We consider an M/M/1 queueing system with impatient consumers who observe the length of the queue before deciding whether to buy the product. The product may have high or low quality, and consumers are heterogeneously informed. The firm chooses a slow or (at a cost) a fast service rate. In equilibrium, informed consumers join the queue if it is below a threshold. The threshold varies with the quality of the good, so an uninformed consumer updates her belief about quality on observing the length of the queue. The strategy of an uninformed consumer has a “hole”: she joins the queue at lengths both below and above the hole, but not at the hole itself. We show that if the prior probability the product has high quality and the proportion of informed consumers are both low, a high-quality firm may select a slower service rate than a low-quality firm. The queue can therefore be a valuable signaling device for a high-quality firm. Strikingly, in some scenarios, the high-quality firm may choose the slow service rate even if the technological cost of speeding up is zero. This paper was accepted by Assaf Zeevi, stochastic models and simulation.
{"title":"Signaling Quality Via Queues","authors":"L. Debo, Christine A. Parlour, U. Rajan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1585930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1585930","url":null,"abstract":"We consider an M/M/1 queueing system with impatient consumers who observe the length of the queue before deciding whether to buy the product. The product may have high or low quality, and consumers are heterogeneously informed. The firm chooses a slow or (at a cost) a fast service rate. In equilibrium, informed consumers join the queue if it is below a threshold. The threshold varies with the quality of the good, so an uninformed consumer updates her belief about quality on observing the length of the queue. The strategy of an uninformed consumer has a “hole”: she joins the queue at lengths both below and above the hole, but not at the hole itself. We show that if the prior probability the product has high quality and the proportion of informed consumers are both low, a high-quality firm may select a slower service rate than a low-quality firm. The queue can therefore be a valuable signaling device for a high-quality firm. Strikingly, in some scenarios, the high-quality firm may choose the slow service rate even if the technological cost of speeding up is zero. \u0000 \u0000This paper was accepted by Assaf Zeevi, stochastic models and simulation.","PeriodicalId":344620,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Marketing eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115137254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-04-07DOI: 10.1108/09564231111106910
Bart Larivière, Lerzan Aksoy, B. Cooil, T. Keiningham
Purpose – Although the influence of using multiple channels on customer behavior has been investigated, most of this research has focused on channel behavior within a single company. Customers however frequently have access to multiple providers amongst which they can choose to allocate their spending in a category. Prior research therefore has neglected to understand what happens when a multichannel customer also chooses to conduct business with multiple companies. This research investigates the moderating influence of both multichannel and multicompany usage on the impact that customer satisfaction has on share of wallet (SOW). Design/methodology/approach - The data used in the analyses was collected as part of both survey and transactional data of 802 households of a large financial services provider. Within class regression models were employed to test the moderating effects of different segments that were identified based on multichannel-multicompany customer differences. Findings – The findings confirm that using multiple channels has an overall positive moderating impact on the satisfaction – SOW link and that customer satisfaction matters more when the customer adopts multiple channels; online channel usage in addition to offline usage. Furthermore, this effect is even more pronounced for customers that transact with multiple providers. That is, the group of customers that use both the company’s and competitors’ offline and online channels reveal a higher satisfaction - SOW association than the group of customers that only adopted the offline channel with the company and competitor. Research limitations/implications – The limitation is that this research examines a single industry. The results however clearly show the need for future research to account for both multichannel and multicompany differences to fully understand the effect of customer satisfaction on share of wallet. Originality/value – There are two major differences of the paper compared to what has already been done in the literature: (1) It examines the impact of both multichannel and multicompany usage, which has never been investigated before; (2) It examines the moderating impact of these variables on the satisfaction - behavior link / relationship as opposed to the direct effect on satisfaction or behavior separately or in isolation. This research also provides important managerial guidance on the need to capture customers’ multicompany preferences and how to more efficiently allocate budgets in creating satisfaction with the goal of ensuring higher share of spending by taking on a more targeted approach.
{"title":"Does Satisfaction Matter More If a Multichannel Customer is Also a Multicompany Customer?","authors":"Bart Larivière, Lerzan Aksoy, B. Cooil, T. Keiningham","doi":"10.1108/09564231111106910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/09564231111106910","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose – Although the influence of using multiple channels on customer behavior has been investigated, most of this research has focused on channel behavior within a single company. Customers however frequently have access to multiple providers amongst which they can choose to allocate their spending in a category. Prior research therefore has neglected to understand what happens when a multichannel customer also chooses to conduct business with multiple companies. This research investigates the moderating influence of both multichannel and multicompany usage on the impact that customer satisfaction has on share of wallet (SOW). Design/methodology/approach - The data used in the analyses was collected as part of both survey and transactional data of 802 households of a large financial services provider. Within class regression models were employed to test the moderating effects of different segments that were identified based on multichannel-multicompany customer differences. Findings – The findings confirm that using multiple channels has an overall positive moderating impact on the satisfaction – SOW link and that customer satisfaction matters more when the customer adopts multiple channels; online channel usage in addition to offline usage. Furthermore, this effect is even more pronounced for customers that transact with multiple providers. That is, the group of customers that use both the company’s and competitors’ offline and online channels reveal a higher satisfaction - SOW association than the group of customers that only adopted the offline channel with the company and competitor. Research limitations/implications – The limitation is that this research examines a single industry. The results however clearly show the need for future research to account for both multichannel and multicompany differences to fully understand the effect of customer satisfaction on share of wallet. Originality/value – There are two major differences of the paper compared to what has already been done in the literature: (1) It examines the impact of both multichannel and multicompany usage, which has never been investigated before; (2) It examines the moderating impact of these variables on the satisfaction - behavior link / relationship as opposed to the direct effect on satisfaction or behavior separately or in isolation. This research also provides important managerial guidance on the need to capture customers’ multicompany preferences and how to more efficiently allocate budgets in creating satisfaction with the goal of ensuring higher share of spending by taking on a more targeted approach.","PeriodicalId":344620,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Marketing eJournal","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117317862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
New product development is usually teamwork. Product development teams are cross-functional, representing different functional units, or multidisciplinary, involving several disciplines, or both. In any case, conceiving and developing new products is a joint effort, which means that the standard view of creativity may not apply – a view that is characterized by a focus on individuals as agents of creativity and by the assumption that creativity is a unilateral quality, not a reciprocal or interactive phenomenon. As a result, significant parts of the dynamics of ‘newness-generation’ and ‘newness- reception’ in organizations are still to be addressed. This paper describes the organization of new product development in a number of medium-sized companies. Discussed are the theoretical issues of newness generation in multidisciplinary new product development teams and newness reception in the larger organization. The results of a series of exploratory interviews are presented.
{"title":"Team Creativity in New Product Development","authors":"G. Vissers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1578834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1578834","url":null,"abstract":"New product development is usually teamwork. Product development teams are cross-functional, representing different functional units, or multidisciplinary, involving several disciplines, or both. In any case, conceiving and developing new products is a joint effort, which means that the standard view of creativity may not apply – a view that is characterized by a focus on individuals as agents of creativity and by the assumption that creativity is a unilateral quality, not a reciprocal or interactive phenomenon. As a result, significant parts of the dynamics of ‘newness-generation’ and ‘newness- reception’ in organizations are still to be addressed. This paper describes the organization of new product development in a number of medium-sized companies. Discussed are the theoretical issues of newness generation in multidisciplinary new product development teams and newness reception in the larger organization. The results of a series of exploratory interviews are presented.","PeriodicalId":344620,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Marketing eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116643812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze a duopoly where capacity-constrained firms offer an established product and have the option to offer an additional new and differentiated product. We show that the firm with the smaller capacity on the established market has a higher incentive to innovate and reaches a larger market share on the market for the new product. An increase in capacity of the larger firm can prevent its competitor from innovating, whereas an increase in capacity of the smaller firm cannot prevent innovation of its larger competitor. In equilibrium the firm with smaller capacity on the established market might outperform the larger firm with respect to total payoffs.
{"title":"New Product Introduction and Capacity Investment by Incumbents: Effects of Size on Strategy","authors":"H. Dawid, M. Kopel, P. Kort","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1555479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1555479","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a duopoly where capacity-constrained firms offer an established product and have the option to offer an additional new and differentiated product. We show that the firm with the smaller capacity on the established market has a higher incentive to innovate and reaches a larger market share on the market for the new product. An increase in capacity of the larger firm can prevent its competitor from innovating, whereas an increase in capacity of the smaller firm cannot prevent innovation of its larger competitor. In equilibrium the firm with smaller capacity on the established market might outperform the larger firm with respect to total payoffs.","PeriodicalId":344620,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Marketing eJournal","volume":"98 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123515697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reverse pricing is a market mechanism under which a consumer's bid for a product leads to a sale if the bid exceeds a hidden acceptance threshold the seller has set in advance. The seller faces two key decisions in designing such a mechanism. First, he must decide where in the process to collect the revenue---that is, whether to commit to a minimum markup above cost (and thus define the bid-acceptance threshold given cost) and whether to set a fee for the consumer's right to bid. Second, the seller must decide whether to facilitate or hinder consumer learning about the current bid-acceptance threshold. We analyze these decisions for a profit-maximizing small intermediary retailer selling to consumers who can also purchase the product in an outside posted-price market. The optimal revenue model is to charge a fee for the right to bid and then accept all bids above cost, rather than to set a positive minimum markup above cost. Avoiding minimum markups in favor of a bidding fee is more profitable because of increased efficiency arising from more entry by consumers and higher bids by the entrants. When consumers learn about the bid-acceptance threshold before they enter the market, efficiency increases further, and generating revenue through a bidding fee can compensate the seller for his loss of information rent when the competition from the outside posted-price firm is relatively weak.
{"title":"Optimal Reverse-Pricing Mechanisms","authors":"Martin Spann, Robert Zeithammer, G. Häubl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1581549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1581549","url":null,"abstract":"Reverse pricing is a market mechanism under which a consumer's bid for a product leads to a sale if the bid exceeds a hidden acceptance threshold the seller has set in advance. The seller faces two key decisions in designing such a mechanism. First, he must decide where in the process to collect the revenue---that is, whether to commit to a minimum markup above cost (and thus define the bid-acceptance threshold given cost) and whether to set a fee for the consumer's right to bid. Second, the seller must decide whether to facilitate or hinder consumer learning about the current bid-acceptance threshold. We analyze these decisions for a profit-maximizing small intermediary retailer selling to consumers who can also purchase the product in an outside posted-price market. The optimal revenue model is to charge a fee for the right to bid and then accept all bids above cost, rather than to set a positive minimum markup above cost. Avoiding minimum markups in favor of a bidding fee is more profitable because of increased efficiency arising from more entry by consumers and higher bids by the entrants. When consumers learn about the bid-acceptance threshold before they enter the market, efficiency increases further, and generating revenue through a bidding fee can compensate the seller for his loss of information rent when the competition from the outside posted-price firm is relatively weak.","PeriodicalId":344620,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Marketing eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133818081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-02-01DOI: 10.1111/J.1937-5956.2010.01197.X
G. Gutierrez, Xiuli He
We analyze the dynamic strategic interactions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a decentralized distribution channel used to launch an innovative durable product (IDP). The underlying retail demand for the IDP is influenced by word-of-mouth from past adopters and follows a Bass-type diffusion process. The word-of-mouth influence creates a trade-off between immediate and future sales and profits, resulting in a multi-period dynamic supply chain coordination problem. Our analysis shows that while in some environments, the manufacturer is better off with a far-sighted retailer, there are also environments in which the manufacturer is better off with a myopic retailer. We characterize equilibrium dynamic pricing strategies and the resulting sales and profit trajectories. We demonstrate that revenue-sharing contracts can coordinate the IDP's supply chain with both far-sighted and myopic retailers throughout the entire planning horizon and arbitrarily allocate the channel profit.
{"title":"Life-Cycle Channel Coordination Issues in Launching an Innovative Durable Product","authors":"G. Gutierrez, Xiuli He","doi":"10.1111/J.1937-5956.2010.01197.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1937-5956.2010.01197.X","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the dynamic strategic interactions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a decentralized distribution channel used to launch an innovative durable product (IDP). The underlying retail demand for the IDP is influenced by word-of-mouth from past adopters and follows a Bass-type diffusion process. The word-of-mouth influence creates a trade-off between immediate and future sales and profits, resulting in a multi-period dynamic supply chain coordination problem. Our analysis shows that while in some environments, the manufacturer is better off with a far-sighted retailer, there are also environments in which the manufacturer is better off with a myopic retailer. We characterize equilibrium dynamic pricing strategies and the resulting sales and profit trajectories. We demonstrate that revenue-sharing contracts can coordinate the IDP's supply chain with both far-sighted and myopic retailers throughout the entire planning horizon and arbitrarily allocate the channel profit.","PeriodicalId":344620,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Marketing eJournal","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131831228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider loyalty discounts whereby the seller promises to give buyers who commit to buy from it a lower price than the seller gives to uncommitted buyers. We show that an incumbent seller can use loyalty discounts to soften price competition between itself and a rival, which raises market prices to all buyers. Each individual buyer’s agreement to a loyalty discount externalizes most of the harm of that individual agreement onto all the other buyers. The resulting externality among buyers makes it possible for an incumbent to induce buyers to sign these contracts even if they reduce buyer and total welfare. Thus, if the entrant cost advantage is not too large, we prove that with a sufficient number of buyers, there does not exist any equilibrium in which at least some buyers do not sign loyalty discount contracts, and there exists an equilibrium in which all buyers sign and the rival is foreclosed from entry. As a result, with a sufficient number of buyers, an incumbent can use loyalty discounts to increase its profit and decrease both buyer and total welfare. Further, the necessary number of buyers can be as few as three. These effects occur even in the absence of economies of scale in production and even if the buyers are not intermediaries who compete with each other in a downstream market.
{"title":"Robust Exclusion Through Loyalty Discounts","authors":"E. Elhauge, Abraham L. Wickelgren","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1544008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1544008","url":null,"abstract":"We consider loyalty discounts whereby the seller promises to give buyers who commit to buy from it a lower price than the seller gives to uncommitted buyers. We show that an incumbent seller can use loyalty discounts to soften price competition between itself and a rival, which raises market prices to all buyers. Each individual buyer’s agreement to a loyalty discount externalizes most of the harm of that individual agreement onto all the other buyers. The resulting externality among buyers makes it possible for an incumbent to induce buyers to sign these contracts even if they reduce buyer and total welfare. Thus, if the entrant cost advantage is not too large, we prove that with a sufficient number of buyers, there does not exist any equilibrium in which at least some buyers do not sign loyalty discount contracts, and there exists an equilibrium in which all buyers sign and the rival is foreclosed from entry. As a result, with a sufficient number of buyers, an incumbent can use loyalty discounts to increase its profit and decrease both buyer and total welfare. Further, the necessary number of buyers can be as few as three. These effects occur even in the absence of economies of scale in production and even if the buyers are not intermediaries who compete with each other in a downstream market.","PeriodicalId":344620,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Marketing eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132194881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It’s time for the Romanian organizations to know what foreign companies have found along time. Without innovation, a company cannot survive! The innovation index is different from a sector to another, achieving, for example, even 100% in the field of read-made clothes. Innovation is like a breath of oxygen in a world which becomes extremely exigent and materializes in a new solution from any point of view (technological constructive, creative, organizational etc.), an improvement without pretending to be unique, which the companies throw on the market to ensure success and their chances in future. Although innovation is something more than staying on the spot, but it must be also mentioned the fact that more than half of innovations do not enjoy success.
{"title":"Aspects of Permission Marketing","authors":"Cristian Morozan, E. Enache, Bogdan Ţinteanu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1524769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1524769","url":null,"abstract":"It’s time for the Romanian organizations to know what foreign companies have found along time. Without innovation, a company cannot survive! The innovation index is different from a sector to another, achieving, for example, even 100% in the field of read-made clothes. Innovation is like a breath of oxygen in a world which becomes extremely exigent and materializes in a new solution from any point of view (technological constructive, creative, organizational etc.), an improvement without pretending to be unique, which the companies throw on the market to ensure success and their chances in future. Although innovation is something more than staying on the spot, but it must be also mentioned the fact that more than half of innovations do not enjoy success.","PeriodicalId":344620,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Marketing eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121938768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adriana Zait, Claudia Bobâlcă, Oana Anton, Adrian Monoranu
The trend of marketing strategies indicates that practitioners make great efforts in order to consider the challenges of sustainable development. Besides the green marketing and sustainable consumption areas we can already talk about a sustainable marketing mix for companies. The efforts are huge especially for the SME, mainly for marketing communication policies. Even new marketing measures have been developed, such as “consumer’s affinity”, strongly connected with the sustainable development concept (it measures consumers’ long term loyalty). New steps in marketing communication have been made: green communication policies (virtual), social responsibility campaigns, the division between material consumption and perceived value, brand contribution to the sustainable development. We wanted to investigate the situation of these trends for Romanian companies – both large and SME – from the NE region. We made an attempt to analyze the perceptions of the companies towards three types of marketing: green marketing (sustainable products), social marketing (education for a sustainable behavior) and responsible marketing (regulations for avoiding marketing activities’ negative collateral effects). The study is based on a survey of 108 managers from companies situated in the NE region of Romania and partial descriptive results of their perceptions are presented in this paper.
{"title":"Sustainable Development Challenges and the Position of Romanian Enterprises Towards Green Marketing","authors":"Adriana Zait, Claudia Bobâlcă, Oana Anton, Adrian Monoranu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1512622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1512622","url":null,"abstract":"The trend of marketing strategies indicates that practitioners make great efforts in order to consider the challenges of sustainable development. Besides the green marketing and sustainable consumption areas we can already talk about a sustainable marketing mix for companies. The efforts are huge especially for the SME, mainly for marketing communication policies. Even new marketing measures have been developed, such as “consumer’s affinity”, strongly connected with the sustainable development concept (it measures consumers’ long term loyalty). New steps in marketing communication have been made: green communication policies (virtual), social responsibility campaigns, the division between material consumption and perceived value, brand contribution to the sustainable development. We wanted to investigate the situation of these trends for Romanian companies – both large and SME – from the NE region. We made an attempt to analyze the perceptions of the companies towards three types of marketing: green marketing (sustainable products), social marketing (education for a sustainable behavior) and responsible marketing (regulations for avoiding marketing activities’ negative collateral effects). The study is based on a survey of 108 managers from companies situated in the NE region of Romania and partial descriptive results of their perceptions are presented in this paper.","PeriodicalId":344620,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Marketing eJournal","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134505230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Two surplus markets of Bale Robe and Shashimiene and one deficit market of Jimma are observed to fix long run price. However the system is observed to have better capacity to process demand side than supply side shocks. Therefore for efficient stabilization the focus should be in Jimma. For equity and political feasibility it would be preferable if poor deficit centers are provided with subsidized supply of grain, too. Though distance did not seem to be an important factor for border of one price but only for strength of cointegration, the methodology used by early papers is observed to work.
{"title":"A Multivariate Approach for Identification of Optimal Locations with in Ethiopia’s Wheat Market to Tackle Soaring Inflation on Food Price","authors":"Taddese Mezgebo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1506078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1506078","url":null,"abstract":"Two surplus markets of Bale Robe and Shashimiene and one deficit market of Jimma are observed to fix long run price. However the system is observed to have better capacity to process demand side than supply side shocks. Therefore for efficient stabilization the focus should be in Jimma. For equity and political feasibility it would be preferable if poor deficit centers are provided with subsidized supply of grain, too. Though distance did not seem to be an important factor for border of one price but only for strength of cointegration, the methodology used by early papers is observed to work.","PeriodicalId":344620,"journal":{"name":"Entrepreneurship & Marketing eJournal","volume":"64 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120973385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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