theology and the subjectivism he sees as endemic to the German idealist tradition, above all as exemplified in Hegel’s “onto-theo-ego-logy.” The article explores Heidegger’s reading of this tradi- tion of German philosophy as it begins with Leibniz and culminates in Nietzsche. It is the Event itself that makes possible the overcoming of metaphysics and its onto-theology. As Heidegger says in Contributions to Philosophy (From the Event), the ens realissimum (das Seiendste) “is” no more. It is the Event (Ereignis) that is the “most real,” since it is the Event that shows up and manifests itself as the revelation of the truth of Beinge in Da-sein, the being that is there in the Event
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Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.08
Mark Nelson
“Only a God can save us.” So says Martin Heidegger in his pessimistic assessment of merely human philosophy’s ability to change the world. The thought is not unique to Heidegger: another thinker who arrived at a similar conclusion was Heidegger’s contemporary and sometime admirer, Carl Schmitt, in his idea of “political theology.” I take up Schmitt’s version of the idea and use it to examine the New Atheism, a relatively recent polemical critique of religion by an informal coalition of English-speaking scientists, philosophers, and writers. Taking Sam Har- ris’s book The End of Faith (2005) as my test case, I ask whether the New Atheism can instructively be read as a Schmittian “political theology”, not least because of its strongly anti-liberal implications for toleration of religious belief and practice. I close by posing the question of what sort of theory would deserve to be called an atheistic political theology and whether such a theory exists, or could exist.
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Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.02
B. Balogun
Christopher Peacocke’s Interlocking Account offers an example of the identity-based strategy for resolving the conceptual problem of other minds. According to the Identity Model, the sameness of meaning of a mental concept across inter-subjective domains is guaranteed by the sameness of the mental states to which the concept refers. Hence, for example, the meaning of the concept “pain” is fixed by the sameness of the sensation of pain to which the concept refers across inter-subjective fields. As an instance of this model, the Interlocking Account draws its most fundamental strength from the claim that human beings are similar in so far as they are carriers of conscious mental states, and that similar mental concepts have similar mental contents across individuals. The implication of this is that when similar mental concepts are used to describe contents of experience by different persons, the meanings of the concepts used are fixed by the similarity of the contents of experience to which the concepts refer. This paper argues that this identity-based strategy fails for three main reasons: (1) the identity relation it purports to establish between one’s own case and those of others is difficult to achieve; (2) “the sense in which the relation of one's mind and those of others exhibits that identity is not clear;” and (3) it is an argument by analogy in disguise.
Christopher Peacocke的《环环相扣的叙述》提供了一个基于身份的策略来解决其他思想的概念问题的例子。根据同一性模型，一个心理概念在主体间领域的意义同一性是由该概念所指向的心理状态的同一性来保证的。因此，例如，“疼痛”这个概念的意义是由疼痛感觉的同一性所确定的，这个概念指的是跨主体间的领域。作为该模型的一个例子，“连锁说”最基本的力量来自于这样一种说法，即人类是相似的，因为他们都是意识心理状态的载体，相似的心理概念在个体之间具有相似的心理内容。这意味着，当相似的心理概念被不同的人用来描述经验的内容时，所使用的概念的意义是由这些概念所指代的经验内容的相似性所确定的。本文认为，这种基于身份的策略之所以失败，主要有三个原因:(1)它试图在自己的案例与他人的案例之间建立的身份关系难以实现;(2)“在某种意义上，一个人的心灵与他人的心灵的关系显示出同一性是不清楚的;”(3)这是一种变相的类比论证。
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Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.03
Kingsley Mbamara
The concept of Christian Philosophy is not new in the history of philosophy. However, since the mid-twentieth century the idea of Christian Philosophy gained momentum and has become an object of explicit discussion among philosophers. The historical circumstances leading to its emergence as a distinct type of philosophy are not here discussed, and the existence of Christian Philosophy with a distinct content and purpose that sets it apart from other philosophies is here presupposed. Instead, the paper focuses on the concept and methods of practising Christian Philosophy with specific reference to the methodology developed by Stanisław Kamiński (1919–1986). The paper argues for the suitability of his method of philosophising within the context of Christian Philosophy. Kamiński proposes a unique style that is strictly philosophical but also Christian. This methodology was based on the classical theory of being which fulfils the demand for the autonomy of philosophy but in relationship to faith. Kamiński’s doctrinal standpoints in philosophy are rational, objective, and universal. But is also most friendly and compatible with the Christian faith. In this sense, one can speak of his Christian philosophy and the suitability of his methodology for the practice of Christian philosophy.
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